MSR Industrial Services, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 2015

363 NLRB No. 1 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

363 NLRB No. 1
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
MSR Industrial Services, LLC and Local 25, Interna-
tional Association of Bridge, Structural, Orna-
mental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL–
CIO. Cases 07–CA–106032 and 07–CA–106627
August 31, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On April 9, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Union filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, the Respondent filed answering briefs, and the
General Counsel filed a reply brief. The Union also filed
a motion to withdraw certain of its exceptions, which
was granted on July 23, 2014.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions, briefs, and the Union’s motion
and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,
and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.1
The primary issue in this case concerns the lawfulness
of unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employ-
ment made by the Respondent, a construction industry
employer, after the Respondent lawfully terminated its
agreement with the Union. Contrary to the judge, we
find that the changes did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
I. FACTS
The Respondent is a construction contractor that re-
moves and replaces smokestacks and wastewater treat-
ment equipment. On June 1, 2011, the Respondent, by
signing a “me-too” agreement, agreed to be bound by the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) be-
tween the Union and the Great Lakes Fabricators and
Erectors Association (the Association). The Association
CBA was effective from June 1, 2010, to May 31, 2013.2

1 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and to the Board’s standard remedial language, and we shall
substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified and in
accordance with our decision in Durham School Services, 360 NLRB
No. 85 (2014).
2 The “me-too” agreement provided that, absent termination, the Re-
spondent would be bound to any successor contracts signed by the
Association and the Union. On March 21, 2013, the Association and
the Union signed a successor contract, effective from that date until
May 31, 2019. Initially this case involved an allegation that the Re-
Four members of the Union began working for the Re-
spondent at a wastewater site in Dexter, Michigan, in
mid-May 2013.3 Employees were supervised by Clint
Goettl and were paid according to the 2010–2013 Asso-
ciation CBA. On May 31, the expiration date of that
agreement, Goettl told the four employees that the Re-
spondent no longer had a contract with the Union, but
that they could continue to work at Dexter at the “pre-
vailing wage” without the fringe benefits called for by
the union contract.4
Union members stopped working at the Dexter site
from June 1 until June 27, when the Union gave its
members permission to work for the prevailing wage,
pursuant to the Respondent’s offer. Three members of
the Union worked at the Dexter site from June 27 until
August 15 and were paid the prevailing wage without the
fringe benefits called for in the Association CBA.
On May 31, the Respondent’s counsel sent a letter to
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
stating that the Union had refused to negotiate with the
Respondent and was threatening to strike on June 3. The
Respondent did not notify the Michigan Employment
Relations Commission (MERC), the state mediation and
conciliation agency, of its dispute with the Union.
II. THE JUDGE’S DECISION
The judge found that the changes to terms and condi-
tions made by the Respondent when the contract expired
on May 31 were unlawful, not because the Respondent
was bound to the successor agreement or because the
Respondent made the changes without bargaining with
the Union, but only because the Respondent failed to
fully comply with the notice requirements of Section 8(d)
of the Act. Specifically, because the Respondent did not
notify FMCS of the dispute until May 31, the day the
contract expired, the judge found that the Act prevented

spondent had not given sufficient and timely notice to the Union to
terminate the “me-too” agreement and that the Respondent was there-
fore bound to the 2013–2019 Association CBA. The judge found that
the Respondent had given sufficient notice and was therefore not bound
to the successor agreement. The General Counsel did not except to the
judge’s finding. The Union did except, but has since withdrawn the
relevant portion of its exceptions and supporting brief. As a result, no
party now contends that the Respondent was bound to the successor
agreement.
The Union disclaimed interest in representing the Respondent’s em-
ployees in early July 2014, after the judge’s decision had issued and
exceptions were submitted.
3 All dates are in 2013 unless otherwise indicated.
4 The Union’s business manager testified that the difference between
the “prevailing wage” and the Union’s total wage and benefit package
was under $2 per hour. There is no suggestion in the record that the
“prevailing wage” referred to was the equivalent of the “prevailing
wage” within the meaning of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141
et seq.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
the Respondent from making changes to any terms and
conditions until the 60-day period mandated by Section
8(d) had expired (i.e., July 30, 2013).5
The judge dismissed allegations that the Respondent
either locked out or constructively discharged employees
between May 31 and June 27, finding instead that em-
ployees went on strike. The judge made no findings on
the complaint allegation that the Respondent unlawfully
assigned bargaining-unit work to a nonbargaining-unit
supervisor on about June 5.6
III. ARGUMENTS ON EXCEPTIONS
The General Counsel and the Union both filed excep-
tions to aspects of the judge’s findings concerning the
changes made by the Respondent when the contract ex-
pired.7 The General Counsel argues that the Respondent
could not alter terms and conditions of employment be-
cause, in addition to failing to notify FMCS of the dis-
pute in advance of contract expiration, the Respondent
also did not provide notice to MERC.8 The Union argues
that the judge should have found that the changes contin-
ue to violate the Act because the Respondent still has not
given notice of the labor dispute to MERC. The Union
further argues that the Board should order the Respond-
ent to restore the 2010–2013 contract terms until 60 days
after it gives notice to MERC.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Nature of the Relationship Between the Respondent
and the Union
The complaint alleges, and the judge found, that the
Respondent is an employer in the construction industry.
The judge, however, made no finding on whether the
parties’ relationship was governed by Section 9(a) or by
Section 8(f) of the Act. Although no party excepted to
this aspect of the judge’s decision, we find that the judge
erred in failing to make such a finding.
When relationships in the construction industry are
governed by Section 9(a), the employer cannot change
terms and conditions of employment unilaterally upon
contract expiration, and it must continue to recognize and

5 The judge did not discuss the Respondent’s failure to notify MERC
of the dispute.
6 The judge found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by (1) bypassing the Union and dealing directly with bar-
gaining-unit employees on May 31, 2013 (2) failing to provide the
Union some of the information it requested on March 18, 2013, and (3)
failing to provide the Union the remainder of the information it re-
quested on March 18, 2013, in a timely manner. There are no excep-
tions to these findings.
7 The Respondent did not except to any of the judge’s findings.
8 The General Counsel also excepted to the judge’s failure to find
that the Respondent unlawfully locked out and/or constructively dis-
charged employees and assigned bargaining-unit work to a non-
bargaining-unit supervisor after the contract expired.
bargain with the union after the contract expires. See
Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 U.S.
190, 198 (1991). In an 8(f) relationship, by contrast,
either party may repudiate the contract and terminate the
parties’ bargaining relationship when the contract ex-
pires. See John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375,
1386–1387 (1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers Local 3
v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488
U.S. 889 (1988). The employer has no duty to meet or
bargain about renewing the contract or negotiating a
successor agreement. See id. at 1386–1387. See Sheet
Metal Workers Local 9 (Concord Metal), 301 NLRB
140, 145 (1991).
The complaint alleges violations based on changes that
the Respondent made in terms and conditions of em-
ployment and other actions that it took after its contract
with the Union expired. Because the Respondent had
different rights and obligations post-contract depending
on whether its relationship with the Union was governed
by Section 8(f) or 9(a), it is necessary to resolve that
question in order to determine whether the Respondent’s
actions were lawful.
We find on the record before us that the parties’ rela-
tionship was governed by Section 8(f). First, the com-
plaint implicitly alleges an 8(f) relationship. It alleges
that the Respondent is in the construction industry and
that it recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit “without regard to
whether the Union’s majority status had ever been estab-
lished under Section 9(a) of the Act.” The complaint
also alleges that the Union has been the “limited exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative” of the unit
“based on Section 9(a)” since June 1, 2011. Those are
the standard phrases used by the General Counsel when
alleging a Section 8(f) relationship. See, e.g., Bemboom
Heating & Cooling LLC, 360 NLRB No. 139, slip op. at
2 & fn. 2 (2014).
Second, under Deklewa, the Board presumes that con-
struction industry bargaining relationships such as the
one at issue here are governed by Section 8(f). See H.Y.
Floors & Gameline Painting, 331 NLRB 304, 304
(2000); Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951, 952 (1993).
This presumption can be rebutted, and the burden of
proving the existence of a Section 9(a) relationship is on
the party asserting that such a relationship exists. See
Casale Industries, 311 NLRB at 952; Deklewa, 282
NLRB at 1385 fn. 41.9 No party here has argued that the
relationship was based on Section 9(a) or presented any
evidence proving the existence of such a relationship.

9 A 9(a) relationship may be established either through a Board-
certified election or through an employer's voluntary grant of 9(a)
recognition. J & R Tile, 291 NLRB 1034, 1036 fn. 11 (1988).
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. 3
Thus, the presumption of 8(f) status stands, and we find
that the parties’ relationship was governed by that sec-
tion. See, e.g., A. S. B. Cloture, Ltd., 313 NLRB 1012,
1012 fn. 2 (1994) (finding Section 8(f) based on com-
merce data and unit description and in the absence of any
allegation that the bargaining relationship was actually
based on 9(a) support).
B. Whether the Respondent’s Unilateral Changes Violat-
ed the Act as Alleged
The next issue to be decided is whether an employer in
an 8(f) relationship may lawfully make unilateral chang-
es upon contract expiration without giving advance no-
tice to FMCS as required by Section 8(d). We find that it
may.
Section 8(d) imposes certain obligations on parties
wishing to terminate or modify a collective-bargaining
agreement. These include notifying FMCS and the ap-
propriate state mediation agency of the existence of a
dispute within 30 days of notifying the other party to the
contract of its desire to modify or terminate the con-
tract.10 A failure to comply with these notice require-
ments precludes an employer from making changes to
existing terms and conditions of employment. See Geo.
C. Christopher & Son, 290 NLRB 472, 474 (1988). A
party in a 9(a) relationship that wishes to modify or ter-
minate its CBA is indisputably required to follow the
notice requirements of Section 8(d). See, e.g.,
Weathercraft Co. of Topeka, 276 NLRB 452, 453 (1985).
Contrary to the implicit position of the judge and the
General Counsel, however, we find that the notice re-
quirements of Section 8(d) do not apply when the rela-

10 Sec. 8(d) provides, in relevant part:
[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . the du-
ty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract
shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such
termination or modification—
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration
date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date,
sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or
modification;
. . . .
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within
thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simulta-
neously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to
mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the
dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time;
and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or
lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a peri-
od of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of
such contract, whichever occurs later.
tionship between the parties is governed by Section
8(f).11
As explained in Deklewa, a union that is party to a
Section 8(f) relationship does not gain the “full panoply
of Section 9 rights and obligations.” 282 NLRB at 1385.
Although a union in an 8(f) relationship operates as the
exclusive bargaining representative of employees during
the term of a collective-bargaining agreement, the union
enjoys no presumption of majority support on the con-
tract’s expiration and gains no Section 9(a) rights or priv-
ileges “[b]eyond the operative term of the contract.” Id.
at 1387. Concomitantly, the obligations imposed on a
Section 8(f) employer through application of Section
8(a)(5) to 8(f) agreements are “limited to prohibiting the
unilateral repudiation of the agreement until it expires
. . . .”12 Id. On expiration, the employer may unilaterally
terminate its relationship with the union, change existing
terms and conditions of employment without bargaining,
and refuse to meet or bargain about renewing the contract
or negotiating a successor agreement. See id. at 1386–
1387; see also Concord Metal, 301 NLRB at 145.
The 8(d) notice requirements are a component of the
duty to bargain collectively, and are designed to give the
parties assistance in settling their labor disputes peace-
ably and to minimize the interruption of commerce re-
sulting from strikes. See Douglas Autotech Corp., 357
NLRB No. 111, slip op. at 3 (2011); Boghosian Raisin
Packing Co., 342 NLRB 383, 384 (2004). Such re-
quirements are essential in Section 9(a) bargaining rela-
tionships, where the parties’ collective-bargaining rela-
tionship continues after contract expiration.
By contrast, there is no compelling rationale for im-
posing those notice requirements when an employer (or
union) terminates an 8(f) agreement. In those circum-
stances, termination of the 8(f) agreement effectively
terminates the parties’ bargaining relationship as well.
There is no ongoing obligation, on either side, to meet
and bargain about renewing the contract or negotiating a
successor agreement. As a result, a key purpose of the
8(d) notice requirements—to assist the parties in settling
their differences—is no longer served, and it makes little
sense to require the parties to go through the formality of
notifying government mediation agencies that they notify
government mediation agencies that they intend to ter-
minate their contract.
For these reasons, having found that the parties’ rela-
tionship was governed by Section 8(f), we conclude that

11 Because the notice requirements do not apply to the parties’ rela-
tionship here, the Respondent’s failure to notify MERC of the dispute
has no bearing on the outcome.
12 Or until the employer’s unit employees vote to reject or change
their representative. Id.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
the Respondent’s failure to comply with the notice re-
quirements of Section 8(d) is not a basis for finding that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act when it changed employees’ terms and conditions of
employment. Accordingly, we dismiss that allegation.
C. The Remaining Complaint Allegations
Because the Respondent had no further bargaining ob-
ligation toward the Union after the contract expired, was
privileged to change terms and conditions of employ-
ment unilaterally, and had no ongoing obligation to as-
sign bargaining-unit work to unit members, we find no
merit to the General Counsel’s allegations that the
changes resulted in an unlawful lockout or that the Re-
spondent unlawfully assigned bargaining-unit work to a
nonbargaining-unit supervisor after the contract expired.
We further reject as unsupported the General Counsel’s
contentions that the employees were constructively dis-
charged.13 As a result, we dismiss all of the complaint
allegations except for the allegations that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by (1) bypass-
ing the Union and dealing directly with bargaining-unit
employees on May 31, 2013 (2) failing to provide the
Union some of the information it requested on March 18,
2013, and (3) failing to provide the Union the remainder
of the information it requested on March 18, 2013, in a
timely manner. As noted, those violations occurred prior
to contract expiration, and there are no relevant excep-
tions.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, MSR Industrial Services, LLC, Burton,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Bypassing the Union and dealing directly with bar-
gaining-unit employees with regard to their terms and
conditions of employment when employees are repre-
sented by an exclusive bargaining representative, such as
the Union.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
failing and refusing to furnish or failing to timely furnish

13 In finding that employees were not constructively discharged, the
judge noted that they could have continued working for the Respondent
after resigning from the Union. In affirming the judge’s finding, we
disavow any suggestion that the Respondent could lawfully have re-
quired the employees to resign from the Union as a condition of return-
ing to work. An employer may not condition an employee’s continued
employment on the employee’s abandonment of rights guaranteed by
Sec. 7 of the Act. See Intercom I (Zercom), 333 NLRB 223, 223 fn. 4
(2001) (citing Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 227 NLRB 612, 613 (1976));
see also Newark Electric Corp., 362 NLRB No. 44, slip op. at 13–15
(2015). The Respondent imposed no such requirement here.
it with requested information that is relevant and neces-
sary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s
unit employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the infor-
mation requested by the Union on March 18, 2013, as set
forth in complaint paragraph 28(a) insofar as the Union
requested information from the period June 1, 2011, to
May 31, 2013.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Burton, Michigan facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees
and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since May 31, 2013.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 7 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted and Mailed by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted and Mailed
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforc-
ing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. 5
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 31, 2015
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT bypass the Union and deal directly with
you with regard to your terms and conditions of em-
ployment when you are represented by an exclusive bar-
gaining representative such as the Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union by failing and refusing to furnish or failing to
timely furnish it with requested information that is rele-
vant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its
functions as the collective-bargaining representative of
our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information requested by the Union on March 18, 2013,
insofar as the Union requested information from the pe-
riod June 1, 2011, to May 31, 2013.
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-106032 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Kelly A. Temple, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James J. Parks and Jesse Viau, Esqs. (Jaffe, Raitt, Heuer &
Weiss, P.C.) of Southfield, Michigan (at trial); David M.
Cessante and Kurt M. Graham, Esqs.(Clark Hill), of De-
troit, Michigan (on brief), for the Respondent.
David R. Radtke, Esq. (McKnight, McClow, Canzano, Smith &
Radtke, P.C.) of Southfield, Michigan, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on January 8 and 9, 2014.
Ironworkers Local 25 filed the charges in this case on May 29,
and June 6, 2013, and the General Counsel issued the complaint
on September 30, 2013.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging Party
Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, MSR Industrial Services, LLC, is a limited lia-
bility company based in Burton, Michigan. It is owned by a
company named Source Capital. MSR Industrial Services is a
construction contractor which performs work such as the demo-
lition, removal and replacement of smokestacks and wastewater
treatment equipment. At its facility in Burton, Michigan, dur-
ing the calendar year 2012, Respondent purchased and received
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
the State of Michigan. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union, Ironwork-
ers Local 25, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
The issues in the case are as follows: (1) whether Respond-
ent became a party to the 2013–2019 collective-bargaining
agreement between Local 25 and the Great Lakes Fabricators
and Erectors Association (GLFEA). The General Counsel and
Union allege this is the case because Respondent failed to time-
ly notify the Union by certified mail that it no longer wished to
be party to a contract with Local 25 after the expiration of the
2010–2013 agreement; (2) did Respondent illegally lock-out
and/or constructively discharge four Local 25 members be-
tween May 31 and June 27, 2013; (3) did Respondent illegally
bypass the Union and deal directly with the four employees by
offering them employment under conditions different than
those specified in the 2013–2019 collective-bargaining agree-
ment; (4) did Respondent violate the Act by failing to adhere to
the terms of the 2013–1019 collective-bargaining agreement
with regard to wages and fringe benefits; (5) What are the con-
sequences of Respondent’s delay in notifying the Federal Me-
diation and Conciliation Service as required by Section 8(d) of
the Act; and (6) did Respondent violate the Act by failing to
adequately and timely respond to the Union’s information re-
quest of March 18, 2013.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In 2010 Ironworkers Local 25 signed a collective-bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the Great Lakes Fabricators and Erec-
tors Association (GLFEA or “the Association”). The term of
this agreement was from June 1, 2010, to May 31, 2013, G.C.
Exh. 2.
Section XXVI of the CBA contains the following Termina-
tion Clause:
This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until May
31, 2013, and shall renew itself from year to year unless either
party shall notify the other party, in writing by certified mail,
at least ninety (90) days prior to any anniversary date of this
Agreement of its desire to change the Agreement in any way
or to terminate the Agreement. In the event of notice by ei-
ther party to change and/or terminate, and no agreement of
such changes and/or termination is reached prior to May 31,
2013, this Agreement shall be deemed to have terminated
midnight May 31, 2013 (emphasis added).
On June 1, 2011, Respondent, which is not a member of the
Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Association, agreed to be
bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement
between the Association and Local 25. It did so by signing a
“me-too” agreement, i.e., a sheet placed at the end of the con-
tract (GC Exh. 4). That page contains the following language:
We, the undersigned, hereby agree to be bound by all the
terms and conditions set forth in the forgoing Agreement and
to become a party thereto. It is also agreed by the under-
signed Employer that any notice given by the Union to the
Association pursuant to Section XXVI of the Agreement shall
be notice to the Employer and shall have the same legal force
and effect as though it were served upon the Employer per-
sonally. Finally, the Employer agrees that, unless he noti-
fies the Union to the contrary at least ninety (90) days prior
to the termination date of this Agreement or any subsequent
agreement, the Employer will be bound by and adopt any
agreement reached by the Union and the Association during
negotiations following the notice by the Union referred to in
the proceeding sentence (emphasis added).
On March 21, 2013, the Association and Local 25 signed a
successor contract, effective on that date. The terms of the
2010–2013 Agreement remained unchanged except for those
specified in a 2 page term sheet (GC Exh. 3). The successor
agreement contains the following new termination clause:
SECTION XXVI Termination Clause
This Agreement is effective March 21, 2013 through May 31,
2019. This Agreement will remain in full force and effect
through May 31, 2019, and thereafter for successive periods
of one year, unless either party serves written notice upon the
other party of its desire to terminate this Agreement at least
60 days prior to the expiration date of this Agreement. A
timely written notice of desire to terminate this Agreement
will terminate this entire Agreement . . .(emphasis added).
