More Development Property Company Ltd.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 3, 2021

88443474 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2021)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: September 3, 2021

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re More Development Property Company Ltd.
_____

Serial Nos. 88443364 (Parent)
88443386
88443413
88443474
_____

Bryce J. Maynard and Laura K. Pitts of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
for More Development Property Company Ltd.
Claudia Garcia, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111,
Chris Doninger, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Heasley, Coggins, and Hudis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, More Development Property Company Ltd., has filed four
applications1 seeking registration on the Principal Register of the standard character
mark MORE DEVELOPMENT for:

1 Application Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, and 88443474 were filed on May
23, 2019, based on a declared intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).

The TTABVUE and Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) citations refer to the
Board’s proceeding docket database and the USPTO’s electronic file database for each
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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Real estate development; Real estate development and construction of
commercial, residential, and mixed use properties; Building construction,
construction supervision, building repair and maintenance in
International Class 37;2

Architecture and architectural consultation; surveying; urban planning in
International Class 42;3

Landscape gardening; landscape design; Landscaping maintenance
services, namely, care and upkeep of gardens and grounds in International
Class 44;4 and

Real estate management services; financial consultancy; Leasing of real
estate; Rental of real estate; Building management; Real estate services,
namely, property management services for condominium associations,
homeowner associations and apartment buildings; Real estate services,
namely, rental, brokerage, leasing and management of commercial
property, offices and office space in International Class 36.5

In each application, the Trademark Examining Attorney has required Applicant
to disclaim the exclusive right to use “DEVELOPMENT,” and has refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the
ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark MORE (in standard
characters) for “real estate services, namely, commercial and residential real estate
agency services and real estate brokerage” in International Class 36.6
Applicant appeals from these requirements and refusals. The Board consolidated

involved application. All citations to the TSDR database are to the downloadable .pdf version
of the documents.

2 Serial No. 88443386 (identification of services as amended).
3 Serial No. 88443413.
4 Serial No. 88443474 (identification of services as amended).
5 Serial No. 88443364 (identification of services as amended).
6 Registration No. 4862280, issued on the Principal Register on Dec. 1, 2015. The Sections 8
and 15 declarations have been accepted and acknowledged.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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the four appeals on the Examining Attorney’s motion.7
We affirm the disclaimer requirements. We affirm the refusals to register on the
basis of likelihood of confusion in part and reverse in part.
I. Disclaimer Requirement
The Trademark Act provides that the USPTO can “require the applicant to
disclaim an unregistrable component of a mark otherwise registrable.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1056(a). Absent a showing of acquired distinctiveness, a term is unregistrable on
the Principal Register if, “when used on or in connection with the goods [or services]
of the applicant,” it is “merely descriptive . . . of them.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). A term
is merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it immediately conveys
information concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of the goods or services
for which registration is sought. Real Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906
F.3d 965, 128 USPQ2d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Thus, the USPTO “may require a
disclaimer as a condition of registration if the mark is merely descriptive for at least
one of the products or services involved.” In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 77
USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Failure to comply with a disclaimer requirement
is a basis for refusal. Id.; In re UST Global (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., 2020 USPQ2d 10435,
* 2 (TTAB 2020).
A. Arguments and Evidence

The Examining Attorney maintains that “DEVELOPMENT” must be disclaimed
in each of the four Applications. She bases the requirement on dictionary definitions

7 14-15 TTABVUE (‘364 application).
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and evidence of third parties (i.e., competitors) using “DEVELOPMENT” in
connection with similar services.
1. The Examining Attorney
The Examining Attorney maintains, for example, that Applicant’s Class 37
services—“real estate development; Real estate development and construction of
commercial, residential, and mixed use properties; Building construction,
construction supervision, building repair and maintenance”—clearly match the
dictionary definition of “development”: “[t]he act of developing or the state of being
developed, as … [t]he business of constructing buildings or otherwise altering land
for new uses.”8 Other developers—such as Valor Development, Western Development
Corporation, Neighborhood Development Company, and Douglaston Development—
use “DEVELOPMENT” in connection with their real estate development services.9
Similarly, the Examining Attorney maintains that landscaping, recited in
Applicant’s Class 44 services, develops the land by “improv[ing] the appearance of (an
area of land, a highway, etc.), as by planting trees, shrubs, or grass, or alter ing the
contours of the ground.”10 Other developers—such as Landscape Development,
Summit Landscape Development, and Site Landscape Development—provide
landscaping services as part of real estate development services.11

8 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, AHDictionary.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at
TSDR 9.
9 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 9; March 17, 2020 Office Action at 89-102.
10 Dictionary.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 26-30 (‘474 application).
11 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 10; March 17, 2020 Office Action at 52 -63 (‘474
application).
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In like manner, the Examining Attorney states, when Applicant uses
“DEVELOPMENT” in connection with its “architecture and architectural
consultation; surveying; urban planning” services in Class 42, it conveys to
consumers “that applicant formulates plans for the development and management of
urban and suburban areas, typically analyzing land use compatibility as well as
economic, environmental and social trends.”12 Other developers—such as American
Structure Point, Inc. and Urban Vantage—use “development” or “developer” in
connection with architectural and urban planning services.13
Furthermore, the Examining Attorney contends, “development” can refer not only
to the act of developing property, but to the developed property itself: “a tract of land
that has been made available or usable: a developed tract of land.”14 In that sense,
she maintains, when Applicant uses “DEVELOPMENT” in connection with its real
estate management services in Class 36, “it merely describes the buildings it services
through its real estate services. Applicant is in the business of managing developed
property and the word ‘DEVELOPMENT’ immediately conveys that to consumers.”15

12 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 10; Wikipedia.org: “urban planning” is a
“technical and political process concerned with the development and design of land use and
the built environment, including air, water, and the infrastructure passing into and out of
urban areas […]”, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 35 (‘413 application).
13 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 10; March 17, 2020 Office Action at 58-63 (‘413
application).
14 Merriam-Webster.com, Aug. 16, 2019 Office Action at 9; Examining Attorney’s brief, 16
TTABVUE 5.
15 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 7.
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Other developers—such as Realty Development Services, Neighborhood
Development, and Graco Real Estate Development—perform these services in-house,
developing the land and managing developed properties.16
2. Applicant
During the course of prosecution, Applicant agreed to the requested disclaimers
in the alternative if the Board affirmed the Examining Attorney’s requirement.17 But
Applicant still maintains that “DEVELOPMENT” does not merely describe its
services, and that no disclaimer is required.18 So the issue is not moot. In re
RiseSmart Inc., 104 USPQ2d 1931, 1932 (TTAB 2012) (“Here, applicant clearly stated
that it offered the disclaimer in the alternative but maintained that these terms are
not merely descriptive. Thus, the disclaimer requirement issue is not moot.”).
Applicant does not deny that its “real estate development” services in Class 37 fall
under the rubric of “DEVELOPMENT.” It raises instead a two-pronged defense,
applicable to all of its Classes.
First, it argues, “the Examining Attorney has held DEVELOPMENT to be equally
descriptive of disparate services across 4 classes (Classes 36, 37, 42, and 44), which
indicates that the term is sufficiently vague and nebulous as to not be descriptive of
any of the services at all.”19 “This means that consumers will need to pause and go

16 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 7 (citing Aug. 16, 2019 Office Action at 16; March
17, 2020 Office Action at 83-87, 94-97).
17 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 11 (request for reconsideration).
18 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 4 n.3.
19 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 8-9 (citing Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
240 U.S. 251 (1916) (“‘The American Girl’ would be as descriptive of almost any article of
manufacture as of shoes; that is to say, not descriptive at all.”); RJR Foods, Inc. v. Queen
Spray Cranberries, Inc., 174 USPQ 244, 245-46 (TTAB 1972) (“[T]he meaning is not so direct,
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through a multi-step reasoning process in order to reach a conclusion about the
meaning of the term DEVELOPMENT as applied to Applicant’s services.”20
Second, Applicant argues that its mark is unitary:
MORE DEVELOPMENT is a unitary phrase, with MORE acting as a
comparative adjective that modifies DEVELOPMENT, a noun. Together,
MORE DEVELOPMENT acts as a grammatical unit that conveys
comparative superiority and this meaning can only be derived by
considering the phrase as a whole. Applicant therefore respectfully
submits that the Applied-For Mark, MORE DEVELOPMENT, is a unitary
mark. As such, no disclaimer of DEVELOPMENT is required.21

This two-pronged defense obviates the need to disclaim DEVELOPMENT in all of
its identified Classes, Applicant claims.
Applicant further argues that its Class 44 landscaping services fall outside the
definition of “development”:
…DEVELOPMENT suggests fundamentally changing the underlying
purpose for which land is used, while “landscaping” refers to using plants
to improve the appearance of an outdoor space. Moreover, Applicant does
not seek to register the Applied-For Mark in connection with landscaping
per se. Instead, it seeks to register the Mark in connection with landscape

revealing or informative of applicant’s product as to be merely descriptive thereof.”); see also
In re Lufthansa Technik AG, Serial No. 75824687, *11 (TTAB 2004) (non-precedential) (“In
this connection, we note that, because applicant’s application is in four classes, the Office
must show that TIS is merely descriptive of the services in each class….[T]he mere fact that
‘time in service’ is a term that has something to do with aviation, even if it is commonly used
in the aviation field, does not mean that it immediately conveys information about the
various services identified in applicant’s application.”)).
“Board decisions which are not designated as precedent are not binding on the Board, but
may be cited and considered for whatever persuasive value they may hold.” In re Soc’y of
Health & Physical Educators, 127 USPQ2d 1584, 1587 n.7 (TTAB 2018), quoted in In re
Alabama Tourism Dep’t, 2020 USPQ2d 10485, *6 n. 25 (TTAB 2020).
20 Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 4.
21 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 10. See also Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 5-6
(citing In re Walmart Apollo, Inc., Serial No. 88/040,421 (TTAB 2021) (nonprecedential
decision: “while we do not find SUPER TECH to be unitary in the sense that it is incongruous
or is a double entendre, the combination of SUPER with this somewhat general term in this
industry has the effect of binding them together.”).
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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gardening, landscape design, and landscape maintenance services, which
place an even greater focus on the ornamental aspects of landscaping. As
such, DEVELOPMENT does not immediately describe a feature or
characteristic of Applicant’s Services.22

With respect to its Class 42 architectural, surveying, and urban planning services,
Applicant, like the Examining Attorney, focuses on the term “urban planning”, and
argues that “urban planning does not include providing building construction or land
‘development’ services. Put another way, ‘development’ does not convey with
particularity any immediate feature or characteristic of urban planning.”23 Rather,
Applicant asserts, one must engage in a multi-step reasoning process to determine
what attribute may be identified by “development”:
One must first understand that urban planning is a multidisciplinary
approach to community planning and the nature of the services they
provide. Second, based upon the Examining Attorney’s contention, one
must understand that DEVELOPMENT as used in Applicant’s Mark refers
to land development. Third, one must understand that land development
is not a service of urban planning; rather it is a distinct service typically
provided by private enterprise. Fourth, one must consider how the services
provided by urban planners could relate to land development services
provided by private enterprise before any meaning can be discerned from
the term DEVELOPMENT in the context of Applicant’s Services.24

Applicant concludes that the term is suggestive, not descriptive, of these Class 42
services.25
Finally, Applicant notes that its Class 36 real estate management services do not
fit the Examining Attorney’s initial definition of “development.” Rather, it notes, “the

22 Applicant’s brief, 11 TTABVUE 6 (‘474 application).
23 Applicant’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 6 (‘413 application for Cl. 42).
24 Applicant’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 6-7 (‘413 application for Cl. 42).
25 Applicant’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 7 (‘413 application for Cl. 42).
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real estate services for which Applicant seeks registration relate to the leasing,
rental, and management of established buildings and commercial properties. These
services bear no immediately descriptive relationship to building construction or
altering land for new uses.”26 The Examining Attorney’s alternate definition of
“development,” describing the developed property, would encompass any number of
maintenance or management activities distinguishable from the core concept of
developing the property.
For these reasons, Applicant concludes, “DEVELOPMENT” does not merely
describe its Class 36 services, and need not be disclaimed as to that Class.
B. Discussion and Analysis

“Disclaiming unregistrable components prevents the applicant from asserting
exclusive rights in the disclaimed unregistrable terms.” Royal Crown Co., Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 127 USPQ2d 1041, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2018) quoted in
Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Aiping Fan, 2020 USPQ2d 10611, *10 (TTAB 2020). No single
entity may appropriate exclusive rights to merely descriptive wording because other
commercial entities need to be able to use the wording in marketing similar services.
“The major reasons for not protecting such [merely descriptive wording] are: (1) to
prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of particular
[services]; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use the language involved,
thus avoiding the possibility of harassing infringement suits by the registrant against
others who use the mark when advertising or describing their own [services].” In re

26 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 6.
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Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978).
The disclaimer requirement furthers these purposes:

The Lanham Act’s disclaimer requirement strikes a statutory balance
between two competing trademark principles. On the one hand, it
provides the benefits of the Lanham Act to applicants for composite
marks with unregistrable components. On the other hand, the Act
prevents an applicant from claiming exclusive rights to disclaimed
portions apart from composite marks. The applicant’s competitors in
the same trade must remain free to use descriptive terms without legal
harassment.

Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 21 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
With these principles in mind, we address the Applications seriatim.

We find, unsurprisingly, that the term “DEVELOPMENT” is merely descriptive,
if not generic, for Applicant’s Class 37 “real estate development” services. Clearly,
Applicant is in “[t]he business of constructing buildings or otherwise altering land for
new uses.”27
There is nothing vague or nebulous about this definition, unlike the definitions of
terms in the decisions on which Applicant relies.28 In one such decision, RJR Foods
v. Ocean Spray, 174 USPQ at 245, the Board found “GRAPEBERRY” not merely
descriptive of a beverage consisting of grape juice, cranberry juice , water, and lesser
ingredients, in part because the mark failed to identify which kind of berry was used
as an ingredient. The Board later rejected this approach in In re Entenmann’s Inc.,
15 USPQ2d 1750 (TTAB 1990), holding that:

27 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, AHDictionary.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action
at 9.
28 See decisions Applicant cites in footnote 19.
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While it is true that in order to be held merely descriptive, a term must
describe with some particularity a quality or ingredient of the product in
question, it need not describe it exactly.
…
To the extent that our 1972 decision in RJR Foods sets forth a rule of law
that in order to be held merely descriptive, a term must describe with
absolute exactness an ingredient of the product, we decline to follow that
rule.

Id. at 1751. The other decisions on which Applicant relies are even farther afield.29
Applicant’s real estate development services fall squarely under the definition of
“DEVELOPMENT” set forth above.
MORE DEVELOPMENT also is not unitary. In Dena. v. Belvedere Int’l, 21
USPQ2d 1047, the Federal Circuit held that:
A unitary mark has certain observable characteristics. Specifically, its
elements are inseparable. In a unitary mark, these observable
characteristics must combine to show that the mark has a distinct meaning
of its own independent of the meaning of its constituent elements. In other
words, a unitary mark must create a single and distinct commercial
impression.

* * *

In this case, this court cannot uphold the Board’s determination that
Belvedere’s mark is unitary. An examination of the mark discloses that its
elements are not so merged together that they cannot be regarded as
separate.

29 Hamilton-Brown Shoe, 240 U.S. 251, found “THE AMERICAN GIRL” not geographically
descriptive or descriptive of women’s shoes. In re Lufthansa Technik, No. 75824687 (TTAB
2004), a nonprecedential Board decision, found the acronym “TIS” not merely descriptive of
management consultation in the field of aviation, aircraft repair and maintenance, training
of flight and ground personnel, and interior engineering design for aircraft—partly because
“it is not entirely clear that TIS, per se, would be recognized as the equivalent of the phrase
‘time in service.’” Id. at *9. “[A]s a general rule, initials cannot be considered descriptive
unless they have become so generally understood as representing descriptive words as to be
accepted as substantially synonymous therewith.” Id. at *10. And “time in service” simply
did not describe the services: “the mere fact that ‘time in service’ is a term that has something
to do with aviation, even if it is commonly used in the aviation field, does not mean that it
immediately conveys information about the various services identified in applicant’s
application.” Id. at *11.
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Id. at 1052, quoted in In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 78 USPQ2d 1395, 1399 (Fed. Cir.
2006) and In re Am. Furniture Warehouse Co., 126 USPQ2d 1400, 1406 (TTAB 2018).
Here, the words MORE DEVELOPMENT are not so merged together that they
cannot be regarded as separate. The adjective MORE may modify DEVELOPMENT,
but DEVELOPMENT retains its original descriptive meaning. “[T]he separate words
joined to form a compound have a meaning identical to the meaning common usage
would ascribe to those words as a compound.” In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017,
5 USPQ2d 1110, 1111-12 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generally TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1213.05 (July 2021) (unitary marks). We find
accordingly that MORE DEVELOPMENT is not unitary. This finding applies to the
mark in all classes of services identified in the four applications.
“DEVELOPMENT” thus merely describes Applicant’s Class 37 services; the
Examining Attorney has appropriately required the disclaimer.
Much the same reasoning applies to Applicant’s Class 44 landscaping services.
Applicant argues that its recitation of services—landscape design, gardening, and
maintenance—focuses on the ornamental, not developmental, aspects of
landscaping.30 But the recitation of services sweeps more broadly than that. See
Southwestern Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015)
(with a broad identification of services, “we must presume that the services
encompass all services of the type identified”). The relevant purchasing public,
property owners or buyers, would tend to perceive Applicant’s identified services as

30 Applicant’s brief, 11 TTABVUE 6 (‘474 application).
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integral parts of developing property—the land as well as the buildings. See In re
Abcor Dev., 200 USPQ at 218 (“descriptiveness of a mark, when applied to the goods
or services involved, is to be determined from the standpoint of the average
prospective purchaser.”). Competitor developers would have an equal right to use
“DEVELOPMENT” in connection with those landscaping services. Dena v. Belvedere
Int’l, 21 USPQ2d at 1051 (disclaimer protects rights of competitors). For example, one
of the Examining Attorney’s cited third-party developers, Summit Landscape
Development, describes itself as “a landscape design/build and maintenance firm that
creates unique outdoor living areas….”).31 “DEVELOPMENT” thus merely describes
Applicant’s Class 44 services, and is appropriately disclaimed.
So too with Applicant’s architecture and architectural consultation, surveying,
and urban planning services in Class 42. We determine the descriptiveness of a term
in relation to an applicant’s services, the context in which the mark is being used,
and the possible significance the mark would have to the average purchaser because
of the manner of its use or intended use. See In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.,
675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963-64, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
Although the Examining Attorney and Applicant focused on the “urban planning”
aspect of its services, we find that “DEVELOPMENT” more clearly describes
Applicant’s architectural services. “Architecture is “[t]he art and science of designing

31 March 17, 2020 Office Action at 59-60 (‘474 application).
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and erecting buildings.”32 By using “DEVELOPMENT” in connection with its
architectural services, Applicant presents itself to prospective purchasers as a
design/build developer, a developer that performs architectural planning in-house, as
an integral feature of the development process. One of the articles cited by Applicant
states, “[t]he act of manipulating, building on, and/or designing and constructing
new uses for real estate is known as developing.”33 Applicant’s competitors offer
similar design/build services under the rubric of “development.” See, e.g.,
Ghidorzi.com, (offering design/build services).34 Applicant’s architectural services are
an aspect or feature of “DEVELOPMENT,” so the disclaimer is therefore appropriate
for Applicant’s Class 42 services.
The same can be said for Applicant’s real estate brokerage and management
services in Class 36. Here the Examining Attorney relies on an alternate definition
of “development”: not “constructing buildings or otherwise altering land for new
uses,” but “a developed tract of land.”35 Under this new definition, the Examining
Attorney maintains, Applicant’s use of “DEVELOPMENT” “merely describes the
buildings it services through its real estate services.”36

32 AHDictionary.com, last visited 8/6/2021. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary
definitions, including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or regular fixed editions.
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Interprofession du Gruyère and Syndicat Interprofessionnel du
Gruyère, 2020 USPQ2d 10892, * 17 n. 115 (TTAB 2020).
33 “Challenges in Real Estate Development,” Investopedia.com, Sept. 17, 2020 Response to
Office Action at 194 (emphasis added) (‘386 application).
34 March 17, 2020 Office Action at 42, 52 (‘413 application).
35 Merriam-Webster.com, Aug. 16, 2019 Office Action at 9; Examining Attorney’s brief, 16
TTABVUE 8. See also AHDictionary.com, Development: “A group of dwellings built by the
same contractor: bought a condo in a new development built by the river.” March 17, 2020
Office Action at 9.
36 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 7.
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Applicant contends that the third-party evidence adduced by the Examining
Attorney differentiates between a property’s “development” and its later
management:
 Realty Development Services offers “acquisitions, development, and
management of residential, commercial and retail properties”;37
 Graco Real Estate lists “development” as separate from “property
management”;38 and
 Concorde Management & Development shows “development” and
“management” as distinct services.39
On consideration of this and all the other evidence of record, we find that
“DEVELOPMENT” merely describes the Class 36 services. Applicant intends to
lease, rent, and manage building developments, such as condominiums and
apartment complexes. The Board has often found that terms that are descriptive or
generic for goods are at least descriptive of the services involving those goods. Cf. In
re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1637-38 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(CHURRASCOS, a typed of cooked meat, is the generic term for a restaurant
featuring that churrascos steak). Even if rental, leasing, and management were not
considered core development services – and they do not need to be – competitors have
a right to use DEVELOPMENT to designate the property being leased, rented, and

37 August 16, 2019 Office action at 16.
38 Mar. 17, 2020 Office Action at 80-81.
39 Id. at 85-88.
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managed. See Dena v. Belvedere, 21 USPQ2d at 1051. So the word must be disclaimed
as to Applicant’s Class 36 services.
C. Conclusion

The requirement that Applicant disclaim “DEVELOPMENT” is affirmed as to all
four applications.
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act provides that a mark may be refused
registration if it “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously
used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used
on or in connection with the goods [or services] of the applicant, to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive….” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1053.
The Examining Attorney contends that Applicant’s MORE DEVELOPMENT
mark is confusingly similar to the registered mark MORE for “real estate services,
namely, commercial and residential real estate agency services and real estate
brokerage” in International Class 36.
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks under
Section 2(d), we analyze the evidence and arguments under the DuPont factors. In re
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973)
(“DuPont”) cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 113
USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is
evidence and argument. In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160,
1161-62 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Not all DuPont factors are relevant in each case, and the
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weight afforded to each factor depends on the circumstances. … Any single factor may
control a particular case.” Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc., 955
F.3d 994, 2020 USPQ2d 10341, *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods and services.” In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340,
71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cited in Ricardo Media v. Inventive Software,
2019 USPQ2d 311355 at *5 (TTAB 2019).
A. The First and Sixth DuPont Factors
1. Arguments and Evidence

