Mudi M. Fluman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2019

14013154 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/013,154 08/29/2013 Mudi M. Fluman SJO920130070US1 7838
11480 7590 09/03/2019
IBM Corporation - Endicott Drafting Center
9000 S Rita Road
Internal M/D 9032-1 269
Tucson, AZ 85744
EXAMINER
YEW, CHIE W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2131
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
edciplaw@us.ibm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MUDI M. FLUMAN, YAACOV FRANK,
JANICE M. GIROUARD, and YEHUDA SHIRAN
____________

Appeal 2018-006152
Application 14/013,154
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.

LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellants1 appeal from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 26–40. Claims 1–25 have been
canceled. App. Br. 5. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corporation. App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention generally relates to “performing maintenance
tasks on storage devices.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 26, which is illustrative of the
claimed invention, reads as follows:
26. A method comprising:
receiving, by one or more processors, information
indicative of at least one maintenance task queued for operation
on a storage device;
receiving, by the one or more processors, state information
associated with the storage device;
identifying, by the one or more processors, at least one
requirement of the at least one maintenance task;
in response to the at least one requirement of the at least
one maintenance task indicating an interleave requirement,
interleaving, by the one or more processors, (i) one or more
operations of the at least one maintenance task indicating an
interleave requirement with (ii) one or more incoming
input/output (I/O) operations sent to the storage device;
in response to the at least one requirement of the at least
one maintenance task indicating a non-interleave requirement,
identifying, by the one or more processors, an idle time
associated with the storage device; and
in response to the idle time associated with the storage
device exceeding a predetermined threshold, executing, by the
one or more processors, one or more operations of the at least
one maintenance task indicating the non-interleave requirement.

Rejections
Claims 26–29, 31–34, and 36–39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over the combination of Tsai et al. (US 8,751,699 B1,
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issued June 10, 2014) (“Tsai”), McBride et al. (US 2007/0180195 A1,
published Aug. 2, 2007) (“McBride”), Hundt et al. (US 9,563,532 B1, issued
Feb. 7, 2017) (“Hundt”), and Gibson (US 2009/0055829 A1, published Feb.
26, 2009). Final Act. 2–22.
Claims 30, 35, and 40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Tsai, McBride, Hundt, Gibson, Lenny
(US 6,467,054 B1, issued Oct. 15, 2002), Brittain et al. (US 2008/0091905
A1, published Apr. 17, 2008) (“Brittain”), and Miller et al. (US 7,945,752
B1, issued May 17, 2011) (“Miller”). Final Act. 22–25.

ANALYSIS
Claim 26
Appellants contend the combination of Tsai, McBride, Hundt, and
Gibson fails to teach or suggest
in response to the idle time associated with the storage device
exceeding a predetermined threshold, executing, by the one or
more processors, one or more operations of the at least one
maintenance task indicating the non-interleave requirement,
as recited in claim 26. App. Br. 22. Appellants argue “[t]he ‘credit’ of
Gibson does not teach or suggest ‘an idle time associated with a storage
device’” because “the credit in Gibson is associated with a task, not a
device,” as required by claim 26. App. Br. 22. Appellants further argue “the
credit is not used to determine if a task is to be executed” but, instead,
Gibson teaches that “the credit only accrues when the task is not being
executed.” App. Br. 22. Additionally, Appellants argue:
While comparisons to “idle time” of the claims and “delayed
from execution” in Gibson may be similar, Gibson does not teach
or suggest “in response to the idle time associated with the
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storage device exceeding a pre-determined threshold, . . .
execut[e] . . . one or more operations of the at least one
maintenance task indicating the non-interleave requirement”. As
was said above, the value of the credit does not initiate the
execution of the task in Gibson. The credit in Gibson allows
longer held tasks to have greater execution times. However,
Gibson does not teach or suggest initiating the execution of a task
based on the value of the credit.
Id.
We find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. The Examiner finds
Gibson teaches that the execution of a task “occurs when sufficient credit
has been accumulated.” Ans. 24 (citing Gibson Abstract). The Examiner
further finds claim 26 “only require[s] an ‘association between idle time and
storage device.’” Id. The Examiner reasons, therefore, “[a]pplying
Gibson’s teachings to Tsai as modified, execution of the background task on
a different module with no other tasks (non-interleave/interleave with
nothing) would only occur after accumulation of credit as taught by Gibson”
and “[s]ince credit is associated with [a] background task and the
background task is associated with storage, credit is associated with storage
via the background task.” Id.
The definition of “idle time” includes “[t]he period of time during
which a system or component is operational and in service, but not in use.”
Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms 531 (7th Edition 2000).
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellants’ invention
would understand that “an idle time associated with the storage device,” as
recited in claim 26, refers to a period of time during which the storage
device is operational and in service, but not in use, which is consistent with
Appellants’ Specification. See e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 24, 34. Gibson teaches
“[s]hould a task be delayed for [a] period of time, it may accumulate credit
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for work to be completed” and “[w]hen a task is not executing it is
accumulating credit.” Gibson ¶ 42. As such, Gibson teaches that the credit
is associated with delaying the execution of a task and not a period of time
during which the storage device is operational and in service, but not in use,
as required by claim 26.
Further, we also agree with Appellants (App. Br. 22) that Gibson does
not teach that the task is executed in response to accumulated credit
exceeding a pre-determined threshold. Gibson teaches “[a] maximum work
to be completed (Wm) may be used if so configured to limit the work
accumulated such that Cw [accumulated credit] is not greater than Wm.”
Gibson ¶ 42. Because Gibson teaches the use of a maximum work to be
completed to limit the amount of credits accumulated by a task, one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand that the task is not executed in
response to the amount of credits exceeding a pre-determined threshold.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 26;
independent claims 31 and 36, which recite corresponding limitations; and
claims 27–29, 32–34, and 37–39, which depend, directly or indirectly, from
claims 26, 31, and 36.
Claims 30, 35, and 40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on
Tsai, McBride, Hundt, Gibson, Lenny, Brittain, and Miller. Final Act. 22–
25. The Examiner does not find the teachings of Lenny, Brittain, and Miller
cure the deficiencies noted above with respect to claim 26. See id.
Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 30,
35, and 40.

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DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 26–40 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).

REVERSED