The February 14 email from Respondent
to the Union
On February 14, 2013, Gerald Webb, the acting chief execu-
tive officer of Respondent and Mid-State Rigging sent an email
to two union officials, John O’Donnell and David Gonzalez.
This email was received by the Union.1 The email attached a
letter to O’Donnell stating that Respondent wanted to change
the terms of the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement.
Webb characterized the letter as “our 90 days notice per the
requirements of the agreement,” (Exhs. R-2 and 3).
Subsequent discussions between Respondent
and the Union
On February 21, 2013, Gerald Webb emailed union business
agents O’Donnell and Gonzalez suggesting a meeting to dis-
cuss “the working relationship” between Respondent and the
Union. The three men met on February 28.
Webb testified that the three discussed changes Respondent
wanted to the collective-bargaining agreement. Specifically he
recalled some discussion as to whether Respondent needed an
account at a Detroit area bank and whether it could pay em-
ployees by electronic direct deposit, as opposed to by paper
check. Webb also testified that they discussed the qualifica-
tions of Local 25 members to do certain kinds of work.
CEO Webb also testified that at the February 28 meeting, the
union representatives asked for information regarding who
owned MSR, what other companies were owned by the same
individuals or organizations and what work these other compa-
nies were doing.
During this discussion Webb informed the union officials
that MSR or a related company was moving machinery at the
ACII Sheldon Road Detroit Thermal facility with using some
nonunion labor (GC Exh. 6, Tr. 211–216).
At the end of the meeting, O’Donnell told Webb that “an
email wasn’t good enough,” (Tr. 188, 244).2 I infer that what

1 O’Donnell testified that he never saw the email until early 2014.
Gonzalez did not testify in this proceeding.
2 O’Donnell does not recall whether or not he made such a statement
at the February meeting, Tr. 244.
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. 7
O’Donnell was communicating to Webb was that he could not
prevent the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement from
rolling over simply by emailing the Union. At this point, Re-
spondent still had a day to send the Union a certified letter
within the 90-day window for opting out of the successor con-
tract.
On March 1, Webb emailed O’Donnell and Gonzalez identi-
fying other companies owned in whole or in part by Source
Capital. One of these was MS Industrial Services in Burton,
Michigan. At the hearing, Webb testified that MS Industrial
Services was a “dormant entity,” (Tr. 211–212).
The Union’s grievance and information request
Based on its conversation with Gerald Webb on February 28,
the Union filed a grievance with the Joint Grievance Board of
the Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Association on March
12. The grievance alleges that Mid-States Industrial Services, a
sister company of MSR, was performing rigging work with
non-union labor at the Detroit Thermal project.
On March 18, the Union submitted an extensive information
request to Respondent, which probed the relationship between
Respondent MSR, Mid-States Industrial Services and Source
Capital.
Respondent has not provided the Union with the following
information that it requested on March 18:
A list of all of MSR’s accounts receivable since January 1,
2008;
A list of all of MSR’s accounts payable since January 1, 2008;
The names and addresses of all suppliers of materials, ser-
vices or equipment for MSR since January 1, 2008;
Copies of all invoices submitted to MSR for supplies, materi-
als, services or equipment since January 1, 2008;
The names and addresses of all attorneys providing legal ser-
vices to MSR since January 1, 2008;
MSR’s check registers since January 1, 2008;
All MSR’s corporate records;
All Source Capital’s corporate records;
All organizational charts for Source Capital;
All documents relating to the wages and benefits provided to
hourly employees, including iron workers, by MSR since
January 1, 2008;
All documents that relate to the project for Detroit Thermo at
the AC II Sheldon Road Plant.
On July 17, 2017, Respondent via its attorney provided much
of the other information requested by the Union on March 18.
He stated that there is not and was never any such entity called
Mid-States Industrial Services. Respondent asserted that some
of the information requested was confidential and that some of
the requests were vague, overly broad, and unduly burdensome.
Respondent did not offer to make any accommodation with the
Union to balance the parties’ competing interests.
Labor performed by Local 25 members for
Respondent MSR
For several days in late April and early May 2013 several
Local 25 members worked for MSR demolishing and scrapping
2 steel smokestacks at a site in Flint, Michigan. Respondent’s
management representatives, Clint Goettl and Mazen Banat
offered these employees work at a wastewater treatment site in
Dexter, Michigan, which was to start later in May.
Four Local 25 ironworkers began work at the Dexter site,
which is near Ann Arbor, Michigan, in mid-May.3 The project
involved removing two digesters (or tanks)4 from a huge circu-
lar concrete structure and cutting up the digesters with torches
so that the pieces could be transported to a scrap yard. The job
also entailed building two new digesters and installing them
inside the concrete structure. The digesters look like a large
steel hut. They have sides and a roof, but no floor (GC Exhs.
8–12). The sides of the digester have gaps between the metal
components; thus it appears that liquids could not be held in-
side a digester. When operational, the digesters float on liquid
waste inside the concrete structure.
The four Local 25 members worked through Friday, May 31,
2013, and were paid during this period according to the 2010–
2013 collective-bargaining agreement. On May 31, Respond-
ent’s representative, Clint Goettl, told the four ironworkers that
MSR no longer had a contract with their union and that they
would have to leave the site.
However, Goettl also told the four at some point on May 31,
that they could continue to work at Dexter at the prevailing
wage without the fringe benefits called for by the Union con-
tract, e.g. (Tr. 105–109). He did not contact the Union before
making this offer to the four employees. The employees left
the jobsite.
Goettl’s offer to employees of work at the prevailing wage
was repeated in a letter signed by Acting CEO Webb and deliv-
ered to the employees (GC Exh. 7). Although this letter is dat-
ed May 31, the record does not reflect when employees re-
ceived it.
In late June Respondent notified a Board agent that its offer
of employment at the prevailing wage at the Dexter project was
still open. The Board agent transmitted this information to the
Union which then gave its members permission to work under
this arrangement. Three union members began working at
Dexter again on June 27. A considerable amount of work had
been performed on the digesters between May 31 and June 27
by other persons.
One of the employees who began working at Dexter on June
27, Erin Early, had worked at Dexter in May. Roger Shultz,
another of the three, worked at Dexter from June 27 to July 19.
Between July 20 and August 15, 2013, the work on digesters
was performed by Early, Local 25 member Michael Steele and
Respondent’s project superintendent Clint Goettl. Most of this
work entailed welding and grinding the metal components of
the digester. The Local 25 members’ work at Dexter ended on
August 15 when it became apparent that the digester would not
fit inside the concrete structure as it was supposed to.

3 Three of the four appear to have started working at Dexter on May
13; Erin Early apparently worked 12 hours during the prior week, Jt.
Exh. 1.
4 Respondent argues that the digesters are not tanks. The collective-
bargaining agreement specifies that Local 25 has jurisdiction over all
processing tanks.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
Notice to the FMCS
On May 31, 2013, James Parks, then representing Respond-
ent, sent a letter to the Federal Conciliation and Medication
Service stating that the Union had refused to negotiate with
Respondent and was threatening to strike on June 3 (GC Exh.
20). Respondent did not so notify the Michigan conciliation
and mediation agency of its dispute with the Union.
Analysis
Respondent is not bound to the terms of the 2013–2019
collective-bargaining agreement
In deciding whether Respondent is bound by the terms of the
Union’s 2013–2019 collective-bargaining agreement with the
GLFEA, I apply the contract law rule that ambiguous terms will
be construed against the drafter of the contract when the
nondrafter’s interpretation is reasonable, e.g., Hills Materials
Co., v. Rice, 982 F. 2d, 516 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Board has
applied this principle in interpreting employers’ rules which are
ambiguous as to their application to protected activity, e.g.,
Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLB 1236, 1245 (1992). I conclude
that Respondent is not bound by the terms of the new contract
because the ambiguity as to which provision of the 2010–2013
agreement governs inures to the detriment of the Union.
In this vein, I conclude that Respondent’s interpretation of
the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement, is reasonable
and the tension between Section XXVI and the “me-too” signa-
ture page, must be resolved against the Union, since it partici-
pated in the drafting of the 2010–2013 agreement and Re-
spondent did not.
Moreover, I find that Respondent’s interpretation of Section
XXVI is also reasonable. Thus, even if Section XXVI takes
precedence over the signature page, the collective-bargaining
agreement was only renewed by 1 year, not 6, if Respondent is
bound by its failure to send the Union a certified letter. Finally,
the equities in this case clearly dictate that Respondent is not
bound by the 2013–2019 agreement. The purpose of the certi-
fied letter requirement must be to avoid any dispute as to
whether one party communicated to another its desire to change
or terminate the 2010–2013 agreement. Here that purpose was
clearly served in that the Union had actual notice that Respond-
ent desired a change to terms of the agreement more than 90
days before its expiration. See The Oakland Press, 229 NLRB
476, 478–479 (1977); Champaign County Contractors Assn.,
210 NLRB 467, 470 (1974) [Actual notice of intent to modify
or terminate a collective bargaining agreement is sufficient
even when not technically adequate].
Lock-out, constructive discharge, and direct dealing
The allegations of lock-out, direct dealing, and constructive
discharge are all linked together, factually and legally. These
allegations all stem from the fact that Respondent informed unit
employees on May 31, the day the 2010–2013 contract expired,
that if they continued working for it the next week , they would
do so under the prevailing wage and not under the terms of the
new or old collective-bargaining agreement.
Constructive Discharge
The Board has held that an employee is constructively dis-
charged when it is shown that (1) the employer established
burdensome working conditions sufficient to cause the employ-
ee to resign and (2) the burden was imposed because of the
employee’s union activities, KRI Constructors, 290 NLRB 802,
813–814 (1988). First of all, I find that requiring employees to
work at $58 per hour (the prevailing wage) instead of for the
Union wage and benefit package of approximately $60 per
hour, does not constitute sufficiently burdensome working con-
ditions to cause employees to quit.
Moreover, this is not a case like White-Evans Service Co.,
285 NLRB 81 (1987), cited by the General Counsel. Here em-
ployees were not faced with the choice of relinquishing their
right to bargain collectively or quit. Employees could have,
after consulting with the Union, gone on strike, continued
working with the union’s permission or possibly continued
working after resigning from the Union.
Lockout
The record reflects that before these employees left work on
May 31, they were told that they could continue working at the
Dexter Treatment Plant for the prevailing wage, e.g., testimony
of Darryl Karpuk at Tr. 105–109. Thus, I find that Respondent
did not lockout these employees; they went on strike.
Respondent’s failure to comply with Section 8(d) of the Act
and consequently with Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
Section 8(d) requires prohibits a party to a collective-
bargaining agreement from terminating or modifying the con-
tract unless it complies with 4 requirements:
(1) Serve written notice upon the other party to the contract of
the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to
expiration date of the contract. Respondent complied with
this requirement.
(2) Offer to meet and confer with the other party for the pur-
pose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing
such modifications. I find that Respondent complied with this
requirement.
(3) Notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) within thirty day of the existence of a dispute and
simultaneously notify any state mediation and conciliation
agency. It is undisputed that Respondent did not comply with
this requirement.
(4) Continue in full force without a strike or lockout all terms
and conditions of the existing contract for sixty days after no-
tice is given or the expiration of the contract whichever is lat-
er. It is undisputed that Respondent did not continue the
terms of the 2010-13 contract for 60 days after giving notice
to the FMCS.
A failure to comply with Section 8(d) is by definition a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). It is clear that a Union’s fail-
ure to timely notify the FMCS of a dispute may render a strike
unprotected, Boghosain Raisin Packing Co., 342 NLRB 383
(2004). This consequence is specifically set forth in Section
8(d). The consequences of an employer’s failure to comply
with the requirement to timely notify the FMCS is not explicit-
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. 9
ly set forth in the statute. However, it stands to reason that
there are consequences, one of which would be that such an
employer is precluded from making unilateral changes in the
terms and conditions of bargaining unit employees, Nabors
Trailers, 294 NLRB 1115(1989).
Respondent argues at page 12 of its brief that its violation of
this requirement was essentially de minimis since the Union
made it clear that MSR had a choice of accepting the GLFEA
contract or nothing. In Boghosian Raisin, supra, the Board
majority by rejected the dissent’s plea to apply “equitable prin-
ciples.” Consistent with the majority in that case, I find there-
fore that Respondent was not privileged to unilaterally change
the terms of unit employees’ compensation. Therefore, I find
that Respondent was required to maintain the terms of the
2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement for 60 days follow-
ing its May 31, 2013 notification to the FMCS.
Given the fact that Respondent was obligated to maintain the
contractual terms for 60 days following its May 31 notice to the
FMCS, I find that unit employees engaged in an unfair labor
practice strike between June 3 and 27, 2013.
However, by allowing unit employees to return to work on
June 27, 2013, under conditions different than those specified
in the 2010–2013 contract, the Union waived any objections it
had to those changes after that date. Therefore, I find that the
consequences of Respondent’s failure to comply with Section
8(d) (and therefore Section 8(a)(5) and (1)) is that it must make
the unit employees who worked for it on May 31 whole for the
period June 3–27, 2013. It must also compensate Erin Early
and Michael Steele for the difference between the prevailing
wage and the collective-bargaining agreements for the period
from June 27 to the expiration of 60-day period mandated by
Section 8(d), i.e., July 30, 2013. Respondent must compensate
Roger Schultz for this difference for the period June 27 to July
19, when his employment terminated.
Direct Dealing
It is undisputed that Respondent dealt directly with unit em-
ployees on May 31, 2013, with respect to their compensation
instead of going through their exclusive collective-bargaining
representative. It violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in doing so,
Obie Pacific, Inc., 196 NLRB 458 (1972).
Respondent’s assertion that the Dexter work was not covered
by the 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agreement.
Respondent asserts that digesters are not tanks and therefore
the work at Dexter was not covered by the 2010–2013 contract
between the Union and GLFEA. I conclude that by employing
union members at Dexter and compensating them pursuant to
the 2010–2013 contract, Respondent has waived any such ar-
gument. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Respondent’s
agents, Goettl and Mazen Banat recruited the union ironwork-
ers for the Dexter project, while they were working in Flint
several weeks before the Dexter project started. By doing so
Respondent gave the Union every reason to believe that the
work at Dexter was within the Union’s jurisdiction. Therefore,
I conclude Respondent waived or is estopped from arguing that
the Dexter work was not covered by the collective-bargaining
agreement, see Dixie Sand & Gravel Co., 231 NLRB 6, 8
(1977).
The Information Requests
Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of its
employees. An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general
duty to provide information needed by the bargaining repre-
sentative for contract negotiations or administration, NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956). Information
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit is presumptively
relevant, Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235
(2005). In this matter, I conclude the presumption of relevance
dates from June 1, 2011, when Respondent became party to the
GLFEA contract. Thus, I find that the General Counsel has not
established the relevance of the information the Union request-
ed pertaining to dates prior to June 1, 2011. Respondent there-
fore violated the Act only with regard to documents dated June
1, 2011, to May 31, 2013.
An employer must respond to an information request in a
timely manner. An unreasonable delay in furnishing such in-
formation is as much of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
as a refusal to furnish the information at all, American Signa-
ture Inc., 334 NLRB 880, 885 (2001).5
If an employer has a claim that some of the information re-
quested is confidential or unduly burdensome to produce, such
claims must be made in a timely fashion, Detroit Newspaper
Agency, 317 NLRB 1071, 1072 (1995). The reason a confiden-
tiality claim must be timely raised is so that the parties can
attempt to seek an accommodation of the employer’s confiden-
tiality concerns, Tritac Corp., 286 NLRB 522 (1987). The
same is true with respect to a claim that satisfying the request
would be unduly burdensome, Honda of Hollywood, 314
NLRB 443, 450–451 (1994); Pet Dairy, 345 NLRB 1222, 1223
(2005).6
If an employer declines to supply relevant information on the
grounds that it would be unduly burdensome to do so, the em-
ployer must not only timely raise this objection with the union,
but also must substantiate its defense. Respondent has done
neither. Respondent did not advise the Union that its request
was unduly burdensome until July 17. It never sought clarifica-
tion from the union in order to narrow the request, Pulaski
Construction Co., 345 NLRB 931, 937 (2005). There is no
doubt that production of the information may impose strains on
an employer, but that consideration does not outweigh the un-
ion's right to the information requested. H.J. Scheirich Co., 300
NLRB 687, 689 (1990).
Respondent has not advanced a sufficient excuse for either
its delay in providing the requested information or failing to
provide the information withheld. I find that it violated the Act
in both respects.
Conclusions of Law
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in the following
respects:
1. Failing to adhere to the terms of the 2010–2013 collec-
tive-bargaining agreement for 60 days after notifying the Fed-

5 This case has also been cited under the name of Amersig Graphics,
Inc.
6 Also cited as Land-O-Sun Dairies.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service of its dispute with the
Union.
2. Dealing directly with bargaining unit employees on May
31, 2013, instead of dealing with them via their exclusive col-
lective bargaining representative.
3. Failing to provide the Union the documents specified in
complaint paragraph 28(a) insofar as it requests information
from June 1, 2011, to May 31, 2013.
4. Failing to provide the information specified in complaint
paragraph 28(b) in a timely manner insofar as it requests infor-
mation from June 1, 2011, to May 31, 2013.
The Remedy
The Respondent, having illegally changed the terms and
conditions of employment of unit employees must make these
employees whole. Backpay shall be computed in accordance
with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
Respondent shall reimburse the discriminatees in amounts
equal to the difference in taxes owed upon receipt of a lump-
sum backpay award and taxes that would have been owed had
there been no discrimination. Respondent shall also take what-
ever steps are necessary to insure that the Social Security Ad-
ministration credits the discriminatees’ backpay to the proper
quarters on their Social Security earnings records.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended7
ORDER
The Respondent, MSR Industrial Services, LLC, Burton,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Changing the terms and conditions of employee’s wages,
hours, and/or other terms and conditions of employment during
a period when it is obligated to maintain the terms and condi-
tions of an expired collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Dealing directly with employees who are represented by
an exclusive collective-bargaining agent.
(c) Failing to provide or unreasonably delaying providing to
the Union any information that is or was requested by the Un-
ion and is or was relevant to its duties as collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent’s employees.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Erin Early, Darryl Karpuk, Tony Pena, and Jamie
Johnson whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suf-
fered as a result of Respondent’s illegal unilateral change in the
terms of their compensation, i.e., whatever they would have

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
earned had they not gone on strike due to Respondent’s failure
to maintain in effect the terms of the 2010–2013 collective-
bargaining agreement through July 30, 2013, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Make Erin Early, Michael Steele and Roger Schultz hole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result
of Respondent’s illegal unilateral change in the terms of their
compensation, i.e., whatever they would have earned had Re-
spondent maintained in effect the terms of the 2010–2013 col-
lective-bargaining agreement through July 30, 2013, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Provide the Union with the documents set forth in com-
plaint paragraph 28(a) insofar as the Union requests infor-
mation from the period June 1, 2011, to May 31, 2013.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Burton, Michigan facility copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since May 31, 2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., April 9, 2014.

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. 11
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this No-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT implement changes to your wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment during a period
when we are required to maintain the terms and conditions of
an expired collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT deal directly with you when you are represent-
ed by an exclusive bargaining representative, such as Local 25
of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Orna-
mental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL–CIO.
WE WILL NOT fail to provide your union or delay in providing
to your union information that is relevant to its duties as your
exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL compensate Erin Early, Darryl Karpuk, Tony Pena,
and Jamie Johnson for whatever compensation they were due
under the terms of our 2010–2013 collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Associa-
tion, through July 30, 2013.
WE WILL compensate Erin Early, Michael Steele, and Roger
Schultz for the difference between their compensation from
June 27, 2013, to July 30, 2013, and the compensation they
would have received had we adhered to the terms and condi-
tions of our collective-bargaining agreement with the Great
Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Association.
MSR INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC