Morse Chain Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 25, 1969175 N.L.R.B. 575 (N.L.R.B. 1969) Copy Citation MORSE CHAIN COMPANY 575 Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt -Denver Plant and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and its District Lodge No. 86, AFL-CIO. Cases 27-CA-2308 and 27-CA-2393 April 25, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On July 29, 1968, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in these cases and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, only to the extent consistent herewith. On October 5, 1966, pursuant to a consent agreement, an election was conducted in a unit of the Respondent's employees. Of the approximately 176 employees eligible to vote, 171 voted; 115 ballots were cast against the Union, and 55 for, with I challenged ballot.' Approximately 8 months later, on June 21, 1967, the Union began another campaign to organize the Respondent's employees. Although precluded from an immediate election,' the Union's announced purpose was to obtain authorization cards from a sufficiently large number of employees so that it could demand bargaining without the necessity of an election, under the Board's decision in Conren, Inc.' On July 17, 1967, it made such a demand on the Respondent. 'These findings are based, in part , upon credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner to which the Respondent has excepted . After careful review of the record , we conclude that these credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all relevant evidence . Accordingly , we find no basis for disturbing these findings . Standard Dry Wall Products. 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 'In 1961, the United Steelworkers of America had lost an election among the Respondent's production and maintenance employees. 'Section 9(c)(3). ' 156 NLRB 592, enfd. 368 F.2d 173 (C.A. 7), cert . denied 386 U.S. 974. Although agreeing with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent has, by conduct detailed in the Trial Examiner's Decision, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, we disagree with his further conclusion that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union upon receipt of the Union's letter of July 17, 1967. Initially, the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent never "manifested" a doubt concerning the Union's majority status and that it relied solely on its contention that there was no obligation to recognize the Union within 1 year after an election. However, it is apparent that this interpretation of the facts is inaccurate. Thus, the Respondent's letter of July 20, in rejecting the Union's request, stated:' As you know an election by secret ballot held last October upon your petition showed overwhelmingly that our employees do not favor union representation. An earlier election had similar results. All the information we have indicates to us that our employees' feeling is unchanged. The letter went on to indicate that the Respondent was willing to cooperate in the holding of a Board-supervised election as soon as possible. On August 2, the Respondent returned a contract proposal submitted by the Union on July 31, reiterating its doubt of a Union majority and stating that the proposal had not been considered and would not be unless and until the Union was authorized to represent the employees in a Board election. It is apparent from the above that the Respondent's letters of July 20 and August 2 may only be construed as statements of doubt as to the Union's majority status. Indeed, the Trial Examiner, in footnote 93 of his Decision, recognizes this in his statement that "Admittedly, Respondent acquired no new evidence between July 18 and July 31, to support its July 20 claim that it doubted the Union's majority representative status." The record also clearly reveals that the Respondent, during the hearing, continued to rely on and advance its claim of doubt of the Union's majority. Thus, the Respondent's plant manager testified that the Respondent refused recognition because the Union had been beaten by a 2 to 1 margin in the election, held within the year, and the Respondent still had approximately the same employees and approximately the same number of employees. The Respondent's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and its brief in support thereof press this position. Under all the evidence in this case, we find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of establishing that Respondent's rejection of the Union 's bargaining demand was in bad faith and thus violative of Section 8(a)(5). The Union had recently participated in a Board election which it 'This letter is quoted at greater length by the Trial Examiner. 175 NLRB No. 98 576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD lost by a decisive vote. Furthermore, the interference found herein, while not isolated, does not involve the type of gross misconduct which demonstrates an adamant rejection of the collective-bargaining principle, particularly when considered in a Conren situation involving Section 9(c)(3) of the Act and where the Respondent consistently expressed doubt as to the Union's majority status. We note also that the relatively insubstantial violations of Section 8(a)(1) found here occurred during a brief period prior to the Union's request for recognition, and that the record does not show that such conduct was repeated thereafter. It would be difficult to find in these circumstances that the Respondent's conduct made a fair election impossible. Finally, the Respondent in its letters to the Union clearly recited the background of the election as the basis for its doubt as to the reliability of the cards, and the Respondent offered to cooperate fully in the holding of a Board election at the earliest possible date. In this entire context, we are not persuaded that the Respondent's conduct was such as to establish an unlawful refusal to bargain or to require the issuance of a bargaining order in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleges violations of Section 8(a)(5).6 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt-Denver Plant, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating its employees concerning their activities and sympathies on behalf of any labor organization. (b) Promising its employees benefits in order to discourage membership and activities in support of the Union. (c) Threatening its employees with loss of benefits if they remained union members. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except in a manner permitted by the provisions of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post in conspicuous places at its Denver, Colorado, operations, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional 'In view of our decision herein, we need not determine whether the Union in fact had valid cards from a majority of the employees, and we therefore do not consider or pass upon the Trial Examiner 's discussion and findings concerning the cards Director for Region 27, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in such conspicuous places. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not specifically found herein. 'In the event this Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "the Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees regarding their union activities and sympathies, nor will we promise our employees benefits or threaten our employees with loss of benefits in order to discourage membership and activities in support of the Union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and its District Lodge No. 86, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Dated By MORSE CHAIN COMPANY, EBERHARDT -DENVER PLANT (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, New Custom House, 721-19th St., Denver, Colorado 80202, Telephone 303-297-3551. MORSE CHAIN COMPANY TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HOWARD MYERS, Trial Examiner. This consolidated proceeding, with the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the'General Counsel i and the Board), and Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt-Denver Plant (herein called Respondent) each being represented by counsel, and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and its District Lodge No 86, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union), being represented by two officials thereof, was heard before Howard Myers, the duly designated Trial Examiner, at Denver, Colorado, on 9 hearing days between January 30, and February 23, 1968, upon an amended consolidated complaint, dated November 30, 1967, issued by the General Counsel, for and on behalf of the Board, through the Director of Region 27 (Denver, Colorado), and Respondent's answer duly filed on December 8, 1967.2 The amended consolidated complaint, as further amended at the hearing, based upon a charge and three amended charges (Case 27-CA-2308) duly filed by the Union on June 29, July 24, August 16, and November 9, 1967, respectively, and upon a charge duly filed by the Union on November 17, 1967 (Case 27-CA-2393), alleged, in substance, that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended from time to time, herein called the Act.' Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, I make the following-' FINDINGS OF FACT I. RESPONDENTS BUSINESS OPERATIONS Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt-Denver plant, a division of Borg-Warner Corporation, is a New York corporation, having its principal offices and place of business at New York, New York. At its Eberhardt-Denver plant, which is located at 4650 Steele Street, Denver, Colorado, the employees of which This term specifically includes counsel for the General Counsel appearing at the hearing On the same day, November 30, 1967, the amended consolidated complaint was issued, the aforesaid Regional Director , for and on behalf of the Board , also issued an order, by virtue of the authonty vested in him by Section 102 33 of the Board ' s Rules and Regulations , Series 8, as amended , consolidating , for the purpose of hearing , the above numbered cases Specifically, the consolidated amended complaint , as further amended at the hearing , alleged that ( a) on certain stated dates Respondent, through certain named supervisors , interfered with , restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by engaging in certain unlawful conduct , (b) Respondent , since on or about July 17, 1967 , and specifically on certain other stated dates, has failed and refused to recognize or to bargain collectively with the Union as the collective -bargaining representative of Respondent ' s employees in a certain claimed appropriate unit notwithstanding the fact that the Union at all times since July 17, 1967, has been designated and selected as such representative by a majority of the employees in said claimed bargaining unit, and (c) on or about November 6, 1967, Respondent unilaterally, and without notice to or consultation with the Union , changed the then existing conditions of employment by reducing the hours of work of the unit employees and by increasing said employees ' hourly rate of pay On April 8, 1968, the General Counsel and Respondent ' s counsel filed briefs which have been carefully considered 577 are the only ones involved in this proceeding, Respondent is engaged in, and during all times material was engaged in, the manufacture, sale, and distribution of speed reducer units. During the 12-month period immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, which period is representative of all times material, Respondent shipped from its Denver plant to customers located outside the State of Colorado finished products valued in excess of $50,000. During the aforesaid representative 12-month period, Respondent's out-of-state purchases of goods and materials used in the course and conduct of its Denver plant operations exceeded $50,000 in value. Upon the basis of the foregoing facts, I find, in line with established Board authority, that Respondent is engaged in , and during all times material was engaged in, a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that its business operations meet the standard fixed by the Board for the assertion of jurisdiction. iI THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of Respondent Ili. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A Prefatory Statement On September 6, 1966, the Union filed a petitions with the Board's Twenty-seventh Regional Office (Denver, Colorado) seeking to be certified as the statutory collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the bargaining unit set out in said petition.` On October 5, 1966, the aforementioned Regional Director conducted a secret ballot election among the employees in the appropriate unit . Of the appropriate 176 employees eligible to vote, 171 thereof voted; 115 ballots were cast against the Union and 55 for. The ballot of one voter was challenged. On October 13, 1966, the then acting Director of Region 27, certified the results of the election finding that the Union had not been designated the collective-bargaining representative of the employees involved ' B Interference, Restraint , and Coercion; Refusal to Bargain Collectively with the Union 1. The refusal to bargain collectively a. The appropriate unit The amended consolidated complaint, as further amended at the hearing, alleged and the answer admitted that all persons employed at Respondent's Denver plant, but excluding office clerical employees, and supervisors as 'Case 27-RC-3080 The unit found appropriate in said proceeding was All persons employed by Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt -Denver plant , 4650 Steele Street, Denver , Colorado , but excluding office clerical employees, salesmen, guards , professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act 'Pursuant to a petition filed by the United Steelworkers of America with the Board in 1961 , the Regional Director of Region 27 held a secret ballot election among Respondent 's Denver-Eberhardt plant production and maintenance employees. The Steelworkers lost that election. 578 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD defined in the Act constitute a unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. Upon the record as a whole, the Trial Examiner finds that at all times material, all Respondent's Denver plant employees, salesmen, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act constituted, and now constitute, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act with respect to grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. The undersigned further finds that said unit insures to Respondent's employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and collective bargaining, and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act." b. The Union's majority status in the appropriate unit There was introduced into evidence by the General Counsel a list compiled by Respondent containing the names of 216 bargaining unit employees in Respondent's employ on July 17, 1967,9 the date on which the Union wrote Respondent demanding recognition as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees here involved. On behalf of the General Counsel there were offered and received in evidence 118 cards expressly authorizing the Union to represent the signers thereof for the purposes of collective-bargaining. The 118 cards, referred to immediately above, plus the Union's authorization cards of Delbert Craig (dated June 27), James Ducey (dated June 21), and Robert W Runk (dated June 22), were in the Union's possession on or prior to July 1710 Respondent, in support of its contention that the Union did not represent an uncoerced majority when it made its initial demand for recognition on July 17, maintained at page 19 of its brief, "Of the 78 employees who testified as to the signing of their own card, 47" of those witnesses testified they signed the card for the purpose of getting an N L.R.B. election," and hence, Respondent's argument runs, the cards of said 47 persons should not be counted in support of the Union's majority status. The cards of the 47 named persons are discussed seritiam immediately below: Carl Green, called as a General Counsel witness, testified on direct examination that he signed, dated, filled in two union authorization cards - One on June 12 and the other on June 21; that he received the June 12 card from Duane Arterburn, a coworker, on the day he signed 'This unit is the same as that found appropriate for the purposes of the October 5, 1966 Board -conducted election (Case 27-RC-3080) 'All dates hereinafter mentioned , unless otherwise indicated , refer to the year 1967 "The cards of Craig, Ducey, and Runk were not offered in evidence because, as the General Counsel explained , their employment with Respondent had ceased prior to July 17 Under the circumstances, the cards of Craig, Ducey, Runk will not be considered in determining the Union's majority status as of July 17, or at any time thereafter "Namely, Carl Green, DeForest , James Dennis, Cook , Frakes, Cooper, Gardner, James Green, Shaefer , Medina, Rickard, Wilson, Pryor, Schnaltz, Stratton , Salazar, Allen , Anderson , Clark, Roberts, Legvold, McClure, Jeanpierre , Arterburn, Bishop , Schippert, Dusch, Pfeifer, Kugi, Graham, Hinton, Dick , Eastin, Chenoweth, Heidnck, Brown, Lucci, John Dennis, Bryan, Adamson , Ruiz, Van Meter , Martin, Johnson, McDuffie, and Fong it; that after signing, dating, and filling in said June 12 card he mailed it the same day to the Union;" that he received the June 21 card from Arterburn "one or three days" prior to June 21, that the June 21 card was an authorization card used by the Union in 1966;" that he signed said June 21 card because Arterburn told him that the June 12 card was "no good" and it was therefore necessary for him to sign an authorization card the Union was then using; and that he read, signed, dated, and filled in the June 21 card and returned it to Arterburn on June 2 l.14 "The Union' s name and address appear on the front of the card (a so-called "business reply" postage paid card) The card is postmarked June 12 and the Union' s receipt stamp indicates that it was received on June 13 'This card reads as follows Authorization for Representation Under the National Labor Relations Act I the undersigned employee of MQRSE CHAIN CO. COMPANY 4650 STEEL ST DENVER. COLO. ADDRESS OF COMPANY hereby authorize District Lodge No 86, International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO (Telephone SHerman 4-3189) to represent me and, in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of Labor, Wages, and other employment conditions This authorization supersedes any similar authority previously given to any person or organization My Signature Carl J. Green Date June 12, 1967 My Adress 7320 Dexter Phone 288 4594 Kind of Work O.D GRINDER Dept GRINDING Present Wage Scale 2 36 PER HR . Shift . Day Swmg_L Graveyard- Do your receive a night shift bonus" YES "This card reads as follows. YES, I WANT THE lAM I the undersigned , an employee of (Company) Morse Chain Co. hereby authorize the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) TO ACT as my collective bargaining agent with the company for wages , hours and working conditions It is my understanding that I will be invited to ioin the iAM NAME (print) . Carl J Green DATE 6-21-67 ADDRESS (pent) 7420 Dexter CITY Commerce City DEPT Grinding SHIFT Night PHONE 288 4594 Classification _ n n G.-icr 7 SIGN HERE X Carl J. Green NOTE This authorization to be SIGNED and DATED IN EMPLOYEE'S OWN HANDWRITING YOUR RIGHT TO SIGN THIS CARD IS PROTECTED BY FEDERAL LAW Received by (initial). DEA The words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM," appearing at the top of the card, are in bold three-point type, white print on red background All the cards referred to in the instant proceeding , except Green 's June 12 card, bear the same printing as Green 's June 21 card MORSE CHAIN COMPANY Green further testified on direct examination that he knew Vincent H. DeForest, a Respondent employee, that he acted as a "go-between between Arterburn and Mr. DeForest"; that "previously" to DeForest "signing a card I asked him if he would be interested in signing a card, that I was asked by Mr. Arterburn to ask him"; that when DeForest replied that he might be interested, he said to DeForest, "I'll get you one. If you want to sign it, fine; if you don't, that's fine"; that a "couple of days" or "a week" after he gave DeForest a union authorization card he saw DeForest sign it, after work, in the employees' locker room;" and that DeForest returned the signed card to him and he, in turn, gave it to Arterburn. Green then testified on direct-examination as follows: Q. Was there any discussion about an election at the time? A. The way that I understood - the way it was explained to me - TRIAL EXAMINER: Who explained it? THE WITNESS- Mr. Arterburn - that this was a card requesting a union vote - not a vote for the union at the time that you turned the card in, and that is the same way I explained it to Mr. DeForest. Q. (By Mr. McCabe) Now, what do you mean this was not a vote? A. Well, it just seemed - it turned out that these cards are not to be a vote for the union. They get so many percentage, they can come in and say - aribtrate with us or else - we were under the assumption - at least, I was, and I gave the same assumption to Mr. DeForest that this was a request for the union to come and request a vote Q. Did Mr Arterburn - what did Mr. Arterburn tell you that led you to believe that? A. Just exactly what I got through telling you. Q. Did he say that is the only thing the card would be used for? A. That's right. That's the way I was led to believe. Q. Now, again , what words were you told? A. I don't remember exactly what words I was told, but in the nut shell that this was just a request for the union to request a vote. That this was not a vote for the union to come in and say, "Well, bargan [sic] or else." Q. Did you read the card before you signed it9 A. I sort of breezed through it. I should have read it a bit closer. To my chagrin I found this out a little later. Then I found out the damage had been done. Q. Did you ever ask for your card back? A. No, I didn't. On cross-examination by Respondent's counsel, Green was asked, "Was there any discussion at the time Mr. DeForest signed his card as to what he thought the effect of this card would be?", and he answered, "I said in [my] previous testimony that we thought that it was just a call for a union vote " Green then testified that he did not sign an authorization card during the Union's 1966 organizational drive, that after he had signed the June 21 union authorization card he heard "rumors going "The record establishes that DeForest signed his authorization card on June 23 579 around," but could not "say for sure who I heard it from" the "statement in relation to those [authorization]cards, `Sign now and it's $10.00; if the union gets in and you haven't signed, it's $50.00"'; that he received the June 21 card from Arterburn "between one and three days" prior to June 21; that he signed said June 21 card at home; and that he did not attend any union meeting because, "Secondly, I am not what you call a union man , but it's getting - first, to beat the rush in case there is a lower union fee should the union get in - that's fine; that's money I save"; and that he "didn't really pay any attention", when asked by Respondent's counsel, "Now, were you present when Mr. Arterburn was giving authorization cards to any other employees?" DeForest, who was in the hearing room during the entire time Green was testifying, was the next witness. On direct examination by the General Counsel, DeForest testified that he received a union authorization card from Green; that he read the card but "not very thoroughly"; and that he signed and dated the card on June 23. Arterburn testified on direct examination that he had been in Respondent's employ for about 5 years; that because "he was very unhappy with the company," he telephoned, and within a day or two, called upon Meacham," a Grand Lodge representative of the International here involved, and the person who personally conducted the Union's 1966 and its 1967 organization campaigns among Respondent's employees, that at Meacham's home they talked about unions in general, what the Union had accomplished for employees at other plants and what the Union could accomplish for Respondent's employees; that before leaving Meacham's home, Meacham gave him some union authorization cards for distribution among Respondent's employees; and that (on some undisclosed date) Meacham instructed him "to pick up the [signed union authorization cards] and bring them to Meacham. Arterburn further testified on direct examination, that he attended the second of the two organizational meetings held on June 21;" that besides signing a union authorization card at said meeting he also signed the attendance sheet which Meacham had prepared. On cross-examination by Respondent's counsel, Arterburn testified that commencing "right after" the meeting he attended on June 21, he handed out union authorization cards to some of his coworkers at which "Arterburn was in error when he placed this incident as having taken place on June 18, his call and visit to Meacham apparently took place about a week prior to the date fixed by him This finding finds support by Meacham ' s credited testimony which shows (1) the day following the aforementioned telephonic conversation with Arterburn and the latter's visit to his home , he mailed letters, dated June 13, addressed "Dear Supporters and Friends" to about 20 Respondent employees who had assisted in the Union 's 1966 organizational campaign , requesting each of them "to assist in organizing for a majority representation among all production and maintenance employees" and to meet with certain union officials on June 21 at a place to be announced later, (2) on June 14, Meacham sent letters, addressed "To All Inside Committee Members," to the aforesaid approximately 20 employees , informing them of the time and place of the scheduled June 21 meeting In addition, (a) Arterburn testified that when he met with Meacham at the latter's home , Meacham gave him some union authorization cards which Meacham requested Arterburn to distribute among Respondent 's employees , and (b) Carl Green testified, and the undersigned finds , that he received a union authorization card from Arterburn on June 12 and he signed it that day "The first of these meetings was held from about 2 to about 4 p m for the night shift and was attended by seven Respondent employees. The other meeting commenced at about 4 30 p m . and was attended by 13 day-shift employees of Respondent 580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD time he "told them that there would be an election"; that he got the idea that there would be an election from the fact, "The year before the cards were filled out were for an election, and that was part of where I got the idea, I suppose, and then I think another reason was that at the meeting1s somebody said, `Well, we're starting kinda early, you know.' This was in June, and we still had till October before we could have a vote, and George [Meacham] says, 'Well, we'll get an early start"';" and that he signed an authorization card only because he "expected" that an election would be held "when the one year was up." Arterburn, although never requesting the return of his union authorization card, ceased being active in behalf of the Union around July 7. In fact, he ceased (1) requesting his coworkers to sign authorization cards, which he did prior to the aforesaid date at all available times - before, during, and after work - on and off company property; (2) attending union meetings , and (3) having any contact whatsoever with Meacham.20 Regarding what transpired, and what he and others said, at each of said two June 21 meetings, Meacham, credibly and without contradiction, testified that he asked the employees, upon their entering the meeting, or shortly after they had entered, to write their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and their departments on the paper he had prepared for such information; that each employee did as requested; that, among other things, he asked the employees, "How much interest there was in the plant for organizing"; that when "they told me there was a lot of interest" he "advised them that in view of the fact that we had an election eight months before that there could not be another election, but that in view of recent rulings of the Board and upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals," that we did have another avenue and that was through demanding recognition if enough people authorized us to represent them"; that he also "told them if they wanted to serve as an in-plant committee , we would start in organizing the plant"; that when the employees expressed their willingness to have the Union represent them and "to serve as an in-plant committee ," he distributed union authorization cards; that at the first of the two meetings five of the seven employees attending signed union authorization cards; 12 that at the second meeting, 9 of the 13 employees attending signed similar cards;23 that before the close of each June 21 meeting some employees took unsigned union authorization cards for the purpose of distributing them among their coworkers; and that arrangements were made for Arterburn to collect the authorization cards signed by Respondent's night-shift employees who would then turn the cards over to him and for Morgan to collect the authorization cards signed by Respondent's day-shift employees who would then turn the cards over to him. "Held on June 21 "Arterburn testified that he did not know who said "Aren ' t we starting early ," but, "It might have been me" "Arterburn, however , did obtain a signed authonzation card on July 12, from Jerry Cook which he turned over to James Ducey Regarding Cook's card , Arterburn testified that it "was the last card that I got signed, and that was more or less just on a bet with Ducey . He said that I didn't have enough guts to go get it signed , and I said I did " "Referring to Conren, Inc , etc , and et ano v N L R B , 368 F 2d 173 (C A 7) "Namely, Arterburn , Bruce Badsky, Ernest Carter, James Ducey, and Ronald Groetkin "Namely, Arthur Morgan, George Dick , Harold Dumakowski, Marvin In the light of the Trial Examiner's observation of the conduct and deportment at the hearing of Arterburn, Carl Green, and DeForest, and after a very careful scrutiny of their testimony, all of which had been carefully read, and parts of which have been reread and rechecked several times, I find that Arterburn, Green, and DeForest signed their respective cards, on the dates they bear without being told by anyone that the cards were to be used for any purpose other than what the cards stated they were to be used; namely, the designation of the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Although, Green attempted to give the impression that he signed the card because he assumed from what Arterburn had told him, that the card was merely a request that a "union vote" be had, he admitted he found out later to his "chagrin" that the card he signed was "not a vote for the union at the time that you turned the card in," he, nonetheless, never requested the return of the card after he discovered, as he testified, "To my chagrin, I found this out a little later. Then I found out the damage had been done." In addition, Arterburn testified that he received the signed card from Green but nowhere in his testimony is there any mention that he made any remark which could lead Green to assume that the card was to be used for any purpose other than what it explicitly said, in large, bold letters, "YES, I WANT THE IAM " Furthermore, although DeForest, who was present in the hearing room throughout Green's entire examination and testified immediately after Green had been excused from the witness-stand, there is absolutely nothing in DeForest's testimony of any mispresentation by Green or by anyone else as to the purpose of the card or that DeForest signed it because of any coercive remarks made by anyone connected with the Union or made by anyone soliciting signatures to union authorization cards. I also find that Green signed the June 12 and the June 21 cards absent any coercive remarks from anyone connected with the Union or from anyone soliciting signatures to union authorization cards or because of any misrepresentation of the purpose of the cards. I further find that Arterburn's testimony that he signed the authorization card on June 21, because he expected it would bring about a Board-conducted election sometime after October 1967, is, to say the least, patently false. This finding becomes inescapable when consideration is given to: (1) Arterburn impressed me as being above average intellectually and hence proficient enough to read and comprehend the clear and unambiguous statement of representation on the card, (2) the fact that he initiated and then spearheaded the Union's 1967 organization campaign , (3) attended the June 21 meeting at which Meacham stated, in no uncertain words, that no election could be held until October, but if sufficient number of employees designated the Union their collective -bargaining representative then the Union could and would demand recognition from Respondent as such representative, (4) attend all union meetings prior to about July 7, when his active participation in the Union's affair apparently ceased, and (5) secured more signed authorization cards, prior to July 7, than most union adherents." Gassman, Robert B Laing, Forrest Neal, Nelson Begay, and Leonard Anthony "It is significant to note at this juncture that during the evening of June 21, Kenny Huston, Arterburn 's foreman and immediate supervisor, came to Arterburn's machine and asked Arterburn if he had been to the union meeting that day Huston asked if he were for the Union, and Arterburn replied that he was because of the benefits the Union could secure for the employees MORSE CHAIN COMPANY Under the circumstances, Arterburn's, Green's, and DeForest's purported afterthoughts as to what they thought the cards meant cannot negate the overt act of having signed the cards designating the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.25 Accordingly, upon the entire record in the case, I find, contrary to Respondent's contention, the authorization cards of Carl Green, Vincent DeForest, and Duane Arterburn are valid and that the said cards should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. James Dennis, a General Counsel witness, testified and I find, that about a week after he had been employed by Respondent, a coworker handed to him, and also to "the other guy" with whom he was working, union authorization cards, that he could not recall who handed him the card; he had no discussion with the person who handed him said card, except that said person asked him if he wanted a card; that he "glanced through" the card; filled in the information called for thereon; dated it (June 30), signed it, and a few hours later returned the signed card to the person from whom he had received it; and that, although the person who gave him the card said nothing "about the card being for an election," he signed it because, "We heard it was for a vote so we [sic] signed it." Upon the record as a whole, I find James Dennis' card is valid and that it should be counted as such in support of the Union's majority status. James Curtis, a General Counsel witness, testified that he is a high school graduate; that he had been a Respondent employee for about 15 months; that James Ducey handed him the union authorization card which he read, signed, filled in the information called for, dated it (June 21), and then returned it to Ducey; that at the time the card was given to him, Ducey asked if he were interested in the Union; that he never was told by anyone about an election; and that he had attended two union meetings.26 Upon the record as a whole, I find that James Curtis' card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Robin Frakes, a General Counsel witness, testified, that he has been in Respondent's employ for over 8 years; that, although he did not read the authorization card which Arterburn handed him, he filled in all the information called for on the card, dated it (June 30), and then handed it back to Arterburn; that the only discussion he had with Arterburn about the card was, "He [Arterburn] just said if I signed this card there would be a vote as the previous year"; and that he was never present when Arterburn gave an authorization card to, or even spoke to, any employee about such cards. Frakes meticulously printed all the information requested on the authorization card, except his signature. It is therefore safe to infer, which I do, that Frakes' testimony that he did not read the card is unworthy of belief. Under the circumstances, I find that Frakes signed the card for the sole purpose of designating the Union his collective-bargaining representative and that it is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's "See, for example, N L R B v. Gordon Mfg Co , 395 F.2d 668 (C A 6), decided June 6, 1968 "Since the first meeting of the Union was on June 21, it follows that whatever meetings Curtis attended must have been subsequent to his signing the authorization card This finding is buttressed by Curtis' credited testimony to the effect that he probably attended the second union meeting since "everybody" talked about a meeting which had been held pnor to any he had attended 581 majority status. William Cooper, a General Counsel witness, testified that he worked for Respondent for 1 year; that he read the authorization card which he received from Phillip Hamilton, a coworker; that he read the card, filled in the information requested thereon;27 and signed it on the date it bears (July 5). Upon the record as a whole, I find that William Cooper's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Brian Gardner, a General Counsel witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for about 5 years; that he read and signed the union authorization card which James Ducey had given him; and that as he was leaving the plant on July 5, the day he signed said card, Ducey asked him to sign the card if he were interested in the Union. Upon the record as a whole, I find that Gardner's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. James Green testified, on direct examination by the General Counsel, that he has been in Respondent's employ for approximately 18 months; that on July 7, James Ducey, "asked me if I wanted to sign" a union authorization card; that when he replied in the affirmative, Ducey handed him an authorization card which he read, filled in all the information called for, dated it (July 7), and then signed it. On cross-examination, Green testified that when Ducey handed him the card, Ducey said, "Well, this was supposed to be an election, these cards"; that he was never "present at any time when Mr. Ducey told any other employees that the card would be for an election"; that Ducey did not "say anything about $10.00; $50.00 later,"28 adding, however, "There was plenty of talk like this"; that he could not recall from whom he heard the above quoted expression, but, to quote Green, "I don't believe [Ducey] ever" made such a statement. The pertinent portion of Green's redirect examination is as follows Q. (By Mr. McCabe)29 Was it your testimony James Ducey told you if they got enough cards there would be an election? A. Yes, sir. Q. When did he tell you that? A. Before I signed the card. Q. He told you that before you signed the card? A. Yes, sir. Q. But, did he tell you that is the only thing the card would be used for? A. Well, if the union did happen to come in, they could also save you $40.00. Q. If the union should come in, how - A. If there was a vote. Q. Now, are you using James Ducey's words or using your words? A. Well, this is what he told me. TRIAL EXAMINER: Who gave you the card? "The requested information was printed by him "The expression, "$10 now, $50 later " refers to some discussion regarding reduced initiation fees offered to any employee who desired to become a union member pnor to the Union becoming the collective-bargaining representative. "Counsel for the General Counsel 582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE WITNESS: Jim Ducey. Actually, there were two men. Jim Ducey and Arterburn were together. TRIAL EXAMINER: And who - THE WITNESS: Arterburn. I think that's his name. TRIAL EXAMINER: You mean Duane Arterburn9 THE WITNESS Yes, Sir. Upon the entire record in the case, coupled with the fact that Green gave me the distinct impression that he was studiously attempting to conform his testimony to what he believed to be to the best interest of Respondent, I find, (1) Ducey did not tell Green that the proffered card was for the purpose of obtaining an election, (2) that Green signed the card for the sole purpose of designating the Union his collective- bargaining representative, (3) that James Green's authorization card is valid, and (4) that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Frank Schafer, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he is presently employed by Colorado Industrial Bank; that he was employed by Respondent from January 1967 until the following November; that on June 23, a coworker named Schmidt gave him and another employee, Robert Bishop, union authorization cards; that Schmidt said, when he handed the cards to him and Bishop, to quote Schafer, "He wanted to know if we wanted the union to represent us, we should go ahead and fill the card in; if enough were filled in, we could have the union come in to our company"; and that he read, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it, signed it, and then returned the card to Schmidt. Upon the record as a whole, I find Frank Schafer's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Robert Bishop, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he is now employed at the Pinehurst Country Club; that he was in Respondent's employ from March 6 until October 13, 1967; that on June 23, Paul Schmidt30 gave him a union authorization card; that he took the card home, read it, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it, signed it, and then returned it to Schmidt. When asked by Respondent's counsel what he thought "the effect of signing that card would be," Bishop replied, "Well, at the time I signed it, I just thought whatever it says on there. I don't know what it says now. I was willing to listen to what the union had to offer." Upon the record as a whole, I find that Robert Bishop's is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. William Medina, a General Counsel witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 22 months; that he received a union authorization card from William Decker, a fellow worker, on June 29; that he read the card; that he was not positive if he filled in all the information requested on the card, but he did date it, signed it, and then returned the card to Decker. Medina testified on cross-examination that it was his "understanding, that the purpose of the card was so there would be an election"; and that Decker had mentioned "that" about a week or so before he got the card from Decker. Upon the record as a whole, and despite Medina's "understanding" as to the purpose of the card," I find that William Medina's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. "Apparently the same individual about whom Schafer testified William Decker, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he is presently employed by M.D.C. Products; that prior to ceasing work at Respondent's plant on August 7, he had been employed there for about 18 months; that on June 21, James Ducey gave him a union authorization card, read it, dated it, signed it, and then returned it to Ducey; and that the only conversation he had with Ducey at that time about the Union was, "How we was doing." Upon the record as a whole, I find that William Decker's card is valid and that the card should be counted toward the Union's majority status Lowell Rickard, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, has been in Respondent's employ for about 18 months; that Bruce Badsky, a coworker,72 gave him a union authorization card which he read, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it (June 21), and then returned the card to Badsky; and that no conversation transpired at the time Badsky gave him the card. Upon the record as a whole, I find that despite of Rickard's testimony on cross-examination that when he signed the card, "I just thought they'd have an election; that's what they did the year before," Lowell Rickard's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Rickey Wilson, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he could not recall the name of the person who gave him the union authorization card which he read, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it, signed it, and then on June 21, delivered it to Arterburn, and that the card had been given to him a couple of days prior to his signing it. Upon the record as a whole, and despite Wilson's testimony on cross-examination that he "thought there would be some sort of an election,"" I find that Rickey Wilson's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Urias Pryor, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for upwards of 12 years; that he received a union authorization card from James Ducey; that he could not recall whether he read the card because, "I had been through this four or five other times"; that he filled in the information requested on the card, dated it (June 21) and then returned it to Ducey; and that no one told him that there would be an election at the time he signed the card given him by Ducey. Upon the record as a whole, I find that Urias Pryor's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Max Schmaltz, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that when Arterburn handed him the authorization card, the following transpired, "He simply told me that if I signed the card, he didn't tell me it would be for an election, but what he did tell me, he said it wouldn't count as a vote"; that he took the card home, read the card, filled in the information requested on the card, signed it (June 26); and that the next day he returned the signed card to Arterburn. "To presently undertake a search of the deepest recesses of Medina's mind as of June 1967, in order to fathom motivation in face of the clear and unambiguous language of the card, impresses me as a chimerical and futile exercise "Badsky attended one of the two aforementioned June 21 meetings "Wilson also testified on cross-examination that 'no one told him there would be an election MORSE CHAIN COMPANY 583 Upon the record as a whole, I find that Max Schmaltz' card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. George Stratton, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for upwards of 5 years; that Art Morgan, a coworker," gave him a union authorization card, which, after keeping said card overnight he read it, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it (June 30), signed it, and then returned the card to Morgan; that he had no conversation with Morgan when the latter handed him the card; and that thereafter he signed a membership application and paid the required $10 initiation fee. Upon the entire record in the case, I find, despite Stratton's testimony on cross-examination that Morgan told him that the card "was for trying to vote the union into the shop" and that he thought "in a way" the card was to be used for "a vote," the undersigned finds that George Stratton's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Ike Salazar, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 18 months; that either James Ducey or Arterburn handed him a union authorization card which he read, filled in the information requested on the card, dated it (June 23), signed and then returned it to Arterburn; that the only conversation which took place when the card was given to him was that either Ducey or Arterburn "asked me to sign" the card; and that thereafter he signed a union membership application and paid the required $10 initiation fee. Upon the entire record in the case, I find, despite Salazar's testimony on cross-examination, "I thought they would have an election before the year was up for the union to have another election"; that Ike Salazar's card is valid and that the card should be counted toward the Union's majority status. John Allen, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 4 years; that he received a union authorization card from James Ducey, read it, filled in the information called for on the card, dated it (July 8), signed it , and then returned the card to Ducey; and that at the time he received the card from Ducey the only conversation they had was that Ducey said, "Let's get to work on getting the union thing started." Upon the record as a whole, I find that John Allen's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Bruce Allen, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 3 years; that on or about June 20, Ronald Groetkin" gave him a union authorization card; that he read the card, filled in the information called for on the card, dated it (June 21), signed it, and returned the card to Groetkin; and that when Groetkin handed him the card, Groetkin said, "It was a vote card rather than a card for a vote." Upon the entire record in the case, I find that the card of Bruce Allen is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Darrell Anderson, a General Counsel witness , testified, and I find, that he . has been in Respondent 's employ for about 10 months; that he received a union authorization card in the mail ; that he read it, filled in the information "Morgan attended one of the two June 21 meetings and thereafter was very active soliciting his coworkers to sign union authorization cards. "Groetkin attended one of the two June 21 meetings. requested thereon, dated it (July 21), and then mailed it to the Union about 2 weeks after he had received it." Upon the record as a whole, I find, despite Anderson's testimony on cross-examination that two coworkers," who, apparently were not officially connected with, or agents of, the Union, told him that the card "was not for a vote and you [the employees] will get an election," that Darrell Anderson's card is valid" and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status." Dennis Small, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 3 years; that he received a union authorization card, together with some other union material at the plant gate; that he took the card home, read the card, filled in the information requested thereon, dated it (July 4), signed it at home in his wife's presence, and then mailed it to George Meacham, the Union's Grand Lodge representative and its chief campaign leader. Upon the record as a whole, I find that Dennis Small's card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Richard Roberts, a General Counsel witness, testified that he is presently employed by Mine and Smelter Supply Company; that previously to said employment he worked for Respondent from about October 1966 until about November 1967; that, Orville Sackrider, a fellow employee, told him about a week or two prior to June 21, "We were going to get some cards so the union would have an idea how many people were in favor of the union"; that Sackrider gave him a union authorization card which he read, filled in the information called for thereon, dated it (June 21), signed it, and then returned the card to Sackrider; and that he signed the card because, "I was in favor of the union." Roberts further testified, and I find, that Sackrider and James Ducey each gave him a union button (about the size of a silver dollar) and he openly wore one of said buttons in the plant commencing about a week after he had signed the authorization card; and that he also signed a union membership application and paid the $10 initiation fee. Upon the record as a whole, I find that Richard Roberts' card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Gary Legvold, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he is presently employed by FTS Corporation; that he worked for Respondent from about February 20 until about December 5, 1967; that someone in the plant gave him a union authorization card and he also received such a card at the plant gate; that he read the cards, filled in one of the cards, dated it (June 26), signed it, and then delivered the card to a person whose name he could not recall. Legvold further testified, and I find, that on two separate occasions he wore a union button on the job; and that he signed the authorization card "to get the union into the company, to represent us." "The Union 's date stamp indicates that it was received on July 24. "Mike Martin and Dennis Small. "Anderson read the card prior to signing it; the language thereon is clear and unambiguous; he had the card in his possession about 2 weeks before he signed and mailed it to the Union ; hence he did not sign the card heedlessly. "Since the card was signed and received by the Union after the Union had made its initial demand for recognition , the card, obviously , cannot be, and it is not being , considered with respect to that particular demand of the Union. 584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the record as a whole, I find that Gary Legvold's card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. John McClure, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he is presently unemployed; that he worked for Respondent from February 1967 until about January 1968; that Bruce Badsky gave him a union authorization card, that he read the card, filled in the information requested thereon, dated it (June 21), signed it, and then returned it to Badsky. McClure further testified, and I find, that when Badsky gave him the card, Badsky said, "they were trying to get a union - the card would help us get a union in and we could vote, and it was to join the union"; that he signed the card because "at the time I wanted a union in and I believed that if it helped get the union in the plant, I would sign it." Upon the entire record, I find that, despite McClure's testimony on cross-examination, "It was my understanding that if I signed the card and enough of them were signed, we could have an election," John McClure's card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status Louis Jeanpierre, a General Counsel witness, testified, and I find, that he has been in Respondent's employ for about a year and 4 months, that over a period of 3 or 4 weeks James Ducey and he discussed the Union; that during said period Ducey gave him two union authorization cards which he read; that he filled in one of the cards Ducey gave him, then dated it (July 7), signed it, and returned the signed card to Ducey; that he was not sure what Ducey actually said during the aforementioned 3-4 weeks discussions but he thought it was something like, "This is for an election, or something around there. °0 Upon the entire record in the case, coupled with the fact that Jeanpierre thought over the question of whether he should sign the card for a matter of weeks, clearly shows that he did not sign the card heedlessly, in face of the clear and unambiguous language of the card. Therefore, I find that Louis Jeanperre's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status James Dusch, called as a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a full-time employee of Respondent since July 1961,°1 and is presently a leadman in the shipping department; that in the absence of the foreman, he is a supervisor,42 that he signed a union authorization card during the Union's campaign which is the subject matter of the instant proceeding; that Art Bogaard, in the presence of employee Joseph Pfeifer and former employee Don Kreiger, gave him a union authorization card; that he read and signed the card and then returned it to Bogaard; that he signed the card because he wanted an election. Dusch further testified that, although he spoke to Bogaard about the Union and authorization cards in general on about two or three occasions prior to the time he received the card, Bogaard said upon giving him the card he signed, "If we could get enough cards there would be an election"; that in his conversations with Bogaard prior to signing his authorization card, "I told 'OJeanpierre added to the above quote , "Really, I can't be sure exactly what [Ducey] said " "Prior to graduating from high school , Dusch worked as a part-time employee in Respondent 's plant "There is no contention that Dusch is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act him [Bogaard] that I thought the union would be good for the plant and good for the employees"; and that he attended a union meeting but could not recall whether it was held prior to or after he had signed an authorization card. Dusch's testimony that he apparently signed the authorization card relying on Bogaard's statement, "If we could get enough cards . . there would be an election" does not ring true. This finding is buttressed by Dusch's own testimony that prior to his signing the card he told Bogaard, "I thought the union would be good for the plant and good for the employees." In addition, Dusch appeared to me as being a person of more than average intelligence This being so, it is safe to infer, and I do, that Dusch, after reading, filling out, dating, and signing the card did not realize that the card - especially in view of the clear and unambiguous language contained thereon - was a collective-bargaining representative designation and not a request for an election. Under the circumstances, I find that the card of James Dusch is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Jospeh Pfeifer, a Respondent witness, was in the hearing room throughout Dusch's entire examination and the next witness called, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ since August 1965, that Bogaard, in the presence of Dusch and Don Kreiger, gave him a union authorization, that he could not recall if Bogaard made any statement at the time nor could he recall talking about the card; that "everybody knew that the union was trying to get in and that they was [sic] going to pass out cards to see whether or not we wanted an election," that he got the idea that an election would be held from "more or less rumor going around"; that he did not think Bogaard mentioned an election; that before he signed the card he, Dusch, and Kreiger talked "about that we wanted the union . . and I think we talked if they got enough cards that it would bring it to a vote"; that he read the card and signed It; 43 and that no one told him there would be an election. Regarding the authorization cards of Dusch, Pfeifer, and Kreiger, Bogaard, who attended one of the two aforementioned June 21 meetings and who was very active on the Union's behalf, testified, as a General Counsel witness, that he gave Dusch a union authorization card and that Dusch returned it signed, with the date (June 26) filled in; that he gave Kreiger a union authorization card, which Kreiger signed in his presence, and Kreiger gave him the entirely filled out, signed, and dated (June 26) card; that he gave Pfeifer a union authorization card which Pfeifer returned to him completely filled out, including signature and date (June 26); and that he delivered the said cards to Meacham. Upon the entire record in the case, I find that the cards of James Dusch, Jospeh Pfeifer, and Don Kreiger" are valid and that they should be counted in support of the Union's majority status I further find that the signers of said three cards each intended to designate the Union as his collective-bargaining representative when he signed the card. Merle Schippert, a "legally" blind person, was called as a Respondent witness and testified that he has been in Respondent's employ since July 22, 1966; that he received a union authorization card from James Ducey while he, "The card bears the date of June 26 "Kreiger did not testify His card was received in evidence through the credited testimony of Bogaard MORSE CHAIN COMPANY 585 Ducey, and Bill Decker, a Respondent employee and a chum of Ducey, were in the plant's parking lot; that he could not read the card because he did not have his special reading glasses with him, but was able to read the words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM" because they were in large letters; that Ducey told him the purpose of the cards was for the holding of an election; that he signed the card because he was "a little bit annoy" by Ducey's asking him to sign a card; and that about a week after he had signed the card he heard that the card was not for an election but was for some other purpose, at which time he asked Ducey for the return of the card; and that Ducey said he could not return the card because it "had already gone in.,, Ducey, who was called as a witness prior to Schippert's examination, testified that he gave the card to Schippert, saw Schippert sign it, and received the signed card from Schippert;45 that he read the card to Schippert because of Schippert's affiliation and told Schippert that the card authorized the Union "to come in for collective bargaining and whatever else involved in the union", that he did not tell Schippert anything about an election. In view of the fact that Schippert requested Ducey to return his card prior to any union demand for recognition, I will not consider Schippert's card in support of the Union's majority status. John Kugi, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ about 14 years; that when Bogaard gave him a union authorization card, Bogaard "didn't mention anything"; that he "glanced over" the card and then signed it,46 that Lee Miles was also present when he signed the card; that, although no one told him that the card was for an election, he nonetheless thought it was for that purpose; and that on May 20, 1967, he executed a union membership application and paid the $10 initiation fee. Upon the entire record in the case, I find that the card of John Kugi is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. George Dick, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ since October 25, 1966; and that he attended the second of the aforementioned June 21 meetings at which he signed a union authorization card in Meacham's presence Dick then testified as follows.07 Q Now, what was said by Mr. Meacham about the cards at that meeting9 A. About the card specifically, I don't remember him saying anything one way or the other Q. What, if anything, was said about an election at that meeting? A Well, as I recall, he said something to the effect that he wanted to get together with as many of the men as possible before the election came up, which it couldn't be held until a year after the prior election, which was before I got there, in October. Upon the entire record in the case, especially Meacham's credible testimony concerning what he told the people attending the two June 21 meetings about his desire to secure union recognition from Respondent without the necessity of a Board-election, I find that George Dick's card48 is valid and that the card should be "The card is dated June 30 "Kugi's card , dated June 26, was received in evidence through the credited testimony of Bogaard prior to Kugi testifying "Dick also testified regarding Meacham buying alcoholic drinks for the people attending this meeting This matter will be discussed infra "This card is dated June 21 counted in support of the Union's majority status Jerry Hinton, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 16 months; that during a "break," Bogaard walked over to where he and "a bunch of guys," included therein were Phil Martinez and Joe Gonzales, were sitting, "and handed" him a union authorization card, asking, "If I'd sign it and bring the union in",d9 that the day he received the card, he read it, took it home, signed it at home, and the following day went to Bogaard's work area and handed the signed card to Bogaard. Upon the record as a whole, I find that the card of Jerry Hinton is valid50 and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status Richard Graham, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for over 8 years, that while in his car during the luncheon period, apparently on June 27, the date of the card, Bogaard gave him a union authorization card; that after glancing over the card, he signed it and then handed it to Bogaard; and that one of the reasons, "I didn't read it [the card] thoroughly was that I was under the impression that it was to get a majority of the cards to call an election"; and that no one ever told him that an election would be held. Upon the record as a whole, I find that the card of Richard Graham is valid51 and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status Danny Eastin, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 6 years, that he attended, at the suggestion of Art Morgan, the second of the two aforementioned June 21 meetings, that he received a union authorization card at said meeting, but did not sign it at that time; that he also received cards, at some later undisclosed date, from Morgan and from Harold Dumakowski, 52 that he signed an authorization card at home and his wife "mailed it in";" that he "imagined" he was in the plant when Dumakowski gave him a union authorization and "It might have been his card I signed " Upon the record as a whole, I find that the card of Danny Eastin is valid and the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status.54 Dumakowski's credited testimony discloses, in part, that Dumakowski told Eastin when he gave Eastin the authorization card that the purpose of the card was to get the plant organized so that the Union could become the employees' bargaining representative. Irven Chenoweth, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for over 9 years, that because he "was irritated that day,"55 he went to Marvin Gassman's5B work area and asked Gassman for a union authorization card; that Gassman then went to his tool box - located some five paces away - got an authorization card, and handed it to him, that when he asked Gassman for the card, "I probably said I'd like to sign one", that he took the card back to his work area in "Hinton added , " He [Bogaard ] never said that it [the card] was bringing up for an election or what" "Hinton's card is dated July 7 "Graham's card is dated June 27 "Dumakowski and Morgan attended the same June 21 meeting which Eastin attended "Eastin' s card is dated July 18 "Since Eastin's card is dated after the Union made its original demand for recognition , said card will not be considered in support of the Union's majority status with respect to this particular demand "Apparently on July 5, the date the authorization card bears "Gassman attended the second June 21 meeting 586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the laboratory, signed it, and then took the card to Gassman and handed him the signed card; that before he signed the card he read it and "It sounded rather severe." Upon the entire record in the case, I find that Irven Chenoweth's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Ronald Heidrick, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee since July 13, 1966; that Arterburn approached him at his machine and asked, "If I wanted to sign a card," and handed him a union authorization card;57 that he "understood it was for an election";58 that he did not see any of the authorization cards being distributed during the 1967 campaign prior to the time Arterburn handed him one; that he asked Arterburn "what it [the card] was for, if it was for an election, and he [Arterburn] said yes"; that he did not recall whether he signed the card at the time Arterburn gave it to him; that he "probably" retained the card 2 or 3 days prior to handing the signed card to Arterburn who had come to his machine for the card; that he did not see Arterburn hand out or receive any union authorization cards; that he read the card Arterburn gave him before he signed it, including the words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM." Upon the entire record in the case, coupled with the fact that Heidrick gave me the distinct impression that he was studiously attempting to conform his testimony to what he considered to be to the best interest of Respondent, it is found that Ronald Heidrick's card is valid59 and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Colman Brown, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for about 18 months; that while on a "break" a "guy had [sic] my card, so I just took the card and come on back and signed the card";" that he could not recall who handed him the union authorization card, but said person worked in a department other than his, that the person who handed him the card made no comment whatsoever; that prior to the above-described incident he had heard, "They was [sic] going to try and get a union in there, so I took the card because the year before we had tried to get a union. We all voted. I voted against it. So I just took the card and went off"; and that no one told him that the purpose of the card was to secure "a vote." Upon the record as a whole, I find that Colman Brown's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Anthony Lucci, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for about 13 years; that Arterburn had "been badgering me for several weeks to sign [a union authorization card] and I kept telling him no, and he kept telling me, 'Sign one, because we want to talk to the guys and see what their benefits, are' and I says, 'Well, okay, I'll help you out,' so he., gave me a "Apparently this incident took place 2 or 3 days before June 26, the date appearing on the card "Respondent 's counsel then asked, "is that what he [Arterburn] said?" and Heidnck replied, "Yes " "Heidnck had the card in his possession 2 or 3 days before he returned it to Arterburn signed Under the circumstances, it is clear that Heidnck did not sign the card heedlessly At the time of the hearing, Heidnck was working in "a white-collar job" having been transferred to the office as a factory control employee Prior thereto he worked in the thread department located in the factory portion of the plant "Brown testified that he read and signed the card on June 30. card";" that the above referred to incident took place on June 27; that Arterburn gave him the card as he was returning from his "break" and Arterburn was going on his "break"; that he signed the card at his machine and placed it between a red rag and when he saw Arterburn returning from his "break" he ran some 80 feet to Arterburn's machine and placed the red rag (presumably together with the card) on Arterburn's workbench and then ran back to his own machine; that, although he filled in all the information requested on the authorization card prior to signing it, he did not read the card, that he could not "really honestly say" that he saw, "YES, I WANT THE IAM" on the card, because, "It was about a 12-minute period in there from the time I got the card to the time I gave it back to Duane Arterburn; . . . I didn't really even get time to read it, plus I was a little worried about it myself"; and that prior to the time he signed the card in question, Art Morgan told him, "They were trying to get a re-organization committee going before the [election] year was up." I am, convinced, and find, that neither Arterburn nor Morgan ever told Lucci that the purpose of the card was to obtain an election. This finding is based mainly, but not entirely, upon the fact that Lucci did not impress me as being a forthright witness. In short, to me, Lucci's testimony regarding the events surrounding the signing of the authorization card does not ring true. Accordingly, upon the entire record in the case, I find that the card of Anthony Lucci is valid62 and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. John Dennis, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ a little over a year; that one day around the end of June or early in July,63 "I just jumped off my fork[ lift] and went over and asked" Morgan , who was working at his machine, I fort al union authorization card; that Morgan gave him such a card, at which time Morgan said, the card was for "a vote"; that, although, when he had requested the card from Morgan, he nevertheless inquired of Morgan the purpose of the card; that he directed the above referred to inquiry to Morgan, even though he had heard from other sources that the Union's authorization cards were "for a vote"; that he took the card to his own work area, some 100 feet from Morgan's, signed the card and then placed it on his leadman's66 desk; that about 3 days later, his leadman called his attention to the fact that the card was still on the desk; and that he then took the card, which is dated July 6, to Morgan's work area and gave Morgan the signed card Dennis further testified that he read the card, including the words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM," and understood the card. Dennis appeared to me as being a person of more than average intelligence. Under the circumstances, it is inconceivable to me that Dennis signed said card relying solely upon Morgan's purported assurances , as apparently Respondent seeks to imply, that the card was for the purpose of requesting a Board-conducted election. "Respondent's counsel then asked, "And did he [Arterburn] say anything about an election when he gave you the card9", and Lucci replied, "Yeah, he told me That's why I wasn't going to sign one because I didn't particularly want a union Well, he said , 'This just entitles you to hear what they 've got to offer, and then we'll have a vote on it to see whether you want it or not,' so I says, 'Well, all right, I'll let you guys see what you want "' "Lucci's card is dated June 27 "Dennis did not work from June 30 through July 4. "Not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act MORSE CHAIN COMPANY Accordingly, and upon the record as a whole, I find that (1) Dennis executed the card given him by Morgan for the sole purpose of designating the Union his collective-bargaining representative; (2) the card is valid, and (3) the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Dave Bryan, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for over 3 years; that last summer Art Morgan gave him a union authorization card during his lunch "break"; that on the particular occasion, Morgan "just asked me if I wanted a card and handed it to me"; that he "signed it [the card] right then" and then returned it to Morgan " Bryan further testified that he read and understood the meaning of the card. Upon the record as a whole, I find that Dave Bryan's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Arthur Adamson, a Respondent witness, testified he has been in Respondent's employ for upwards of 8 years; that last summer, while he was on his lunch "break," Art Morgan came over to where he and two fellow workers, Dale Ager and Roger Wisehart, were and gave him a union authorization card; that at that time, to quote Adamson, "He [Morgan] told me he'd like me to sign it, that it was to take a vote, and that's what I understood"; that he kept the card about 3 or 4 days before he signed it;" and that he signed the card at his machine, took the card to Morgan's work area, while en route to the tool crib, and gave the signed card to Morgan. Adamson testified on cross-examination by the General Counsel, that he read, filled in the card, and understood the card; that when Morgan handed him the card, Morgan volunteered, to him, Ager, and Wisehart, "That all it [the card] was for was to have the union come in to take a vote and see how we stand." Adamson further testified on cross-examination that he had attended a union meeting about 2 or 3 weeks prior to the time he signed the aforementioned card, at which meeting a Mr. Wagner, a union representative, was the main speaker; that Wagner told the approximately 20 Respondent employees present, he was "just trying to get the union in, and that was all, see what kind of a contract we could get." Morgan, called by the General Counsel on rebuttal, testified that when he handed Adamson the card in question he told Adamson that it was "to be used to get the union in, to bargain for us", that before Adamson signed the card he and Adamson had several conversations in which Adamson wanted to know "if the card was going to be used for an election, and I told him no, we couldn't have an election even if we wanted to until October"; and that he never told Adamson the card was going to be used for an election. Upon the record as a whole, I find that (1) Morgan never told Adamson that the purpose of the card was to secure an election, (2) Adamson signed the card for the sole purpose of designating the Union his collective-bargaining representative, and (3) the card is valid and (4) the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status " "The card is dated June 29. "Adamson's card is dated July 18 "Since the card is dated subsequent to the Union's original demand for recognition the card will not be considered with respect to that particular demand 587 Tony Ruiz, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for about 6 years; that on a particular day last summer Morgan asked him to sign a union authorization card, adding, to quote Ruiz, "if I signed it, it would be a vote." During the course of his cross-examination by the General Counsel, Ruiz testified that he read the card in question, including the words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM," completely filled out the card, then signed and dated (June 30) it; that he had spoken to Morgan about the card on several occasions over a 2 or 3-week period immediately prior to signing it and also once or twice during the week immediately preceding June 30; that at the time he received and signed the card he and Morgan were on their "break" and he just happended to walk past Morgan's machine and Morgan said, to again quote Ruiz, "If you sign the card, we could have a vote on it." When asked by the General Counsel how the election question came up when Morgan asked him to sign the card, Ruiz replied, "I said, `What's it for?' and he says, `After we sign it we might get the union in there and get a vote on it."' Morgan testified, as a General Counsel rebuttal witness, that he had more than once asked Ruiz to sign an authorization card; that he never told Ruiz that the card was to be used to obtain an election; and that when the question of an election did arise, "I told him [Ruiz] the cards were to get the representation of the union and that there would not be an election and couldn't be an election until after October." Upon the entire record in the case, I find that (1) Morgan did not tell Ruiz that the purpose of the authorization card was to obtain an election, (2) that Ruiz signed said card for the sole purpose of designating the Union as his collective-bargaining representative, (3) Ruiz's card is valid, and (4) the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Gerald Van Meter, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ for approximately 2 years; that he signed a union authorization card last summer; that Art Morgan gave him such a card after, "I went up and asked him what the last union meeting was about, and he said if I wanted to find out to just sign a card", that Morgan then gave him an authorization card which he read, completely filled out, and signed;" that, "some ways" he wanted the Union and "some ways" he did not want the Union, but mainly he "wanted to find out what the Union was offering"; and that no one told him the purpose of the authorization cards was to obtain an election. With respect to Van Meter's card, Morgan's testimony as a rebuttal witness is as follows: Q. You also testified about a card signed by Gerald Van Meter? A. Yes. Q. Did you ever talk to him about the card? A. Yes. Q. One time or more than one time? A. Several times. Q. Did you ever talk about an election? A Yes. Q. What did you say to him about an election? A. Well, on our breaks when we was talking about it in the canteen room, he was all the time trying to tell us guys that these cards were going to be used for an election, and I was trying to convince him that they "Van Meter' s card is dated July 8 588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD weren't going to be used for an election. Q. Did you ever tell him if he wanted to find out what the cards were for, he should sign one? A No, I didn't. Upon the entire record in the case, I find that Gerald Van Meter's card is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Michael Martin, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for about 2 years, that last summer he signed a union authorization card; that he received said card from Duane Arterburn who "said it was only supposed to - for to have an election whether or not the union came in"; and that he could not recall whether he was in Arterburn's department or in his own department when he received the card. On cross-examination by the General Counsel, Martin testified that he read the card Arterburn gave him, signed it, and then returned it to Arterburn " Martin then testified under cross-examination as follows: Q. Did you understand it? A. I guess I didn't now. Q. What do you mean, you guess you didn't now? A. I thought it was just so we could have a vote; I didn't want that to be my vote. Q. Was there anything on the card that said it was for a vote? A. It has been so long since I read the card, I can't exactly remember what it said. Q. I will show you what is in evidence as General Counsel No. 102 which you identified, the copies, as being the card you signed. Look at that and tell me if there is anything about an election on that card. A. No Q Well, what did he [Arterburn] say - how did the conversation about an election come up? A. Well, he just told me that it wasn't for a vote; it was just so the union could try to come in so we could take a vote. Q Well, how - why did he tell you that? How did that part of the conversation come up? A I think I asked him whether or not - what the card was for. * * * * * Q. Well, is this something about a vote something you remember by later conversation or at the time you got the card? A. Maybe later conversation. Q. Do you think it is possible he didn't say anything about the card at the time you got it? A. Maybe. Q. You did read the card? A. Yes. Q. And then you filled it out and signed it? A. Yes Q Then you gave it back to him? A Uh-huh Upon the record as a whole, I find that ( 1) Martin signed his card for the sole purpose of designating the Union as his collective-bargaining representative , (2) the card is valid , and (3 ) the card should be counted in "The card is dated June 21, the day the Union held its first two meetings support of the Union's majority status. John Johnson, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee since 1961; that last summer, while at his machine, he asked Art Morgan for a union authorization card; that thereupon Morgan gave him one; that prior to that time he and Morgan had, "off and on" spoken about such cards and from said conversations he got "the impression that it [the card] was for an election more than anything else"; that he "couldn't honestly" say that Morgan ever said to him the cards were for an election, and that he signed the card the day he received it and then returned it to Morgan." Johnson further testified that he read and understood the meaning of the card. Upon the entire record in the case, I find that John Johnson's card is valid and that it should be counted in support of the Union's majority status Sal McDuffie, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been a Respondent employee for about 30 months; that on July 11, he read, understood, filled out, and then signed a union authorization card; and that he signed said card at home, which he had received from Art Morgan. Upon the entire record in the case, I find that the card of Sal McDuffie is valid and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status Tony Fong, a Respondent witness, testified that he has been in Respondent's employ a little over a year; that he read the card, which Art Morgan gave him, including the words, "YES, I WANT THE IAM," understood the card, and signed it; and that Morgan "didn't tell me anything" when Morgan handed him the card, apparently because, as Fong testified, "We talked about it [the card] prior and afterwards, but I did assume we'd have an election, and if we had enough cards that the union would come in." Upon the entire record in the case, I find that the card of Tony Fong is valid" and that the card should be counted in support of the Union's majority status. Respondent contended at the hearing and in its brief argued, "The record indicates that 13 card signers" had been told directly or by rumor that the signing of the card would save them $40.00 of the Union's initiation fee. It appeared from the testimony that the source of the rumor that an employee would save $40.00 by signing a card before the Union got in was employee Art Morgan, who was the prime movant on behalf of the Union and who was an authorized distributor of cards .... I am convinced, and find, that the above quoted contention is not borne out by the credited evidence and hence the contention is without merit or substance. Furthermore, as found above, for reasons other than the above-quoted contention, I found that the card of Merle Schippert should not be considered in support of the Union's majority status, it is further found that the cards of the 12 other persons are valid designations of the Union's collective-bargaining status. As stated in its brief, Respondent seriously objected at the hearing "to the procedure which was followed by the General Counsel in putting signed authorization cards into evidence Respondent's Exhibit No. 20" indicates clearly that the Counsel for the General Counsel had advance "Johnson's card is dated June 21 "The card is dated July 6 "Namely, John Johnson, Jerry Cook, Carl Green, Ulysses Johnson, Louis Jeanpierre , Anton Freidnch, Merle Schippert , Jerry Hinton, George Dick, Anthony Lucci, Arthur Adamson, Tony Ruiz, and Gerald Van Meter "Letter, dated January 18, 1968 , from Respondent ' s counsel to the Director of Region 27 MORSE CHAIN COMPANY 589 notice from the Respondent that all or most of those persons who signed authorization cards were available for personal testimony and were within ten to fifteen minutes of the location at which the hearing in this case was held. The Respondent also volunteered to cooperate in scheduling said employees into the hearing room to testify. It would seem appropriate under circumstances where a witness is readily available to testify, and particularly where the General Counsel intends to substitute a signed card for a secret ballot vote, that the person who actually signed the card be required to testify, and that this should be a necessary element of the General Counsel's case. While it may be argued that these witnesses are as available to the Respondent as to the General Counsel, it must be remembered that the burden of proof rests with the General Counsel, and it must further be remembered that the only basis upon which second-hand evidence may be admitted is where those persons who could testify personally as to an event are unavailable for testimony. In retrospect the conduct of the General Counsel in attempting to put cards into evidence through second-party testimony raises the question as to whether the General Counsel is hiding an element of the card signer 's testimony which may not benefit his case. Therefore, it is urged that the General Counsel should be required, at least in this particular case, to put in first hand evidence of card signing because of the general policy involved." Twenty-seven union authorization cards" were received in evidence through the credited testimony of Bogaard who testified that he (1) personally knew each of the persons who signed said cards, (2) either observed the cards being signed or received them from the persons who signed them; and (3) personally initialed each of said cards at the bottom thereof at the time it was given to him by the card signer. Meacham credibly testified that at the two aforementioned June 21 meetings, 13 Respondent employees" signed union authorization cards; that he personally knew all said 13 employees except George Dick; that the said 13 cards were signed in his presence; and that he put his initials at the bottom of each signed card at the time it was given to him at said meetings. Twenty-five union authorization cards'" were received in evidence through the credited testimony of Morgan who testified that he (1) personally knew each of the persons from whom he received said cards, (2) saw each card either signed by the person whose name appears thereon or it was given to him by the person whose name appears thereon filled out and signed, and (3) upon receipt of said card he placed "A. R. T." at the bottom of each card upon its receipt from the signer. "Those of Estell Campbell, Jim Dusch, John Fresquez, Leroy Gassman, Gabriel Gonzales, Joseph Gonzales, Richard Graham, Jim Graver, Roy Henssenflow, Jerry Hinton, Leroy Howard, Newlyn Jackson, Don Krieger, John Kugi, Joe Logan, Richard McGrath, Joseph Martinez, Harris Mennenga , Lee Miles, Clarence Mitchell, Kenneth Payton , Joseph Pfeifer, Darrell Rustin, Guillermo Serna, Gary Smith, Peter Summerton, Sam Tsuchiya. In addition , at the hearing the cards of some of the above-named persons were further identified by the signers thereof. "Those employees who did not identify their own cards at the hearing are: Ernest Carter, Robert Laing, Forrest Neal, and Nelson Begay. "Those of Arthur Adamson, David Bryan, Bobby Bush, Richard Calhoun, Lee Cyrus, John Dennis, Tony Fong, Ronald Godfrey, Ronald Graham, Willard Henderson, John Johnson, Charles Kear, Fred McDaniel, Sal McDuffie, Carl Moore, Robert Morris, Larry Muse, Arterburn testified, and I find, that he personally knew Robert Bowen, Colman Brown , Ronald Heidrick, Anthony Lucci, Michael Martin, and Jim Motoyama; and that each of said named persons gave him filled out, signed union authorization cards." Three union authorization cards" were received in evidence through the credited evidence of Marvin Gassman who testified that he (1) personally knew the three persons who signed said cards, (2) received filled out, signed authorization cards from Bahr and Chenoweth," and (3) saw Jacobs date and sign his card. Ben Garcia, a conceded handwriting expert, and a General Counsel witness, credibly testified that the cards of John Baier , Ray Jodon, Jr., Edward Mirci, Robert Sims, and Elmer Ulibarri were signed by the person whose name appears thereon."° The genuineness of the signatures appearing on the 79 authorization cards received in evidence through the testimony of Bogaard, Meacham, Morgan, Arterburn, Gassman, and Garcia was not questioned nor challenged, except the five cards introduced through Ben Garcia. As to those five cards, I find, in accordance with Garcia's credible testimony, were filled out, dated, and signed, by the persons whose names appear thereon. Recently the contention advanced by Respondent and as quoted above was presented to the Tenth Circuit in a case" very similar to the instant one. In rejecting said contention, the Court stated at pages 16 and 17 of slip opinion: Nine union authorization cards were identified at the hearing by the employees who actually signed the cards, and were admitted in evidence. Five more cards were identified by some witness who testified that he knew the man whose name appeared on the card and that he saw the man fill out the card and write his name on it. Counsel for the respondent contends that the admission of these 5 cards in evidence constituted a flagrant violation of the "basic principles" of the hearsay rule. The union authorization cards speak clearly for themselves. They read: "I authorize Local 775 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America to represent me as my collective bargaining agent." Below this unambiguous statement on- the top of the card are spaces to be filled out with the name of employer, kind of work performed, address, telephone number, date and signature. The situation then is that a witness on the stand gave testimony that he saw a known fellow employee give the union authority to represent him for collective bargaining purposes. This is not "written hearsay," as counsel for the respondent calls it, but direct evidence of the creation of an agency relationship between a fellow employee and the Union. It is as though a witness testified that he heard P employ A as chauffeur at a stated renumeration and under stated conditions and heard A accept the employment. The authentication of the signatures on the cards is, of Walter Rapue, Tony Ruiz, Garry Shaner, Bernhard Strand, Gerald Van Meter, William Wedig, Roger Wisehart, and Mike Wright. In addition , at the hearing the cards of some of the above-named persons were further identified by the signers thereof. "In addition , at the hearing Brown, Heidrick , Lucci, and Martin identified their own cards. "Those of Harry Bahr, Irven Chenoweth, Gerald Jacobs. "In addition, Chenoweth identified his card at the hearing. '"The General Counsel stated on the record that the above-named five persons were not available as witnesses. "N.L.R.B. v. Merrill Axle and Wheel Service. 388 F.2d 514 (C.A. 10). 590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD course, by direct evidence. The witness saw the fellow employee write his name. The 5 cards were properly admitted in evidence. NLRB v. Economy Food Center, Inc , 333 F.2d 468, 471 (C.A 7, 1964); Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F 2d 128, 134 (C.A. 8, 1965). Under the circumstances, I find no merit to Respondent's contention that the cards received in evidence through persons not the card signers should not be considered in support of the Union's majority status. Certain testimony was elicited by Respondent's counsel from Meacham and from Respondent's employees with respect to the Union serving free beer and whiskey to the employees attending the two aforementioned June 21 meetings at which authorization cards were solicited and/or were signed. This testimony, I assume, was introduced for the purpose of proving that the Union used undue influence to obtain signatures to authorization cards by those who signed said cards at said June 21 meetings. I further assume that Respondent also relies upon this evidence in support of its contention that the Union never had an uncoerced majority at any time material. Since no mention was made of this evidence in Respondent's brief I gather that the aforesaid apparent contention has been abandoned. In any event, the credited evidence discloses (1) no one testified he received more than one free beer or one free whiskey at any one of said two meetings except George Dick who testified he was given and he drank one or more free beers, perhaps as many as six, seven, or eight free beers and Manuel Corrosco who had two free double scotches; (2) Corrosco did not sign a union authorization card at the June 21 meeting he attended or at any other time, and (3) the cost of the free refreshments served to the 20 or so persons attending said two meetings amounted to $9.15. Under the circumstances, I find that by serving free liquid refreshments at said June 21 meetings, the Union did not influence any employee in signing an authorization card nor was it the Union's purpose in serving the refreshments to unduly or unlawfully influence the employees to sign authorization cards or to otherwise influence them in their choice of a bargaining representative. On July 17, 1967, the date of the Union's letter demanding recognition, there were 216 persons in the appropriate unit, two of whom were on military leave. On behalf of the General Counsel there were offered and received in evidence 113 signed cards,"= all bearing dates of July 17, 1967, or prior thereto, expressly authorizing the Union to represent the signers thereof for collective bargaining. The genuineness of the signatures appearing on said cards, except the five cards received in evidence through the credible testimony of Ben Garcia, the handwriting expert, was not questioned nor challenged. I have compared the names appearing on Respondent's July 17, 1967 payroll and find that as of July 17, 1967, 113 employees in the appropriate unit had selected and designated the Union as their collective-bargaining representative." I further find that as of July 17, 1967, the Union was, and at all times thereafter has been, the duly selected and designated representative of Respondent's employees in the bargaining unit heretofore found appropriate. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the "Excluding the cards of Darrell Anderson, Merle Schippert, Danny Eastin , Richard Calhoun, and Arthur Adamson Schippert' s card is not being considered as a valid designation since he requested its return prior to the Union' s recognition demand and the cards of the four other persons are not being considered with respect to the Union's July 17 recognition demand because said cards were signed after the date of said demand Act, the Union was, and now is, the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. The consolidated amended complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleged that the Union requested and Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in a certain stated appropriate unit on or about July 17, and on or about July 31, 1967. The number of unit employees had changed between July 17 and July 31 in that six persons had left Respondent's employ during said period and two persons had been hired, so that the total number of employees, including the two who were on military, were reduced to 212. On July 31, the Union's majonty had also changed in that the Union had obtained 8 valid additional authorization cards" between July 17 and July 31, giving the Union a total of 121 cards on July 31. Between July 17 and July 31, four of the Union's 121 card signers had left Respondent' employ."s Thus, as of July 31, the credited evidence establishes that 117 persons in the appropriate unit had signed cards, all bearing dates prior to July 31, 1967, expressly authorizing the Union to represent the signers thereof for collective bargaining. As found above, the Union, about mid-June 1967, commenced an organizational drive among Respondent's employees. The Union held the first two of a series of organizational meetings at a bar-restaurant near Respondent's plant on June 21. The first meeting was for the night-shift employees which was followed almost immediately by a meeting attended by the men working on the day shift. Of the 20 employees attending these two meetings, 13 signed union authorization cards. Besides holding meetings of employees, the Union, together with the support of some Respondent employees, openly solicited membership in and outside the plant, before, during, and after working hours. The fact that the employees ' organizational activities came to Respondent ' s attention immediately after they had commenced cannot be successfully rebutted for the credited evidence clearly establishes that, as early as June 21, Respondent began a counter-campaign to disorganize, discourage , and destroy the Union' s attempt to organize the employees and took all possible means , lawful and unlawful, to wean its employees away from the Union. In short, the record indicates that Respondent proceeded upon the premise that employees' union activities, like malignancy, can be stamped out most easily in its incipient stage. This finding is supported, among other credible evidence, by the findings and conclusions set forth immediately below. James Ducey, who voluntarily left Respondent's employ on July 18, 1967, testified that he attended the first of the two aforementioned union June 21 meetings; that he reported to work that evening, June 21, wearing a union button, and that shortly thereafter his foreman, Kenny "These 113 authorization cards were in the possession of the Union on July 17 "The cards of Arthur Adamson (dated July 18 ), Darrell Anderson (dated July 21), Richard Calhoun (dated July 18 ), John Kindsfather (dated July 23), Danny McElhaney (dated July 21), Phil Martinez (dated July 20), and Carl Moore (dated July 18) "Namely, Pat Baier , Newlyn Jackson, Danny McElhaney , and Kenneth Payton MORSE CHAIN COMPANY Houston," came to his work area and engaged him in a conversation. Regarding the conversation, referred to immediately above, which lasted some 45 or 60 minutes, Ducey testified that Houston began it by asking if he had attended a union meeting that day and how many other Respondent's employees had attended, that after admitting he had been to the union meeting, Houston inquired why he, in particular, wanted the plant unionized; that he replied that he believed the Union could secure higher wages, more benefits, and better working conditions for the employees; that Houston then stated that the Union was not only composed of a bunch of crooks who would steal its members' money, but it could not do anything worth while for Respondent's employees; that Houston also remarked that in the past, during slack periods, Respondent would have the employees wash the plant windows rather than lay off employees, but if the Union was successful in unionizing the plant, Respondent would lay off employees during slack periods, and that Houston warned him that if he "pushed the Union," things would be "pretty rough" for him. Ducey further testified that at the end of his shift that night, about 2 a.m , June 22, Jack Bolte, Respondent's night shift superintendent and admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, asked him, during an hour-long conversation which Bolte initiated, why he wanted a union in the plant since there was no necessity for one, especially since unions were composed of crooks who appealed mainly to the masses; that Bolte also said that if the Union organized the plant, Respondent would no longer "stretch" the work during slack periods in order to keep the men working but instead it would lay off employees not absolutely needed; and that toward the end of the conversation Bolte told him that if he kept his "nose clean" and worked hard he would one day be made a foreman Houston not only denied that he made the statements attributed to him by Ducey but also denied that he even talked to Ducey on June 21 Bolte, although admitting he had a conversation with Ducey at the conclusion of the June 21-22 night shift, but denied he initiated the conversation, claiming that Ducey initiated it. Bolte further denied that he told Ducey that if the Union organized the plant, Respondent would lay off employees during slack periods rather than, as in the past, "stretch out" the work. Bolte, however, admitted that he and Ducey did discuss working conditions in the plant, as well as wages and sick leave. In the light of my observation of the conduct and deportment of Ducey, Houston, and Bolte while each was on the witness stand, and after a very careful scrutiny of the entire record , I find that Ducey's versions of what he and Houston said on the evening of June 21 and what he and Bolte said early on June 22, as summarized above, to be substantially in accord with the facts. This finding is based mainly, but not entirely, on the fact that Ducey impressed me as being one who is careful with the truth and meticulous in not enlarging his testimony beyond his actual memory of what was said during the two conversations referred to above. On the other hand, neither Houston nor Bolte so impressed me. Orval Sackrider testified that he signed a union authorization card on June 26 and a few days later he began to openly wear a union button at work; and that around July 1, while he was alone working at his machine, "Admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act 591 Bolte came along and told him that the union button was interfering with his work, adding that all union talk in the gear room must stop immediately. Paul Schmidt testified that he signed a union authorization card on June 22, and a few days later openly wore a union button at work, that around July 1, Bolte came to him while he was working in the gear room and said that the union button was interfering with his production; and that later that same evening, while he was working at his machine and two or three other employees were nearby, Bolte approached them and told them to stop grouping around Richard Roberts testified that he signed a union authorization card on June 22, and several days later began wearing a union button at work; that about 2 weeks thereafter Bolte came into the gear room, called him, and two other gear room employees, Joe Martinez and Robert Bishop, together and stated that since they have been wearing union buttons, gear room production has suffered and if the wearing of such buttons caused poor production he would not tolerate it Joe Martinez testified that he signed a union authorization on June 22, and about a week later began wearing a union button at work; and that around mid-July, Bolte came into the gear room and, despite the fact they were actually working at their machines, Bolte called him, Roberts, and Bishop together and told them the union buttons were interfering with production but, nevertheless, the wearing of said buttons was their business, adding that he would not permit them to "sell" the Union on company time Bolte testified that he never spoke to Sackrider about the Union or about union buttons when the two of them were alone; that he did not call Bishop, Roberts, Schmidt, and Martinez together, that on the occasion in question he observed these last named four employees away from their machines (which were running) joking, talking, and pointing at the union buttons they were wearing; that he approached the group and told them that if they wanted to wear union buttons it was strictly up to them, but that the buttons and union talk was taking them away from their machines and hence interfering with their work; and that he ordered them back to their respective machines. Bolte admitted, although he admonished the four named men for talking Union during working hours, he did not hear any portion of their conversation. At the time of the above referred to incidents, Schmidt, Roberts, Sackrider, Roberts, and Bishop worked in the gear room; Martinez worked nearby Bishop and Roberts were trainees and, as the record establishes, they had to rely upon Schmidt and Sackrider for help in setting up their machines and for operational assistance; and that Schmidt and Sackrider operated machines side by side. Upon the record as a whole, I find that the versions of Sackrider, Schmidt, Roberts, Bishop, and Martinez with respect to the incidents described immediately above to be substantially in accord with the facts. I find that Bolte spoke to Sackrider and that Bolte spoke to the group consisting of Schmidt, Roberts, Bishop, and Martinez prior to July 17, the date of the Union's letter demanding recognition. Art Morgan, one of the most active union adherents, I find, testified, that George Carter, his foreman and admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, asked him on or about June 20 or 21 whether he intended to attend the union June 21 meeting; that Carter, from time to time, asked him about various union meetings, 592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD what transpired at said meetings, and the number of Respondent employees attending especially with respect to the meetings of June 21, July 5, July 12, and July 22; that when Carter requested permission to attend the July 22 meeting, he telephoned Meacham who said that Carter would not be permitted to attend. Morgan further testified, and I find, that around July 1, Carter asked him why he was "pushing" so hard; that during a particular conversation early in July, Carter stated that if he would hold off the union "deal" until his next merit raise conference - then set for the following October and to be presided over by Carter - maybe he would get a 20-cent per hour raise.87 Richard Roberts testified that at the conclusion of his July 14 merit rating interview, which was conducted in the shop office by his foreman, Ronald Wilson, admittedly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, Wilson asked him what his views were with respect to the Union; and that when he replied he did not have any, Wilson remarked that he (Wilson) did not see any need for a labor organization in the plant; and that Wilson recommended, and he received, a 10-cent per hour wage increase in July. Wilson testified that during the aforesaid interview he asked Roberts if he had any questions regarding the company's policy toward the Union; that when Roberts replied that he had none, he told Roberts it was the company's "rough policy" or "feeling" that the wages and benefits it was paying and giving were competitive and that the employees did not need a union to represent them.88 Upon the record as a whole, coupled with the fact that Roberts impressed the undersigned as a forthright witness, and that Wilson did not give that impression, I find that Roberts' version of what transpired at said July 14 interview to be substantially in accord with the facts. Under date of July 17, the Union wrote Respondent that it represented a majority of Respondent's employees in a certain stated unit,"' requested that Respondent recognize it as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for all the employees in said unit, and that a date be set to commence bargaining. In said letter the Union offered to prove its majority status by submitting to an impartial third party the cards then in its possession which Respondent's employees had signed expressly authorizing the Union to represent the signers thereof for collective bargaining. On July 18, the above referred to letter was received by Respondent and was immediately referred to Forrest Votaw, Respondent's plant manager who then conferred with Respondent's president, whose headquarters are located in New York and who happened to be visiting the Denver plant when the Union's letter arrived, and also with Respondent's attorney.90 As the result of said conferences, Votaw, under date of July 20, wrote the Union as follows. "Morgan was rated by Carter in October During the interview or conference , Carter stated that Morgan ' s work was good but Morgan's attitude toward Respondent was bad , adding that Morgan would do himself good if he looked for a job elsewhere Carter recommended, and Morgan received , a 5-cent per hour wage increase in October "Wilson testified that he learned of this company policy from Bolte, Plant Superintendent Wilmer Waugman , and Bill Tronick , Respondent's industrial relations manager "The appropriateness of the claimed unit is not disputed, it being the same unit the parties agreed to in the 1966 proceedings "An attorney other than the one appearing at the hearing on Respondent 's behalf This is in reply to your letter of July 17, 1967, alleging that a majority of certain of our employees has authorized your organization to represent them. As you know an election by secret ballot held last October upon your petition showed overwhelmingly that our employees do not favor union representation An earlier election had similar results. All the information we have indicates to us that our employees' feeling is unchanged The best method of ascertaining the true desires of our employees is through the democratic method of an election by secret ballot again supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. We stand ready to cooperate in the holding of such an election as quickly as possible and are sure that you will also. In the meantime we do not think that it would be fair to our employees or to our company to undertake negotiations with your organization We suggest an early meeting with representatives of the National Labor Relations Board. As more fully set forth below, the record as a whole provides no basis to support Respondent's asserted reasons, as set forth in the letter quoted immediately above, for doubting the Union's majority In addition, consideration should be given to (1) at no time during the 1966 campaign, or for that matter at no time prior to July 17, 1967, did the Union claim to represent a majority of Respondent's employees or did it prior to July 17, 1967, demand recognition as the bargaining representative without being certified by the Board as such representative, (2) according to the Tally of Ballots issued in the election proceedings of October 1966 (27-RC-3080) there were approximately 176 eligible voters, 115 of whom cast ballots against, 55 of whom cast ballots for the Union, and one ballot was challenged, (3) as of July 17, 1967, the bargaining unit was composed of 214 employees plus two on military leave, (4) on July 17, 1967, the Union had in its possession 113 valid authorization cards, all of which were signed between late June and July 17, 1967, and (5) Votaw's testimony to the effect that as of July 20, the date of his letter rejecting the Union's request for recognition, Respondent had no reasons for doubting the Union's majority claim other than those set forth in his rejection letter plus the fact that at the end of the July 20 shift Union representatives were at the plant gates passing out literature requesting those employees who had not already signed authorization cards to sign the authorization cards which were attached to said literature. " On the same day, July 20, Respondent rejected the Union's recognition request and its request for an appointment to commence bargaining, Respondent filed a petition with the Director for Region 27 seeking to have the question of representation resolved through the Board's election procedure (Case 27-RM-243). On July 21, the Union received a letter, dated July 20, from the aforesaid Regional Director enclosing a copy of the aforementioned representation petition. By letter, dated July 21, the Union informed said Regional Director93 of its prior demand upon Respondent for recognition, of its request for a bargaining conference, and its offer to prove its majority representative status through an impartial third party. The letter concluded by "Admittedly, Votaw's July 20 letter was written and the representation petition mentioned immediately below was filed, prior to the distribution by the Union of the aforementioned literature "A copy of this letter was forwarded to Respondent on July 21 MORSE CHAIN COMPANY recalling that a Board-conducted election had been held on October 5, 1966, and hence Respondent's aforementioned petition was untimely. On July 28, the Union distributed to the employees, including Votaw, at the plant gates a circular, on its letterhead, addressed, "An Open Letter to Mr. Votaw," stating among other things, that (1) the Union had been authorized by 129 of Respondent's employees to represent them for collective bargaining, (2) the signed authorization cards had been given to the N.L R B. for verification, (3) no election is needed, (4) the Union is ready to negotiate a bargaining contract and a proposed contract, which Respondent's employees had approved, would be submitted to Respondent on July 31, (5) Respondent was stalling by seeking a Board election, which Respondent knows cannot be held for at least 2-1/2 months and (6) the Union again offers to prove its majority status. Under date of July 31, Respondent sent each employee a letter, over Votaw' s signature , disclaiming any attempt by Respondent of "stalling" as charged in the Union's July 28 letter, and maintaining , among other things, that the Union's representative status should be resolved by an election. On July 31, the Union, through Meacham and another union official, delivered to Votaw a proposed contract and said officials requested a meeting to discuss the proposed contract. Under the date of August 2, Respondent, over Votaw's signature , answered the Union's "open letter" of July 28, by addressing a letter to Meacham in which Respondent again stated that (1) it has a good-faith doubt that the Union represented the majority of the bargaining unit employees, (2) an election, if held, would bear out its position that the employees do not want the Union to represent them, (3) it is not "stalling ," and (4) until there is proof through an election that the Union, in fact, represents the employees involved, it will not recognize nor bargain collectively with the Union. The letter then also stated: Having again made our position clear we are returning herewith the contract proposal which you delivered to me on Monday. We have not considered it and will not do so unless and until you are authorized to represent our employees in the manner indicated.93 Under date of August 3, the aforementioned Regional Director notified Respondent and the Union that he was dismissing Respondent's representation petition because it was not timely filed, in that the Board had conducted an election among the employees involved on October 5, 1966. On August 4, Respondent sent a letter to its employees reading , in part, as follows: It now appears that the I A.M. (union) is presently attempting , by a clever scheme, to deprive you out of a chance to vote on whether or not you want them as your representatives. In the aforesaid August 4 letter, Respondent reviewed some of the events which had occurred since the Union's July 17 demand for recognition, but Respondent omitted therein certain vital events which had taken place. For example, Respondent attached to the aforesaid letter a copy of the Regional Director's July 20 letter to the Union enclosing a copy of Respondent's representation "Admittedly , Respondent acquired no new evidence between July 18 and July 31, to support its July 20 claim that it doubted the Union's majonty representative status 593 petition of July 20. Respondent, however, neglected to attach a copy of the Union's July 21 letter to the Regional Director calling attention to the untimeliness of the petition. Instead, Respondent's letter advised the employees that it always had been willing to waive its right to refuse to have an election before October but that the Union continues to stand on a technicality and refused to so waive. On August 8, Respondent filed with the Board a second representation petition which was timely under the Act This petition was withdrawn when the Regional Director advised Respondent that the petition could not be processed due to the fact that the Union had filed a charge of unfair labor practices against Respondent. In a letter to its employees, dated August 23, Respondent stated, in part, as follows On August 8, 1967, when we became eligible to file for an election for you we did so for the second time. The government has informed us that as long as the union keeps making unfair labor practice charges there cannot be an election. Therefore since our request for your election has been stalled indefinitely by union charges, we will withdraw our last request and wait to see what the future brings. During July and August, the Union issued certain handbills urging the employees to support its organizational drive On November 3, Respondent advised the employees, in writing, as follows: Due to generally unfavorable business conditions, we are forced at this time to reduce hours to 40 hours per week. This will be a permanent change, and as previously done in 1963 when we reduced hours, a blanket wage increase will be given. Effective Monday, November 6, 1967, all hourly shop employees will receive a 5-1/2% pay increase. The new shop hours beginning Monday, November 6, will be 7.00 AM to 3.30 PM for the day shift; and 3:30 PM to midnight for the night shift. On November 8, Respondent advised the employees, in writing, as follows: In Order To Better Serve Our Customers And Maintain Effeciency In Handling And Shipping Orders We Find It Necessary to Change Our Hours. Effective Wednesday November 8, 1967 The ENTIRE Plant Will Work The Same Hours As Follows: Days 7:30 AM to 4:00 PM Nights 4:00 PM to 12:30 AM Respondent admits that the November 3 and the November 8 changes in the employees' hours and pay were made and put into effect without first consulting with, or advising, the Union. The right of employees under Section 7 of the Act "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . [and] to refrain from any or all such activities" is effectively implemented by Section 8(a) (1) and (5). These provisions forbid an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the rights guaranteed in Section 7," and likewise prohibit an employer from refusing to recognize or bargain collectively with the majonty representative of his employees in the appropriate unit. 594 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The employer's economic hold over his employees, which inheres in their relationship, is thereby neutralized in matters of organization and representation, which are particularly the concern of the employees. Interdiction against employer intrusion in such matters is essential if employees are to be free from the coercive influence of their employer, for employees are, as the courts have repeatedly and uniformly held, not insensitive to the advantages in their employment that they consider are likely to flow from their employer, nor to the disadvantages which may attend their choice of representative opposed by their employer. And for the same reason, employees cannot be expected to derive the full benefit from their protected right of self-organization and to the selection of a representative of their own choosing if they believe, from circumstances which their employer creates, or for which he was fairly responsible, that their representative, however chosen, is subject to the employer's approval or disapproval. Respondent, having concededly refused to bargain with the Union, argues principally that it was under no obligation to recognize or bargain with the Union, whose demand for recognition was based on signed authorization cards, within a year following a valid Board-conducted election, due to the provisions in Section 9(c)(3). The election, which the Union lost, had been held on October 5, 1966, and the Union's demand for recognition came less than a, year later.9` Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires an employer "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provision of Section 9(a)." Section 9(a) provides that "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. . Although Section 9(c)(1) provides machinery by which the question of representative status may be determined in a Board-conducted election, it has long been established that an election is not the onl means by which representative status may be determined. 4 Thus, contrary to Respondent's contention as expressed at the hearing and in its brief, it is settled law that these provisions of the Act impose upon an employer the duty to recognize and confer with the representative of a majority of his employees in an appropriate bargaining unit upon a clear demand from such representative.96 The language and legislative history97 of Section 9(c) clearly indicates that Congress was aware of alternative methods of determining union representative status, but that it was concerned only with limiting the frequency of elections.when it passed Section 9(c)(3). It is significant to note that while the words of Section 9(a) - "designated or selected" - authorized the use of such alternative methods, Section 9(c)(3) refers only to elections. Further, there is nothing in the Act or in the legislative history of Section 9(c)(3) to suggest that Congress intended to permit an employer to disregard the principle of collective bargaining , or to receive immunity from his obligation under Section 8(a)(5), merely because an election was held "Section 9(c)(3) provides : "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held." "Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96; United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.. 351 U.S. 62. "Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678; N. L.R.B. v. Burton-Dixie Corp ., 210 F.2d 199 (C.A. 10); N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 379 U.S. 736. among his employees within a year preceding a demand for recognition by a labor organization representing a majority of his employees. The legislative history of Section 9(c)(3) shows that Congress wanted to avoid the plant disruption expense to the Board of too frequent elections but there is no evidence of congressional intent to incur the greater disruption resulting from an employer being permitted to ignore the duty of collective bargaining altogether. In short, there is no support in law for Respondent's contention that Section 9(c)(3) precluded Respondent's employees from validly selecting the Union as their collective-bargaining representative and that Respondent was at liberty to deny recognition to the Union because it was less than a year since certification of the results of the October 1966 election. Under the circumstances, I reject Respondent's aforementioned contention and find them to be without substance or merit." Uncontroverted credited evidence establishes that on July 17, 1967, the day the Union informed Respondent by letter that a majority of Respondent's employees had selected the Union to represent them for collective bargaining and requested Respondent to confer with it, the Union, in fact, had been selected and designated by the majority of the employees in the appropriate unit as their collective-bargaining representative. That being so, Respona,•nt was under a statutory duty to recognize and bargain with the Union as such representative. Instead of fulfilling its statutory duty, Respondent continued its spirited campaign to undermine the Union's majority status. This campaign, as epitomized above, included threats of economic reprisals for union activities, unilaterally granting wages, unilaterally changing the employees' hours of work to dissuade the employees from seeking union representation, coupled with numerous other acts of interference, designed to interfere with the employees' exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Nor did Respondent challenge the Union's majority when the bargaining request was made. The record as a whole clearly establishes, and I find, that Respondent never manifested a doubt of the Union's majority status. Respondent's rejection of the Union's demand for recognition was based solely on Respondent's contention that it was under no obligation to recognize the Union under the circumstances here presented; that is to say, because the demand was made and received within the 12-month period of the certification of the result of the October 1966 election. This erroneous view of the law is not available as a defense to a refusal to bargain.99 This is not a case which requires a determination whether Respondent entertained a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Respondent's contention that the employees, or at least a large number of them had signed authorization cards relying on the assurances of the solicitors that the cards were to be used to secure an election finds no support in the record. The contention now tendered by Respondent suffers from the infirmity of being a legal afterthought since the record is barren of any "Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. at 100, n. 8. "Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB, affd. sub nom Conren, Inc., etc. v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 173 (C.A. 7) cert. denied 386 U.S. 974; Rocky Mountain Phosphates. Inc., 138 NLRB 292, 295; Cincinnati Gasket, Packing & Mfg., Inc.. 163 NLRB No. 104, n. 4. "Respondent's contention that it doubted the Union's majority status when it refused the Union's request for recognition because of the Union's July 20 solicitation of additional authorization cards is without merit or substance . The mere solicitation of additional cards did not make immediate suspect the Union's claimed majority status on July 17. MORSE CHAIN COMPANY evidence that Respondent knew at the time it rejected the Union's request for recognition, that any authorization card was signed for any reason save for the clear and unambiguous purpose set forth on said card. Upon the entire record in the case, which clearly establishes that at no time did Respondent attempt to fulfill its statutory duty to bargain collectively with the chosen representative of the majority of the employees in the unit heretofore found appropriate, I find that on July 20, 1967,100 and at all times thereafter, Respondent failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the duly designated and selected representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 thereof. I also find that Respondent further violated Section 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act by, on November 6, 1967, and on November 8, 1967, without notice to, or consultation with, the Union it changed its employees' pay and hours of work. I further find that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by: (1) Huston's June 21 remarks to James Ducey, (2) Bolte's June 21-22 remarks to James Ducey, (3) Bolte's early July remarks to Sackrider, (4) Bolte's late June or early July remarks to Paul Schmidt, (5) Bolte's early July remarks to Roberts, Schmidt, Bishop, and Joe Martinez, (6) Carter's early July remarks to Art Morgan, and (7) Wilson's July 14 remarks to Roberts. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the business operations of Respondent as described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and, such of them as have been found to constitute unfair labor practices, tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent on July 20, 1967, and at all times thereafter, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the duly designated representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, I will recommend that Respondent, upon request, bargain collectively with 595 the Union as the exclusive representative of said employees, and if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce or in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All persons employed by Respondent at its 4650 Steele Street, Denver, Colorado, plant, excluding office clerical employees, salesmen, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. On July 17, 1967, and at all times since, the Union has been, and now is, the exclusive representative of Respondent's employees in the aforesaid unit, for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on and after July 20, 1967, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, as found in the foregoing findings of fact, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. By unlawfully questioning its employees about their union sympathies and the union sympathies of their coworkers , Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. By promises of benefits if the employees would repudiate their support for the Union and threats of loss of benefits if they remained or became members of the Union , Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] '"'The date of Respondent's letter rejecting the Union's request for recognition Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation