Multi-ad Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1226 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1226
Multi-Ad Services, Inc. and Graphic Communications
Union, Local 68C, Graphic Communications In-
ternational Union, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 33–
CA–11945
August 25, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On December 2, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam J. Pannier III issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging
employee Ted Steele, and violated Section 8(a)(1) by
coercively interrogating Steele about his union sympa-
thies, by impliedly promising to help improve his em-
ployment situation without the need for union representa-
tion, and by threatening to close the bindery department
should its employees become represented by a union.
The Respondent has excepted, inter alia, to the judge’s
findings that it violated the Act by coercively interrogat-
ing and making an unlawful implied promise to Steele on
August 16, 1996. For the reasons that follow, we find no
merit in the Respondent’s exceptions and disagree with
our dissenting colleague.
Since June 1989, Steele had been employed as a bind-
ery worker for the Respondent. At a meeting of bindery,
press, and finishing department employees convened by
Plant Manager Jerry Ireland on July 29, 1996,3 Steele
loudly and persistently argued with the Respondent’s
president, Larry Clore, about its drug policy. In a meet-
ing of just bindery department employees later that day,
Clore told Steele “[I]f you don’t like the policies, why
don’t you think about leaving the Company?” Steele
replied that he would not give Clore “the pleasure of
quitting.” After Clore left the bindery department meet-
ing, Steele announced that he was on his own time now
and that he was leaving the meeting. The meeting ended
shortly thereafter. The next day, Clore apologized to
Steele for “the way things went in our meeting,” and
Steele in turn apologized to Clore for his comments.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decision in Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
3 All dates are in 1996 unless otherwise noted.
The following day, July 31, Steele met alone with Ire-
land in the latter’s office at Steele’s request. After
apologizing to Ireland for his behavior at the July 29
meeting, Steele told Ireland that the hourly shop workers
were not satisfied with the way company policy was be-
ing handed out, or with raises, and that “management
needed to just sit down with the hourly employees and
work some things out.” Ireland replied that, “at that time
that could not be done.” Steele then told Ireland that “if
we could not sit down and work things over and talk
things out, that I was going to organize a union.” Ireland
asked Steele to wait until Ireland got back from vacation
in August to discuss this further, and Steele agreed not to
“do anything” while Ireland was gone. Ireland returned
from vacation around August 11.
On August 16, Steele met with Ireland and Bindery
Department Manager Martin (Marty) Heathcoat in the
latter’s office. During this meeting, the managers fo-
cused on the topic of union representation and probed the
reasons for Steele’s union interest. According to Steele’s
credited testimony, the managers asked why he would
want to bring a union into the Company. Steele re-
sponded that “it would be nice to have seniority rights,
better working conditions, raises when it was possible
and so on.” Then, towards the end of the meeting, Ire-
land asked him “[W]hat it would take to satisfy [Steele],”
and Steele replied that it would satisfy him if manage-
ment would sit down with the hourly employees and
work something out. When Ireland replied that they
could not do that, Steele said that he was leaving the
meeting and was going to attempt to organize a union.
In the midst of this talk about unionization, Ireland in-
troduced the subject of career opportunities for Steele.
Ireland said, “Ted, let’s talk about what you can do to
improve your situation here at [the Respondent]. What
can you do to help yourself work your way up the ladder,
make more money and that type of thing.” When Ireland
pointed out to Steele that the Respondent posts jobs,
Steele replied, “Jerry, there is only two things that I have
ever gotten out of this Company, bad arms and a bad
attitude.” Yet, when Steele nevertheless then expressed
interest in an assignment to a maintenance job,4 Ireland
told him that he would have Maintenance Supervisor Bill
Wolfram “interview [him] about a maintenance position,
although at the time we did not have an opening.” The
following day, Wolfram interviewed Steele, at Ireland’s
direction, but the interview revealed that Steele lacked
the necessary qualifications for the job and was not really
interested in the position.
We adopt the judge’s findings that Ireland’s remarks
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We agree with the
judge that Ireland impliedly promised benefits to Steele
on August 16 in “an obvious effort to ascertain what
4 We note that the judge sometimes characterizes this maintenance
position as a “mechanic’s job.”
331 NLRB No. 160
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1227
could be done to diminish, if not eliminate altogether,
[Steele’s] desire for representation.” Notwithstanding its
arguments to the contrary, the topic of job promotion had
never before been raised with Steele during his many
years of employment with the Respondent. In fact,
Steele’s July 31 announced union support prompted the
August 16 meeting. During that meeting, Ireland brought
up job advancement for Steele not long after he probed
the reasons for Steele’s union support and shortly before
he questioned Steele about what would personally satisfy
him. In context, Ireland’s remarks were clearly linked to
Steele’s union support, and that linkage could not have
escaped Steele’s notice that day. Ireland quickly rein-
forced the union connection by promptly arranging the
maintenance job interview the next day although there
was no opening for a maintenance position at the time.5
While Steele never actually received the job promotion,
and the Respondent did not rectify Steele’s other com-
plaints, the fact that Ireland immediately acted to ac-
commodate Steele upon learning that Steele intended to
initiate union organizing clearly supports the judge’s
finding that the Respondent unlawfully promised benefits
to Steele to discourage his union activity.
Even if, as our colleague urges, the Respondent did not
make a commitment to Steele about a maintenance job, or
raise false hopes about one, Ireland’s statements to Steele
were unlawful. In the meeting between Steele and Ire-
land and Department Manager Heathcoat, in the latter’s
office, Ireland asked Steele, why he “would want to
bring a union into the Company.” Steele’s answer, fo-
cusing on the work force, suggested seniority rights, im-
proved working conditions, and raises for employees.
Ireland replied with, “Ted, let’s talk about you and what
you can do to improve your situation here at [the Re-
spondent]. What can you do to help yourself work your
way up the ladder, make more money and that type of
thing.” (Emphasis added.) Ireland’s message left little
to the imagination: Forget about improving terms and
conditions of employment for the workforce, concentrate
instead on your own career advancement, and the com-
pany will help you get ahead. It is immaterial, as our
colleague asserts, that Ireland did not expressly condition
the maintenance job on Steele’s abandoning his union
interest. Ireland did not need to literally spell that out.
His point was plainly made.6
We also agree with the judge that Ireland coercively
interrogated Steele on August 16. Steele, an open union
supporter, was questioned in his department manager’s

5 See Noah’s New York Bagels, 324 NLRB 266, 270 (1997) (an em-
ployer violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when its president impliedly promised a
possible job transfer in the future to discourage an employee’s union
support).
6 See NLRB v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1981), enfg.
249 NLRB 412 (1980) (employer’s implied promise to remedy em-
ployee grievances or provide other employee benefits if the union was
abandoned held violative of the Act).
office, by both the department and the plant managers.
Steele was not informed of any legitimate purpose for
being asked why he wanted a union; and he was given no
assurances that he need not answer such a question, or
that no reprisals would be taken against him regardless of
his answers. Indeed, this is the same conversation in
which Ireland implicitly promised career advancement
benefits to Steele in an effort to discourage, if not com-
pletely kill, Steele’s desire for union representation. We
agree with the judge that “[q]uestioning of an employee
about his union attitude in such circumstances would
naturally cause that employee to become apprehensive
and, consequently, the questioning would be inherently
coercive” under the Board’s standard set forth in Ross-
more House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984), affd. sub
nom. Hotel Employees Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760
F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).7
We cannot agree with our dissenting colleague’s view
that this exchange between Plant Manager Ireland, De-
partment Manager Heathcoat, and Steele was simply a
benign quest by the Respondent to learn more about
Steele’s views on unionization. The exchange was both
accompanied and followed by other unlawful conduct,
which aggravated the coercive context of this question-
ing.8 As stated, the interrogation of Steele was coupled
with an unlawful implied promise of benefits. Just 9
days later, it was followed by a meeting of bindery de-
partment employees conducted by Heathcoat and De-
partment Supervisor Ted DeRossett, at which the latter
unlawfully threatened the bindery employees that if the
Union got in, the bindery department would be “the first
to go.” Steele said that DeRossett’s statement was
against the law and a heated argument between them
ensued, bringing the meeting to an abrupt end. Further,
contrary to our dissenting colleague, the judge’s finding
that Steele did not appear to actually have been intimi-
dated by the questioning does not support a finding that
the interrogation was not unlawful. It is well settled (and
the judge himself quickly pointed out) that the basic test
for evaluating whether there has been a violation of Sec-
7 See Reliable Mfg. Corp., 240 NLRB 90, 99 (1979) (interrogation of
open union supporter in plant manager’s office was coercive and viola-
tive of the Act); Borg Wagner Corp., 229 NLRB 1149, 1151 (1977)
(supervisors unlawfully interrogated employees wearing union buttons,
including Delores Jarvis who was also told that she was being consid-
ered for the team leader job only after she had voiced complaints about
unfair treatment by the incumbent team leader).
8 See U.S. Web, Inc., 327 NLRB 132 (1998) (employee witnesses to
interrogation were not likely to miss the Respondent’s message that it
would retaliate against employees suspected of union activities, in light
of subsequent unlawful discharge of interrogated employee a month
later); Thore, Inc., 296 NLRB 859, 860 (1989) (questioning open union
supporter about what he had to do with “this union stuff,” unlawful, in
light of company’s vigorous opposition to union and subsequent unlaw-
ful mass discharge of open union supporters a month later); Florida
Steel Corp., 215 NLRB 97, 97–98 (1974), enfd. in relevant part 529
F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1976) (questioning employee about whether he
knew anything about union organizing campaign, unlawful, in light of
subsequent unfair labor practices a month later).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1228
tion 8(a)(1) is an objective test, i.e., whether the conduct
in question would reasonably have a tendency to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights, and not a subjective test having to
do with whether the employee in question was actually
intimidated.9
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By coercively interrogating an employee concern-
ing his union sympathies, by impliedly promising to help
an employee improve his employment situation without
the need for representation, and by threatening to close
the bindery department should its employees become
represented by a union, the Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By discharging employee Ted Steele on September
4, 1996, because of a belief that Steele might contact a
union to initiate efforts to organize its Peoria employees,
the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
3. By the above conduct, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Multi-
Ad Services, Inc., Peoria, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(e).
“(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Peoria, Illinois place of business copies of the at-
tached notice marked Appendix.3 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
33, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the Peoria
facility, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employ-
ees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since August 16, 1996.”

MEMBER BRAME, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I agree with my colleagues that the judge properly
found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged bindery

9 See, e.g., Richard Mellow Electrical Contractors Corp., 327 NLRB
1112 fn. 9 (1999), citing American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146,
147 (1959); Florida Steel Corp., supra at 97.
department employee Ted Steele because of his union
activities, and unlawfully threatened to close the bindery
department should the employees become unionized.1
However, contrary to my colleagues, I would dismiss the
8(a)(1) allegations involving the purported interrogation
of and promise of benefits to Steele on August 16, 1996.2
The relevant background and facts pertaining to these
August 16 allegations are as follows. Earlier on July 31,
Steele had arranged a meeting with Plant Manager Jerry
Ireland, in which Steele apologized for his behavior at an
ESOP meeting conducted on July 29. After his apology,
Steele told Ireland that the employees were not satisfied
with the way raises and company policy were being ad-
ministered and wanted management to sit down with the
hourly employees and work things out. In response, Ire-
land said “[A]t that time that could not be done.” At
some point, Ireland mentioned possible job advancement
opportunities for Steele, and he and Steele briefly dis-
cussed this topic.3 Towards the end of the meeting,
Steele voluntarily announced his interest in union orga-
nizing if management declined his demand to sit down
with the employees and work things out. In response,
Ireland asked to continue their discussion at a later date
after his scheduled vacation was over. Steele agreed to
this arrangement, and the meeting ended amicably.
After Ireland returned from his vacation, he and Steele
met on August 16 in the office of Bindery Department
Manager Martin (Marty) Heathcoat, with Heathcoat pre-
sent. The meeting began with Steele updating Ireland
that, while he had been on vacation, an agreement had
been reached between the employees and the human re-
sources personnel regarding the Company’s new drug
policy. They then talked about Steele’s July 31 an-
nouncement of his union interest. Ireland asked why
Steele wanted to bring a union into the Company. Steele
replied that “it would be nice to have seniority rights,
better working conditions, raises when it was possible,
and so on.” According to Steele’s testimony, Ireland did
not specifically respond to these demands. Sometime
later in their meeting, Ireland returned to another topic
that he and Steele had discussed on July 31. He asked
Steele what could be done to improve Steele’s situation
with the Company. In this connection, Steele mentioned,
for the first time, his interest in a maintenance position.4
1 In adopting the judge’s finding of an unlawful threat to close the
bindery department, I find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s discus-
sion about the profitability of the bindery department set forth in sec. II,
par. 31 of his decision.
2 All dates are in 1996 unless otherwise noted.
3 The judge erred when he found that the subject of possible job ad-
vancement for Steele had not been discussed prior to August 16.
Steele’s testimony reveals that at the July 31 meeting he and Ireland
talked about how he could get ahead or make progress in his job. The
record also shows that this discussion occurred before there was any
mention of Steele’s union interest at the end of the meeting.
4 The record gives no indication whether the maintenance position
paid more or was considered more desirable by employees.
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1229
Ireland replied that Steele could pursue his interest fur-
ther by interviewing with Maintenance Supervisor Bill
Wolfram, although there were no maintenance positions
open at that time. At the end of the meeting, Ireland
asked what it would take to satisfy Steele. Steele an-
swered that it would satisfy him “if management would
sit down with the hourly employees and work something
out.” When Ireland indicated that he could not satisfy
that request, Steele said that he was leaving the meeting
and was going to organize.
The next day, Steele interviewed with the maintenance
supervisor. The interview revealed that Steele lacked the
necessary qualifications for the job and was not really
interested in the position after all.
As interrogation is not per se unlawful, “[t]o fall
within the ambit of §8(a)(1), the words themselves or the
context in which they are used must suggest an element
of coercion or interference.” Midwest Stock Exchange v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980), cited by the Board
with approval in Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176,
1177 (1984), affd. sub nom. Hotel Employees Union,
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The
traditional test for determining whether interrogations
violate the Act is “whether under all of the circumstances
the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Id. In ana-
lyzing whether alleged unlawful interrogations are coer-
cive of employees’ Section 7 rights, useful indicia in-
clude the Bourne5 factors—history of employer hostility,
nature of information sought, identity of questioner,
place and method of interrogation, and truthfulness of
reply. “[T]he Bourne factors are a primary analytical
tool in determining whether an employer’s questioning
of employees is coercive and therefore unlawful and, as
such, they offer a systematic application of the totality of
the circumstances analysis.”6 In addition, the analysis
may include other factors such as tone, duration, and
purpose of the question and whether it was repeated.7
I find that the Bourne factors do not support the con-
clusion that Ireland’s questioning was coercive and
therefore unlawful. When Ireland and Heathcoat spoke
with Steele on August 16, there was no history of em-
ployer hostility or union discrimination and the August
16 conversation itself contained no expression of dis-
pleasure or antagonism towards the Union. Ireland’s
general questions why Steele, an open union supporter,
wanted to bring a union in and what would satisfy him
were nonthreatening in nature and were framed to pro-
mote a dialogue to gather information about Steele’s

5 Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964), cited with approval in
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB at 1178 fn. 20.
6 See my separate opinion in Medcare Associates, Inc., 330 NLRB
935, 950 (2000).
7 Id. slip op. at 14.
concerns.8 Further, Steele himself had sought out the
July 31 meeting with Ireland a little over 2 weeks earlier
when he voluntarily informed Ireland that he might con-
tact a union. At the close of that July 31 meeting, Steele
had indicated his willingness to continue these discus-
sions after Ireland returned from his vacation. Thus,
Ireland’s question as to why Steele wanted a union ap-
pears to have been simply a continuation of their prior
conversation in which Steele had raised the union issue.
Also, Steele responded truthfully to the question of why
he wanted to bring a union in, and he was not intimidated
by the questioning, according to the judge’s credited
findings. In addition, there was no evidence that the
manner or tone of the August 16 meeting was threatening
or hostile. Finally, although the questions were asked by
a relatively high-ranking official, Ireland, in the office of
the department manager, they were not accompanied by
any threats or unlawful promises as discussed below.
Unlike my colleagues and the judge, I find that none of
Ireland’s statements about the maintenance position on
August 16 constituted an implied promise of benefits that
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.9 The context for Ire-
land’s remarks reveals that he had earlier discussed ca-
reer possibilities for Steele at their July 31 meeting be-
fore Steele had given any indication of an interest in un-
ion organizing. Then, when Steele, not Ireland, sug-
gested the maintenance position for the first time on Au-
gust 16, Ireland’s response was that Steele could inter-
view with the maintenance supervisor, not that Steele had
the job. Thus, in stating that the maintenance supervisor
could talk to Steele, Ireland imparted no false hopes or
made any commitment to Steele about the maintenance
position. In fact, Ireland made sure that Steele knew that
there were no immediate maintenance job openings, and
he gave no indication that he would treat Steele special
by creating a job opening for him or holding out the
maintenance position as a future possibility for him.10
8 See Baptist Medical System v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 661, 665–666 (8th
Cir. 1989) (no violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) where a supervisor asked a
nurse “why she was prounion and what problems she had with hospital
management”); Santa Rosa Blueprint Service, 288 NLRB 762 (1988)
(no violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) where company president and co-owner
asked a group of mostly open union supporters what they hoped to gain
from the union).
9 I do not adopt the judge’s erroneous finding that Ireland solicited
Steele’s grievances on August 16. The judge incorrectly found griev-
ance solicitation based on the same set of facts which the General
Counsel had submitted in support of the implied promise allegation. I
note that grievance solicitation was never alleged by the outstanding
complaint, never argued by the General Counsel, and never litigated by
the parties at the hearing.
10 Cf. Frank Leta Honda, 321 NLRB 482, 489 (1996) (company
parts manager unlawfully offered to create an assistant manager posi-
tion if employee Smith would not join the union, and he then unlaw-
fully offered an assistant parts manager position if Smith would not
support an upcoming strike); Ernst Enterprises, 289 NLRB 565, 566
(1988), enfd. mem. 895 F.2d 1414 (6th Cir. 1990) (company president
unlawfully offered a lead man position to union activist Lamb if he
would “forget about this union stuff here”); Wilker Bros. Co., 236
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1230
If he had been trying to divert Steele in a direction
away from the union, I do not believe that Ireland would
have put Steele in an interview situation in which the
latter would have likely experienced even more frustra-
tion with management. Having an employee interview
for a position for which there was no actual opening, and
for which he was not qualified, hardly seems to be a
move calculated to make the employee think that man-
agement, as opposed to a union, would be responsive to
his needs. Furthermore, the Respondent made no effort
to soften the maintenance supervisor’s rejection by mak-
ing any allowance for Steele’s skills deficiencies.11 In
addition, Ireland’s outright rejection of Steele’s sug-
gested ways to keep the union out—i.e., provide senior-
ity rights, better working conditions, and raises, and have
management sit down with the hourly employees and
work something out—demonstrates that Steele had no
reason to suspect that Ireland was responding to Steele’s
interest in the maintenance position as a way to dissuade
him from union support.
My colleagues and the judge overlook that Ireland
never stated nor indicated that the job interview was in
exchange for Steele’s abandonment of his union interest.
According to Steele’s credited testimony, Ireland did not
refer to the union in connection with the maintenance
position,12 and he did not speak against the union or say
anything to discourage Steele’s union support on August
16.13 Rather, Ireland specifically rebuffed Steele’s ulti-
matum, which was expressed at the end of their meeting,
to stop him from engaging in union organizing. Thus, if
anything, Ireland put considerable distance between his
course of action and Steele’s union interest.14

NLRB 1371 (1978), enfd. in relevant part 652 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1981)
(company vice president unlawfully promised a future promotion to an
employee if she helped in defeating the union).
11 Cf. Gencorp., 294 NLRB 717 (1989) (violation of Sec. 8(a)(1)
found where supervisor suggested that employee May “would make
good supervisory material and broadly hinted that past obstacles to such
a promotion, such as checkered attendance record, could be overlooked
if May would abandon his known support of the Union”).
12 Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co., 227 NLRB 1170, 1173 (1977) (vio-
lation of Sec. 8(a)(1) found when company store manager told union
adherent that there were management positions becoming available for
which she would be eligible, and then stated that he hoped her union
activities would not continue).
13 Cf. The Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 NLRB 794 (1977) (violation
found where the company personnel director urged employee to assist
in soliciting employees to sign an antiunion petition and then offered to
“help” him if he “helped” the company).
14 Cf. K. G. Knitting Mills, 320 NLRB 374, 378 fn. 4 (1995) (viola-
tion of Sec. 8(a)(1) found where company vice president told an em-
ployee who supported one union that his wife could have a job with the
employer, and then immediately told him to vote for another union
favored by the employer); Triumph Twist Drill, 237 NLRB 1442, 1444
(1978) (violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) found when employer told a staunch
union adherent that “if [he] quit[s] [his] union activity . . . and would
work towards the company side, [he] could work into this supervision
deal or [a] better paying position”); and United Artists Eastern Thea-
tres, 275 NLRB 158, 160 (1985), enfd. mem. 795 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1985) (employer unlawfully offered employee union organizer a pro-
motion “if everything will be dropped with the union”).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I would
dismiss the 8(a)(1) complaint allegations based on Ire-
land’s August 16 statements.

Sang-yul Lee, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael R. Lied, Esq. (Husch & Eppenberger), of Peoria, Illinois,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in Peoria, Illinois, on May 29, 1997. On De-
cember 20, 1996,1 the Regional Director for Region 33 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board), issued a complaint
and notice of hearing, based on an unfair labor practice charge
filed on September 27 and amended on December 20, alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (the Act). All parties have been afforded full oppor-
tunity to appear, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Based on the entire re-
cord, on the briefs which were filed, and on my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The complaint presents an issue of the lawfulness of the Sep-
tember 4 discharge of a bindery department employee and, in
addition, issues of whether statutory supervisors made unlawful
statements to bindery department employees during August.
Since approximately 1986, Multi-Ad Services, Inc. (Respon-
dent), has been an employee-owned corporation with one of its
offices and places of business located at 1720 West Detwiler
Drive in Peoria. There it engages in the business of providing
printing services and related marketing services. More specifi-
cally, it is a commercial printer with its own product lines for
retail advertising, for art work supplied in printed and in elec-
tronic formats, and for binders.
Respondent admits that at all material times it has been en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, based on the admitted facts that, in conduct-
ing the above-described operations at Peoria during calendar
year 1996, it derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and,
moreover, sold goods valued in excess of $50,000 which were
shipped from its Peoria facility directly to points outside of the
State of Illinois and, also, purchased goods valued in excess of
$50,000 which were shipped directly to its Peoria facility from
points outside of Illinois.
During 1996 approximately 450 employees worked at Re-
spondent’s Peoria facility. A large number of them were com-
mercial artists and approximately 85 others were production
employees. Though some departments do work second shifts,
from 3 to 11 p.m., employees at Peoria ordinarily work from 7
a.m. to 3 p.m. When necessitated by increased business, sec-
ond shifts have been instituted temporarily, from 3 to 11 p.m.,
until the workload diminishes. Occasionally, employees will
be assigned to work a third shift.
Respondent’s president is Larry Clore, an admitted statutory
supervisor and agent of Respondent at all material times. Its
vice president of finance has been Bruce Taylor. Responsible
1 Unless otherwise stated, all dates occurred during 1996.
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1231
for the Peoria facility’s daily production operations is Plant
Manager Jerry Ireland, also an admitted statutory supervisor
and agent of Respondent at all material times. Reporting to
Ireland are individuals with the title of manager. Reporting to
the managers, in turn, are individuals with the title of supervi-
sor. Rank-and-file employees report directly to the supervisors.
Some of those employees are designated as leadpersons who,
while serving in that capacity, earn an extra 25 cents an hour.
But, there is no contention, nor evidence to support one, that
lead persons, or any one of them, are or have been statutory
supervisors.
As must be evidence from what was said in the initial para-
graph in this subsection, the complaint is based on conduct
occurring in Respondent’s Peoria bindery department. Em-
ployees in that department produce looseleaf, three-ring binders
for Respondent’s product lines and for commercial applica-
tions. At all times material to this proceeding, the supervisor of
that department was Ted DeRossett and the manager, Martin
(Marty) Heathcoat, both admitted statutory supervisors and
agents of Respondent during August and early September.
Heathcoat continued to be employed by Respondent as man-
ager by the time of the hearing. But, by then DeRossett had left
employment with Respondent, although there is neither repre-
sentation nor evidence that he had become unavailable to ap-
pear as a witness in this proceeding. The leadman in the bind-
ery department during late August and early September had
been Larry Clutts.
Bindery department operations are among the least signifi-
cant of Respondent’s overall operation. For example, by the
time of the hearing on May 29, 1997, bindery department sales
had amounted to approximately $750,000 of total sales to that
date of $35 to $38 million. Moreover, historically the bindery
department’s profit margin has been low compared to that of
other products. Indeed, employment in that department has
been declining. Eleven or 12 employees had been employed in
the bindery department during 1997, while approximately 15
employees had worked there during 1996, and about 18 or 19
had been employed in the bindery department during 1995.
The bindery department employee whose September 4 dis-
charge is at issue is Ted Steele. He had been employed con-
tinuously by Respondent as a bindery worker since June 1989.
Steele testified that, by the time of his discharge, he had be-
come “pretty much” qualified to operate all bindery department
machinery, having floated from machine to machine over the
years. Indeed, when a second shift for that department had
been created during 1993, Steele had been appointed leadman
for that shift. After performing those duties for awhile, he took
leave for surgery and had been replaced as leadman by the time
that he returned. The important point is that he had not been
demoted from leadman for cause, but merely as a consequence
of happenstance.
Plant Manager Ireland characterized Steele’s work record as
“acceptable” and “okay.” In fact, Ireland agreed that while
Steele’s work record had not attained the category of “excel-
lent,” it had achieved a rating “just below that in most of his
reviews[.]” Viewed from the opposite perspective, although he
testified that Steele had “problems with absenteeism, tardiness”
during some unspecified past period, Ireland acknowledged that
Steele had never been terminated, suspended, or placed on pro-
bation during the approximately 7 years that he had worked for
Respondent as a bindery worker. Furthermore, it is undisputed
that, prior to September 4, Steele had received no warnings that
he might be disciplined or possibly terminated by Respondent.
By late summer, Steele had become upset with some of Re-
spondent’s policies: projected initiation of certain aspects of a
drug testing program, overtime work, and assignment to a sec-
ond shift. As discussed in succeeding subsections, he spoke out
against those policies during meetings and conversations with
Respondent’s officials. He threatened to, and eventually did,
contact a union. He demanded to see certain documents. Even-
tually, on September 4, he admittedly walked out in the middle
of a meeting in Vice President of Finance Taylor’s office. He
refused to return when ordered to do so by Manager Heathcoat.
Ireland made a decision to discharge Steele for that conduct.
Respondent contends that Ireland’s motivation had been
solely Steele’s insubordination in walking out of, and refusing
to return to, that meeting. The General Counsel alleges that
Steele’s conduct on September 4 had been no more than a pre-
text advanced to conceal Respondent’s actual motivation which
had been to discharge a likely union proponent before he had
time to initiate an organizing campaign among Respondent’s
employees and, further, to discourage other employees from
engaging in such activities.
The general principles applicable to the General Counsel’s
theories of motivation are settled. An employer violates the
Act whenever it discharges a perceived union adherent to pre-
vent that employee from initiating an organizing campaign and,
as well, as a lesson to other employees regarding what may
happen to them if they participate in and support such a cam-
paign. As to the first, unlawful motivation exists whenever an
employer discharges an actual or potential union activist as a
means of “scotch[ing] lawful measures of the employees before
they [have] progressed too far toward fruition,” NLRB v.
Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1954),
thereby “so extinguish[ing] seeds [that] it would have no need
to uproot sprouts.” Ethan Allan, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706,
708 (1st Cir. 1975).
As to the second above-enumerated unlawful motivation,
discharge of even “a single dissident may have—and may be
intended to have—an in terrorem effect on others,” (citation
omitted), Rust Engineering Co. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 172, 174
(6th Cir. 1971), “by making ‘an example’ of [one] of them.”
NLRB v. Shedd-Brown Mfg., 213 F.2d 163, 175 (7th Cir. 1954).
Still, an employee who engages in statutorily protected activ-
ity is not immune altogether from discipline, even discharge.
“Indeed, there is a point when even activity ordinarily protected
by Section 7 of the Act is conducted in such a manner that it
becomes deprived of protection that it otherwise would enjoy.”
Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144, 151 (1996). Beyond
that, should such an employee engage in misconduct which
would normally warrant discipline, that employee is not
shielded from discipline even if his/her employer is pleased at
being afforded the opportunity to administer that discipline to a
union activist. As the Board stated in Klate Holt Co., 161
NLRB 1606, 1612 (1966):

If an employee provides an employer with a sufficient
cause for his dismissal by engaging in conduct for which
he would have been terminated in any event, and the em-
ployer discharges him for that reason, the circumstance
that the employer welcomed the opportunity to discharge
does not make it discriminatory and therefore unlawful.
[Footnote omitted.]

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1232
For the reasons set forth in section II, below, I conclude that
a preponderance of the credible evidence does establish that
Respondent’s statutory supervisors and agents did make unlaw-
ful statements to employees during late August, evidencing
hostility toward unionization of employees. Moreover, I con-
clude that a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes
that Respondent seized upon Steele’s abrupt departure from
Taylor’s office as a pretext for terminating a likely union activ-
ist, before he began conducting an organizing campaign on
behalf of a union. Therefore, I conclude that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
B. The July–August Meetings
It is not altogether clear exactly when Steele began feeling
dissatisfied with his employment situation at Respondent.
What is clear is that he expressed that dissatisfaction at one of
the periodic ESOP meetings, one conducted on July 29.
By way of background, as pointed out in subsection A
above, Respondent is an employee-owned corporation. Thus,
its employees are also among its shareholders. As a result,
Respondent conducts quarterly meetings of its employees to
review its financial situation. While the record is not clear, it
appears that each quarter there are a series of such meetings
with employee groups, each consisting of several departments,
timed so that, when applicable, first-shift employees attend near
the end of their shift and into the beginning of the incoming
shift, which arrives early to attend the entire meeting.
Attendance at such meetings, however, is not mandatory.
That was admitted by Plant Manager Ireland. Nevertheless,
Terry Harms, a bindery department employee who appeared as
a witness for the General Counsel, agreed that employees are
encouraged to attend quarterly ESOP meetings and, if unable to
attend ones scheduled for their departments, are encouraged,
but not obliged, to attend a different meeting for other depart-
ments.
Ireland testified that there have been occasions when em-
ployees have departed early from a quarterly ESOP meeting.
But, he testified, “They always have enough courtesy to let me
know of what their intentions are or if they have another en-
gagement or something.”
As to the substance of the quarterly meetings, made available
to assembled employees are Respondent’s quarterly financial
reports and other financial information such as whether Re-
spondent has met its goals, and departmental performance and
profitability. While individual departments also have periodic
production meetings, Respondent’s officials also take advan-
tage of quarterly ESOP meetings to announce or discuss other
work-related subjects. And time is allotted for employees to
ask questions about, it is undisputed, any work-related sub-
ject—not merely about financial matters. To facilitate those
aspects of the meetings, Respondent’s officials, including
President Clore, typically attend quarterly ESOP meetings.
Finally, Plant Manager Ireland testified, without contradiction,
that it is “usual” for quarterly ESOP meetings to be followed by
meetings of employees in smaller groups, on a departmental
basis, “[i]n a formal setting[.]”
Which leads to what occurred on July 29 at the second-
quarter ESOP meeting for employees in the bindery, press, and
finishing departments. Among the management in attendance
were Supervisor DeRossett and Plant Manager Ireland. In fact,
as Manager Heathcoat was then on vacation, Ireland conducted
that meeting. As it progressed, President Clore entered the
room.
After the financial information portion of the meeting had
been completed, Ireland brought up a new or revised, it is really
not clear from the record which, drug policy which would be
implemented for employees. Steele, at least, protested the need
for such a policy and got into an argument with Clore over it.
All who testified agreed that Steele had been loud and persis-
tent in his opposition to the program. Some other employees
protested testing of blood and saliva, in addition to urine. The
exchange between Steele and Clore ended with the former ask-
ing for “laws and bylaws” of Respondent and with Clore re-
sponding that Steele “could have those right after the meeting.”
When the ESOP meeting concluded, group meetings were
conducted, with press department employees adjourning to the
production office and with the bindery department employees
going to the lunchroom. By the time those meetings com-
menced it was approximately 3 p.m., the normal quitting time
for day-shift employees. Ireland began to discuss bindery is-
sues when Clore entered and gave Steele the Summary Plan
Description (SPD) of the ESOP. Steele testified, “I told him
that I already had summary papers and these were not what I
requested. And his reply to me was, have your lawyer get
them.” Apparently those were not the only remarks exchanged
between the two of them. For Ireland testified that Clore said
to Steele, “Ted, if you don’t like the policies, why don’t you
think about leaving the Company?” According to Ireland,
Steele retorted, “Mr. Clore, I will not give you the pleasure of
quitting.”
Ireland testified that Clore left and that he (Ireland) tried to
continue the meeting. It is uncontroverted that Steele suddenly
stood up, announced that he was on his own time now and was
leaving, and left the meeting. Steele testified that Ireland
“[J]ust said okay,” but Ireland testified that Steele’s remark had
shocked him and, “I didn’t really say anything that I know of,”
but, after Steele left, “apologized to the group for Ted’s behav-
ior.” In any event, it is undisputed that Steele was not ordered
to remain for the rest of the meeting which, Ireland testified,
ended shortly after Steele had left.
Clore was not called as a witness, though there was neither
representation nor evidence that he was not available to testify.
Ireland testified that Clore had been “totally offended by Ted
Steele’s actions in that meeting and he let me know that.” Yet,
it is uncontested that, during the following day as Steele was
having a cigarette break at the back door of the bindery depart-
ment, he encountered Clore who “offered an apology for the
way the things went in our meeting.” In turn, Steele apologized
for his own statements, saying that, “I was not trying to put
anybody on the spot with my comments, that I was trying to
make a correction in his statements,” and that, “I just wanted to
know the answers to the questions.” So far as the evidence
discloses, no comments were exchanged during that conversa-
tion about Steele obtaining Respondent’s “laws and by laws.”
Ireland conceded that, to his knowledge, no one ever repri-
manded Steele for his conduct on July 29. In fact, no evidence
was adduced that Respondent had done so. Instead, it was
Steele who broached Ireland about the events of the meeting
that day.
On July 31 Steele asked to meet with Ireland. The two men
met alone in Ireland’s office. Steele acknowledged that he
apologized “about the way our ESOP meeting had went,” say-
ing, “I wasn’t trying to put anyone on the spot.” In contrast,
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1233
Ireland testified that Steele had apologized “for his behavior at
the ESOP meeting,” admitting “that he was totally out of line,”
after which “we agreed that I would not expect to see those
types of actions again.” Both men agreed, however, that Steele
did mention during this meeting the possibility of contacting a
union.
“Right after his apology to me, then Ted informed me that he
did not like the policies, some of the policies that were in effect
or going to be in effect,” testified Ireland, “And that if things
did not change, that he knew people in a union and he would
consider contacting them.” Ireland testified that he expressed
disappointment with Steele’s attitude, given that Respondent is
“an ESOP company” and “a very good organization,” and that
he (Ireland) was disappointed “that he would have those types
of views.” Yet, Ireland never denied specifically certain as-
pects of Steele’s earlier description of their July 31 meeting.
Steele testified that after the apology, he had said that “the
hourly workers out in the shop were, were not satisfied with the
way Company policy was being handed out and raises and so
on and that management needed to just sit down with hourly
employees and work some things out.” In other words, while
Ireland’s above-quoted description portrays Steele as having
complained on his own behalf—about what “he did not like”—
Ireland never denied that Steele had said that it was “hourly
workers out in the shop” who were not satisfied with Respon-
dent’s policies. Nor did he deny that Steele had suggested that
“management needed to just sit down with hourly employees
and work some things out.” Beyond that, undenied also was
Steele’s testimony that, in response to that suggestion, Ireland
had said “[A]t that time that could not be done.” It had been
that response which, Steele testified, had led him to say, “[T]hat
if we could not sit down and work things over and talk things
out, that I was going to organize a union.”
There is no dispute about the fact that their meeting had
ended amicably, with the two men shaking hands. However,
there is a conflict in their accounts as to what had been said
immediately before that. Steele testified that, in response to his
remark about organizing a union, Ireland “had asked me to wait
until he came back from vacation to discuss that further. And I
told him I would.” During cross-examination, Steele attempted
to expand on that account: “He asked me not to talk to the
other employees about it while he was gone.” But that ex-
panded version was not necessarily consistent with Steele’s
earlier above-quoted account. Certainly it was not consistent
with his description in his prehearing affidavit: “Ireland asked
me if I would hold off on my thoughts until he returned from
vacation. And I told him I would do that.” (Emphasis added.)
Even if Steele’s account on cross-examination did not corre-
spond with his accounts given elsewhere about what had been
said by Ireland, the latter did not advance wholly consistent
testimony about that aspect of the July 31 conversation. During
direct examination, as quoted above, Ireland testified that he
had merely expressed disappointment upon hearing Steele talk
about contacting a union. But, during cross-examination he
was asked if he had told Steele that they would continue the
conversation after Ireland’s return from vacation. Ireland an-
swered: “Well, I was busy that day. I have a lot of functions
that I was trying to wrap up. So it’s quite possible that I said
that I would talk to him again.”
Now, according to Ireland, as set forth above, by the conclu-
sion of their July 31 conversation, Steele had already apolo-
gized for his July 29 conduct and had promised that Ireland
“would not expect to see those types of actions again.” Seem-
ingly, there would have been nothing further to be said about
that aspect of the conversation. So, if there was to be continued
conversation between them, after Ireland returned from vaca-
tion, that conversation would seemingly have to pertain to
Steele’s remarks about meeting with employees and, if that
could not be done, contacting a union. No other purpose for
such a subsequent meeting is suggested by either Steele’s or
Ireland’s description of their July 31 meeting.
Apparently perceiving as much, Ireland attempted to attrib-
ute any discussion of a further meeting to Steele, based upon
the latter’s asserted remark, “I am not going to do anything
while you are gone.” According to Ireland, Steele had been
referring to “his behavior, first of all. His disruptive behavior.”
But, it makes no sense for Steele to promise to hold off on dis-
ruptive behavior, in the context of Ireland’s overall testimony
concerning the July 31 meeting. After all, as quoted above,
Ireland testified that Steele had promised that Respondent
“would not expect to see those types of actions again.” Given
that promise, it hardly makes sense for that same employee to
then promise to hold off on disruptive behavior only until the
departmental manager returns from vacation. And it hardly
seems logical that a statutory supervisor would accept as satis-
factory so limited a promise not to engage in disruptive behav-
ior for but a limited period.
In any event, Steele made no effort to contact a union while
Ireland was on vacation. Ireland testified that “I probably came
back around August 10th or 11th, somewhere in there.” There
is no dispute about the fact that, following his return, Ireland
did engage in another meeting with Steele, this time on August
16 in Heathcoat’s office, with Heathcoat present. It is alleged
that, during that meeting, Ireland and/or Heathcoat coercively
interrogated Steele, offered him unspecified benefits to refrain
from organizing activity, and threatened him with layoffs if the
employees became represented. Ireland and Heathcoat each
testified that he had made no threats or promises during the
August 16 meeting.
According to Ireland, the meeting had occurred because of a
report by Heathcoat and DeRossett that, during one of the peri-
odic bindery department production meetings, “there were
some disruptions during that meeting and Ted [Steele] was the
disruptive force in that meeting.” Ireland continued, in that
regard, “they informed me that Ted Steele was still upset and I
made myself available to meet with them and Ted Steele in
Marty’s office.” Interestingly, while he appeared as a witness
for Respondent, Heathcoat did not corroborate that account by
Ireland as to how their August 16 meeting with Steele had
come to be conducted. As pointed out above, DeRossett was
never called as a witness. So, there was no corroboration from
him as to how that meeting came to be conducted. The General
Counsel portrays it as essentially a continuation of Ireland’s
July 31 meeting with Steele, as picking up where that conversa-
tion had left off.
“They asked me why I would want to bring a union into the
Company,” Steele testified, and, “I responded by saying I, it
would be nice to have seniority rights, better working condi-
tions, raises when it was possible and so on.” Ireland did not
deny that Steele had been asked why he wanted to bring a un-
ion into Respondent. Questioned as to whether he had asked
why Steele wanted the union, Heathcoat answered merely, “I, I
don’t remember. I may have.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1234
As to Steele’s above-quoted response to such a question, Ire-
land equivocated, testifying that Steele “could have said” un-
ions are good because they provide things like seniority and
better working conditions, but “I really do not remember.” Of
course, it is difficult to ascertain why Steele might have made
such statements unless he had been responding to a question
regarding why he wanted a union. In fact, Heathcoat acknowl-
edged that Steele “did” talk about unions during the August 16
meeting and, further, had “brought up other people’s wages and
he also made the statement that he doesn’t even make enough
money to have a savings account yet.”
According to Steele, there also was a discussion on August
16 about what could be done to improve his situation and the
subject of a mechanic’s job was mentioned. Steele testified that
he was encouraged to talk to someone about the job. Yet, so far
as the evidence shows, no such subject had been discussed with
Steele prior to August 16, before his reasons for wanting to
bring in a union were questioned.
There is no dispute that the subject of a mechanic’s job was
discussed that day. Ireland testified, “I posed the question to
Ted, Ted, let’s talk about you and what you can do to improve
your situation here at [Respondent]. What can you do to help
yourself work your way up the ladder, make more money and
that type of thing.” When he pointed out that Respondent posts
jobs, testified Ireland, Steele retorted, “Jerry, there is only two
things that I have ever gotten out of this Company, bad arms
and a bad attitude.” Still, when Steele also expressed interest in
a maintenance position, Ireland testified that he said he would
have Maintenance Supervisor Bill Wolfram “interview Ted
about a maintenance position, although at the time we did not
have an opening.” Eventually, Heathcoat corroborated the
testimony given by Ireland. In fact, Ireland acknowledged that
on the following day Wolfram did interview Steele, at Ireland’s
direction, but the interview revealed that Steele lacked the nec-
essary qualifications and, in any event, that Steele was not
really interested in the position.
Steele testified that, as the August 16 meeting progressed,
Ireland “asked me what it would take to satisfy me. And I told
him that it would satisfy me if management would sit down
with the hourly employees and work something out.” When
Ireland replied that “we could not do that,” testified Steele, “I
informed him that I was leaving the meeting and that I was
going to attempt to organize.” According to Steele, Ireland
asked Steele to come back and talk some more, but Steele re-
sponded that there was nothing left to talk about and left. No
one told him to remain or stay and, moreover, he was never
reprimanded for having left that meeting. Significantly, when
he left, it was 3:30 p.m., a half hour after his shift had ended,
and another employee, Bob Caldwell, was waiting for a ride
home with Steele.
Ireland acknowledged that the meeting had broken up at ap-
proximately 3:30 p.m. and, further, testified, “I had indicated to
[Steele] that I knew Bob Caldwell was riding with him. And
Bob Caldwell was outside I was sure.” When he mentioned
that, Ireland testified, “Ted’s parting words were, well, you
guys aren’t listening to me and he kind of threw up his hands
and walked out.” Ireland admitted that he had not ordered
Steele to remain in Heathcoat’s office. But, Ireland was less
forthright about other aspects of that meeting.
Questioned as to whether he had asked what would satisfy
Steele, Ireland answered merely, “I don’t remember asking him
that.” As a result, Ireland never did deny having put that ques-
tion to Steele. Nor did Heathcoat deny that Ireland had done
so. Beyond that, when asked if Steele had said that he wanted
management to sit down with the employees and work things
out, Ireland again answered, “I don’t remember him saying
that.” However, Heathcoat answered, “Yes,” when asked if
Steele had said that management really needed to sit down and
talk to employees about their concerns. Moreover, although
Heathcoat testified that he “did not hear” Steele say that he
would contact a union if management did not sit down with the
employees, he conceded, “I heard that he would have to do
what he would have to do,” and, moreover, as to whether that
had meant contacting a union, Heathcoat acknowledged, “I
assumed that that’s what [Steele] meant, yes.”
Steele testified that on August 25 he met with an official of
Graphic Communications Union, Local 68C, Graphic Commu-
nications International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC (the Union), an
admitted labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act. They agreed that a meeting with employees would
be conducted during the evening of August 26 at the Holiday
Inn in East Peoria. Other than Steele, apparently the only em-
ployee who attended that meeting was bindery department em-
ployee Harms, Steele’s brother-in-law. Even so, rumors about
the Union began to circulate through Respondent’s Peoria facil-
ity. Both Bob Seckler, a silk screener, and Betty Isbell, for-
merly a detail operator, testified that employees had been talk-
ing there about Steele and the Union.
Isbell was a particularly significant witness concerning those
rumors. For she quit on August 26, returning to employment
with Respondent on October 4 or 5. Thus, the rumors which
she heard had to have been circulating prior to August 27. Her
testimony was also significant in another respect.
She testified that on the day before she first left employment
with Respondent, during August, she had attended a meeting of
bindery department employees called hastily by Heathcoat and
DeRossett. In fact, Steele, Harms, and Seckler also testified
about that meeting during which, the complaint alleges, DeRos-
sett threatened that the bindery department would be the first to
close if the Union came in and things got “tight.”
Heathcoat agreed that there had been a meeting during late
August at which production and profitability in the bindery
department had been discussed, as occurred each month. Most
of the employees agreed that bindery department production
had been mentioned during that meeting. All four bindery de-
partment employees testified that Heathcoat also had mentioned
the union and had asked for the assembled employees’ opinions
or reasons for wanting a union. Harms and Steele testified that
the latter had said that everyone knew who it was that was try-
ing to bring in the Union. Steele testified that he had added, “I
am trying to bring the union in here.” According to Harms and
Seckler, some other employees also spoke up.
Heathcoat initially denied flatly having encouraged or solic-
ited employees’ view on unionism during a meeting. Yet, dur-
ing cross-examination, he became more equivocal about that
subject. Thus, asked if during that August departmental meet-
ing, or at a productivity meeting prior to that meeting, he had
asked employees what they thought in general about unions,
Heathcoat answered merely, “Not that I am aware of.” Later,
he answered that he could not recall a time when employees
had provided him with their opinions about unions or organiz-
ing, in general.
According to all four employees—Isbell, Seckler, Harms,
and Steele—they then had been told, during the meeting, that if
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1235
the Union got in, the bindery department would be the first to
go. Steele, Harms, and Seckler attributed that statement to
DeRossett. Isbell testified that it had been made both by
DeRossett and by Heathcoat. Beyond that, Steele testified that
DeRossett had not explained what he meant by that comment.
Asked if Heathcoat or DeRossett had explained why bindery
possibly would be the first to go, Seckler testified, “Probably
because, if they did, it was probably because it’s probably a
small part of the Company’s profit.” “But,” added Seckler,
“[I]f they said something like that, I can’t remember.” Isbell
testified that, in connection with “the first to go” statement,
there had been mention of that being because of wages going
up and it being too costly.
Harms testified that DeRossett had no opportunity to explain
his warning because Steele had interjected, “[Y]ou can’t be
telling us that.” Indeed, Steele did testify that, “I told Ted
DeRossett what he had just told the bindery employees was
against the law.” As it turned out, Heathcoat put an abrupt end
to the meeting as the argument between Steele and DeRossett
became more heated.
Inasmuch as he was not called as a witness, there was no de-
nial by DeRossett concerning the “first to go” statement attrib-
uted to him during that meeting. Initially, as he did concerning
other subjects, Heathcoat denied flatly having said or heard
anyone else say that the bindery employees would be the first to
go if the Union got in, but then qualified that denial. Asked
during cross-examination if DeRossett had told a gathering of
employees that if the Union got in bindery would be the first to
go, Heathcoat answered, “The word union was not mentioned
in there,” adding, “what was mentioned in there was if the prof-
itability of the bindery department did not increase, that bindery
department would be, it wouldn’t be there anymore.”
That would have been a somewhat strange remark for
DeRossett to have made in the circumstances, were it not con-
nected to unionization of bindery department employees. For,
as explained below, business in bindery had been picking up to
the point where Respondent would first extend the workday in
that department to ten hours and, then, add a second bindery
department shift. Certainly, during late August, there was no
decline in business for bindery department employees. In con-
sequence, it makes no sense for DeRossett to have been ex-
pressing concern about discontinuance of the bindery depart-
ment unless his concern had related to unionization of employ-
ees working in that department. A conclusion that DeRossett’s
“first to go” warning had been tied to the Union is reinforced
by what occurred during the following day.
Isbell had tendered her resignation. On the day after the
abruptly convened bindery department meeting, described
above, she testified that she went into Heathcoat’s office and
explained her reasons for resigning. Later that afternoon, it is
undisputed, she was summoned by DeRossett to another meet-
ing with Heathcoat. DeRossett remained during that meeting.
After discussing further her reasons for quitting, Isbell was
asked if Steele was serious “[a]bout trying to getting [sic] a
union in there,” and “if there was a lot of people that were in-
teres5ted [sic] in it or was it just a few.” Isbell testified that, “I
told him I thought he was serious and I didn’t really know if
people were really interested in it.” Heathcoat never denied
having made, or having heard DeRossett make, those remarks
to Isbell.
Nor did Heathcoat deny having approached Seckler, during
this same time period, and having said, somewhat cryptically,
“by law we can’t call a meeting about union activities, but you
can with us if you want.” Neither this statement nor the ones to
Isbell are alleged as unfair labor practices. Even so, those con-
versations evidence both knowledge by Respondent that union
activity was in progress and, at least, suspicion that Steele was
a primary activist on the Union’s behalf.
Two final meetings also occurred during the latter half of
August. At one, bindery department employees were informed
that they would begin working 10-hour shifts. It is difficult to
date that meeting, since counsel suggested a date to Steele in
one instance—August 27—and opposing counsel suggested a
different date—August 15—to Heathcoat. The significant
point about this meeting, in the context of alleged discrimina-
tory motivation, is Steele’s testimony that, during this meeting,
he had protested the unfairness of making bindery employees
work overtime, when employees “in the past had been able to
pass up overtime” and “it was decisions like that that were
making me check into bringing a union into” Respondent.
Heathcoat acknowledged that Steele had “seemed a bit up-
set” at the announced extended workdays. Moreover, Heath-
coat testified that Steele had left his position in the meeting and
“came up to me and told me, this is why we need a union here.
And he pointed his finger an inch away from my face,” at
which point, “I just asked him if he could conduct himself in a
more professional point [sic] in the meetings cause it was dis-
rupting our work flow during the meetings.” Still, Heathcoat
acknowledged that, later that day, he and DeRossett had ap-
proached Steele and had explained that employees had to work
the 10-hour days, but that they would accommodate Steele’s
scheduled days off and try to accommodate time off which he
needed to take.
To that point, it might seem that there was support for the
suggestion to Heathcoat of the August 15 date, given the fact
that, as described above, Ireland testified that he had partici-
pated in the August 16 meeting with Steele as a result of a
complaint by Heathcoat and DeRossett that Steele had dis-
rupted a production meeting. Moreover, if the August 27 date
suggested to Steele had been the correct one, that would mean
that Respondent had announced a 10-hour workday and, then,
almost immediately thereafter, announced creation of a second
shift for the bindery department on August 28 or 29, as de-
scribed below. Such immediate shifts in planning seem some-
what disorganized and, for that very reason, might appear to
have been unlikely, meaning that the 10-hour shift announce-
ment meeting had occurred earlier in August. But, in fact, there
is evidence which does lend support to a conclusion that, after
having announced 10-hour workdays, Respondent had suddenly
shifted direction and created a second shift.
Ireland testified that, once Heathcoat and DeRossett had de-
cided “to go to ten hour shifts” and had announced as much in a
meeting with bindery department employees, “shortly thereafter
I got a call from . . . the CMR department . . . basically ques-
tioning if we were going to be able to handle the workload.”
Afterward, Ireland testified that he suggested to Heathcoat and
DeRossett that they consider going to a second shift and they
decided to do so. Thus, the 10-hour workday could have been
announced on 1 day, with the second shift being decided upon
and announced within a day or two thereafter. If so, then the
date suggested to Steele for the 10-hour workday announce-
ment may have been the correct date.
In any event, when creation of the second shift was an-
nounced, three bindery department employees were told that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1236
they would be assigned to it. One was to be Steele who, as he
had in 1993, would be leadman on that shift. In his brief, coun-
sel for the General Counsel wanders into arguing that the selec-
tion of Steele for that shift had been made to isolate him from
other bindery department employees, save for the two who
would be working with him on second shift. Yet, there is no
allegation in the complaint that Respondent had unlawfully
selected Steele to work on the second shift. Neither during the
hearing nor in his brief, moreover, did counsel for the General
Counsel move to amend the complaint to add such an allega-
tion. As a result, there is no basis in the pleadings for making
any finding that Respondent had violated the Act by selecting
Steele to work on the second bindery department shift.
Beyond that, there is no basis for concluding that a prepon-
derance of the credible evidence warrants such a conclusion.
To be sure, Steele’s assignment to second shift would have
isolated him at work from the bindery department employees
remaining on the day shift. But, there is no evidence that he
had engaged in any activity on behalf of the Union, save for
repeatedly announcing to Respondent’s officials his planned
union support, while actually at Respondent’s Peoria facility.
Nor is there evidence that he had contemplated doing so or that
Respondent could fairly have anticipated that he would be so-
liciting and campaigning for the Union at its facility.
On the other hand, while Larry Clutts had been a leadman on
the second shift at one time, by August Clutts was first-shift
bindery department leadman. Transferring him to second shift
would mean that Respondent would have to replace him on first
shift. There is no evidence showing that doing so—playing
musical chairs by transferring Clutts to second shift and replac-
ing him as leadman on first shift with another employee—was
inherently more logical than simply appointing Steele to the
position of second-shift leadman. Certainly the latter course
created the least disruption to operational continuity.
Aside from Clutts, Steele identified only one other bindery
department employee—Terry Legtboet—who was as capable
and knowledgeable about running all bindery department ma-
chines as was Steele. At that, however, Steele acknowledged
that Legtboet was not familiar with the screen printer. Further,
there is no evidence that Legtboet had ever previously occupied
the position of lead, whereas Steele had done so during 1993, as
pointed out in subsection A, above. In consequence, selection
of Steele for second-shift leadman has not been shown to have
been an inherently illogical choice.
One point about that assignment is material to the discharge
allegation which is included in the complaint. When he heard
of the assignment, Steele became concerned about its affect on
leave which he had scheduled from August 30 through Septem-
ber 3. Heathcoat testified that he and DeRossett discussed that
subject with Steele on August 29. According to Heathcoat, the
two officials wanted to ascertain if Steele “could, in fact, go to
that second shift with a positive attitude with the rest of the
employees” and, in the process, assured Steele that he still
could take his scheduled days off. The significant point about
that conversation, in light of the events discussed in the follow-
ing subsection, is that after Heathcoat and DeRossett’s conver-
sation with Steele, Ireland testified that he was told by those
two officials that Steele had said to them “that he would go to
second shift and he would do the job and represent the Com-
pany as was expected of him.”
C. The Discharge of Steele on September 4
On Friday, August 30, while Steele was on scheduled leave,
Respondent received from him a registered letter. That letter
was not introduced by any party and, as a result, the record
contains only secondary evidence as to what it stated. Steele
and Ireland testified that the letter requested the laws and by-
laws of the ESOP, financial information, and the laws and by-
laws of Respondent.
The letter did not state why Steele wanted that information
and he had not told any official of Respondent why he wanted
it. Ireland testified that he had been puzzled about the request,
since Steele already had the SPD and financial information
through the second quarter of calendar 1996. Moreover, the
bylaws of Respondent are 50 years old and the only copy is
kept in Vice President of Finance Taylor’s office. As to that,
Ireland testified, “[W]e don’t have very many people that I can
recall that have requested to see the bylaws.”
Still, Ireland conceded that there was nothing improper about
Steele’s request. Respondent’s employee handbook provides
that employees are allowed to request access to information
concerning the ESOP. Ireland admitted that no reason need be
given. He also admitted that Steele’s request for the informa-
tion did not break any rule.
At one point Ireland testified that, upon receipt of the letter,
“I contacted Marty [Heathcoat] about it and we agreed that we
wanted to meet, they wanted to meet with Ted in Bruce’s office
to find out why exactly he wanted this information, some of it.”
Heathcoat did not corroborate that account. To the contrary,
while he testified that he had been aware of the letter’s receipt
by Respondent, when asked if he had known what was going to
happen on September 4, Heathcoat answered, “No. I wasn’t. I
was kind of disappointed that the letter came. But, no.”
Indeed, rather than going to Taylor’s office on September 4
pursuant to an agreement with Ireland to meet with Steele about
the information request, as Ireland claimed, Heathcoat testified
that on September 4 he and DeRossett had merely “tagged
along with” Steele to Taylor’s office because, “We just wanted
to see what the materials were more than anything else. Just to
make sure that he did, in fact, get over there and that the meet-
ing or whatever it was over there was going to be conducted.”
That hardly is the account of an official who had planned to
meet with Steele on September 4, as Ireland portrayed.
At another point Ireland laid the decision to meet with Steele
at the door of Taylor: “I had a brief discussion with him [Tay-
lor],” and, “I believe Mr. Taylor” made the decision to have
Steele brought to the office on September 4. Significantly,
Taylor never was called as a witness to corroborate that particu-
lar account by Ireland and, if so, to explain why such a meeting
—to have Steele explain why he was requesting documents
which the employee handbook allowed him to request and
which he broke no rule by having requested to examine them—
had been regarded as necessary. Certainly Taylor’s nonappear-
ance as a witness was not because he was not available to tes-
tify. As shown by the appearances which were entered, he sat
with counsel for Respondent throughout the hearing.
An overview of what occurred on September 4 shows that
Steele was told by Heathcoat and DeRossett that he could see
the requested documents in Taylor’s office. He then went there
where, besides Taylor, also attending were Ireland, Heathcoat
and DeRossett. Eventually, Steele walked out, saying that he
would not participate in a meeting with them. Heathcoat pur-
sued him, directing Steele to return to the office. Also in pur-
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1237
suit of Steele, as he walked to the plant, was Ireland. When
Steele continued refusing to return to the office, as directed by
Heathcoat, Ireland fired Steele. At Steele’s insistence, Heath-
coat prepared a written explanation of the reason for the dis-
charge and Steele then left Respondent’s facility.
Breaking down that overview, Steele testified that when he
had arrived to start his second-shift work on September 4, wait-
ing for him were Heathcoat and DeRossett: And they asked me
if I wanted the documents that I had requested by registered
mail. And I told them that I did. According to Steele, they said
that he could get those documents in Taylor’s office, he
punched in on the timeclock, and started to walk toward the
building where Taylor’s office was located. But, as he did so,
he testified that he “noticed Ted DeRossett and Marty Heath-
coat were still walking behind me.” “I told them that I didn’t
need them to go pick these papers up,” testified Steele, but
“their reply to me was, we are just going in case you have some
questions.” Steele testified that he told Heathcoat, “I can’t
possibly have any questions until I read over this literature.
And they proceeded to follow me to Bruce Taylor’s office.”
As set forth above, Heathcoat admitted that he and DeRos-
sett had “tagged along” with Steele as the latter walked to Tay-
lor’s office. Heathcoat testified that he and DeRossett had done
so “to make sure that [Steele] did, in fact get over there,” but he
did not dispute having told Steele that he and DeRossett were
going with Steele “in case you have some questions.” The fact
is that neither of those explanations makes any sense.
Having told Steele that the requested information was avail-
able in Taylor’s office, and having heard Steele say that he still
wanted to see it, there is no basis in the record for Heathcoat or
DeRossett to suspect that Steele would not “get over” to Tay-
lor’s office. Indeed, Heathcoat never claimed that he had sus-
pected that Steele might go elsewhere than to Taylor’s office
after punching in on September 4. On the other hand, Heath-
coat provided no basis for a conclusion that either he or DeRos-
sett would be able to supply answers to Steele’s “questions”
that could not be provided by Taylor.
It should not escape notice that on September 4 Heathcoat
and DeRossett were, in effect, abandoning their own duties
merely to “tag[ ] along” with Steele, if Heathcoat’s above-
quoted explanation is believed, to do no more than satisfy their
own curiosity about the documents. The fact that there was no
apparent reason for them to have followed him would naturally
lead an employee to become apprehensive about the true reason
for being trailed to the vice president of finance’s office. That
apprehension could only be inherently heightened by what
occurred once that employee reached the office.
According to Ireland, Taylor’s office during September “was
a very small” one. Nonetheless, Heathcoat and DeRossett
squeezed into it, along with Steele and, of course, Taylor, who
was sitting at his desk. They were then joined by Ireland who
testified that, “I did not really plan on being there,” but he had
asked Taylor beforehand “[I]f he thought that I should be in
that meeting. And Bruce said that, yes, why don’t you come
into the meeting? And so I was there on last minute notice.”
Two points about that testimony should not be overlooked.
First, since Taylor did not testify, Ireland’s explanation for
his presence in the office on September 4 is uncorroborated.
Moreover, Taylor’s failure to testify leaves the record devoid of
evidence as to his reason for assertedly wanting Ireland to be
present during the meeting. Of course, one could speculate as
to a lawful reason. But, given the absence of testimony about a
reason, that is all that can be done: speculate. To indulge in it
would be to supply an explanation that Taylor, himself, failed
to provide. That is not permitted in formal proceedings under
the Act. “The employer alone is responsible for its conduct and
it alone bears the burden of explaining the motivation for its
actions.” Inland Steel Co., 257 NLRB 65, 65 (1981).
Second, Ireland’s above-quoted testimony about being asked
by Taylor to attend the meeting tends to contradict his earlier
testimony, also quoted above, that, upon receipt of Steele’s
letter requesting information, he and Heathcoat had “agreed
that we wanted to meet . . . with Ted in Bruce’s office to find
out why exactly he wanted this information, some of it.” If that
truly had been Ireland’s plan upon receipt of Steele’s letter,
then surely there later was no reason for him to inquire if Tay-
lor thought that he (Ireland) “should be in that meeting.” Of
course, there might have been some intervening change in Ire-
land’s initial plan, assertedly discussed with Heathcoat. If so,
however, Respondent failed to provide evidence of it.
Ireland did testify that, from what he had ascertained from
Taylor, the latter’s purposes for conducting a meeting with
Steele had been to ascertain “why did Ted want this informa-
tion since he had some of it,” and, as well, “we wanted some
assurance from Ted that he was going to be able to carry out his
previous commitment that he had agreed to . . . perform the
duty over there on the second shift in the bindery department.”
Yet, Respondent has not shown any connection between
Steele’s request for information and his performance of work
on a second shift. So far as the evidence reveals, the two sub-
jects are entirely separate. There is no basis for concluding that
the request for information was somehow inextricably con-
nected to performance of work on a second shift. Of course,
Taylor never appeared as a witness to supply the connection
which Ireland claimed that Taylor felt warranted such a meet-
ing. And, as pointed out at the end of the preceding subsection,
Steele had assured Heathcoat and DeRossett that he would try
to do a good job on second shift. There is no basis for conclud-
ing that that assurance became somehow called into question as
a result of Steele’s letter requesting information.
The fact that the plant manager had joined the departmental
manager and supervisor in a meeting, ostensibly convened for
no purpose other than to examine information, would naturally
serve to increase an employee’s apprehension arising from
being followed to such a meeting by departmental supervision.
That apprehension would be increased further by what occurred
once the meeting began.
According to Heathcoat, the materials requested by Steele
were on Taylor’s desk and, “I think the only thing that was said
was, well, Ted, here is the information you requested. We
thought you already had a copy of the financial report.” But,
this testimony by Heathcoat, that the information was offered to
Steele, is contradicted both by Ireland and by Steele. For, Ire-
land testified that, as he walked into Taylor’s office, it had been
Heathcoat who had been talking to Steele, saying,

Ted, I, you know, I thought we had, you know, an un-
derstanding here. Why is it that you are requesting these
things again? Not that you can’t see them, but I thought
we had an understanding and that you had gave [sic] us the
impression that you were going to do a good job over in
the bindery area on second shift.

From that account, obviously something quite different had
been said to Steele than an offer to furnish him with informa-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1238
tion which he had requested and which he had broken no rule in
asking to examine.
Indeed, Steele testified that when he had asked Taylor “if he
had the papers,” he had not been “given an answer.” Instead,
he testified, Taylor said that Steele had previously been given
the ESOP statement during the quarterly meeting. Steele testi-
fied that he replied that he was not asking for a summary, but
for the complete documents and “I asked him again for a copy
of the papers I requested and I got no response.” While Steele
did not dispute that he had been told by Heathcoat, who sup-
posedly was in the office merely out of curiosity, “[n]ot that
you can’t see” the documents, neither Ireland nor Heathcoat
actually contested Steele’s testimony that when he had asked
twice for the documents, Taylor had not offered them to him
and had not even responded to Steele’s requests.
There is no real dispute about what followed. Steele an-
nounced that he would not participate in a meeting. He walked
out. In doing so, he ignored Heathcoat’s order to remain, even
though he was warned that he would be fired if he did not stay in
the office. Interestingly, based upon his own account, Heathcoat
had been no more than an interested observer at this meeting.
Taylor, who had been the official who had convened it, appar-
ently said nothing about Steele’s sudden departure from it.
Steele walked back to the plant, pursued by Heathcoat and
by Ireland. Heathcoat ordered Steele to return to Taylor’s of-
fice or be fired. Steele ignored that order. When he overtook
Steele and Heathcoat, Ireland testified that he said, “Ted, this is
the third meeting you walked out of. You are gone.” As to
what he meant by “the third meeting,” Ireland testified that, in
addition to the September 4 meeting, he had been referring to
the July 29 post-ESOP departmental meeting in the lunchroom
and to the August 16 meeting in Heathcoat’s office, both de-
scribed in subsection B, above.
Ireland testified that he had been the official who had made
the decision to discharge Steele. He did so, he testified, solely
because Steele had walked out of the meeting on September 4
despite specific direction to remain and, then, to return to that
meeting. Against a background of having walked out of two
other meetings, testified Ireland, Steele had displayed insubor-
dination by being “disrespectful to management.” “Refusing to
obey orders of supervisors pertaining to work or supervisors’
duties,” under Respondent’s discipline and performance rules,
is a Group II offense which warrants “immediate termination of
employment without warning.” Yet, leaving these meetings
was not the sole reason given to Steele on September 4 for his
termination.
After Ireland fired Steele, the latter demanded a written ter-
mination letter. A written explanation was prepared by Heath-
coat. In pertinent part, it states:

He said that he didn’t come here for a meeting, [sic]
and then walked out of the room. I told him to get back in
Bruce’s office to discuss this with us. He repeated himself
again saying that he didn’t want a meeting. Jerry Ireland
then Fired [sic] him.
Ted Steele has walked out of three meetings within a
month because he didn’t feel like hearing what was being
said to him. He has said that he does not agree with cor-
porate policies set for all the employees of Multi Ad. He
has interrupted the work flow of the Bindery Department
by persuading it’s [sic] employees that this is not a good
place to work. Ted will never see eye to eye with [Re-
spondent]’s policies and goals for it’s [sic] employees and
will not even conduct himself in professional manner
when talking to management about his concerns. Ted is
terminated on 9–4–96 because of his unwillingness to
abide to [sic] corporate policies.

Heathcoat never explained what had been meant by such
phrases as “corporate policies,” “persuading its employees that
this is not a good place to work,” and “never see eye to eye
with [Respondent]’s policies and goals for it’s employees.”
Obviously, such phrases contemplate more than merely having
left a meeting or meetings.
To be sure, the written account had been prepared by Heath-
coat and he did so without conferring with Ireland who claims
to have made the actual decision to fire Steele. In another set-
ting it might be possible to infer that Heathcoat had not truly
understood a plant manager’s discharge reasons. Yet, Heath-
coat never claimed that he had prepared the written account
without such an understanding. “Yes. That’s fair,” testified
Heathcoat when asked if he had prepared the written account
based on his own contact with Steele and on the basis of what
he was informed by other management. Most significantly,
Ireland has not disavowed any portion of the above-quoted
written explanation prepared by Heathcoat. Yet, like Heath-
coat, Ireland never explained what was meant by phrases such
as “corporate policies,” “persuading its employees that this is
not a good place to work,” and “never see eye to eye with [Re-
spondent]’s policies and goals for its employees.”
II. DISCUSSION
In evaluating allegations of discrimination under the Act, the
ultimate question which must be answered is the actual motiva-
tion for a respondent’s allegedly unlawful action. See Schaeff
Inc., 321 NLRB 202, 210 (1996), enfd. 113 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir.
1997), and cases cited therein. More specifically at issue is the
actual motivation of the official or officials who made the deci-
sion to take that allegedly unlawful action. Advanced Installa-
tions, Inc., 257 NLRB 845, 854 (1981), enfd. mem. 698 F.2d
1231 (9th Cir. 1982). “The state of mind of the company offi-
cials who made the decision . . . reflects the company’s motive
for” the allegedly discriminatory action. Abilene Sheet Metal,
v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1980).
Here, though Heathcoat prepared the written explanation for
Steele’s termination, Plant Manager Ireland testified that he had
been the official who had made the actual decision to fire
Steele. Accordingly, the starting point for analysis of the moti-
vation issue is the explanation advanced by Ireland for dis-
charging Steele.
Ireland denied that his reason for making that decision had
been influenced by Steele’s expressions of intent or desire to
bring a union into Respondent’s Peoria facility or, for that mat-
ter, by any possibility that Steele had been acting as a spokes-
man for other employees. Instead, testified Ireland, he had
made that discharge decision because Steele, was totally disre-
spectful to management. Here was an individual that was very
sarcastic with the president of our Company and in the ESOP
meeting, the tone of his voice directed towards our president.
Bruce Taylor occupies the second or third most powerful posi-
tion within our organization, the vice president of finance. He
is on the executive management team.
And he walked out of his office without so much as a word,
without saying excuse me or anything.
And I am also on the management team and he has shown
total disrespect to me.
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1239
More specifically, Ireland testified that Steele had been in-
subordinate on September 4 when he walked out of Taylor’s
office and ignored Heathcoat’s orders to return to the meeting
there.
As pointed out in section I,A, above, the protection afforded
employees by Section 7 of the Act is not unlimited. “To be
sure . . . otherwise protected employee conduct may be so ex-
treme as to lose the protection of the Act; and in such a case
discharge or discipline by the employer for that conduct is law-
ful.” Brunswick Food & Drug, 284 NLRB 663, 664 (1987),
enfd. mem. 859 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1988). As a general propo-
sition, subject to some exception, the Act does not protect in-
subordinate conduct by an employees.
On the surface, at least, there are certain objective facts
which tend to support Ireland’s above-quoted testimony that his
discharge decision had been motivated by no more than Steele
having walked out of Taylor’s office and refusing to return
there, against a background of having walked out of two earlier
meetings. Steele had walked out of three meetings, including
the one on September 4. He did ignore specific orders to re-
main and, then, to return to Taylor’s office. The September 4
meeting was being conducted on company time. There is no
allegation that Respondent had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by convening that meeting. There is no evidence that, by
the time that Steele walked out of it, any unfair labor practice
had been committed during that meeting by any of Respon-
dent’s officials. The events of September 4 occurred spontane-
ously: Steele abruptly left the meeting, he refused to obey or-
ders to stay and return, he was discharged on the spot. There is
no basis for concluding that Respondent’s officials could have
anticipated, before the meeting, that Steele would leave it and
refuse to return.
The fact that those events were spontaneous precludes a find-
ing that Steele’s September 4 discharge had somehow been
planned in advance. Nevertheless, it is not unheard of for an
employer to seize upon an unanticipated event and convert that
event to its own purposes, by terminating an employee’s em-
ployment to prevent unionization of that employer’s employ-
ees. In this instance, the above-enumerated factors do not exist
in isolation. Rather, certain other considerations refute a con-
clusion that Steele’s departure from the meetings, including the
one on September 4, had been the sole reason for his termina-
tion. Most compelling is the written explanation for that dis-
charge. True, it does mention that Steele had walked out on,
and had refused to return to, the meeting in Taylor’s office.
And it also mentions that Steele “has walked out of three meet-
ings within a month.” But, if those had been the sole reasons
for discharging Steele, that is not what the written explanation
states.
Instead, it recites that, “Ted is terminated . . . because of his
unwillingness to abide to corporate policies.” Undoubtedly,
subordination is one company policy. Yet, if that had been the
only company policy which had been the actual reason for Re-
spondent’s discharge decision, it seems odd that the written
explanation does not so state. Use of the plural, “policies,”
inherently implies that there is more than one reason for the
termination.
In fact, a conclusion that Steele’s discharge had been moti-
vated by more than walking out of meetings is reinforced by
other statements appearing in the written explanation: that
Steele “has said that he does not agree with corporate policies,”
that Steele had been “persuading . . . employees that this is not
a good place to work,” and that Steele “will never see eye to
eye with [Respondent]’s policies and goals for its employees.”
Such statements have no seeming relationship to walking out of
meetings and Respondent’s officials provided no connection.
Indeed, a reading of the entire written explanation reveals that
mention of Steele walking out of meetings appears as, at best, a
springboard to the explanation’s more prolonged complaints
about those other, unrelated, subjects. That more prolonged
series of complaints is strong objective evidence that walking
out of and refusing to return to the September 4 meeting, and
walking out of earlier meetings, was not the sole reason for
Steele’s termination, as Ireland has tried to portray.
To be sure, it had been Heathcoat, not Ireland, who had pre-
pared the written explanation. But, as pointed out section I,C,
above, Heathcoat admitted that he had prepared that written
explanation based both upon his own contacts with Steele and
upon what he had been informed by other management. Given
that testimony, there is no basis for concluding that Heathcoat,
an admitted agent of Respondent, had been unclear as to the
reasons for having fired Steele. Certainly Ireland never dis-
avowed any aspect of what Heathcoat had written.
Beyond the substance of that written account, neither Ireland
nor Heathcoat seemed to be testifying with candor, when each
appeared as a witness. A review of the record of their testimo-
nies confirms that impression, formed as each testified. As
described throughout sections I,B, and C, above, the testimony
of each was sometimes internally contradictory, other time
uncorroborated, and too often inconsistent with objective con-
siderations and with each other’s accounts. I do not credit ei-
ther Ireland or Heathcoat.
Therefore, I do not credit the testimony underlying the de-
fense that Steele’s having walked out of meetings, and his re-
fusal to return to the September 4 meeting, had been the sole
reason for the decision to fire him. Even though walking out of
one or more of those meetings might have constituted legiti-
mate cause for discharge, “an employer cannot carry its burden
of persuasion by merely showing that it had a legitimate reason
for imposing discipline against an employee,” Hicks Oils &
Hicksgas, 293 NLRB 84, 85 (1989), since “the policy and pro-
tection provided by the . . . Act does not allow the employer to
substitute ‘good’ reasons for ‘real’ reasons.” Hugh H. Wilson
Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied 397 U.S. 935 (1970). “The mere presence of legitimate
business reasons for disciplining or discharging an employee
does not automatically preclude the finding of discrimination.”
J. P. Stevens & Co., v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676, 681 (4th Cir.
1981). See also ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S.
317, (1994).
Of course, the fact that Respondent has advanced an unreli-
able defense is not necessarily dispositive of the ultimate issue
as to whether its true motive had been one unlawful under the
Act. See, e.g., Society to Advance the Retarded & Handi-
capped, 324 NLRB 314–315 (1997). The methodology for
determining motivation is that set forth in Wright Line, 251
NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), as modified in
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Colleries, 512 U.S. 267, 276–278 (1994).
That is, the General Counsel bears the burden of establishing
that antiunion animus motivated the employer’s action. Rose
Hills Co., 324 NLRB 406 fn. 4 (1997). See Schaeff Inc. v.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1240
NLRB, 113 F.3d 264 fn. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In turn, “[t]he
employer may escape liability for its action either by . . . dis-
proving one or more of the critical elements of [the General
Counsel’s] case, or by establishing as an affirmative defense
that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of
the employee’s protected conduct.” TNT Skypak, Inc., 312
NLRB 1009, 1010 (1993).
There can be no question here that at the very least Steele
had announced that he intended to contact a union and that
Respondent at least believed that Steele would, or at least was
likely to, do so. By its terms, the right “to form, join, or assist
labor organizations” is encompassed by Section 7 of the Act.
“In fact, [Section] 7 itself defines both joining and assisting
labor organizations–activities in which a single employee can
engage–as concerted activities.” (Footnote omitted.) NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).
As set forth in section I,B, supra, Ireland admitted that, dur-
ing the July 31 meeting, Steele had said, “[T]hat he knew peo-
ple in a union and he would consider contacting them.” Heath-
coat admitted that, during the August 16 meeting, Steele has
said, “[H]e would have to do what he would have to do” and,
further, that he (Heathcoat) “assumed” that Steele meant con-
tact a union. Heathcoat also acknowledged that during the
meeting when 10-hour shifts were announced, Steele had said,
“[T]his is why we need a union here.” Accordingly, there can
be no question that the record establishes that Respondent had
been put on notice that Steele had been disposed to contacting a
union to attempt to correct what he perceived as unsatisfactory
working conditions.
To establish unlawful discrimination under the Act, it is not a
prerequisite that the respondent know of actual union activity
by the alleged discriminatee. For, “the Act is violated if an
employer acts against the employee[ ] in the belief that [he/she
has] engaged in protected activities.” Henning & Cheadle, Inc.
v. NLRB, 522 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Handi-
cabs, Inc., 318 NLRB 890, 897 (1995), enfd. 95 F.3d 681 (8th
Cir. 1996). Clearly, Respondent suspected that Steele was
likely to follow through on his expressions of intent to contact a
union. It is not contested that Isbell was asked if she thought
that Steele was serious “[a]bout trying to get[ ] a union in”
Respondent. As discussed further below, bindery department
employees were asked for their opinions about unionizing and,
during a meeting with Ireland and Heathcoat on August 16, it is
essentially undisputed that Steele was asked why he wanted a
union. Obviously, Respondent’s officials believed that Steele
might follow through on his statements about contacting a un-
ion.
Beyond that, a conversation such as Heathcoat’s uncontested
one with Isbell evidences Respondent’s concern that Steele
might actually contact a union and try to initiate an organizing
campaign among Respondent’s employees. In fact, credible
evidence shows that such concern led Respondent to engage in
unfair labor practices.
Heathcoat admitted that he “may have” asked Steele, during
the August 16 meeting described in section I,B, above, why
Steele would want to bring in a union. In fact, Steele testified
credibly that he had been asked that question during his meet-
ing with Ireland and Heathcoat that day. The same conversa-
tion had continued with a discussion, admittedly initiated by
Ireland, of what could be done to improve Steele’s employment
situation.
When testifying, Ireland seemed to be attempting to portray
that particular discussion as no more than an effort to satisfy
Steele’s dissatisfaction as expressed during a departmental
production meeting and as reported to him (Ireland) by Heath-
coat and DeRossett. Yet, Ireland’s testimony about such a
report was not corroborated by Heathcoat nor, of course, by
DeRossett. Indeed, even if the 10-hour bindery department
shifts had truly been announced on August 15, as was sug-
gested to Heathcoat, whatever dissatisfaction it had caused
Steele seems to have been resolved by a later conversation in
which Heathcoat testified that he and DeRossett had engaged
with Steele. As a result, there seems to have been no need for
Ireland to become involved in a controversy which had been
resolved between the employee and his departmental supervisor
and manager. And Ireland suggested no role which he could
have so belatedly played in that resolved controversy.
Of course, if the 10-hour shift announcement meeting was
not the meeting to which Ireland had claimed to be referring,
then not only is there no corroboration for his assertion of a
report by Heathcoat and DeRossett, about supposed disruption
by Steele during a production meeting, but neither is there any
evidence of a meeting having occurred immediately prior to
August 16 which likely would have generated such a report by
departmental supervision.
In fact, there is substantial evidence that on August 16 Ire-
land had brought up improving Steele’s employment situation
as a means for weaning Steele away from his earlier announced
intention to contact a union as a means of resolving his em-
ployment dissatisfactions. As pointed out above, it is not truly
denied that the August 16 meeting had begun with questioning
about why Steele “would want to bring a union into” Respon-
dent. Steele testified that he had enumerated a series of reasons
for wanting to do so. While Ireland professed lack of recollec-
tion concerning that enumeration, Heathcoat agreed, at least,
that Steele had complained about the employees’ wages during
the August 16 meeting. Against such an immediate conversa-
tional background, injecting the issue of what could be done to
improve an employee’s employment situation appears to be an
obvious effort to ascertain what could be done to diminish, if
not eliminate altogether, that employee’s desire for representa-
tion.
That appearance was but reinforced by Ireland’s prompt ar-
rangement to have Steele interviewed on the following day by
Maintenance Supervisor Wolfram. To be sure, Respondent did
not then have a maintenance opening and, as it turned out,
Steele was not qualified for a maintenance position. Yet, by
having him interviewed for a maintenance position, Respondent
demonstrated its willingness to make an effort to address
Steele’s employment dissatisfactions and to do so without the
need for him to be represented.
In effect, Ireland had been soliciting Steele’s grievances on
August 16. There is no evidence that Respondent had a prac-
tice of soliciting employees’ grievances. More particularly,
there is no evidence that Ireland, or any other official of Re-
spondent, had previously taken the time to ascertain from
Steele why he might be dissatisfied with his employment situa-
tion and what could be done to improve it. True, no express
promises were made to Steele on August 16 by Ireland or by
Heathcoat. Nonetheless, even a supervisor’s “refusal to give a
specific promise did not demonstrate the absence of an implied,
general promise.” NLRB v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 1981). See also Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460,
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1241
462 (7th Cir. 1981). Given the totality of the foregoing consid-
erations, I conclude that Ireland’s remarks to Steele on August
16 did constitute an implied promise of benefits, to dissuade
him from his avowed intention to contact a union by demon-
strating Respondent’s willingness to address his employment
dissatisfactions without the need for union representation.
As to the interrogation allegation, it is accurate that Steele
had openly professed an intention to contact a union. Thus, his
position was tantamount to that of an open union proponent
during an organizing campaign. Such open advocacy allows
some room under the Act for “questioning, as part of the ongo-
ing dialogue involved in employee choice regarding representa-
tion, of leading union proponents concerning the benefits those
proponents foresee as resulting from selection of a bargaining
agent,” but it does “not completely strip [open employee union
advocates] of the Act’s protection.” (Citations omitted.)
Koronis Parts, Inc., 324 NLRB 675, 691 (1997).
The questioning of Steele occurred in his departmental man-
ager’s office. There, he had been confronted by both that de-
partmental manager and by the plant manager. So far as the
evidence discloses, Steele was not informed of any legitimate
purpose for a meeting in which he was asked why he wanted a
union. Nor is there evidence that he was given assurances that
he need not answer such questioning, nor that reprisals would
not be taken against him for whatever answers he chose to pro-
vide. Questioning of an employee about his union attitude in
such circumstances would naturally cause that employee to
become apprehensive and, consequently, the questioning would
be inherently coercive.
To be sure, it does not appear that Steele actually had been
intimidated by the questioning. But, that is only a single in-
dicium of coercion when evaluating interrogations. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Rich’s Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613, 624
(7th Cir. 1981); and NLRB v. Ajax Tool Works, Inc., 713 F.2d
1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The basic test for
evaluating whether or not there has been a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act is an objective one which does not ordinarily
“turn on the employer’s motive, or on actual effect.” Lee Lum-
ber & Building Material, 306 NLRB 408, 409 (1992). On bal-
ance of the totality of the foregoing considerations, I conclude
that an employee would naturally be intimidated by questioning
in circumstances such as those present on August 16. There-
fore, I conclude that the interrogation of Steele, as to why he
wanted a union, had been inherently coercive and did violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Additional interrogation was conducted during an abruptly
convened bindery department meeting, as also described in
section I,B, above. During that meeting, credible testimony
shows that the employees were asked for their opinions about a
union. In addition, there is testimony that DeRossett had
threatened that the bindery department would be the first to go
should Respondent become unionized. DeRossett was never
called as a witness to deny having made such a threat, though
there is no basis in the record for concluding that he was not
available to Respondent, as a witness. Heathcoat, in effect,
conceded that DeRossett had made statements about closure of
the bindery department, though Heathcoat claimed that, “[t]he
word union was not mentioned in there.” As concluded above,
however, Heathcoat was not a credible witness and four em-
ployees testified credibly that DeRossett had said “union.”
Even had he not expressly said that word, the preceding ques-
tioning about employees’ opinions of a union would naturally
lead employees to conclude that DeRossett’s closure statement
was connected to their becoming unionized.
An employer may make predictions about the precise effects
of unionization. When it does so, however, those “prediction[s]
must be carefully made on the basis of objective fact to convey
an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond its control.” Schaumburg Hyundai, 318 NLRB 449,
450 (1995), citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). As the Board held in that case, it is the respondent who
bears the burden of showing the accuracy of such predictions.
There is testimony concerning the relatively low volume of
income generated by the bindery department and, as well, its
low profitability. Even so, there is no evidence that, during that
meeting with bindery department employees, DeRossett—or
Heathcoat either, for that matter—made any effort to connect
possible closure of the department to increased labor costs as a
result of negotiations with a union. Steele, Harms, and Seckler
each testified that DeRossett had said simply that the bindery
department would be the first to go if the union got in. Isbell’s
testimony on that point was garbled. But, the important point is
that Respondent failed to produce credible evidence that
DeRossett had mentioned any “objective fact” that would leave
employees with even an impression that department closure
would be based upon anything other than “solely [Respon-
dent’s] own initiative” and for reasons “known only to” Re-
spondent, NLRB v. Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 618, rather than
upon “demonstrably probable consequences beyond its con-
trol,” Schaumburg Hyundai, supra.
True, Seckler testified that Steele had interrupted DeRossett
when the latter had made the threat, by challenging the legality
of what DeRossett had said. Nevertheless, there is not even a
contention by Respondent that DeRossett had intended to add
statements to his announcement which would have converted a
plainly-worded threat into a legitimate prediction, but for
Steele’s interruption.
Beyond that, it should not escape notice that although the
bindery department is small and not particularly profitable, it
still was profitable, at least so far as the record reveals. Re-
spondent had been operating it continuously before August and
was continuing to operate it at the time of the hearing. There is
no evidence of a policy which leads Respondent to close de-
partments whenever their profitability drops below a certain
level. And there is no evidence that, if such a policy exists,
bindery department profitability had been declining by August
to anywhere even near that level. To the contrary, at the time
of that bindery department meeting, Respondent was moving
toward extending the workday in the department and, then,
added a second shift for the department.
In sum, I conclude that Heathcoat and DeRossett did conduct
a meeting during which, after having asked for employees’
opinions about unionization, DeRossett unlawfully threatened
department closure should Respondent’s employees become
unionized. By that threat, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Moreover, that unlawful threat and the unlawful
remarks on August 16 to Steele demonstrate Respondent’s
animus toward the concept of unionization of its employees.
Violations of that type convey “unmistakable overtones of a
purpose to discriminate and retaliate because of the union activ-
ity.” NLRB v. Ferguson, 257 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1958).
“Inference of an employer’s unlawful motive [toward an
employee] may be drawn from the employer’s hostility toward
the union.” Hall v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1991).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1242
By September 4, so far as the evidence shows, Steele had been
the only identified likely proponent of unionization at Respon-
dent’s Peoria facility. His termination can “give rise to an in-
ference of violative discrimination.” NLRB v. First National
Bank of Pueblo, 623 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1980). See also
NLRB v. Des Moines Foods, Inc., 296 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir.
1961); Intermountain Rural Electric Assn. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d
754, 759 (10th Cir. 1984), and cases cited therein. Further
indication of unlawful motivation is supplied by the timing of
Steele’s termination—shortly after his likely efforts to contact a
union were disclosed and confirmed by Respondent’s question-
ing of Steele, Isbell and the bindery department employees.
See Handicabs, supra, 318 NLRB at 897, and cases cited
therein. Finally, Respondent has advanced a reason for the
termination, solely because he left meetings and refused to
return to the September 4 one, which, as concluded above, is
not an accurate description of Respondent’s motivation for
terminating Steele.
Given the totality of the foregoing considerations, the record
does establish that Respondent had seized upon Steele’s abrupt
departure from Taylor’s office, and Steele’s refusal to return to
that office, as a pretext for discharging a likely union activist,
thereby ending any possibility that he would engage in efforts
to bring in a union and, also, diminishing the possibility that
other employees would try to do so. Turning to Respondent’s
advanced defense, as concluded above, Respondent has failed
to credibly show that the reason which it advanced for
discharging Steele had been the sole reason for its decision, as
its officials claimed. As a result, Respondent has failed to
satisfy its burden of establishing that it would have fired Steele
for leaving Taylor’s office, and refusing to return to it, even if
he had not been a likely union activist. Aside from the lack of
candor displayed by Ireland and by Heathcoat, several objective
factors about that defense should not escape notice.
First, if Steele’s conduct in connection with the September 4
meeting, and in connection with two previous meetings, had
been the actual motive for discharging him, it would logically
seem that the written explanation for his discharge would have
straightforwardly said so. Instead, it recites that his discharge
was “because of his unwillingness to abide to corporate poli-
cies.”
Second, that language and, as well, other language used in
the written explanation appears to be no more than euphemisms
for dissatisfaction with his employment conditions which Steele
was announcing would lead him to contact a union.
Third, the very circumstances of the September 4 meeting
would likely have caused an employee to become apprehensive
about what might occur during it. Prior to September 4 Steele
had been a target of unlawful statements by Respondent’s offi-
cials. When he reported for work on September 4, he was told
that he could examine documents which he had requested to
inspect, and, which he should have been allowed to inspect
without violating any company rule. But, when he walked to
Taylor’s office, he was trailed by his departmental supervisor
and manager for no apparent reason. Once he arrived at Tay-
lor’s small office, DeRossett and Heathcoat also crowded into it
and they were joined by Plant Manager Ireland. An employee
could hardly be expected to believe that the presence of all of
these supervisors was needed in so confined an area merely to
watch him looking at documents. In fact, it is not truly dis-
puted that Steele was not offered the opportunity to look at the
documents. Instead, he was questioned about why he wanted to
see them. In such circumstances, Respondent’s own officials
created the situation which would cause an employee to be-
come apprehensive.
Fourth, based on objective considerations, the meeting ap-
pears to have been a voluntary one on the part of Steele. He
had been the party who requested examination of the docu-
ments. When he arrived at work on September 4, he was asked
if he still wanted to do so. So far as the evidence discloses, had
he said that he did not want to do so, he would not have been
directed to Taylor’s office and no discipline would have been
imposed upon him. In essence, his decision to abandon an
effort to examine the documents, once in Taylor’s office, was
no different than an initial decision, when he arrived at work, to
change his mind and not examine the documents. If no disci-
pline would have been imposed for the latter, there seems no
logic in disciplining him for deciding abruptly, once in Taylor’s
office, to abandon his desire to examine the documents.
Fifth, possibly perceiving that above-described flaw, Ireland
claimed that Respondent also wanted to question Steele, in
Taylor’s office, about his willingness to do a good job on sec-
ond shift, in light of his registered letter requesting to see in-
formation. Yet, there is no logical connection between the two
subjects. Steele had promised, before going on leave the pre-
ceding week, that he would try to go to second shift and do a
good job. There is no evidence that anything in his letter inher-
ently brought that commitment into question. Rather, it appears
that Ireland, at least, perceived that a strictly voluntary meeting,
on the part of Steele, might not truly supply a reason for termi-
nating Steele because he left it. So, Ireland added another rea-
son for the meeting: finding out if Steele would apply himself
to second shift work. But, in doing so, Ireland gave internally
contradictory explanations about the meeting. As described in
section I,C, above, at one point he testified that he and Heath-
coat had decided that a meeting was necessary; at another he
testified that Taylor had said that he planned to meet with
Steele and asked Ireland to join that meeting. Yet, Taylor never
appeared as a witness, with the result that there is no testimony
that he had been concerned about Steele’s work on second shift.
In sum, I do not credit Respondent’s defense. Viewing the
record in its totality, I conclude that a preponderance of the
credible evidence establishes that Respondent was hostile to-
ward unionization of its employees which Steele had been an-
nouncing that he would attempt to accomplish and, accord-
ingly, acted upon that hostility by seizing on Steele’s departure
from the September 4 meeting as a vehicle for eliminating him
before any union campaign could be initiated, in the process
deterring other employees from contemplating an effort to be-
come represented. Therefore, by discharging Steele, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Multi-Ad Services, Inc., has committed unfair labor practices
affecting commerce by coercively interrogating employees
concerning their union sympathies, by impliedly promising to
help an employee improve his employment situation without
the need for representation, and by threatening to close the
bindery department should its employees become represented
by a union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; and, by
discharging Ted Steele on September 4, 1996, because of a
belief that Steele might contact a union to initiate efforts to
organize its Peoria employees.
MULTI-AD SERVICES 1243
REMEDY
Having concluded that Multi-Ad Services, Inc. has engaged
in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and, further, that it be ordered to
take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the
Act. With respect to the latter, it shall be ordered to, within 14
days from the date of this Order, offer Ted Steele full rein-
statement to the same position of bindery worker from which
he was discharged on September 4, 1996, dismissing, if neces-
sary, anyone who may have been hired or assigned to perform
that job after that date. If that job no longer exists, Steele will
be offered employment in a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges
which he would have enjoyed had he not been unlawfully dis-
charged. Moreover, it shall make Steele whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation against him, with backpay to be computed on a quarterly
basis, making deductions for interim earnings, F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest to be paid
on amounts owing, as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). It also shall, within 14 days
from the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference
to the unlawful discharge of Ted Steele and, within 3 days
thereafter, notify Steele in writing that this has been done and
that his discharge will not be used against him in any way.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Multi-Ad Services, Inc., Peoria, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees about their union sympathies
and activities, impliedly promising to improve the employment
situations of employees to dissuade them from engaging in
union activities, and threatening to close the bindery depart-
ment if employees become represented by Graphic Communi-
cations Union, Local 68C, Graphic Communications Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, or by any other labor organiza-
tion.
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against Ted
Steele or against any other employees because of their support
or suspected likely support for the above-named labor organiza-
tion or for any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Ted
Steele full reinstatement to the job of bindery worker from
which he was discharged on September 4, 1996, or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges which
he would have enjoyed had he not been unlawfully discharged.

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(b) Make Ted Steele whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him,
in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to ana-
lyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the discharge of Ted Steele on Sep-
tember 4, 1996, and within 3 days thereafter notify Steele in
writing that this has been done and that his discharge will not
be used against him in any way.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Peoria, Illinois place of business copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 33, after being signed by
its duly authorized representative, shall be posted by Multi-Ad
Services, Inc. and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, Multi-Ad Services, Inc. has gone out of
business or closed the Peoria facility involved in these proceed-
ings, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by it at any time since March 27, 1996.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that it
has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning you union ac-
tivities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT impliedly promise to help you improve your
work situation to dissuade you from contacting or supporting
Graphic Communications Union, Local 68C, Graphic Commu-
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1244
nications International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our bindery department if
you choose to become represented by the above-named labor
organization or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
Ted Steele, or any other employee, because of support or sus-
pected support of the above-named labor organization or any
other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Ted Steele full reinstatement to the bindery worker job from
which he was discharged on September 4, 1996, or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges which
he would have enjoyed had we not unlawfully discharged him.
WE WILL make whole Ted Steele for any loss of earnings
and other benefits resulting from our unlawful discharge of
him, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Ted Steele on September 4, 1996, and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify Steele in writing that this has been done
and that that unlawful discharge will not be used against him in
any way.
MULTI-AD SERVICES, INC.