Under the first DuPont factor, we compare Registrant’s MORE mark with
Applicant’s MORE DEVELOPMENT mark in their entireties, taking into account
their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 177 USPQ
at 567. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The Examining Attorney argues that Applicant’s MORE DEVELOPMENT mark
incorporates Registrant’s MORE mark in its entirety,40 and that, as the first word in
Applicant’s mark, MORE is its dominant part, the part on which customers are
generally inclined to focus.41 Adding the suffix DEVELOPMENT to the registered

40 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 28 (citing Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558
F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and
surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar).
41 Id. at 15-16 (citing inter alia Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity
between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . .
. remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on
the label”).
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MORE mark does not obviate their similarity, she contends,42 not only because it is
a suffix, but because it is a disclaimed descriptive or generic term, which customers
would not regard as source-indicating.43 As such, the registered mark is likely to be
viewed as a shortened version of the applied-for mark.44
In any event, the Examining Attorney maintains,
Even if “MORE” was not the dominant portion of the applied-for mark, the
marks would still convey the exact same commercial impression when used
in connection with their respective, related services. Specifically, both
marks convey to consumers that they can expect additional services being
provided to them by applicant and registrant in their respective related
fields. Consumers are thus likely to assume a connection between the
marks and believe them to be related.45

Applicant agrees that “MORE is used to convey its common, dictionary meaning
– ‘greater,’ ‘additional,’ or ‘in greater quantity or degree.’”46 Indeed, “Applicant
maintains that MORE is a highly suggestive term with laudatory connotations that
is both conceptually and commercially weak. The term MORE has a commonly
understood meaning and is an extremely common formative in connection with real
estate services.”47
To show the conceptual weakness of “MORE,” Applicant submitted dictionary

42 Id. at 18 (citing inter alia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d
556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and
design confusingly similar)).
43 Id. at16 (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
44 Id. at 18 (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)).
45 Id. at 16.
46 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 16.
47 Id. at 11.
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definitions from Dictionary.com: “in greater quantity, amount, measure, degree, or
number…, additional or further….”48 and Merriam-Webster.com: “1: Greater
something more than she expected 2: additional, further more guests arrived.”49
Applicant also cites the sixth DuPont factor, “[t]he number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Under this factor, it cites
third-party marks demonstrating common use of “MORE” in the real estate field: “A
search of the USPTO database reveals that … there were 551 live marks consisting
of or containing ‘MORE’ in Class 36 and 113 live marks consisting of or containing
‘MORE’ in connection with ‘real estate’ goods and services.”50 Applicant submits
representative Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) search results pages of
one hundred marks in each category—Class 36 and real estate. For example:

48 Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office Action at 23.
49 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 161.
50 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 14, exhibits A and B to Applicant’s Sept. 17, 2020 Response
to Office Action at 22-29.
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51
To this Applicant adds TESS printouts of over 60 marks containing MORE in
connection with real estate services. For example:
Mark and Registration No. Pertinent Services
DO MORE
Reg. No. 5967249
Leasing of commercial real estate. Cl. 36
MORE THAN A HOME
Reg. No. 5865567
Property and sales management services, leasing
of manufactured residential housing. Cl. 36
UNLOCK MORE
Reg. No. 6119415
Rental property management; real estate agency
services. Cl. 36
PROVIDING MORE
Reg. No. 5653313
Real estate agency services. Cl. 36.
CREATE MORE
COMMUNITY!
Reg. No. 5011468
Apartment and office rentals; real estate
management services. Cl. 36

51 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 27.
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MAKE IT WORTH MORE
Reg. No. 2770961
Real estate property management. Cl. 36.
MORE BROKER, LESS
FEES
Reg. No. 6132101
Real estate brokerage. Cl. 36.
MORE THAN SHOPPING
EVERYDAY LIVING
Reg. No. 5875426
Real estate leasing and property management
services for shopping centers. Cl. 36.
Real estate development. Cl. 37.
WE’RE MORE THAN JUST
A PRETTY SPACE
Reg. No. 6048246
Rental of leasing of residential housing,
apartments and offices; rental property
management. Cl. 36.
FOR MORE THAN PROFIT
Reg. No. 5509739
Real estate development and construction of
commercial, residential and hotel property. Cl. 37.
MORE LIFE BUILT IN
Reg. No. 5302884
Land development and planning and construction
services; real estate development services. Cl. 37
MORE THAN JUST A
HOUSE, IT’S YOUR HOME
Reg. No. 4855790
Real estate brokerage services. Cl. 36.
MORE OF WHAT YOU
LOVE
Reg. No. 4871574
Real estate and condominium management and
brokerage services. Cl. 36.
SO MUCH MORE THAN
WORTH IT
Reg. No. 3666010
Real estate brokerage, leasing and management.
Cl. 36.
Real estate development services. Cl. 37.52

Applicant contends that these third-party registrations show that “MORE” has a
normally understood and well-recognized highly suggestive significance in the real
estate field, leading to the conclusion that it is conceptually weak.53
To show that “MORE” is also commercially weak, Applicant adds evidence of three
dozen marketplace uses of MORE-formative marks in connection with real estate
services. For instance:
 MORE, REALTORS, St. Louis, MO;
 M.O.R.E. Real Estate Services, Ashburn VA;

52 Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office Action at 35-225.
53 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 14 (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794
F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and Knight Textile Corp. v. Jones Inv.
Co., Inc., 75 USPQ2d 1313, 1315 (TTAB 2005)).
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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 More & More Real Estate, Blauvelt, NY;
 Houses & More Real Estate, Preston County, VA;54
 More Realty, Inc., Honolulu, HAW;
 More Options Realty, Northern VA;
 More Commercial, Charleston, SC;
 More Properties, Indianapolis, IN;
 More Ways Realty LLC, Milwaukee, WISC;
 More Door Properties, Houston, TX;
 More Group, Salt Lake City, UT.55
Taken together, the third-party registration and use-in-commerce evidence is
“powerful on its face,” Applicant concludes, demonstrating that the cited MORE
mark is conceptually and commercially weak, and entitled to no more than a
restricted scope of protection.56
“In light of the extremely weak nature of the shared term MORE, the additional
term DEVELOPMENT is sufficient to distinguish Applicant’s mark from the mark in
the cited registration,” Applicant maintains.57 “MORE standing alone is a highly
suggestive, laudatory, weak source indicator that does not convey anything specific
about the services offered thereunder. ‘It is simply a common noun or adjectival word
of everyday usage in the English language.’”58 On the other hand, “When considered

54 Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office Action at 227-72.
55 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 49-159.
56 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 11-12 (citing inter alia Juice Generation; Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d
1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta Int’l Inc. v. Anthony’s
Pizza Holding Co., 95 USPQ2d 1271, 1278 (TTAB 2009), aff'd, 415 F. App ’x. 222 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
57 Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 7.
58 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 20 (quoting Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
432 F.2d 1400, 167 USPQ 529, 530 (CCPA 1970) (because the common element in the marks
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as a whole, the MORE DEVELOPMENT Mark conveys the commercial impression of
greater growth or expansion,” Applicant suggests.59 “MORE modifies
DEVELOPMENT, with DEVELOPMENT being the dominant portion of the Applied-
For Mark.”60 So taken in their entireties, Applicant concludes, the marks differ in
sight, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.61
The Examining Attorney counters that “MORE” is not a weak source indicator.62
It forms, in fact, the entirety of the cited registered mark, and the dominant, source
indicating part of Applicant’s mark. Given the demonstrably ubiquitous use of
“DEVELOPMENT” to describe features or categories of real estate services, it is not
source-indicating, and is not the dominant feature of the applied-for mark, the
Examining Attorney observes.63
Moreover, she maintains, Applicant’s third-party evidence does not prove that
“MORE” is a weak source indicator.64 In most of the third-party registrations that
Applicant submitted, “MORE” is embedded in larger phrases, such as:
“More Bang for Your Buck”, “Move In. Get More”, “More than a Space, It’s
Your Place”, “Move More Freely”, “More in Less”, “More of What You Love”,
“More Home. Less Money. Guaranteed”, “Move More People”, “More Park,
Less City”, “More Time to Share”, We See More”, “More than Architects”,

is a common noun or adjective of everyday use and has a laudatory or suggestive indication,
PEAK PERIOD for personal deodorants is not confusingly similar to PEAK for dentifrice)).
59 Id. at 22.
60 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 21 (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital
LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that the Board did not
err in “according little weight to the adjective ‘STONE’” and affirming TTAB's finding that
the noun LION was the dominant part of applicant's mark STONE LION CAPITAL).
61 Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 9.
62 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 25-27.
63 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 16.
64 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 25-27.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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“Workplace as More”, and “More with less”.65

The Examining Attorney notes that these marks, which embed “MORE” in longer,
common phrases, “do not support the idea that ‘MORE’ is weak as these uses do not
use the word ‘MORE’ in the same dominant, source identifying manner that the
applied-for marks and the registered mark do.”66
Similarly, the Examining Attorney observes, “the representative common law
examples provided in applicant’s briefs show a good amount of common phrases, such
as ‘More Options’, ‘More Choice’, ‘More House’, ‘More Modern’, [‘]Net more’, and ‘More
Ways’ along with ‘Expect More’, ‘Providing More’, ‘Create More Community!’”67
Unlike Juice Generation, where all of the third-party examples conveyed the same
“Peace Love and…” impression, Applicant’s third-party phrases, quoted above,
convey a variety of messages, the Examining Attorney states. “None of this third
party use has the same effect of showing that “MORE” is a weak source indicator,”
she concludes.68
Applicant replies that:
The analysis of the strength of the elements of the mark is not an either/or
proposition, where one term must be judged to be dominant and the other
terms must be disregarded entirely; instead, the terms must be considered
in combination, and if the term shared by the two marks is weak and
entitled to a narrow scope of protection, a highly suggestive or descriptive
term can be sufficient to distinguish the marks, even if that term is not

65 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 26.
66 Id. at 26-27.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 27.
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“dominant.”69

However, the Examining Attorney answers, even if MORE is considered weak, it
is “still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a
subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related services.”70
2. Discussion and Analysis
The issue here is whether the third-party evidence Applicant submitted
demonstrates that the cited registered mark, MORE, is so weak that it may be
distinguished by the additional wording DEVELOPMENT. On consideration of the
law, evidence, and arguments, we find that the marks, taken in their entireties, are
similar under the first DuPont factor, although the element MORE is somewhat
weakened under the sixth DuPont factor.
a. Similarity or Dissimilarity of Marks
The applied-for mark, MORE DEVELOPMENT, incorporates Registrant’s
MORE mark in its entirety, adding the suffix DEVELOPMENT. This incorporation
of one into the other increases their similarity. See Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d
at 1161 (affirming Board’s finding that applicant’s mark STONE LION CAPITAL
incorporated the entirety of the registered marks LION CAPITAL and LION); Hunter
Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., 110 USPQ2d 1651, 1660 (TTAB 2014) (“Likelihood of
confusion often has been found where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within
another.”).

69 Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 7 (citing Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622,
627 (8th Cir.1987) (determining that OATMEAL RAISIN CRISP and APPLE RAISIN CRISP
are not confusingly similar).
70 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 27-28.
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“[I]f a junior user takes the entire mark of another and adds a generic, descriptive
or highly suggestive term, it is generally not sufficient to avoid confusion.” Double
Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., 2019 USPQ2d 377409, * 7 (TTAB 2019). In this case,
as we have found, “DEVELOPMENT” is merely descriptive of or generic for
Applicant’s intended developer services, and must be disclaimed. The disclaimed
word DEVELOPMENT must still be considered in the final analysis, but it is less
significant than MORE, the dominant element, in creating the applied-for mark’s
commercial impression on customers. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128
USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
MORE forms the entirety of Registrant’s mark and is the dominant—first and
most distinctive—part of Applicant’s mark. Id. at 1049. The marks begin with the
same word, which not only looks and sounds the same in both, but conveys the same
connotation and commercial impression-that of greater, additional, or in greater
quantity or degree. See In re 1st USA Realty Pros., Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586-87
(TTAB 2007) (finding that the respective marks carry the identical suggestive
connotation). “Likelihood of confusion is not necessarily avoided between otherwise
confusingly similar marks merely by adding or deleting a house mark, other
distinctive matter, or a term that is descriptive or suggestive of the named goods or
services; if the dominant portion of both marks is the same, then the marks may be
confusingly similar notwithstanding peripheral differences.” Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Nationwide Realty, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1618, 1635 (TTAB 2016).
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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b. Conceptual and Commercial Strength or Weakness
Under the sixth DuPont factor, Applicant endeavors to diminish the
distinctiveness and dominance of MORE by adducing third-party evidence to show
that it is weak.
Evidence of third parties’ registration and use of similar marks can attenuate the
strength of a registrant’s mark in two ways: conceptually and commercially. First,
evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is commonly adopted by many
different registrants may indicate that the common element has some significance
that undermines its conceptual strength as an indicator of a single source. “[T]hird-
party registrations are relevant evidence of the inherent or conceptual strength of a
mark or term because they are probative of how terms are used in connection with
the goods or services identified in the registrations.” In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., 120
USPQ2d 1738, 1745-46 (TTAB 2016). Third-party registration evidence may show
that a term carries a highly suggestive connotation in the relevant industry and
therefore may be considered conceptually weak. Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136;
see Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574,
22 USPQ2d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Second, evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is used extensively in
commerce by a number of third parties may undermine its commercial strength, as
the consuming public may have become familiar with a multiplicity of the same or
similar marks, and can distinguish them based on minute differences. Omaha Steaks
Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693
(Fed. Cir. 2018). “Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods [or
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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services] is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a
narrow scope of protection.” Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693, quoted in Jack
Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136.
To this end, Applicant has introduced evidence of third-party registrations and
uses of MORE in connection with real estate services. We accord this evidence some
measure of probative value, tempered by gaps in the evidence.
We accord little, if any, weight to the lists of applications and registrations
Applicant has printed from the USPTO’s TESS database. Providing a list of
registrations ordinarily does not make them of record, except where, as here, the
Examining Attorney does not object to the list. In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127
USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018). Even so, the lists Applicant provides have
little probative value. Its first list of 100 marks containing “MORE” covers all of Class
36, encompassing vast fields of banking, insurance, and financial services, as well as
real estate affairs.71 “Because the listed registrations are not of record, and we cannot
determine how many of the listed registered marks … are registered for insurance,
financial, or real estate services, the TESS list is not probative of the strength or
weakness of [Registrant’s] mark[] or of the ability of [Applicant’s] mark[] to co-exist
… in the marketplace.” Nationwide v. Nationwide Realty, 120 USPQ2d at 1639.
Applicant’s second TESS list—100 marks consisting of or containing “MORE” in
connection with “real estate” goods and services72—is at least in the ballpark, but still
falls short. To begin with, it lists not only registrations, but 21 applications (including

71 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action, ex. A at 23-25.
72 Id., ex. B at 26-29.
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two of its own applications), which “have no evidentiary value other than to show that
they were filed.” In re 1st USA Realty Pros., 84 USPQ2d at 1583. And the list of
registered marks (including the cited registration), standing alone, “has no probative
value since it does not show the goods or services for which the marks were
registered.” Id.
Fortunately for Applicant, it supplements this list with TESS printouts of over 60
of the marks containing MORE in connection with real estate services.73 These TESS
printouts are a permissible way to make the applications and registrations of record.
In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, n. 18 (TTAB 2011). But they still suffer
from deficiencies that impair their probative value:
 Over twenty of them are applications, which have no probative value, see In re
1st USA Realty Pros., 84 USPQ2d at 1583;
 They include two of Applicant’s subject applications and the cited registration,
which are not third-party marks;
 They contain numerous duplications—approximately fifteen;
 They encompass disparate services, such as “insurance underwriting”74 or
“vacation real estate timeshare services,”75 see Omaha Steaks v. Greater
Omaha Packing, 128 USPQ2d at 1694-95 (goods and services must be similar);

73 Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office Action, exs. 2 and 3 at 35-225; Sept. 17, 2020 Response to
Office Action, ex. C at 30-47.
74 WE CAN SHOW YOU MORE for insurance underwriting, Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office
Action at 222.
75 MORE TIME TO SHARE for “vacation real estate timeshare services,” Id. at 189.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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 They encompass nine Paris Convention and Madrid Protocol registrations,
which do not necessarily indicate use in commerce, see Calypso Tech., Inc. v.
Calypso Capital Mgmt., LP, 100 USPQ2d 1213, 1221 (TTAB 2011)76;
 They embed “MORE” in proper names, such as LOVELIVERMORE,
ENNISMORE, LAKEMORE, ALDERMORE, GATEMORE, AND
FLAMORE;77
 They embed “MORE” as an incidental part of a composite mark, such as

76 CLICKTRANSFER (44E), LAKEMORE (44e), ENNISMORE (44e), ALDERMORE (44E),
ZIRAAT BANK (66A), KAMES CAPITAL WE INVEST MORE (66A), WE MAKE THE
WORLD MORE RESILIENT (66A), MORE THAN A SPACE, IT’S YOUR PLACE (66A),
GATEMORE (66A) Id. at 37, 59, 75, 89, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162.
77 Id. at 35, 41, 75, 59, 89, 162, 172.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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78
 And they embed “MORE” as an incidental word in a longer slogan, e.g.:
MAA COMMUNITIES EXPECT MORE;

FOR PEOPLE WITH MORE SENSE THAN DOLLARS;

MAKING REAL ESTATE LESS TRANSACTIONAL, MORE PERSONAL;

CREATING AND ENHANCING VALUE FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS;

BECAUSE REAL ESTATE IS MORE THAN A FOR SALE SIGN;

BUILDING A MORE EFFICIENT ECONOMY FOR THE WORLD’S MOST
IMPACTFUL BUYERS AND SELLERS;

THE GOOD HANDS ARE DOING MORE THAN EVER BEFORE;

NO ONE SELLS HOMES MORE INTELLIGENTLY; and

WE MAKE THE WORLD MORE RESILIENT.79

Hence, Applicant’s cited third-party applications and registrations vary widely in
probative value. Some have no probative value—using “MORE” in applications, in
proper names, or with disparate services. Others have little probative value,
displaying “MORE” as a peripheral part of a composite mark or a longer slogan. See
Sports Authority Mich., Inc. v. PC Authority, Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1782, 1796 (TTAB
2002) (finding third-party registrations had little, if any, probative value where some
“appear[] in a slogan not in the same form as the marks of applicant and
[registrant]”).

78 Id. at 37, 84, 107, 180.
79 Id. at 51, 55, 80, 99, 126, 111,115,140,158.
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Still others—two-word phrases such as DO MORE, UNLOCK MORE, and
PROVIDING MORE—clearly use “MORE” consistently with its dictionary definition:
“greater,” “additional,” or “in greater quantity or degree.”80 See RxD Media, LLC v.
Application Dev. LLC, 125 USPQ2d 1801, 1812 (TTAB 2018) (“Third-party
registrations can be used in the manner of a dictionary definition to illustrate how a
term is perceived in the trade, industry, or ordinary parlance.”). The Examining
Attorney and Applicant have already agreed that the registered and applied-for
marks share this dictionary meaning.81 The third-party registrations merely bring
the analysis full circle: corroborating the dictionary definitions of “MORE.”
We find that the relevant third-party registrations weaken the registered MORE
mark’s conceptual distinctiveness somewhat, although perhaps not as much as
Applicant would have it. Because MORE is registered on the Principal Register
without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, we must presume that it is inherently
distinctive—at least suggestive. Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); In
re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1363 (TTAB 2007) cited in Sock It To Me, Inc.
v. Aiping Fan, 2020 USPQ2d 10611, *10 (TTAB 2020). It has, however, been adopted
by many third party registrants, conveying the very suggestive connotation that they
provide “more” services, in greater degree or of better quality than others.
In that sense, this case calls to mind Plus Prods. v. Natural Organics, Inc., 204
USPQ 773 (TTAB 1979), in which the Board allowed the applicant to register

80 See Dictionary.com, Feb. 18, 2020 Response to Office Action at 23, Merriam-Webster.com,
Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 161.
81 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 18; Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 16.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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NATURE’S PLUS for vitamins despite the opposer’s prior registration of PLUS for
vitamins, given the coexistence of fifteen third-party registrations containing PLUS
for similar goods. Id. at 779-80, cited in Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12
Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458 (TTAB 2014). Like “PLUS,” “MORE” suggests
that one’s goods or services are greater in quantity or degree, and is somewhat
conceptually weak. But it is still presumed to be inherently distinctive—certainly
more distinctive than DEVELOPMENT in the real estate field.
To show that “MORE” is commercially weak, Applicant claims to have adduced
evidence of three dozen third-party entities using “MORE” in connection with real
estate activities.82 As with the third-party registrations, we discount some of this
evidence:
 Two are foreign entities (plying their trade in New Zealand, Australia, and
Mexico) see In re Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 222983, at *5 n.7
(TTAB 2019) (“We have not considered two other examples from websites
located outside the United States. One of the websites is for a company that
appears to provide wireless services only in New Zealand….”);83
 One is a proper name (Moore and Co, Realtors);84
 Three are duplications (More Realty of Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii also
appearing in a listing in Honolulu; More, Realtors of St. Louis, Missouri also
listed on a St. Louis real estate search site; More Choice Properties of

82 Sept. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action at 49-159.
83 More Real Estate, New Zealand and Australia, More Riviera Tulum Real Estate Agency,
Mexico. Id. at 49.
84 Id. at 75.
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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Richmond, VA listed twice); and
 A dozen domain name hyperlinks lack copies of the corresponding web pages.85
See In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1194 n. 21 (TTAB
2018) (providing a link to a website does not suffice to put information in the
record).
We thus are left with 18 entities using “MORE” in connection with real estate
activities across the United States. Although their ranks have now been thinned by
half, they represent entities ranging from Washington, D.C. to Honolulu, from Miami
to Washington State. So customers across the country have been exposed to real
estate agents and brokers offering their services under variations of “MORE.” Even
though these entities use a variety of common phrases, such as ‘More Options’, ‘More
Choice’, ‘More House’,86 they all use “MORE” in the same sense: to connote greater,
additional services.
That is the import of third-party evidence of use in commerce: customers have
been exposed to so many similar marks that they have been educated to distinguish
between different marks on the bases of minute distinctions. Omaha Steaks v. Greater
Omaha Packing, 128 USPQ2d at 1692; Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose
Senior Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1033 (TTAB 2016).
We find, then, that MORE is somewhat weakened conceptually and commercially
under the sixth DuPont factor. Even so, the marks, taken in their entireties, are
similar under the first DuPont factor. We also bear in mind that even weak marks

85 Items 24 and 26-36 on Applicant’s table of third party entities, Id. at 50-51.
86 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 26-27.
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are entitled to protection against registration of similar marks for closely related
goods or services. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400,
1401 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974) (likelihood of confusion is to be avoided as
much between weak marks as between strong marks); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl.
Operating Co., Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1173 (TTAB 2011).
B. The Second through Fourth DuPont Factors

Under the second, third, and fourth DuPont factors, we must consider “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use”; the
similarity or dissimilarity of the trade channels; and “[t]he conditions under which
and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567; In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123
USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1. The Class 36 Services
We first compare the Class 36 services for the respective marks. Again, the
registration for MORE identifies “real estate services, namely, commercial and
residential real estate agency services and real estate brokerage,” and the application
for MORE DEVELOPMENT identifies:
Real estate management services; financial consultancy; Leasing of real
estate; Rental of real estate; Building management; Real estate services,
namely, property management services for condominium associations,
homeowner associations and apartment buildings; Real estate services,
namely, rental, brokerage, leasing and management of commercial
property, offices and office space.

Applicant argues that “the services offered under the parties’ respective marks
are not overlapping and are directed to different classes of consumers. … Unlike
Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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Registrant, Applicant’s services are primarily directed towards businesses and
property owners.”87 Applicant also argues that customers of these services will
exercise care in making their purchases:
The extreme care with which the parties’ respective services are utilized
and purchased must also be noted. It is commonly known that real estate
purchases are often one of the biggest financial decisions (and longest
financial commitments) an individual or company will make and therefore
a real estate agency or brokerage is selected with care. Although real estate
management services are distinguishable, they are also a long-term
investment for the business/purchaser that are expensive and require
careful research and planning.88

As the Examining Attorney correctly notes, however, Registrant’s “real estate
services, namely, commercial and residential real estate agency services and real
estate brokerage” are broadly phrased. A “real estate agent” is “a person in the
business of selling land and buildings.”89 “‘[R]eal estate brokerage’ services …
encompass the buying and selling of all forms of real estate, including commercial
and residential real estate, by all types of consumers of those services.” Nationwide
v. Nationwide Realty, 120 USPQ2d at 1637. As such, Registrant’s services encompass
Applicant’s “Leasing of real estate; Rental of real estate ; … Real estate services,
namely, rental, brokerage, leasing … of commercial property, offices and office
space.”90 The services are legally identical in part. See Lincoln Nat’l Corp. v.
Anderson, 110 USPQ2d 1271, 1282 (TTAB 2014) (finding respective Class 36

87 Applicant’s brief, 12 TTABVUE 25.
88 Id.
89 Merriam-Webster.com, Sep. 17, 2020 Response to Office Action, Ex. F at 169.
90 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 19.

Serial Nos. 88443364, 88443386, 88443413, 88443474
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“services as identified in applicant’s application and in opposer’s registration are
similar and in part legally identical.”).
Since the services are legally identical in part, we “presume and find that the trade
channels and purchasers for the respective services likewise are similar and in part
legally identical.” Id. at 1283. Further, because “the services are legally identical, the
degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a determination that
confusion is likely declines.” In re RiseSmart, 104 USPQ2d at 1935 (citing In re
Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Similarity of any item identified in a class supports a finding of confusing
similarity as to that entire class. Primrose Ret. Cmtys., 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1033
(TTAB 2016) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981)).
To underscore the similarity of the respective services, the Examining Attorney
adduces evidence of third-party entities that provide real estate brokerage and
property management services. For instance:
 Dominion Real Estate Advisors – provides brokerage and commercial
property management services.91
 SkyeCroft Realty Group – offers residential and commercial property
management services, as well as leasing and brokerage services.92
 QFC Real Estate – “QFC Real Estate is an award-winning real estate firm
that provides commercial property management services and brokerage
activities….”93

91 DomionRA.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 66-69.
92 SkyeCroftRealty.com, Id. at 70-74.
93 Qfcre.com, Id. at 75-77.
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 CSA Realty Group – “CSA Realty Group is a full service property
management company, offering its clients commercial and residential property
management as well as HOA management and full brokerage services.”94
 Graco Real Estate Development, Inc. – provides brokerage and leasing and
property management.95
 Wheeler Properties - Brokerage, leasing and property management.96

This third-party evidence demonstrates that services of the type offered by both
Applicant and Registrant in Class 36 are marketed and sold by single businesses.
“We find that consumers would readily perceive these types of services as being
sufficiently related as to be offered by a single business.” In re Integrated Embedded,
120 USPQ2d 1504, 1514-15 (TTAB 2016).
Contrary to Applicant’s assertion, Applicant’s and Registrant’s identified services
pertain to both residential and commercial real estate. Real estate brokerage services
are offered to a wide range of consumers, including members of the general public,
many of whom are not likely to be sophisticated in purchasing and selling real estate,
much less capable of distinguishing between the sources of real estate brokerage
services rendered under very similar marks. As to these classes of purchasers, it is
settled that the applicable standard of care is that of the least sophisticated potential
purchasers. Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1163; Lincoln Nat’l v. Anderson, 110
USPQ2d at 1283 (citing Giersch v. Scripps Networks Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1020, 1027
(TTAB 2009)).

94 CSARealtyGroup.com, Id. at 78-79.
95 GracoRealEstate.com, Id. at 80-82.
96 WheelerPropertiesInc.com, Oct. 26, 2020 Office Action at 6.
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Consequently, as to the Class 36 services, we find that the second and third
DuPont factors favor a finding of likelihood of confusion, and that the fourth DuPont
factor is neutral.
2. The Class 37, 42, and 44 Services
Applicant’s Class 37, 42, and 44 services are a different story. All center on core
development services, such as architectural planning, construction, and landscaping,
specifically:
Real estate development; Real estate development and construction of
commercial, residential, and mixed use properties; Building construction,
construction supervision, building repair and maintenance in
International Class 37;

Architecture and architectural consultation; surveying; urban planning in
International Class 42; and

Landscape gardening; landscape design; Landscaping maintenance
services, namely, care and upkeep of gardens and grounds in International
Class 44.

None are identical, legally identical, or overlapping with Registrant’s identified
real estate agency or brokerage services. The services are all in the real estate field.
But a finding that services are similar “is not based on whether a general term or
overarching relationship can be found to encompass them both.” Edwards
Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1399, 1410 (TTAB 2010). A shared
industry or field does not necessarily equate to an identical target market or related
services. See Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21
USPQ2d 1388, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Therefore, to show their relatedness, the Examining Attorney relies on third-party
evidence showing that some entities provide development services and real estate
brokerage services.
Class 37
The Examining Attorney points to approximately a dozen entities that
purportedly provide real estate development and brokerage services,97 e.g.:
 TLG Real Estate Services, PLLC – Provides real estate brokerage and
residential subdivision development services.98

 Western Peak Enterprises - Start to finish development for vertical use
types, mixed-use projects, land development, and leasing and property
management services.99

 The Cress Group Commercial Real Estate Services - “Our development
experience and brokerage team allow us the opportunity to provide competitive
and comprehensive residential and commercial development for clients with
strong growth plans.”100

 Neighborhood Development Company - A fully integrated Real Estate
development company located in Washington DC. “We control all elements of
development in-house, including development, marketing, and management of
our products.”101

 Simpson - Commercial leasing, property management and real estate
development.102

Class 42

The Examining Attorney points to seven entities that purportedly provide

97 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 21-22.
98 August 16, 2019 Office Action at 25-28 (‘386 application).
99 AirportCentri.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 72-74 (‘386 application).
100 CressCRE.com, Id. at 78-80 (‘386 application).
101 NeighborhoodDevelopment.com, Id. at 90-93.
102 Simpsondev.com, October 26, 2020 Office Action at 5.
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architectural planning and brokerage services,103 e.g.:
 GHIDORZI- A fully integrated architecture, construction and interior design
firm that also provides real estate services in the field of leasing.104

 Colliers International- offers architecture services and properties for sale or
lease, such as “225,651 square foot industrial building,” “University Place
Shopping Center,” “Welby Business Park – Industrial Space for Lease”.105

 Southeast Venture- Architectural design and planning and real estate
brokerage services.106

Class 44

The Examining Attorney points to eight entities that purportedly provide
landscaping and brokerage services,107 e.g.:
 Valley Rental Co.- Real estate agent services; landscaping services “coming
soon.”108

 Gatski Commercial –
“Brokerage Services We offer a full-service in-house brokerage division,
which facilitates acquisition and disposition of commercial property, provides
comprehensive property evaluation, negotiates contracts, orchestrates a
thorough due diligence program and handles other regulated broker services
for our clients as needed.”
“Landscaping With our landscaping division, there’s no need to spend time
and energy trying to hire third-party contractors or ensuring quality
control.”109

103 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 22-23.
104 Ghidorzi.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 41-44 (‘413 application).
105 Colliers.com, October 26, 2020 Office Action at 6-14 (‘413 application).
106 SoutheastVenture.com, Id. at 19-31 (‘413 application).
107 Examining Attorney’s brief, 16 TTABVUE 24.
108 ValleyRentalCo.com, August 16, 2019 Office Action at 18-20.
109 GatskiCommercial.com, March 17, 2020 Office Action at 35-38.
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 Commonwealth Real Estate Services –
“Commonwealth’s property management and brokerage operations have
developed a reputation for professionalism and unsurpassed knowledge of all
aspects of real estate management.”
“Commonwealth Homeowner services … now offers to communities the
addition of a professional Landscape Maintenance Division.”110

Applicant critiques the Examining Attorney’s third-party evidence in these three
Classes:
The Examining Attorney’s meager evidence – 11 references in Class 37,
seven references in Class 42, and eight references in Class 44 – is simply
not enough to show that it is common for companies that provide real
estate agency and brokerage services to also provide development,
construction, repair, and maintenance services (Class 37); architectural
consultation, surveying, and urban planning services (Class 42); or
landscape design, maintenance, and gardening services (Class 44),
particularly given the number of companies that are active in the broad
field of real estate. The Examining Attorney has thus failed to meet her
burden of showing that the parties’ services are closely related enough to
cause confusion, particularly in light of the weak nature of the cited
registration.111

Applicant also critiques the quality of this third-party evidence, positing that
despite several opportunities to submit evidence over three office actions, the
Examining Attorney produced a paucity of relevant evidence. In Class 37, Applicant
notes that “only 3 of 13 webpages submitted appear to even reference both real estate
agent or brokerage services and real estate development services.”112 In Class 42, it
notes that “only three (3) appear to show offering of real estate agent and brokerage
services in connection with architecture services.”113 And in Class 44, it notes that

110 CWres.com, Id. at 39-40.
111 Applicant’s reply brief, 22 TTABVUE 10-11.
112 Applicant’s brief, 11 TTABVUE 24 (‘386 application).
113 Applicant’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 25 (‘413 application).
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“only 1 of 12 webpages appears to show advertising of both real estate
agency/brokerage services and landscaping services emanating from the same source
under the same mark.”114
We find the third-party evidence relevant to show some degree of relatedness of
the services, i.e., that developers sometimes provide real estate agency and brokerage
services. But that does not suffice to prove that the respective services, Registrant’s
real estate agency and brokerage services, on the one hand, and Applicant’s
architectural planning, construction, and landscaping services on the other hand—
would be encountered by the same customers under circumstances that could,
because of the weak shared term MORE, give rise to the mistaken belief that they
originate from the same source. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) quoted in DeVivo v. Ortiz, 2020
USPQ2d 10153, *11 (TTAB 2020).
Applicant’s real estate development services in these Classes would by their very
nature tend to be offered at great cost to property owners, purchasers, or investors,
who would tend to exercise great care in the course of negotiating contracts “in the
context of lengthy sales processes leaving no room for misunderstanding about the
sources of the respective [services].” Edwards Lifesciences v. VigiLanz, 94 USPQ2d at
1412. “[I]n light of the inherent nature of the goods and services involved, some
degree of purchasing care may be exercised by Applicant’s potential or actual
consumers.” In re Info. Builders Inc., 2020 USPQ2d 10444, *4 (TTAB 2020). See also

114 Applicant’s brief, 11 TTABVUE 24 (‘474 application).
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Electronic Design & Sales Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21
USPQ2d 1388, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“there is always less likelihood of confusion
where goods [or services] are expensive and purchased after careful consideration.”).
The fact that these services are inherently very specialized, tailored to each particular
customer, and purchased only after careful consideration and negotiation, tends to
diminish any likelihood of confusion. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. Rstudio, Inc.,
105 USPQ2d 1825, 1840 (TTAB 2013).
Thus as to Applicant’s Class 37, 42, and 44 services, we find that the second
DuPont factor shows some degree of relatedness of the services, but the third and
fourth DuPont factors militate against a likelihood of confusion.
C. Conclusion

We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record and all relevant
DuPont factors. We find that the respective marks are similar under the first DuPont
factor, although the strength of the shared element “MORE” is attenuated somewhat
under the sixth DuPont factor.
We find that Applicant’s Class 36 services are legally identical and otherwise
related to Registrant’s identified services, and that they would flow through the same
or similar channels of trade to overlapping classes of customers, some of whom are
presumed to be unsophisticated. We find as to this Class that the second and third
DuPont factors favor a finding of likelihood of confusion, and that the fourth DuPont
factor is neutral. There is thus a likelihood of confusion between the applied -for
MORE DEVELOPMENT mark reflected in Application Serial No. 88443364 and
the cited registered mark MORE.
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We find that Applicant’s Class 37, 42, and 44 services are dissimilar from, though
somewhat related to, Registrant’s identified services, and that they would flow
through different channels of trade to different classes of customers, who would be
expected to exercise sophistication and care in their purchases. Given the
aforementioned weakness of the shared word MORE, particularly in the field of real
estate agency and brokerage, the record does not establish that these potential
purchasers are likely to experience confusion between the mark MORE
DEVELOPMENT mark reflected in Application Serial Nos. 88443386, 88443474,
and 88443413, and the cited registered mark MORE. “[E]ach case must be decided
on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Decision:
The disclaimer requirement is affirmed as to all four applications.
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) is affirmed as to
Application Serial No. 88443364. The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under
Section 2(d) is reversed as to Application Serial Nos. 88443386, 88443474, and
88443413. Since Applicant has already disclaimed “DEVELOPMENT” in the
alternative in each of these three applications, they may proceed to publication with
the disclaimers. See In re RiseSmart Inc., 104 USPQ2d at 1936 n.11 (“Inasmuch as
applicant has already provided the disclaimers in each application, in the event of an
appeal, if the disclaimer requirement is affirmed but the Section 2(d) refusal
reversed, the applications may proceed without further amendment.”).