Morton Salt Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 27, 1958

119 N.L.R.B. 1402 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

1402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Morton Salt Company and Manistee County Independent Union,
Inc., formerly known as Fallen Forge Workers' Union, Inc.
(Ind.) and District 50, United Mine Workers of America,'
and Its Local Union No. 12277, Parties to the Contract. Case
No. 7-CA-1433. January 27,1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 21, 1957, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in any unfair labor practices and rec-
ommending that the complaint be dismissed, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting
brief and the Respondent filed a brief in support of the Intermediate
Report.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members
Rodgers and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
this case , and hereby- adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, to the extent consistent herewith : 2
The Respondent is charged in the complaint with violating Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act in that it failed to honor certain
revocations of checkoff authorizations and, thus, without authority
continued to check off the union dues of two employees and continued
to pay such dues to the UMW, the contracting union.
The UMW and Respondent had a checkoff provision in their 1952
contract and checkoff authorizations were executed by the two em-
ployees involved pursuant to the contract. These authorizations pro-
vided for revocation of the checkoff by written notice to be delivered
to the Respondent and UMW within a specified time. It is not con-
tended that either the contract provision or authorizations were defec-
tive, but it is the position of the General Counsel that the Respondent
failed to honor checkoff revocations which were timely delivered with-
' Hereinafter called UMW.
2 In viewof our disposition of this case , we find it unnecessary to pass on the correct-
ness of the Trial Examiner 's findings as to the binding effect upon the Respondent of the
revocation action taken and as to the scope of the "escape period."
119 NLRB No. 175.
MORTON SALT COMPANY 1403
in the meaning of the language of the authorizations . Respondent
contends , however, that the revocations were untimely under the terms
of the authorizations and thus were not effective. Consequently, this
proceeding involves essentially a dispute concerning the meaning and
administration of the checkoff provisions of UMW's contract, as im-
plemented by the employees ' authorizations . The Board has long
held, however , that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act for
it to police collective-bargaining agreements by attempting to resolve
disputes over their meaning or administration , particularly where it
is evident , as in the case at bar, that the Respondent acted reasonably
and in good faith.3
Accordingly, we shall adopt the Trial Examiner 's recommendation
and dismiss the complaint.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
s United Telephone Company of the West and United Utilities, incorporated, 112 NLRB
779, 781-782; Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 NLRB 694, enfd. 141 F. 2d 564 (C. A. 9).
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A charge having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing
thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named Respond-
ent Company, a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, was held in Manistee, Michigan, on February
19, 1957, before the duly designated Trial Examiner.
As to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges and the answer denies that
the Respondent: (1) in January 1956 illegally failed to honor revocations submitted
by 2 employees, Joseph Helminski and Hayden Anderson, of their previously exe-
cuted checkoff authorizations; (2) since March 1956 has continued to deduct periodic
dues from the wages of the said 2 employees and has paid them over to the local
of the UMW, thereby illegally contributing financial assistance to the said local;
and (3) by such conduct has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
At the hearing all parties were represented, were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to
the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Each of the above-named counsel argued, their
arguments appearing in the official transcript. The filing of briefs was waived by all
parties.'
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following:
1 After the close of the hearing, counsel for the Respondent submitted to all parties and
the Trial Examiner a memorandum citing a certain case referred to in his oral argument.
Also after the close of the hearing the same counsel submitted to all parties and the
Trial Examiner a letter calling attention to two obvious typographical errors in the
official transcript. No objection having been received from other parties, the Trial
Examiner hereby orders that the transcript be corrected in the following respects : (1) on
page 122, fifth line, the word "partiality" should read "impartiality" ; (2) on page 130,
sixth line, the word "received" should read "ceased."
1404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Morton Salt Company is an Illinois corporation , with principal offices in Chicago,
Illinois. It owns and operates plants in eight States of the United States. Its
plant at Manistee , Michigan , is an integral part of its interstate operations, and
annually ships finished products valued at more than $200,000 directly to points out-
side the State of Michigan. During. the year 1955, in the course and conduct of its
multistate business operations , it received as gross revenue more than $ 10,000,000.
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District 50, United Mine Workers of America, and its Local Union No. 12277,
are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Relevant facts
Since 1940 the Respondent Company has recognized and contracted with the
UMW as the bargaining agent for a unit of employees-a unit which in 1956 num-
bered nearly 300. Pursuant to contract, the Employer began in 1954 to deduct
union dues, for transmission to the UMW local, from the wages of all employees in
the unit who signed checkoff slips authorizing such deductions.
General Counsel challenges the legal validity of neither the contracts nor the
checkoff provisions and procedures.
The relevant portion of the checkoff authorization blank is quoted:
My employer . . . is hereby authorized to deduct from my wages and turn
over to the officer or representative , as designated in the applicable agreement,
all such amounts of money above outlined and limited to the amounts provided
in the applicable agreement between the above Union and my employer, and
this authorization and assignment shall be irrevocable for the term of the appli-
cable contract between the Union and the Company or for one year, which-
ever is the lesser, and shall automatically renew itself for successive yearly or
applicable contract periods thereafter, whichever is the lesser, until I give written
notice to the Company and the Union at least 60 days and not more than ----
days before any periodic renewal date of this authorization and assignment of
my desire to revoke the same.
Early in 1954 the Employer received more than 250 such authorization slips,
signed by its employees . Early in 1955 an undisclosed number of such employees
submitted written notice to the Employer of their desire to revoke their authoriza-
tions. It appears that some notifications were honored, and others were not.
Employees whose notifications of revocation were not honored received from the
plant manager , then C . H. Martin , the following communication:
Your wage assignment for union dues was effective April 1 , 1954, and is
revokable ( sic) by written notice to the company and the union only if
delivered between January 20, 1955 , and January 30, 1955 . We do not
consider your revocation effective because it was not delivered within this
period.
The Employer took the above -described action-of rejecting some revocations
and honoring others-after consulting its attorneys as to the proper period within
which , pursuant to the language of the authorization slips, such revocations could
be accepted.
There is no evidence that any charges in 1955 were filed with the Board on behalf
of employees whose revocations that year were not honored.
On January 31, 1956, the Employer received from the UMW revocation notices
from four employees . The employees ' names and respective date of signing such
revocations are as follows:
Hayden Anderson ___________________________________________ Jan.19,1956
Joseph Helminski____________________________________________ Jan.16,1956
John Majchrzak_____________________________________________ Jan.23,1956
John Grabowski _____________________________________________ Jan.26,1956
MORTON SALT COMPANY 1405
Upon receipt of these revocations , the new manager, F . G. Colladay, sought advice
from counsel as to their acceptance or rejection . Acting upon advice received,
management thereafter accepted the revocations of Majchrzak and Grabowski and
notified Anderson and Helminski as follows, in part:
Since the effective date of said revocation, as provided therein, was of a date
more than seventy (70) days before the periodic renewal date of said assign-
ment, it is the position of the Company that said notice was not timely and that,
therefore, said assignment remains in full force and effect.
The Employer thereafter continued to deduct union dues from the, wages of these
two employees, and turned such dues over to the UMW. On their behalf an. inde-
pendent labor organization filed charges with the Board in April 1956, claiming that
by refusing to honor the revocations the Employer had violated the Act. And based
upon these charges, the complaint was thereafter issued by General Counsel.
As to the factor of 70 days, emphasized in the Employer's letters to Anderson
and Helminski, the following relevant facts were established at the hearing, either
by way of stipulations or by concessions.
When received by the Employer in 1954, all but 11 of the more than 250 signed
checkoff authorizations contained the figure "70" written in the blank space noted in
the authorization text quoted above. No figure other than "70" appeared in this
space on any such authorization. Counsel for the Union conceded that the employee
signing the authorization did not, in all cases, fill in this blank space, but that "in
many instances" the space would be filled in by the person soliciting signatures to
the authorization blanks.
As to Anderson and Helminski, their testimony regarding their authorizations and
revocations in substance is as follows. Although each of their checkoff authoriza-
tions (dated respectively March 19 and March 17, 1954), contained the figure "70"
at the time of its receipt by the Employer, both said that the figure was not on the
blank when they signed and that they were not thereafter notified of its insertion.
Both employees admitted that they did not ask any company representative in 1956
as to the proper period within which to file revocation. Anderson said he dated his
revocation on January 19, 1956, because he was told by a union steward that it
should be in "before the 20th." Helminski dated his revocation January 16, 1956-
apparently upon his own calculation-after obtaining through his foreman the date
of his checkoff authorization.
B. Conclusions
In oral argument General Counsel claimed that: (1) Because the figure "70" was
not written upon the authorization slips at the time they were signed by Anderson
and Helminski, "any notice of revocation given at least sixty days prior to the proper
renewal period would be a valid tender of that revocation"; (2) although checkoff
authorizations of Helminski and Anderson were dated in mid-March 1954, they were
really applicable to the succeeding 1954-56 contract and not to the existing 1952-54
contract; (3) since the authorizations were "terminable at the end of one year
or the term of the contract, whichever was the lesser," and because the period of I
year from the date of the authorizations was less than the 2-year period of the 1954-56
contract, the appropriate "escape" period-even accepting the 60-70 days limita-
tion-for Helminski was from January 7 to 17, 1956, and for Anderson from
January 9 to 19, 1956; (4) since the former's revocation was dated January 16, 1956,
and the latter's was dated January 19, 1956, both were timely tendered and should
have been honored by the Employer; (5) if his own previously stated theories are
invalid, and even adopting the Employer's position that the appropriate escape period
was between January 22 and 31, 1956, the Employer should have honored the revoca-
tions upon their receipt, on January 31, since the Union " as agent for the company"
retained possession of them from the date of their signing until January 31 without
notifying the 2 employees that they had been submitted prematurely and for the
further reason that the 2 revocations, while in the possession of the Union, each day
constituted "in effect a new legal tender"; and (6) the subsequent deduction of dues
and their transfer to the Union constituted violation of the Act.
Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, contends that: (1) The 2 authori-
zations in question properly became effective immediately upon their submission
in mid-March 1954, and were properly applicable to the contract then in existence-
particularly so because in mid-March of 1954 there was no assurance that a new
contract would be written, and that such authorizations were automatically renewed
1406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on April 1, 1955, for 1 year because they had not been revoked as of March 31, 1955;
(2) therefore the appropriate "escape period" in 1956 was the 10-day period from
60 to 70 days before March 31, 1956-or between January 22 and 31, 1956; and
(3) since the revocations of Anderson and Helminski were dated before January 22;
they were untimely and properly not honored.
In the first place, the Trial Examiner finds no merit in General Counsel's conten-
tion to the effect that the Respondent must be held accountable for the Union's
failure to submit the revocations of Anderson and Helminski until January 31. Had
either or both of the employees submitted their prematurely dated revocations direct
to the Employer, as required by the language of the authorizations themselves, and
had the Employer then failed to notify them within a reasonable time so they might
have rectified their mistake, some suspicion might well be attached to the Employer's
good faith. Helminski admitted that he gave both copies of his revocation to a
union official, and Anderson's claim that he gave one copy to his foreman, Fortier,
is not credited. Not only did Fortier deny having received any revocations, but
from the Union's files its counsel produced at the hearing the second of the two revo-
cations Anderson said he executed-the first having been submitted to the Employer
on January 31, 1956. General Counsel conceded that he was shown this second
revocation and that it bore Anderson's writing.
In the second place, the Trial Examiner is of the opinion that it was the general
understanding of all parties, including employees signing them, that the checkoff
authorizations provided for a 10-day "escape" period, whether or not in all of the
250 or more cases the figure "70" appeared on the blanks at the time they were
signed. Employee Majchrzak, a witness for General Counsel, testified that it was
common knowledge in his "part of the plant" as to the proper date to revoke such
authorizations. And as noted above, in 1955 the Employer sent written notification
to a number of employees of the proper "escape" period.
The major questions are thus reduced to the issue of determining whether or not
the 10-day period should be figured from the anniversary date of specific authoriza-
tions or from the date of the expiration of the 1954-56 contract. The various posi-
tions taken by General Counsel in his argument support a conclusion that the language
of the checkoff authorizations may well be susceptible of differing interpretations-
that the revocation terms are somewhat ambiguous.
Ambiguity, however, does not establish illegality. The record contains neither
evidence nor allegation of any unfair labor practice except the Employer's perform-
ance of what it believed it was supposed to do under terms of the authorizations.
There is no evidence that it was motivated, in rejecting certain revocations and
honoring others; by any intent to deprive employees of certain legal rights or to
render the UMW any financial assistance.
Under the circumstances, then, and without deciding which of various interpreta-
tions of the "escape" clause is, in his opinion, the most valid, the Trial Examiner
concludes and finds that the preponderance of evidence does not support General
Counsel's allegation that the Respondent, pursuant to its interpretation of an am-
biguous escape clause and its subsequent specific conduct in respect to Anderson and
Helminski, has violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act 2
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of the Respondent occur in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, and its Local Union No. 12277,
are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices, as alleged in the
complaint, within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
a "An interpretation which makes the contract or agreement lawful will be preferred
over one which would make it unlawful." Williston on Contracts, revised edition,
Section 620. IF, I