Mountain View Health Care and Rehabilitation, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 23, 2019

04-CA-235894 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 23, 2019)

JD–66–19
Scranton, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
MOUNTAIN VIEW CARE AND
REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC
Respondent
and Cases 4–CA–235894 and
4–CA–238216
RETAIL, WHOLESALE, AND
DEPARTMENT STORE UNION
Charging Party
David Rodriguez, Esq., and
Samuel E. Schwartz, Esq.
for the General Counsel.
Brandon Williams, Esq., and
Glenn A. Parno, Esq.
for Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on July 8, 2019. The complaint alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating an employee about her
union activities and those of other employees, and Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
first suspending that same employee, Yolanda Ramos, and later discharging her
because of her activities on behalf of the Charging Party Union (hereafter, the Union).
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, also alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by changing its paid time off policy to a new policy and
eliminating employees’ accrued leave balances under the old policy without notifying the
Union that represents its employees or giving it an opportunity to bargain over the
changes. Respondent denied the essential allegations in the complaint. After the trial,
the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs, which I have read and
considered.
JD–66–19
2
Based on the filed briefs and the entire record, including the testimony of the
witnesses and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
5
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Pennsylvania limited liability company, provides rehabilitation
services and nursing home care in a nursing home located in Scranton, Pennsylvania.
In conducting its business operations during a representative 12-month period,10
Respondent received gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and purchased and
received at its location goods valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points outside
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of
the Act and a health care institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. I 15
also find, as Respondent admits, that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
20
A. The Facts
Background and Ramos’s Union Activity
Respondent took over operation of the nursing home from the previous owner in 25
March of 2018. There are some 180 people employed by Respondent at the nursing
home. On June 14, 2018, the Union was certified by the Board as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the following employees of Respondent:
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Certified Nursing Assistants30
(CNAs) and Restorative Aides employed by the [Respondent] at its 2309
Stafford Avenue, Scranton, PA facility.
Excluded: All other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
35
The parties started negotiations in the fall of 2018 and have been bargaining ever since.
As of the date of this trial, the parties had not reached a completed collective bargaining
agreement.
The Respondent also employs a number of dietary aides who are not part of the 40
bargaining unit described above and are not represented. Those employees, who
prepare food and serve it to residents, work in the Respondent’s kitchen and dining
room. Among those dietary aides is Yolanda Ramos, who worked for Respondent and
its predecessor from September 2016 to March 5, 2019, when she was fired by
Respondent.45
JD–66–19
3
In late February 2019, Ramos became interested in the Union after speaking with
a CNA who was represented by the Union. As a result, she signed a petition
authorizing the Union to represent the signers for collective bargaining. Over the course
of two days, February 28 and March 1, she talked to fellow dietary aides in support of
the Union, asking them to sign the petition as well. On Friday, March 1, 2019, in the 5
kitchen, she spoke to fellow dietary aide, Levi Kania, about signing the petition. Levi
said he was not sure about signing it and that he wanted to talk first to his father. Levi’s
father is Eric Kania, a supervisor, at the time, of the dietary employees. Eric was no
longer employed by Respondent at the time of the trial.
10
Respondent’s Reaction to Ramos’s Union Activity
Respondent became aware of the union solicitation between Ramos and Levi
Kania. Human Resources Director Linda Yaros talked to Levi and took a written
statement from him the same day. Levi’s statement, which is dated March 1, states that 15
Ramos asked him to sign a union petition and mentioned several benefits for going with
the Union. The statement also notes that both employees were “clocked in” at the time.
GC Exh. 12. Later, Yaros asked Levi to clarify his first statement and she obtained
another written statement from him, which is undated and is written on a separate piece
of paper; it sets forth the time of the union solicitation, that it took place in the kitchen,20
and that neither employee was on break at the time. Tr. 142, 145-146, GC Exh. 13.
Respondent’s highest ranking official on site, Administrator Donna Molinaro, never
spoke with Levi about the matter, although she read both statements and apparently
directed that the second one be taken. Tr. 166, 173,176, 158.
25
Yaros testified that Levi came to her “visibly upset” because he did not want to
sign anything having to do with a union. Tr. 136. I do not fully credit Yaros’s testimony
on this point. She was, as I describe later, not generally a reliable witness. Moreover,
Levi did not testify in this proceeding and neither of his written statements reflect the
concern attributed to him by Yaros. Indeed, his first one explains in some detail 30
Ramos’s remarks about the value of union representation, which suggests there was
not an immediate rejection of the matter by Levi. Even if it could be found, however,
that some kind of complaint was made, it is not clear what exactly the complaint was or
whether it was encouraged in whole or in part by Yaros. It is well settled that the Act
allows employees, like Ramos, to “engage in persistent union solicitation even when it 35
annoys or disturbs the employees who are being solicited.” And an employer’s
invitation to employees to report instances of “harassment” by employees engaged in
union activity is itself a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Ryder Truck Rental, 341
NLRB 761, 761 (2004), enf’d 401 F.3d. 815 (7th Cir. 2005).
40
The following work day, Monday, March 4, Ramos was asked to come in to work
30 minutes before the beginning of her normal shift and report to Yaros’s office. When
she arrived, she was met by Yaros and Administrator Donna Molinaro. Molinaro asked
whether Ramos had talked to fellow employees about a union petition. Ramos at first
denied that she had. Molinaro then said she would investigate the matter and check the 45
work-place cameras. Molinaro also asked Ramos to submit a written statement about
JD–66–19
4
the matter. Ramos did so, but then, within minutes, she admitted that her previous
statement was untrue and that she had indeed asked someone to sign a union petition.
At that point, Molinaro asked why Ramos would lie about the matter. Ramos replied
that she was told, if anyone from management asked her about her union activity, she
should deny her involvement. Tr. 44. Yaros confirmed that Ramos said during this 5
meeting that “she was told not to say anything because she would get in trouble if she
said she was doing it for union purposes.” Tr. 138; see also Tr. 148. Molinaro then
asked who told Ramos to lie about her union activity and Ramos refused to answer the
question.1
10
A one-page document dated March 4, 2019 and in Ramos’s handwriting is in
evidence as GC Exh. 5. It states in its first paragraph, “I have asked a coworker if they
would like to join a union on Friday, March 1st,” followed by Ramos’s signature. In the
second paragraph, further down the same page, it states, “I recently told Director and
Human Resources that I didn’t because someone told me if I was asked to completely 15
deny it,” also followed by Ramos’s signature.
At the March 4 meeting, Ramos was suspended. She was issued a form notice
of disciplinary action memorializing her suspension that stated she was “suspended per
Administrator pending the investigation of the ‘union’ petition.” No other reason was 20
given on the notice. Nor was any other reason given orally for the suspension during
the meeting by either of the management representatives. Tr. 46, 159-160. Ramos
signed the notice as did both Yaros and Molinaro. GC Exh. 6.
The next day, March 5, Ramos was asked to come into the facility for a meeting. 25
At the March 5 meeting, which again included Molinaro and Yaros, Ramos was told by
Molinaro that she was being terminated for violating Respondent’s no-solicitation policy.
She was presented with the same form notice of disciplinary action she was presented
the day before. This time, the notice set forth her termination. In the section titled
“nature of violation,” a handwritten notation, “solicitation policy” appeared next to the 30
circled word “other” on the form. The violation was described as follows in a
handwritten notation:

1 The above is based on the credible testimony of Ramos, much of which is corroborated by the other
witnesses in the meeting, Yaros and Molinaro. To the extent that there were differences, Ramos’s
testimony was the most credible, as I point out later in the credibility section of this decision. Her
testimony also made the most sense considering the context of the meeting and the documentary evidence
associated with it. As shown below in the credibility section, I did not find Molinaro to be a reliable
witness. She did, however, admit that she asked a question to initiate the meeting although she was
somewhat evasive in describing it. There is some confusion as to who asked the last questions about why
Ramos would lie about engaging in union activity and who asked Ramos to lie about it, but Molinaro
admitted that it was she who asked these questions. Molinaro’s testimony in this respect was also evasive
because she seemed to go out of her way to avoid any reference to the union, but it is obvious from the
context that these inquiries were, like the first question, about Ramos’s union solicitation. See Tr. 159,
168-169. Significantly, in her testimony about these questions and answers, Molinaro did not mention, as
Yaros testified, that Ramos explained, in the meeting, that she lied about her union activity, because
otherwise she would get in “trouble.”
JD–66–19
5
On 3/1/19, after clocking in, you solicited a fellow employee who was also on
the clock in a work area. In a statement you provided on 3/4/19, you admitted
this violation. Per Mt. View’s Progressive Discipline Policy, a violation of mt.
View’s Solicitation Policy is a Group IV violation, which alone results in
termination for a first offense. Additionally, you have a prior discipline from5
August of 2018 which also applies, placing you well over the threshold for
termination. GC Exh. 7. 2
At the termination meeting, Ramos asked to see the no-solicitation policy. Even
though Molinaro had a copy of the handbook containing the policy in her hands, she 10
would not show the applicable no-solicitation policy to Ramos. At first Molinaro could
not find the no-solicitation policy in the handbook, which is 70 pages in length and
contains many other rules and policies. Then, Molinaro said she would have to ask
Respondent’s attorney if Ramos could see the no-solicitation policy. Ramos never was
shown the no-solicitation policy at this meeting. Nor has she ever been shown the no-15
solicitation policy and did not even know that Respondent had such a policy. Tr. 47-48.3
Respondent’s No-Solicitation Policy in Writing and in Practice
At the end of July or the beginning of August 2018, all of Respondent’s 20
employees were presented with Respondent’s 70-page handbook, which contained,
among many other rules, the two-page no-solicitation policy at pages 42 and 43. The
effective date of the handbook was August 1, 2018. Tr. 55, 131-133. R. Exhs. 1-3.4 But
there is no evidence that the two-page no-solicitation policy was highlighted or
separately brought to the attention of employees, contrary to a specific 25
acknowledgement that the employees understood Respondent’s non-discrimination
policy (see R. Exh. 3). There is uncontradicted testimony that, despite management
having held many meetings with employees about work-related rules, it never had
meetings about the no-solicitation policy, including any exceptions or any required
permission. Nor is there evidence that Respondent sent memos to employees notifying 30
them specifically about or emphasizing the no-solicitation policy. Tr. 48-49, 61, 96-97.
It is also conceded that Ramos’s discharge was the only discipline that Respondent
ever issued for violation of the no-solicitation policy. There were no documents

2 The no-solicitation policy set forth at pages 42-43 of the Respondent’s handbook bans, among other
things, “[s]olicitation by employees in non-resident care areas while on working time.” The policy also
states that “[c]ollections for charitable purposes shall be considered solicitations for the purposes of this
policy, unless approved by the Administrator.” The policy further states that employees who participate
or assist in solicitation that violates the policy are subject to disciplinary action up to and including
termination. The Respondent’s handbook states in another section, at pages 63-65, that violation of the
no-solicitation policy permits, but does not require, a discharge for a first offense.
3 The above is based on the credible uncontradicted testimony of Ramos. Neither Yaros nor Molinaro
denied that Ramos asked to see the no-solicitation policy or the rest of Ramos’s testimony about not being
shown the policy.
4 The handbook may have been distributed to different employees at different times. The record
mentions several dates, including one reference to August 8 (Tr. 178). For reasons of clarity, however, I
will accept as its distribution date its effective date, August 1, 2018.
JD–66–19
6
submitted by Respondent in response to a General Counsel subpoena for documents
that showed such discipline. Tr. 126-127, GC Exh. 11.
The evidence shows that Respondent permitted much open work-time solicitation
to sell and actual sales by employees without any sort of discipline. Four employees, 5
including Ramos, testified in detail that such solicitations and sales were done openly by
employees with the knowledge of, and sometimes the participation by, supervisors on
work time and in work areas after the Respondent took over the facility in March 2018,
including after the distribution of the handbook in August of 2018. No permission was
sought or given for these solicitations, some of which were advertised by posted 10
notices. Cash was exchanged, transactions documented, and, in one case, tables set
up for the sale of items. No one was disciplined for this activity and the employees
testified that they were unaware of any rule against this activity or solicitation in general.
The items sold and solicited included candy for the school projects and trips of children
of employees, girl scout cookies, raffle tickets, and the sale and purchase of purses, 15
scarves and jewelry items from a business entity called Sophisticated Lady, which
remained at the facility for “[a] few hours” (Tr. 99). See Tr. 49-53, 66-73, 91-92, 95-105,
109-112,115-118.5
I reject testimony from Molinaro, and to a lesser extent from Yaros, that all the 20
work-time solicitations tolerated by Respondent were treated as charitable contributions
and that Molinaro approved them all, as permitted by an exception to the Respondent’s
no-solicitation policy. As indicated below, I found both generally unreliable witnesses.
Their testimony on this point is contrary the more credible and mutually corroborated
testimony of employee witnesses on the issue. Molinaro’s testimony also amounted to25
a conclusory and general catch-all answer without any supporting detail. There was no
documentary support for what constituted a charitable contribution or for Molinaro’s
asserted approvals. Moreover, in view of the extensive examples of tolerated work-time
solicitations and sales described above, one of which lasted a few hours, it is hard to
square Molinaro’s testimony in this respect with her other testimony that she was30
concerned only with work-time solicitations and even conversations that were “deterring
[employees] from their job duties.” Tr. 171. 6
In any event, as I point out in the analysis section of this decision, well settled
Board law does not permit employers to discriminate in their treatment of the 35

5 Yaros confirmed that, during her entire 25-year tenure in the human relations department at the
facility, including under the former owner, such solicitations took place without any discipline. Tr. 28.
6 Respondent’s position that the tolerated work-time solicitations described in this record were
considered approved charitable contributions fails even apart from the testimonial evidence. Its no-
solicitation policy makes clear that “collections for charitable contributions” are considered solicitations
unless they are approved by the Administrator. But, in the absence of documentary evidence defining the
term, the examples of tolerated work-time solicitations described in this record were not collections for
charitable contributions as those words are ordinarily understood. The solicitations and sales involved
transactions where cash was either promised or exchanged for items passing from seller to buyer. These
were commercial transactions. Even if part of the proceeds went to a charity that does not bring them into
the realm of collections for charitable contributions.
JD–66–19
7
solicitations, as described above, and to discipline only union solicitation. This is true
whether the employer considers them charitable contributions or not or whether they are
approved by management or not.
Credibility5
I found Ramos to be an entirely credible witness, whose testimony was
consistent with the context of the entire story of her activity and Respondent’s treatment
of that activity. She exhibited complete candor and a lack of guile. Her testimony was
direct and detailed and survived strong cross-examination. Her testimony about the 10
meetings with Yaros and Molinaro was often consistent with their testimony, and, in one
particular case—that involving her request for a copy of the no-solicitation policy at the
termination meeting, was uncontradicted. Moreover, her testimony about other work-
time solicitations tolerated by Respondent was corroborated by other employee
witnesses.15
In contrast, I found Yaros and Molinaro to be unreliable witnesses. Yarros in
particular reflected a lack of candor in her demeanor. I have earlier rejected her
testimony about the alleged concern Levi reported to her about the union solicitation.
She often could not remember dates and times, the locations of meetings, or what 20
happened in what meeting. For example, she testified that the suspension meeting was
in Molinaro’s office, but both Ramos and Molinaro testified that the meeting was in her
office. She also seemed to suggest that Ramos wrote some of her statement in the
second meeting, which is contrary to the testimony of both Ramos and Molinaro and
contrary to uncontested fact and common sense. Most importantly, Yaros suggested 25
that violation of the no-solicitation policy was mentioned in the suspension meeting. Tr.
138, 151-152. On this point, she seemed to have been prodded by a leading question
on the subject earlier put to her by Respondent’s counsel, which resulted in an objection
that was sustained. Tr. 136. But it is clear from Yaros’s pre-trial affidavit that that
policy was not mentioned at all in the suspension meeting. Tr. 153-155, G.C. Exh. 14. 30
Indeed, Molinaro conceded that “there was no mention of the solicitation policy” at that
meeting. Tr. 159.
Molinaro was also not a reliable witness. I have earlier rejected her testimony
about the tolerated work-time solicitations. Significantly, Molinaro’s testimony about her 35
first question to Ramos in the suspension meeting was somewhat of a circumlocution to
avoid mentioning the word “union.” Here is her testimony: “I just said that an employee
had some concerns that you had approached them while they were working and asked
you to sign a petition. I didn’t talk about what the petition was or what he claimed it was.
That’s all I had asked her.” Tr. 159. But Molinaro signed the suspension notice, which 40
specifically stated that Ramos was being suspended pending an investigation about the
“union” petition. In addition, Molinaro was aware prior to the meeting of Levi’s first
written statement, which clearly stated that the solicitation by Ramos was a union
solicitation. Moreover, Ramos’s two statements were clearly framed in the context of
union solicitation. In these circumstances, Ramos’s testimony that union solicitation was 45
a specific part of Molinaro’s admitted first question is far more credible than what I
JD–66–19
8
considered Molinaro’s evasive testimony on the point. In addition, as indicated above at
footnote 1, I also viewed Molinaro’s testimony about her last questions to Ramos—why
she lied about not engaging in union solicitation and who told her to lie—as evasive.
Not only was Molinaro evasive in some of her testimony, but she also 5
embellished her testimony beyond what would be expected from a credible witness.
She seemed to be intent on supporting Respondent’s litigation theory. For example,
she went out of her way to add an additional element to Ramos’s alleged dereliction—
the harm Ramos’s brief union solicitation in the kitchen caused Respondent, particularly
threats to “resident safety” or “patient safety.” Tr. 166-167, 170. Molinaro’s testimony 10
about resident safety concerns was unconvincing and she ultimately admitted that there
were no connections to patient safety in Ramos’s union solicitation. Tr. 171-173.
Molinaro also conceded that all kinds of conversations go on during work time, which do
not concern her unless they interfere with work. Tr. 171. But she never mentioned
work-time interference with work in the suspension meeting. And she never spoke to 15
Levi or anyone else in the kitchen about whether the union solicitation interfered with
work even after the suspension meeting when she was supposedly engaged in an
investigation of the Ramos union solicitation. Moreover, Molinaro initially testified that
she was concerned about Ramos’s alleged lying (Tr. 160), but she later admitted that, in
her view, that was not important because Ramos corrected the matter within minutes. 20
Tr. 161. I also found unconvincing Molinaro’s attempt to blame Yaros for adding a 6-
month old verbal unsatisfactory work warning to Ramos as a reason for the termination
in the termination notice, even though past disciplines were not necessary to support
the discharge. Tr. 167-168. Yaros denied that she added that language. Tr. 150.
Molinaro was, after all, the top Respondent official involved in the discharge. She25
presumably made the termination decision and is ultimately responsible for the decision,
as well as the termination notice and what it contains. Molinaro’s unreliability as a
witness leads me to conclude that I cannot rely on her testimony on any significant
issue in this case, particularly with respect to the alleged reason for the termination of
Ramos.30
The Change in Respondent’s Paid Time-Off Policy
Part of the case deals with a change in paid time-off (PTO) policy that applied to
unit employees represented by the Union. The predecessor employer had a PTO policy 35
that was continued under Respondent after it took over the nursing home in March
2018. That policy included 4 different types of paid time off: vacations, personal time,
paid holidays, and personal illness. They were combined to permit employees to bank
unused time off for future use. Employees were also permitted to purchase back 40
hours at a time of accrued time-off totals on a quarterly basis. They were also permitted 40
to cash out their totals at 100%. Running totals were provided to employees for each
type of time off periodically by email. Tr. 73-79, Jt. Exh. 1.
On or about August 1, 2018, Respondent distributed its handbook of applicable
rules to all employees. The handbook included a two-page description of it paid time-off 45
policy; it was contained at pages 26 to 29 of the 70-page handbook. Jt. Exh. 2. That
JD–66–19
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policy was different than the existing policy described above. But there is no evidence
that employees or the Union were specifically notified that the policy had changed.
Some of the changes in the PTO policy included an inability to carry over
accrued time off, thereby losing it if it was not used, and a difference in the cash-out 5
feature to 50% instead of 100%. These changes were described in detail by unit
employee Cynthia Young. Tr. 77, 78. Young described the changes in her own
situation at Tr. 79-82, 84-88 and 92-93, and submitted supporting documents in the
form of payroll information that were received in evidence as GC Exhs. 9 and 10.
10
Since the changes were to her detriment, Young went to Human Resources
Director Yaros to complain about the changes in the early part of 2019. Yaros told her
that there was a “glitch” in the payroll system and that the matter would be “straightened
out.” Tr. 89. Later, Young had occasion to again complain about a change the PTO
policy to her detriment. On that occasion, Yaros made a correction to give Young credit 15
for her deficiency in time-off hours. Tr. 89-90.
Unit employee Danielle Albano described a similar change and deficiency in her
time-off hours. She also brought her complaints about the changes to the attention of
Yaros, who told Albano, as she had told Young, that there was a glitch in the payroll 20
system and that “everything would be taken care of.” Tr. 105-106. But, according to
Albano, nothing was taken care of, despite repeated complaints to Yaros, who never
told Albano that she was not “getting her hours back.” Tr. 106-107.
The unit employees were never told that the PTO policy had changed even in 25
bargaining after negotiations began in October of 2018. Tr. 108. Nor was the Union
notified of such a change. According to the Union’s chief negotiator, Danie Tarrow, she
first learned from unit employees, in January of 2019, that the PTO balances of
employees had disappeared from their pay stubs and that they were told by
Respondent that they did not have any. Tr. 121-122. Before the Union found out about 30
the changes from the employees, Respondent never notified it of the changes in the
PTO policy, even though, in bargaining, Respondent submitted a PTO policy proposal
of its own, supposedly the one in the handbook, although that is not clear on this record.
Tr. 123. Tarrow also testified that, about a month before the start of negotiations, she
received a copy of the 70-page handbook from Respondent in response to a Union 35
request for information. Tr. 124.
The above is based on uncontradicted testimony and supporting documentary
evidence that Respondent does not dispute. Although the extent and exact dimensions
of the changes in the PTO policy are not altogether clear on this record, it is clear that 40
there were significant changes in the policy, all to the detriment of unit employees.
Respondent also stipulated that the payroll documents supporting the changes for all
unit employees would show the same changes as reflected in the payroll documents of
employee Young that were received in evidence. Tr. 128-129.
45
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B. Discussion and Analysis
The Questioning of Employee Ramos
Questioning employees about their union activities or those of others has long 5
been found to be unlawful “because of its natural tendency to instill in the minds of
employees fear of discrimination on the basis of the information the employer has
obtained.” NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1953). In
determining whether an employer’s questioning of employees about union activity
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board considers whether, in all the 10
circumstances, the questioning would reasonably tend to restrain, coerce or interfere
with the Section 7 rights of employees. Hard Hat Services, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 106,
slip op. 6-7 (2018), and cases there cited, including Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48
(2nd Cir. 1964), which lists the following relevant factors to be considered in determining
whether such questioning is coercive: 15
(1) The background, i.e., is there a history of employer hostility and
discrimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g. did the interrogation appear to be
seeking information on which to base taking action against individual 20
employees?
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high was he in the company
hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g. was employee called from work to the
boss’s office? Was there an atmosphere of “unnatural formality?”25
(5) Truthfulness of the reply.
While the Bourne factors are not to be mechanically applied, the last factor
mentioned above—the questioned employee’s understandable attempt to conceal union
activity—has been cited repeatedly in support of a finding of coercive interrogation. See30
Hard Hat Services, cited above; Bristol Industrial Corp., 366 NLRB No. 101, slip op. 2
(2018); Gunderson Rail Services, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 30, slip op. 36 (2016); Portola
Packaging, Inc., 361 NLRB 1316, 1337-1338 (2014); Camaco Lorain Mfg. Plant, 356
NLRB 1182, 1182-1183 (2011); and Sproule Construction Co., 350 NLRB 774, 774 fn. 2
(2007). An employee’s refusal to answer a question about the subject is likewise an 35
indicator of coercion. See Grill Concepts Services, Inc., 364 NLRB No 36, slip op. 16
(2016); and Chipotle Services LLC, 363 NLRB No. 37, slip op. 11-12 (2015).
Applying the above principles to the facts set forth in my credited findings, I find
that three aspects of the questioning of employee Ramos in the suspension meeting40
were coercive. Respondent was certainly entitled to get Ramos’s side of the story in a
meeting that focused only on whether Ramos misused work time or violated the facially
valid no-solicitation policy, although the inquiry had to be done carefully to avoid
suggestions or implications of discriminatory reprisals. But neither the subject of the no-
solicitation policy nor the notion that employees should not be engaged in non-work 45
conversations or activity on work time was ever raised during the suspension meeting.
JD–66–19
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Instead, Molinaro opened the meeting by asking Ramos whether she had asked an
employee to sign a union petition. Understandably, Ramos answered the question
untruthfully fearing that Respondent would not like a truthful answer, which, of course,
when eventually given, resulted in her termination. Indeed, Ramos testified that she
was “afraid of retaliation and getting fired.” Tr. 60. When Ramos recanted and admitted 5
she had indeed engaged in union solicitation, Molinaro asked why she would lie about
the matter. Ramos replied that she was told, if she was asked about union activity, she
should not say anything about it. Yaros’s version of Ramos’s reply is more realistically
ominous—Ramos was told she would get in “trouble” if she replied truthfully. Then
Molinaro asked Ramos who told her to conceal her union activity. Because that answer 10
might have implicated another employee, Ramos understandably refused to answer that
question. The questions whether Ramos engaged in union solicitation, why she would
lie about the union solicitation and who asked her to lie about her union solicitation all
went beyond the legitimate bounds of a proper inquiry about non-work work-time
activity. Those questions were thus coercive. 715
Other circumstances confirm the coercive nature of the questions. The setting of
the questioning was a meeting in the offices of the Human Resources Director and the
questioning was done by Respondent’s highest ranking official, the Administrator. The
purpose of the meeting was to inquire into what was described by Respondent, in 20
writing, as an incident of “union” solicitation. Moreover, as shown above, Ramos gave
one untruthful response and declined to answer another question. The case law cited
above recognizes that such responses are not only normal because of employee fears
that a truthful response might reveal information useful for subsequent retaliation, but
also recognizes that an untruthful response or a non-response is itself an indication of 25
coercion. Nor was the questioning limited or isolated; there were 3 different probing
questions in the meeting. Indeed, the meeting resulted in the discriminatory suspension
of Ramos, as shown below, an independent unfair labor practice. Accordingly, I find
that, in all the circumstances, the questioning of Ramos about her union activities and
those of others was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.30
The Suspension and Discharge of Employee Ramos
It is unlawful for an employer to punish an employee for engaging in union
activity. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act specifically prohibits such discrimination that tends to 35
discourage union activity. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954).
Although a discriminatory motive is usually part of the proof of a violation in these
cases, there is some conduct that carries with it “unavoidable consequences which the

7 Respondent turns the coercive questioning on its head by calling Ramos’s initial response—an
attempt to conceal her union activity—a lie. But calling her response a lie does not diminish the coercive
effect of questioning that results in an understandable concealment of activity that might well result in
retaliation. As Judge Posner has observed, “a lie related solely to one’s union affiliation or unionizing
intentions” is not a subject that warrants employer probing where, as here, that subject is not a proper
inquiry in the circumstances. Hartman Brothers v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2002) (lying
about union affiliation in an employment interview not germane to a legitimate inquiry into qualifications
for employment).
JD–66–19
12
employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended” and thus bears “its own
indicia of intent.” In those cases, the employer is required to prove that the conduct is
something different than what it appears on its face. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388
U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967), citing and discussing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221
(1963), where the Court found unlawful the grant of super-seniority for non-strikers. A5
document that on its face admittedly penalizes employees for engaging in union activity
surely falls within this category of violations.
Where a lawful reason is offered in support of an employer’s adverse
employment action alleged to be unlawful, an inquiry into motive is necessary and the 10
Board applies the mixed motive analysis set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enf’d on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
Under Wright Line, the General Counsel must satisfy an initial burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s protected or union activity was a 15
motivating factor in a respondent’s adverse action. If the General Counsel meets that
initial burden, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it would have taken the
same action even absent the employee’s protected activity. The respondent does not
meet its burden merely by showing that it had a legitimate reason for its action; it must
persuasively demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of 20
the protected conduct. And if the respondent’s proffered reasons are pretextual—either
false or not actually relied on—the respondent fails by definition to meet its burden of
showing it would have taken the action for those reasons absent the protected activity.
See Pro-Spec Painting, Inc., 339 NLRB 946, 949 (2003); and BHC Northwest
Psychiatric Hospital, 365 NLRB No. 79, slip op. 6 (2017).25
A showing of pretext also supports the initial showing of animus and
discrimination. See Wright Line, supra, 251 NLRB at 1088 n.12, citing Shattuck Denn
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966) (where a respondent’s
reasons are false, it can be inferred “that the [real] motive is one that the [respondent] 30
desires to conceal—an unlawful motive—at least where . . . the surrounding facts tend
to reinforce that inference.”). Moreover, a trier of fact may not only reject a witness’s
testimony about his or her reasons for an adverse action, but also find that the truth is
the opposite of that testimony. Pratt (Corrugated Logistics), LLC, 360 NLRB 304, 314
(2014), citing NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).35
Applying the above principles, I find that Respondent discriminatorily suspended
employee Ramos for union solicitation and thereafter discharged her for the same
reason.
40
It is clear that the suspension of Ramos on March 4, 2019, which was
accompanied by the unlawful interrogation described above, was itself discriminatory.
The Respondent’s own notice stated that Ramos was being suspended for her “union”
solicitation. No other reason was given for her suspension on the notice, even though
there was an option for giving other reasons on the form notice. And no other reason 45
was offered orally by either of the management representatives at the meeting they
JD–66–19
13
conducted during which Ramos was suspended. Significantly, the alleged violation of
Respondent’s no-solicitation rule that was mentioned for the first time in the subsequent
termination meeting was not an issue raised or discussed in the suspension meeting.
Since the admitted unlawful reason was the only reason for the action taken, there is no
mixed motive associated with the suspension and no occasion to engage in a Wright 5
Line analysis. Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s suspension of Ramos constituted a
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.8
Moreover, the discriminatory suspension colored Respondent’s decision made
the next work day—to discharge Respondent for the same act of union solicitation that 10
resulted in her suspension. But, here, after a so-called investigation, Respondent
added other reasons for her discharge, most notably a violation of Respondent’s no-
solicitation rule. Thus, consideration of the discharge case calls for a Wright Line
analysis. Because of the discriminatory suspension in the context of an unlawful
interrogation, the General Counsel has easily established the initial burden of proving 15
improper motivation for the discharge. And, as shown below, the Respondent has not
rebutted that initial showing by showing that it would have discharged Ramos in the
absence of her union activity.
With respect to Respondent’s assertion that it discharged Ramos for violating its 20
no-solicitation policy, it is settled law that rules prohibiting solicitation on working time
are presumptively lawful, but that presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the
employer permitted something more than isolated non-union solicitations during work
time and enforced its rule only against union solicitation. Thus, imposing discipline only
against an employee for union solicitation where there has been disparate application of 25
a valid rule is a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Verizon Wireless, 349
NLRB 640, 642 (2007). See also Hammary Mfg. Corp., 265 NLRB 57 (1982); W.D
Mechanical Manor Contractors, 357 NLRB 1526, 1526 n. 1 (2011); and Wal-Mart
Stores, 350 NLRB 879, 881 (2007). The disparate treatment in Verizon Wireless was
punishing union solicitation while tolerating the work-time solicitation and sale of items 30
such as candy, meals and Girl Scout cookies. 349 NLRB at 641. With respect to
tolerating similar sales and solicitations while punishing union solicitation, see also SNE
Enterprises, Inc., 347 NLRB 472, 473-474 (2006); and Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394,
394-395, 402, 411 (1983).
35
Turning to the asserted violation of the no-solicitation policy for the discharge of
Ramos, it is noteworthy, as I have mentioned, that the suspension that immediately
preceded her discharge did not mention violation of the no-solicitation policy. It appears
that that reason was dredged up during the post-suspension investigation, which
consisted only of an internal deliberation about facts already known and considered in 40
the unlawful suspension. The investigation did not address any non-discriminatory
concern for misuse of work-time, which would be a legitimate reason for the no-

8 Respondent’s contention (R. Br. 9) that the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate union animus
is absurd. Even apart from the unlawful interrogation of Ramos, which Respondent did not even address
in its brief, the suspension notice itself not only admits the anti-union animus but also admits the
causation for Respondent’s adverse action.
JD–66–19
14
solicitation policy’s ban on work time solicitation. Molinaro did not inquire of Levi or any
other dietary aide or even a supervisor about whether Ramos’s union solicitation
caused problems in “resident safety”, a concern she specifically expressed about the
union solicitation. Nor did she investigate how much time away from work the union
solicitation consumed, even though she conceded that employees could engage in 5
whatever conversations on work time they wanted, so long as they are “not deterring
from their job duties.” Tr. 171. The investigation apparently was addressed to finding
some reason to terminate Ramos that did not sound discriminatory, as did the
suspension notice.
10
I find that the asserted violation of the no-solicitation policy was not the real
reason for the discharge not only because it was an afterthought—not mentioned in the
earlier suspension, but because the policy was discriminatorily applied to Ramos.
Significantly, the suspension and discharge of Ramos constituted the only discipline of
any employee for the violation of its no-solicitation policy. And it was applied only to 15
discipline someone for union solicitation. Moreover, the evidence shows a disparate
enforcement of the policy because employees repeatedly and openly engaged in other
non-union solicitation on work time, including solicitation for the sale and the actual sale
of candy, other items, including jewelry, scarves and purses, and Girl Scout cookies—all
without discipline. Thus, the asserted violation of the no-solicitation policy was a pretext20
and cannot overcome the initial showing of discrimination in the termination of Ramos.
Rather use of this pretext strengthens the finding of discrimination. See St. Margaret
Mercy Healthcare Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 203-204 (2007).
Accordingly, I find that the discharge of Ramos for engaging in union solicitation 25
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Unilateral Changes
It is well settled that an employer who makes substantial and material changes to 30
existing terms and conditions of employment of represented employees without first
notifying the union that represents them and giving it an opportunity to bargain over the
changes violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
The changes in the computation of paid time off for the employees in the unit
represented by the Union are set forth in the factual statement. The changes obviously 35
involved terms and conditions of employment and Respondent does not deny that
changes were made in the existing PTO policy and that the Union was not notified or
given an opportunity to bargain about the changes. Respondent’s only defense to this
part of the case is that the relevant complaint allegation should be dismissed because a
charge was not filed within 6 months of the alleged change in violation of Section 10(b) 40
of the Act. Tr. 7-9. As shown below, Respondent’s defense is without merit.
Accordingly, Respondent’s unilateral change violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.9

9 Respondent did not raise a Section 10(b) defense in its answer, but I am permitting it to, in effect,
amend its answer to make that assertion because it was done at the beginning of the hearing and there is
no prejudice to the General Counsel.
JD–66–19
15
Respondent’s Section 10(b) defense is based on its contention that the Union
should have filed its unilateral change charge within 6 months of the distribution to unit
employees of the handbook that set forth Respondent’s new policy on paid off time. Tr
82-83. The handbook was distributed to unit employees on August 1, 2018, but there is
no evidence that the employees were alerted to the PTO policy that appears over the 5
course of two pages in the middle of the handbook or that the employees were told that
that policy was an actual change to existing PTO policy. The handbook was not
provided to the Union at that time; it was provided to the Union shortly before bargaining
began in October of 2018. But there was no specific notification to the Union at that
time of any change in the PTO policy. Nor is there any other evidence that the Union 10
had actual knowledge of the change until January of 2019 when it learned from unit
employees that they had found changes in their paid time off in their payroll information.
The charge was filed shortly thereafter, on February 13, 2019, well within 6 months of
the Union’s actual notification and knowledge of the alleged violation. Respondent
apparently contends that, since the handbook containing the PTO policy was distributed 15
to the employees on August 1, 2018, that distribution constituted constructive
knowledge of a change in policy attributed to the Union. According to Respondent, the
Union should have filed its charge within 6 months of August 1, which would have been
February 1, 2019, 12 days before the charge was actually filed. See Tr. 123-124.
20
It is settled law that the Section 10(b) period begins only after a party has “clear
and unequivocal notice of a violation.” Leach Corp., 312 NLRB 990, 991-992 (1993),
enfd. 54 F.3d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It is also settled that a respondent urging a Section
10(b) defense bears the burden of establishing that the charging party had such notice
more than 6 months before filing the charge. Nursing Center of Vineland, 318 NLRB 25
337, 339 (1995). In that case, the Board also stated that a union bargaining
representative is not presumed to have constructive knowledge of all changes in the
wages and benefits of unit employees whether or not employees expressly notified the
union of those changes. It further stated:
30
The concept of constructive knowledge incorporates the notion of “due
diligence,” i.e., a party is on notice not only of the facts actually known to
it but also facts that with “reasonable diligence” it would necessarily discovered.
Ibid.
35
The Board continued by stating that there is no strict rule that imputes employee
knowledge to a union bargaining agent. Rather, “whether unit employees’ knowledge is
imputed to their bargaining representative for purposes of determining when the 10(b)
limitations period commences depends of the factual circumstances.” Ibid.
40
The Respondent has not met its burden of proving that the Union had actual or
constructive notice of the unilateral change more than 6 months prior to its filing of the
relevant charge. There is no evidence that Respondent ever notified the Union of the
unilateral change and certainly none until well within the Section 10(b) period. Nor did
the employees notify the Union of the changes until January of 2019, again well within 45
the Section 10(b) period. The notion that distribution of the handbook to the employees
JD–66–19
16
on August 1, 2018, without more, was constructive notice to the Union is without merit.
The employees themselves did not realize that the handbook even contained a change
in the PTO policy, and they were not specifically notified of such a change by
Respondent. Indeed, there is evidence that, when employees noticed the change in
their paycheck stubs—and that was well within the 6-month period, they brought the 5
matter to the attention of Human Resources Director Yaros, who told them that the
change was a technical “glitch” that would be resolved. It never was, but the employees
were led to believe that the problem was not a substantive one and that there was no
change in policy. Thus, Respondent actually concealed the actual changes, which
would have tolled the limitations period in any event. See Burgess Construction, 227 10
NLRB 765, 766 (1977), enfd. 596 F.2d. 378 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 940
(1979).
Respondent’s position would require a finding that the Union had clear and
unequivocal notice of the violation on August 1, when the handbook was distributed to 15
employees, notwithstanding that its own director of human resources was telling
employees, well after that date, not to be concerned because their loss of hours was
only a payroll glitch that would be resolved. That does not make sense. In any event
there certainly was no way for the Union—or even the employees—to know, from what
Yaros was telling employees, that there had been a change of benefits. The Union did 20
not know for sure that there was a change until it learned from employees what was
happened to their paid time off hours in their payroll data. That occurred in January
2019. The Union then rather quickly filed the applicable charge, well within the Section
10(b) period. Accordingly, the charge in this case was timely filed and Respondent’s
Section 10(b) defense is rejected.25
Conclusions of Law
1. By coercively interrogating an employee about union activities,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.30
2. By discriminatorily suspending and thereafter discharging employee
Yolanda Ramos because of her union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
35
3. By unilaterally changing its paid time-off (PTO) policy without first
notifying the Union and giving it the opportunity to bargain over the change,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.

4. The above violations constitute unfair labor practices within the40
meaning of the Act.
Remedy
Since Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it must be 45
ordered to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and take certain affirmative
JD–66–19
17
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, including the posting of an
appropriate notice.10
Having unlawfully suspended and discharged Yolanda Ramos, Respondent must
offer her reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exits, to a substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority of any other rights or privileges 5
previously enjoyed. The Respondent shall also make Ramos whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits she may have suffered as a result of the unlawful
discrimination against her. The make whole remedy shall be computed in accordance
with F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as prescribed in New
Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River 10
Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). In accordance with King Soopers, Inc., 364
NLRB No. 93 (2016), enfd. in pertinent part 859 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2017), Respondent
shall compensate Ramos for search-for-work and interim employment expenses
regardless of whether those expenses exceed her interim earnings. Respondent shall
also compensate Ramos for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump 15
sum back pay award and file a report allocating backpay to appropriate years in
accordance with AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 143 (2016).
Respondent, having unilaterally and unlawfully changed the terms and conditions
of employment of unit employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Union, shall
rescind the changes it made in its existing PTO policies and make the affected 20
employees whole for any losses they have suffered as a result as a result of the
unilateral changes. The make whole remedy shall be computed in accordance with
Ogle Protection Service, Inc., 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971),
with interest as prescribed above. Adverse tax consequences or proper allocation of
backpay, if any, are to be handled as set forth above. 25
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue
the following recommended11
ORDER30
Respondent, Mountain View Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, its
officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from35

10 The General Counsel requests that the cease and desist order include specific language prohibiting
Respondent from discriminatorily applying its no-solicitation rule. G.C. Br. 31. But, although the matter
was litigated as part of the Ramos discrimination matter, discriminatory application of the rule was not
specifically alleged as a separate unfair labor practice. Thus, I will not include that specific language in
the cease and desist order. General Counsel also suggests (G.C. Br. 34-35) that the notice be read to
assembled employees. I do not believe that the unfair labor practices in this case, although serious,
warrant this additional remedy.
11 If no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purposes.
JD–66–19
18
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their union activities or
those of other employees.
(b) Suspending, discharging or otherwise disciplining employees
because of their union activity.
(c) Unilaterally changing existing wages, hours or terms and conditions 5
of employment, including the existing paid time-off policy, of employees represented
by Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union in the appropriate bargaining unit
without first notifying the Union and offering it an opportunity to bargain over the
changes.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or 10
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
15
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this order, offer Yolanda Ramos
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Yolanda Ramos whole for any loss of earnings and other20
benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth
in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Compensate Yolanda Ramos for the adverse tax consequences, if
any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director for
Region 4, within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by 25
agreement or Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar years.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this order, remove from its files any
reference to the unlawful suspension and discharge of Yolanda Ramos, and, within 3
days thereafter, notify her in writing that is has been done and that neither of the 30
unlawful actions will be used against her in any way.
(e) Restore the PTO policy as it existed before the unlawful unilateral
change and make whole any unit employees adversely affected by or who suffered
losses due to the unlawful unilateral changes to the PTO policy, including restoration of
accrued leave balances, made by Respondent in accordance with the remedy section of 35
this decision.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time
as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable
place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records,40
including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post, at its Scranton,
Pennsylvania facility, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
JD–66–19
19
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed 5
electronically, such as email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of10
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
March 4, 2019.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional 15
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated at Washington, D.C., August 23, 2019.
20
Robert A. Giannasi
Administrative Law Judge25

reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–66–19
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law
and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union.
Choose representatives to bargain with us or your behalf.
Act together with other employees for your
benefit and protection.
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate or question employees about their union activities.
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge or otherwise discipline employees because of their
union activities.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change existing wages, hours or terms and conditions of
employment of employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Retail, Wholesale,
and Department Store Union without giving it prior notice and an opportunity to bargain
over the change.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL offer Yolanda Ramos immediate and ful l reinstatement to her former
job, or if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights and privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Yolanda Ramos whole, with interest, for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of our discrimination against her, less net interim
earnings, plus reasonable search-for-work and interim employment expenses.
WE WILL remove from our files any references to the unlawful actions taken against
Yolanda Ramos, notify her that this has been done, and those unlawful actions will not
be used against her in any way.
JD–66–19
WE WILL compensate Yolanda Ramos for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 4,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar years.
WE WILL restore the paid time-off policy as it existed before we unlawfully changed it
and make whole, with interest, any employees who may have suffered losses by our
unlawful changes to that policy, including restoration of accrued leave balances.
MOUNTAIN VIEW CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in
1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections
to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your
rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You
may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov
Wanamaker Building, 100 Penn Square, East, Suite 400, Philadelphia, PA 19007
(215) 597-7601 Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-235894 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTIE OF
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354.