Motorola Mobility LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 19, 2020

15209527 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/209,527 07/13/2016 Xiaodong Xun MM02057-US-NP 5971
138908 7590 05/19/2020
Burrus Intellectual Property Law Group
(MM Files)
222 12th Street NE
Suite 1803
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
TRAN, KIM THANH THI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2612
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
BIPLaw_docketing@burrusiplaw.com
pburrus@burrusiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte XIAODONG XUN and YE YANG
Appeal 2019-002399
Application 15/209,527
Technology Center 2600
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, LARRY J. HUME, and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Motorola Mobility
LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-002399
Application 15/209,527

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a deformable electronic device and methods
and systems for display remediation to compensate performance
degradation. Claims 1, 9, and 15, reproduced below, are illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, with certain disputed limitations in italics:
1. An electronic device, comprising;
a deformable housing;
a flexible display supported by the deformable housing;
one or more flex sensors supported by the deformable
housing, the one or more flex sensors detecting when the
electronic device is deformed at a deformation portion to
partition the flexible display into a first portion and a second
portion; and
one or more processors operable with the flexible display
and the one or more flex sensors, the one or more processors
presenting content only on the first portion of the flexible display
in response to detecting the flexible display being deformed, and
remediating the second portion of the flexible display to
compensate performance degradation of the flexible display
resulting from the presenting content only on the first portion of
the flexible display.
9. An electronic device, comprising;
a deformable housing;
a flexible display supported by the deformable housing;
one or more flex sensors supported by the deformable
housing, the one or more flex sensors detecting when the
electronic device is deformed at a deformation portion to
partition the flexible display into a first portion and a second
portion; and
one or more processors operable with the flexible display
and the one or more flex sensors, the one or more processors
selecting one of the first portion or the second portion on which
to present content to remediate the one of the first portion or
the second portion to compensate performance degradation as
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a function of a content presentation history of the first portion
and the second portion.

15. A method, comprising:
detecting, with one or more flex sensors of an electronic
device, deformation of a flexible display by a bend;
determining, with one or more processors, a portion of
the flexible display, disposed to one side of the bend, and
requiring remediation to compensate performance degradation
of the flexible display resulting from the presenting content
more frequently to the one side of the bend or more frequently
to another side of the bend; and
remediating the portion of the flexible display.

(Claims App. 28–31). (emphases added).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Sirpal
Song
Jeong
Lin
Lee
Jin
Rakshit
US 2013/0076663 A1
US 2014/0118317 A1
US 2014/0306985 A1
US 2015/0042674 A1
US 2015/0146387 A1
US 2015/0348453 A1
US 2017/0017313 A1
Mar. 28, 2013
May 01, 2014
Oct. 16, 2014
Feb. 12, 2015
May 28, 2015
Dec. 03, 2015
Jan. 19, 2015
REJECTIONS
In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the rejections of claims 15–20
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and (b). Ans. 2.
Claims 1, 3, 9, 13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin and Song. Final Act. 4.
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Jin, Song, and Jeong. Final Act. 8.
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Claims 4 and 5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Rakshit. Final Act. 9.
Claims 6–8, 10, 12, 16, 17, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Sirpal. Final Act. 10.
Claims 11 and 18 are rejected under 5 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Lin. Final Act. 14.
Claims 14 and 19 are rejected under 5 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin, Song, Sirpal, and Lee. Final Act. 16.
OPINION
The invention is for systems and methods for repairing display
damage in an electronic device that can be folded. Appeal Br. 7. An
electronic device includes a flexible display that can be bent or folded. Id.
When the device is folded, one or more processors of the device present
content only on one side of the fold. Id.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under
§ 103. We have considered and reviewed all arguments made in the Briefs,
Final Rejection, and Answer, and we address each of Appellant’s arguments.
We note that regardless of the general contentions and imputed
intended meanings articulated by Appellant in the Appeal Brief, “[i]t is the
claims that measure the invention.” See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.
of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the
explanations contained in the written description, it is important
not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the
claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the
written description may not be read into a claim when the claim
language is broader than the embodiment.
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SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Electro Med. Sys. S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). “[A]lthough the specification often describes very
specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit has] repeatedly
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.” Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
Claim 1
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding that Jin and Song
teach or suggest the limitations of claim 1. In particular, Appellant disputes
that Song teaches “remediating the second portion of the flexible display to
compensate performance degradation of the flexible display resulting from
the presenting content only on the first portion of the flexible display.”
Appeal Br. 20.
The Examiner interprets “remediation” as a “very broad concept” that
means “doing something, such as changing, adjust turn on or turn off.”
Ans. 5. Appellant disputes that this claim construction is reasonable. Reply
Br. 8–10.
Appellant points to both a dictionary definition as well as to
Appellant’s Specification to explain the term “remediation.” Reply Br. 9–10.
First, Appellant submits that the dictionary definition of “remediation”
means “the action of remedying something, in particular of reversing or
stopping environmental damage.” Id. at 9 (citing New Oxford American
Dictionary, electronic version 2.2.2 (203.1) 2017). Additionally, Appellant
directs us to the Specification, which states, in part:
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It should be noted that “remediation” as this term is used in this
disclosure does not mean reversing the performance
degradation, as embodiments of the disclosure contemplate that
performance degradation 70 I is inevitable in many cases.
Accordingly, as used herein, "remediation" refers to executing
compensating methods and applying compensating systems to
lesser used portions of the flexible display 102, such as by
presenting content, tuning color, and/or brightness of the less
used portions so that all portions of the flexible display 102
achieve a substantially equivalent visual appearance when the
flexible display 102 is used in an undeformed configuration.
Accordingly, a remediated display is not devoid of performance
degradation, but instead ensures that any performance
degradation that may occur happens substantially equally along
all portions of the flexible display 102.

Reply Br. 10 (citing Spec. ¶ 75) (emphasis omitted).
Based on Appellant’s dictionary definition, remediate is the action of
remedying something, in particular of reversing or stopping environmental
damage. New Oxford American Dictionary, electronic version 2.2.2 (203.1)
2017. In the Specification, examples of remediation include presenting
content, tuning color, or tuning brightness. Spec. ¶ 75. Therefore, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, “remediation” is remedying or stopping
damage, such as by presenting content, tuning color, or tuning brightness.
Given this construction, Appellant provides insufficient evidence
showing that the Specification or claims limit “remediating” in a way that,
under a broad but reasonable interpretation, is not at least suggested by
Song’s teachings of interrupting a supply of electric power to an unselected
area of its display, as described in paragraph 70 of Song, because
interrupting power supply to an area could stop damage to a screen. As
noted above, regardless of the general contentions articulated by Appellant
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in the Appeal Brief, “[i]t is the claims that measure the invention.” SRI Int’l,
775 F.2d at 1121. The Examiner explains, and we agree, that Song describes
a way of not outputting separate data or interrupting a supply of power to an
unselected content viewing area when its flexible display is folded. Song
¶ 70.
Accordingly, giving the disputed limitation the broadest reasonable
construction, we agree that the combination of Song and Jin teach or suggest
“remediating the second portion of the flexible display to compensate
performance degradation of the flexible display resulting from the presenting
content only on the first portion of the flexible display,” as recited in
claim 1. In other words, the broadest reasonable construction of
“remediating” as recited in claim 1 does not preclude interrupting a supply
of power or not outputting content to an unselected content area when a
flexible display is folded.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1. For the same
reasons, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2, 7, and 8, which
depend from claim 1, and for which Appellant presents no additional
arguments.
Dependent Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and further recites, “the one or more
processors remediating the second portion of the flexible display by
presenting other content that is complementary to the content on the second
portion of the flexible display.” Claims App’x. (emphasis added). Appellant
argues that Jin and Song fail to teach “complementary” content on the
second portion of the display. Appeal Br. 23–24.
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Appellant directs us to paragraph 84 of the Specification to describe
“complementary content.” Id. Paragraph 84 gives one example of
complementary content as a mirror image of content being present on the
other side of the display, and gives another example of complementary
content as the presentation of content that is identical to that being presented
on the other side of the display. Id. Appellant argues that Song does not
teach presenting content on one portion of the display and complementary
content on another portion of the display. Id.; Reply Br. 11.
Giving the disputed limitation “complementary content” the broadest
reasonable construction, we agree that the combination of Song and Jin
teach or suggest “the one or more processors remediating the second portion
of the flexible display by presenting other content that is complementary to
the content on the second portion of the flexible display,” as recited in
claim 3. Song, in paragraph 50, describes outputting the functional area in a
display area other than the image screen. In particular, Song describes:
For example, a ratio of the functional screen selected first may
be allocated to a higher value according to a selection order in
which a plurality of functional screens are selected as the
content viewing area, and then the ratio of the selected
functional screen may be allocated to a lower value.
Alternatively, the screen output support unit 163 may apply the
resizing screen ratio differently according to the types of the
functional screens selected as a content viewing area. For
example, the screen output supporting unit 163 may maintain
the size of an image screen at a previous screen size while the
display area is changed due to the folding of the flexible display
140, and may adjust the size of another functional screen to
output the functional area in a display area other than the image
screen. Alternatively, the screen output supporting unit 163
may maintain or adjust the size of a text screen such that the
text screen has a minimum size for recognition of a letter, for
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example, a specific size preset by the user, and may provide
support to adjust and output a size of another functional screen
and output the size in an area where a specific text screen is not
displayed.
Song ¶ 50.
The broadest reasonable construction of “complementary” as recited
in claim 3 does not preclude outputting the content as described in Song
because the examples given in the Specification do not limit the content to
being only mirror image or identical content, nor does the claim further limit
the scope of what it means to be “complementary content.”
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 3. For the same
reasons, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 4–6, which depend
from claim 3, and for which Appellant presents no additional arguments.
Independent Claims 9 and 15
With respect to independent claim 9, Appellant points out that the
claim has a different scope than claim 1. Appeal Br. 25. In particular,
claim 9 adds the limitation that the remediation occurs as a function of the
content presentation history of the first portion or the second portion. Id. We
agree with Appellant that on this record, the Examiner does not sufficiently
identify where the cited references teach this limitation. See Ans. 7–9
(referring to claim 1 to reject claim 9); Final Act. 7 (“rejected for the same
rationale as claim 1”).
Similarly, with respect to independent claim 15, Appellant points out
that the claim has a different scope than claim 1. Appeal Br. 25. Claim 15
recites remediating one of a first portion or a second portion of a display to
compensate for performance degradation of the display due to content being
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presented more frequently on the other side of the display. Id. We agree with
Appellant that on this record, the Examiner does not sufficiently identify
where the cited references teach this limitation. See Ans. 8 (referring to
claim 1 to reject claim 15); Final Act. 8 (“rejected for the same rationale as
claim 1”).
Accordingly, on this record, we do not sustain the rejection of claims
9 or 15 under § 103. For these reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection
of dependent claims 10–14 or 16–20 under § 103.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed-in-part.
We affirm the rejection of claims 1 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Jin and Song.
We reverse the rejection of claims 9, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Jin and Song.
We affirm the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Jeong.
We affirm the rejection of claims 4 and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Rakshit.
We affirm the rejection of claims 6–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Sirpal.
We reverse the rejection of claims 10, 12, 16, 17, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Sirpal.
We reverse the rejection of claims 11 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Jin, Song, and Lin.
We reverse the rejection of claims 14 and 19 under 5 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Jin, Song, Sirpal, and Lee.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 9, 13,
15
103 Jin, Song 1, 3 9, 13, 15
2 103 Jin, Song, Jeong 2
4, 5, 103 Jin, Song, Rakshit 4, 5
6–8, 10, 12,
16, 17, 20
103 Jin, Song, Sirpal 6–8 10, 12,
16, 17, 20
11, 18 103 Jin, Song, Lin 11, 18
14, 19 103 Jin, Song, Sirpal, and
Lee
14, 19
Overall
Outcome:
  1–8 9–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART