Monroe Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 7, 1972

200 N.L.R.B. 62 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Monroe Manufacturing Company, Inc. and Interna-
tional Ladies ' Garment Workers ' Union, AFL-CIO.
Cases 26-CA-4071 and 26-RC-4059
November 7, 1972
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On May 2, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Eugene F. Frey issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding.[ Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief. The Administrative Law
Judge also found that Respondent's unlawful con-
duct had interfered with the election held on October
14, 1971, in Case 26-RC-4059 and recommended
that the election be set aside.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision in light of the
exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm his
rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order as discussed below.
Chairman Miller agrees with his colleagues that
certain conduct engaged in by the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that the
election conducted on October 14, 1971, should be
set aside and a second election directed, as recom-
mended by the Administrative Law Judge.
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we find no
basis in either the facts or the law to support the
doctrine that because President Levinson's interroga-
tion of employee Bruce on the morning of the
election, October 14, 1971, could be characterized
"as pleasant and nonthreatening," such conduct
thereby lost its coercive impact. Based on the
credited testimony of Bruce and the admissions of
Levinson, Levinson asked Bruce why she was
wearing a union button and what her complaints
were, told her in the future that her complaint could
be remedied, and questioned why she had waited so
long to voice her complaints so that she had to
"resort to this," pointing to her union button.
Finally, Levinson asked Bruce if she had changed her
mind about the Union, and she replied she had not.
In Members Fanning's and Jenkins' opinion such
I The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
seeking out of Bruce by Respondent 's president and
the discussion which followed was calculated to, and
would reasonably be interpreted by the employee
involved as an attempt to, interfere with her right to
self-organization , regardless of the courtesy and
civility of the inquiry . It is the master-servant relation
and the power explicit in it that make such
interrogation unlawful . Such interrogation was clear-
ly improper and violated her Section 7 rights.
Similarly , we are unable to agree with the Chair-
man's view that the discriminatory discharge of
Hebron on August 6 was not violative of the Act
because the Respondent recanted and rescinded its
action . The Administrative Law Judge 's findings
were based on credited evidence fully supported by
the record , and his recommended remedy properly
does not provide for backpay or reinstatement, but
orders the Respondent not to threaten employees
with discharge , as it clearly did in the case of
Hebron for engaging in union or concerted activi-
ties. Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing this
finding.
As for the speech of the Respondent 's attorney,
contrary to the views expressed by the Chairman, we
find that Respondent attorney 's speech to the
employees on the day before the election cannot be
considered in isolation , but should be considered in
the context of the series of speeches made by the
Respondent prior to the election. After Respondent's
officials had addressed the employees and stressed
the beneficence of the Employer and its longtime
concern for the welfare of its employees, the
Respondent attorney's remarks that the employees
might receive less if the plant became unionized
would raise fears and doubts among the employees
and thus went beyond the protection of Section 8(c)
of the Act. Thus, we agree with the Administrative
Law Judge that in the context in which the remarks
were made the freedom of choice of the employees in
the election was interfered with and the Union's
objection in regard thereto should be sustained.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Monroe Manufac-
turing Company, Inc., Memphis, Tennessee, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in his recommended Order.
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A. 3) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
200 NLRB No. 11
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 63
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those allegations in the
complaint as to which no violations have been found
are hereby dismissed.
IT IS ALSO FURTHER ORDERED that the election held
on October 14, 1971, in Case 26-RC-4059 be, and it
hereby is, set aside.3
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
CHAIRMAN MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I concur with my colleagues and the Administra-
tive Law Judge except in the following particulars:
I would not find that Levinson's last minute
electioneering conversation with union adherent
Bruce, which the Administrative Law Judge charac-
terized as pleasant and nonthreatening, violated
Section 8(a)(1). Nor would I find the immediately
rescinded discharge of employee Hebron, when
Respondent accepted his explanation for going
through the timecard rack, was violative of Section
8(a)(1).
As to the objections to the election, I would
overrule Objection 5. I do not agree with my
colleagues that the comments of Fortas to the
employees in a talk the day before the election
amounted to conduct interfering with the conduct of
the election. As recited, his talk fell within the 8(c)
area of legitimate free speech, stated a fact, and was
clear in stating that no one could know what the
employees could expect because the parties had to
bargain in good faith, which, his comments indicat-
ed, Respondent would do.
Since I concur with the Administrative Law Judge
and my colleagues in sustaining Objection 7, I join
them in their decision to set aside the election.
Milchem, Inc., 170 NLRB 362.
3 In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge that the election should
be set aside and a second election held , Members Fanning and Jenkins rely
not only upon the conduct found objectionable by the Administrative Law
Judge as a basis for setting aside the election , but also upon the conduct of
President Levinson on the morning of the election , described above, in
which he engaged employee Bruce in improper interrogation in an effort to
persuade her to change her mind about the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act The Board has held that "conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and
untrammeled choice in an election " See Pandpns Wetdment Company, 196
NLRB No 34
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE F. FREY, Trial Examiner: These consolidated
I In Case 26-CA-4071, the issues arise on an amended complaint issued
December 10, 1971, by the Board's Regional Director for Region 26, after
Board investigation of a charge filed by the Union, International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, on July 23, 1971, and amended
answer duly filed by Respondent admitting jurisdiction but denying the
commission of any unfair labor practices
In Case 26-RC-4059, the issues apse on a Board Order of December 22,
1971, directing a hearing to receive evidence on the Union's Objections 2, 5,
cases were tried before me on January 25 and 26, 1972, at
Memphis, Tennessee, with all parties represented by
counsel, after pretrial procedures conducted in compliance
with the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29
U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. (herein called the Act).
The issues in Case 26-CA-4071 are whether or not
Respondent, Monroe Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
engaged in surveillance of a union meeting of its employ-
ees, created the impression of surveillance of employees'
union and concerted activities , and subjected them to
interrogation about, and threats and warnings of reprisals
because of, such activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
The issues in Case 26-RC-4059 are whether or not
Respondent, by interrogation of employees, delivery of
speeches to captive audiences of employees before an
election, and remarks to employees while they waited in
line to vote on election day, engaged in conduct improper-
ly affecting the results of the election.'
At the close of the testimony in both cases, the Trial
Examiner dismissed paragraphs 11 and 13 of the amended
complaint in Case 26-CA-4071 for lack of proof. All
parties waived oral argument, but were given until
February 21, 1972, to file written briefs with the Trial
Examiner.2 After an extension of time granted by the Chief
Trial Examiner to March 6, 1972, General Counsel duly
filed a brief dealing with the issues in Case 26-CA-4071,
the Union filed a brief dealing mainly with the issues raised
by its objections in Case 26-RC-4059, but adopting the
arguments of General Counsel in the unfair labor practice
case , and Respondent filed a brief dealing with all issues.
These briefs have been carefully considered by me in
preparation of this Decision which was signed and released
by me on April 27, 1972, for distribution to the parties in
the usual course.
Upon consideration of the entire record in the consoli-
dated cases, including my observation of witnesses on the
stand and analysis of the arguments of counsel during the
trial and in their briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT AND STATUS OF
THE UNION
Respondent is a Tennessee corporation with a plant and
place of business located in Memphis, Tennessee, where it
is engaged in the business of making curtains, bedspreads,
and cloth products. In the 12 months before issuance of the
amended complaint Respondent in course of said business
had both a direct inflow and direct outflow of goods and
materials valued in each instance in excess of $50,000.
Respondent admits, and I find on the above facts, that it is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
and 7 to conduct affecting the results of the election, duly filed on October
20, 1971 Both cases were consolidated for trial by order of the Regional
Director issued December 27, 1971
2 On March 6, 1972, counsel for General Counsel moved on notice to all
parties to correct the transcript of testimony in various aspects There being
no opposition by other parties , the motion is granted , and the transcript is
hereby amended in the particulars set forth in the motion The motion will
be marked in evidence as G C Exh 10
64 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
It. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Events
The parties stipulate, and I find, that at all material times
mentioned in the record the following persons were
supervisors and agents of Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act:
Nathan Levinson President
Isaac Greenblatt Vice President
Audrey O. Lambert Supervisor
Lois E. South Supervisor
Raymond L. Wells Supervisor
Nell P. Freeman Supervisor
The Union began an organizational campaign at
Respondent's plant in December, 1970, in course of which
it set up one meeting for plant employees at the Lorraine
Motel, Memphis, Tennessee, on the night of March 18,
1971, and some employees, including Betty Ann Bruce,
solicited others to sign union cards at the plant. Early in its
campaign, the Union recruited one Jesse Busby, a black
man and agent of a Memphis local of the Meat Cutters
Union, to help in contacting employees of Respondent. On
August 18, 1971, it filed a petition in Case 26-RC-4059 for
an election, and pursuant to a stipulation for a consent
election filed therein on September 9, a secret ballot
election was held between the hours of 3:30 p.m. and 4:30
p.m. on October 14, 1971, at the plant among employees in
an agreed appropriate unit 3 The Union lost the election by
a vote of 67 for and 71 against, and thereafter filed timely
objections to conduct affecting the results of the election.
The Board on December 22, 1971, adopted a report of the
Regional Director filed December 1, 1971, overruling all
objections except 2, 5, and 7, and directing a hearing
thereon as noted above.
B. Reaction of Respondent to Union Campaign4
1. Alleged surveillance near plant
During March and April, Busby occasionally solicited
employees on the street outside the plant to join the Union.
Once early in March, while Busby was talking to employee
Leroy Williams and another employee near the driveway
to the plant parking lot, Greenblatt drove out of the lot in
his Thunderbird auto and Williams pointed to Greenblatt
and told Busby that was his "boss." On another occasion
in March, Greenblatt saw Busby again talking to Williams
as he left the plant about noon. Busby offered to take
Williams to lunch. Williams accepted and drove off with
3 All production and maintenance employees, including receiving clerk,
mechanics , and head mechanic, employed at said plant, excluding all office
clerical employees , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act
4 All dates mentioned hereafter are in 1971, unless otherwise stated.
5 These facts are found from credited testimony of Busby and
Greenblatt. Testimony of Busby at variance therewith is not credited, as
Busby was very hazy about the time of the trailing incident , how many
times he had lunch outside with Williams and other workers, and other
details.
Busby in his car. Greenblatt followed Busby in his own car
for several blocks on a winding course through nearby
streets , but when Busby circled back past the plant,
Greenblatt stopped following and drove his car back into
the parking lot. Greenblatt admits the trailing incident,
testifying he did it because he saw a strange black man
talking to one of the employees and driving off with him in
his car, and since Respondent had had recent experiences
with robbery of numerous employees in the plant with
apparent outside help, he trailed Busby and Williams to
find out where they went, since he knew it was unusual for
Williams to leave the plant for lunch and also to get into a
car with an apparent stranger . Greenblatt also testified
without contradiction that, when Williams returned to the
plant after lunch, he told Greenblatt (apparently upon the
latter's inquiry) that Busby had offered him a free lunch so
he accepted. Greenblatt apparently did not then seek to
find out from Williams or any other source who Busby
was, or what they talked about at the plant, in the car, or
elsewhere, but learned later that Busby was a union
organizer.5
In view of Greenblatt's uncontradicted and reasonable
explanation for his single following of a person who was
then a stranger to him, after he had picked up an employee
at the plant, and the lack of later action by Respondent
with respect to Williams or otherwise, after Greenblatt
learned why Williams had ridden with the stranger, a
reason not connected with any union activity, I cannot find
that Respondent was thereby engaging in surveillance of
union or concerted activities of employees in violation of
the Act, and I grant Respondent's motion to dismiss
paragraph 7 of the amended complaint dealing with this
incident .6
2. Alleged surveillance at Lorraine Motel
With the assistance of Busby, the Union arranged a
meeting of employees with union agents on March 18,
1971, at 7 p.m., at the Lorraine Motel, which is located a
few blocks from Respondent's plant. About 6 p.m., Busby
arrived at the motel with Mary B. Cameron, an organizer,
and Lillian Kolwyck, a staff member, of the Union. While
the women checked with the motel management about the
meeting room arrangements, Busby waited outside the
motel to watch for employees as they arrived, as it was
dark and raining hard. Sometime before 7 p.m., employee
Dorothy Jean Van Buren arrived with her husband; she
was the only employee who attended the meeting; her
husband is not employed by Respondent. While Busby was
waiting outside he saw several cars drive past the motel
slowly. One was either a Chevrolet or a Chrysler, and then
he saw a Ford Thunderbird come by.7 Busby testified that
he entered the meeting room and asked Van Buren if she
knew what her "boss" looked like, and what type of car he
6 As Greenblatt clearly had a compelling business reason (protection of
employees against repetition of recent robberies ) for surveillance of the
stranger who had talked to Williams, I cannot equate this incident with the
repeated and continued surveillance of actions of a union agent while
driving with employees in Tru -Lane Metal Products Company, 138 NLRB
964, 966-967, where the employer put forth the questionable defense that he
did it to "satisfy an aroused curiosity "
r 1 find these facts from credited testimony of Cameron, Busby and Van
Buren.
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 65
drove. She replied she knew her boss and he drove a
Thunderbird. Busby told her a car was circling the block,
and took her to a window and drew aside the blind and
showed her a Thunderbird passing, and she identified
Greenblatt as the driver. Busby and Cameron then went
outside with Mr. Van Buren , and either Busby or Cameron
noted the license plate number as Tennessee I DF 291, and
one gave it to the other to note down. Cameron testified
that she went out into the street toward the car and tried to
stop it as it passed by holding up her hand, but it passed
on, nearly knocking her down in the process. Later that
evening Cameron telephoned Greenblatt at his home,
identified herself as a union agent, and accused him of
keeping the meeting under surveillance and of almost
running her down with his car. He made no answer or
comment.
Greenblatt denied categorically that he drove near or
around the motel that night, claiming he drove home as
usual from the plant at 6 p.m., taking his usual route which
passes nowhere near the motel. He also claimed that on
that evening his Thunderbird still had his 1970 Tennessee
license plate number KS 1785, and that his 1971 plate
number 1 DF 291 was not put on by his service mechanic
until about 3 days before April 1. However, records of a
local leasing concern from whom he leased the Thunder-
bird, and testimony of one of its officials, show that the
lessor mailed him the 1971 plates in time for him to receive
them March 11, and billed him for the fees on March 19.
The lessor's testimony at most only throws some suspicion
upon Greenblatt's denial of his presence at the motel that
night. His denial is also supported in part by testimony of
Van Buren flatly denying that she looked out the motel
window and saw or identified Greenblatt and his car; she
admits that her husband at one point went outside with
Busby and Cameron, but there is no testimony from him or
any other witness as to what he saw outside. This leaves
only the testimony of Cameron and Busby to support the
claim of actual surveillance, and I am compelled to
discredit their story for various reasons.
Although Busby insisted he saw the Thunderbird pass by
the motel at least twice, once before talking to Van Buren
and once after, this story is weakened when he admits after
being confronted with his Board affidavit that the first car
he saw was a Chrysler; that he was not sure what he saw
the first time or later is indicated by his admission that he
was looking at the car in the dark through a hard rain from
a point several widths of the street from the car. The
incredibility of his story is also shown by his argument that
when he came outside with Cameron and saw the
Thunderbird, Greenblatt had "changed the car into a
Thunderbird." Cameron further confuses the identification
of the car by her admission that Busby may have identified
one of the cars he saw as a Chevrolet, and that he told her
another car besides a Thunderbird had passed the motel.
The testimony of both thus indicates Busby saw at least
two other cars pass the motel before he saw the Thunder-
bird. Busby's story about calling Van Buren to identify that
car and its driver is clearly spurious, for he admits he
already knew Greenblatt personally from William's earlier
identification of him at the plant, which raises the
unanswered question why he found it necessary to call on
Van Buren to identify Greenblatt . Cameron also contra-
dicts both herself and Busby on this point , for she first says
she did not learn that night that it was Greenblatt driving,
and then turns around and says Busby told her it was he;
she is not sure whether Van Buren identified him to Busby,
although her affidavit given to the Board in August says
that Van Buren told her personally it was Greenblatt; she
then says she knew for sure that it was Greenblatt only
after seeing him in his Thunderbird at the plant on April 7.
Both agents also contradict each other on whether and how
they got the license plate number : he says he wrote the
number down outside the motel on a pad , and gave it to
Cameron in the motel ; she says she called out the license
number from the sidewalk to Busby , and he wrote it down,
although the car was across the street from her in the dark.
Busby further destroys his credibility by his claim that
while the Thunderbird was passing once or twice, he
already knew Greenblatt , and then admits he "really did
not" know he was driving , as he was not paying attention
to the drivers of the cars that passed . Finally , their conflict
on who saw and noted the alleged new license number,
plus Cameron 's admission that she first identified it in
April, indicates strongly that neither actually saw nor
noted the license plate nor saw Greenblatt , but Cameron
was backdating her knowledge gained in April in a
palpable effort to place Greenblatt and his car at the motel
that night . Although Greenblatt admits Cameron's tele-
phone call and her accusations after the abortive meeting,
his failure to deny the accusations or argue with her about
it does not in these circumstances amount to an admission
or in any way support her self-serving and unpersuasive
testimony . Considering the vague, confused , and contra-
dictory testimony of Cameron and Busby , I conclude that
much of their testimony of the events of that night is
contrived and so lacking in credibility that it does not
overcome the straightforward and credible testimony of
Greenblatt and Van Buren to the contrary . I conclude that
General Counsel has failed to adduce substantial testimo-
ny adequate to require a finding that Greenblatt kept the
motel meeting under surveillance that night , or that
Respondent violated the Act as alleged . I grant Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss paragraph 8 of the amended
complaint , and will recommend that it be dismissed
accordingly.
3. Alleged impression of surveillance
Sometime late in June , employee Lottie S. Woods was
visited by a union agent at her home on Monday or
Tuesday night. While she was at work Wednesday
morning, Greenblatt approached her and said "I had a
most mysterious telephone call that you had company
from the Union." Woods replied that her husband was a
100-percent union member and she was, too, and that she
knew who told this to Greenblatt. This conversation, which
I find from credited testimony of Woods and Greenblatt,
was clearly calculated to give Woods the impression that
her union activities were under surveillance by Respon-
66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent, and thus restrain her in such activities. I find that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act .8
4. Alleged interrogation and threats
On a Saturday in March, 1971, while Bruce was working
overtime under the supervision of supervisor Audrey O.
Lambert, the latter came to Bruce's machine and they
began a casual, friendly talk about personal matters. In its
course, Bruce asked if Lambert had heard about the union
organizing campaign. Lambert said she had, and com-
mented that she could not understand why the employees
wanted a union, that the Company had had organizing
campaigns in the past, and that the workers had voted out
the last union that had appeared at the plant because it
would not do for them what it said it would. She argued
that Vice President Greenblatt was a reasonable man, a
good boss, and the workers could take personal and other
problems to him and he would help them out. Lambert also
said that if the employees had a umon "things would not
be the way they are now," they would be "much stricter,
you could not go to the boss with problems, you would not
be able to go to the bathroom without asking permission"9
While most of Lambert's remarks in response to Bruce's
mention of the Union appear to be legitimate free speech
and opinion, I find from Bruce's uncontradicted testimony
that Lambert's remarks about things being "stricter"
without easy access to the boss on problems if the Union
came in were given in a serious tone, and I believe Lambert
spoke in this vem because of her constant discussion with
her mother, Supervisor Lois E. South, about the Union,
union experiences in other plants, and Bruce's activity in
the campaign; Lambert had also learned from other
employees that Bruce was actively soliciting employees to
sign union authorization cards. Hence, I find that while
Lambert made the remarks last quoted seriously and in
good faith, they were the type which have a tendency to
coerce and restrain employees in their union activities, and
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.io
Bruce was transferred to work under lead girl Pearl Cox
in the bedspread department about March 20; that
department had been activated early in 1971 after being
closed for many years. When it resumed operation
Greenblatt assigned Cox as lead girl to train several black
workers in the operation; after they were transferred
elsewhere, Bruce and Faye Higdon were transferred into it
and worked with Cox until the operation closed down
again in September, 1971. After Bruce came in, Cox was
asked by workers in other departments to request Bruce to
stop soliciting them to sign union cards. Cox relayed this
request to Bruce, saying the other workers did not want the
cards. Sometime in June, 1971, Bruce was talking once at
her machine during working hours to several other workers
standing nearby about a union meeting scheduled for the
8 Plasticoid Company, 168 NLRB 135, fn 3
9 I find this conversation from credited testimony of Bruce, corroborated
in part by admissions of Lambert, who could not recall any such discussion
but admitted that Bruce had worked Saturday overtime under her many
times , and that she often talked about the Union to workers after they
brought up the subject or asked questions about it
10 1 find nothing in the record to warrant a finding, as suggested by
Respondent , that Bruce raised the union issue deliberately in order to
provoke an expression of antiunion views from Lambert, so that this
next night. She invited one employee to come to the
meeting. Cox noticed the group, walked up to Bruce, and
told her "we are not supposed to be doing these things
during working hours," and directed Bruce to go back to
her work. The other employees moved away when Cox
came up, and Cox asked Bruce what one, Edie Danovi,
was saying about the Union. Bruce replied she had asked
about the union meeting. Cox said someone in the rear of
the plant was getting union cards signed, and asked if it
was Danovi. Bruce said no. Cox then asked how Bruce
learned about the union meetings. Bruce replied one of the
union agents usually called her. Cox commented "they
never get in touch with me," and Bruce replied "they don't
usually get in touch with supervisors." Bruce told Cox she
could come to the union meeting if she desired."
Cox's queries of Bruce about workers' umon activities
and the way they learned of union meetings were clearly
more than casual interrogations on those subjects and
hence were the type well calculated to coerce and restrain
employees in their union activities. Respondent argues,
however, that Cox was no more than a lead girl in the
bedspread department without supervisory authority, so
that her remarks are not chargeable to Respondent. The
record shows that when Greenblatt reactivated the depart-
ment, he brought Cox in principally to train employees in
the operations, as she knew all of them from long past
experience. However, Respondent held her responsible for
keeping the work flowing through the department, and this
included authority to assign various machine jobs to
workers so as to keep them busy and to transfer them from
one job or machine to another in order to keep the work
flowing. In the process she also ran machines herself as
needed. She also had the duty of (1) initialing timecards of
employees to show their reporting time , if they failed to
punch their cards on checking in; (2) initialing time periods
on their cards when their machines were idle for repair
work; in these instances, Respondent paid the worker for
the idle time on the strength of Cox's notations , not on the
repair time noted on the cards by the mechanic; and (3)
initialing time periods when workers were on piece work,
and changed to straight time work; these bookkeeping
entries were obviously the basis on which Respondent paid
the workers. Cox also reported absences of workers daily to
the personnel office; although employees at times called in
to tell Greenblatt when they intended to be absent, they
also reported to Cox when Greenblatt was not available.
Cox also assigned workers to work overtime when
necessary. Greenblatt had told at least two of her
employees, Bruce and Higdon, that Cox was their
supervisor, and they would take orders from her. On one
occasion, after Bruce and Cox engaged in a serious
argument about Bruce's work, and Cox reported the
incident to Greenblatt, asking him to move either Bruce or
incident does not fall within the ruling of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Colecraft Manufacturing Company, Inc v N L R B, 385 F 2d
998, at p. 1003.
11 1 find these facts from credited testimony of Bruce . Cox denied certain
portions of Bruce's testimony as to her remarks , but also admitted she
talked readily with employees if they asked questions about the Union, its
campaign , and her views on it; hence I do not credit her denials of the
questions about the actions of Danovi, and how workers learned of the
union meetings.
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Cox, as Bruce did not like to work with Cox, Greenblatt
told Bruce she had to do the work the way Cox ordered it,
as she was supervisor; he also told Cox she should ignore
the argument and get along with Bruce as best she could.
Bruce was not transferred from that department until it
was closed. In performing her work, Cox reported directly
to Vice President Greenblatt. Although Cox did not have
the more usual indicia of supervisory status, such as the
rights to hire and fire, recommend effectively such action,
or attend supervisory meetings, I am satisfied from the
above facts that she had clear authority to transfer and
assign other employees in their work and responsibly to
direct them, and in exercise of that authority was required
to use independent judgment, far beyond conduct of a
routine or clerical nature. I find that she was a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, and that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by reason
of her interrogation of workers found above.12
On an unidentified date in April, employee Florina F.
Higdon, a machine operator who had signed a union card
earlier that month, was called in by Greenblatt to discuss
her work of the day before. In course of the discussion,
Greenblatt asked her if Bruce had been "pounding me in
the ear" about the Union. She replied that Bruce was not
but another person was. Greenblatt asked if Higdon knew
that Bruce's husband was "pushing her in the Union."
Higdon replied she did not know what either of the Bruces
were doing.13 Greenblatt's double interrogation, not
triggered by anything that arose in the discussion of
Higdon's work, was clearly far from casual but rather a
deliberate inquiry about the union activities of Bruce, a
prominent union organizer, hence I find that it was
coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On Friday, August 6, while employee William E.
Hebron, an active union adherent, was standingjust before
8 a.m. in front of the timecard rack at the front door of the
plant, Greenblatt came out of his office, saw him, and told
him he did not work there any more. Hebron asked why,
and Greenblatt said he was making a count of the
timecards in the rack and had no right to do that. Hebron
denied making a count, saying he was looking for his
timecard which was missing. Greenblatt asked if he had
clocked in, and Hebron said no. Greenblatt then said he
did not have to clock in, as he no longer worked there.
Hebron repeated that he was really looking for his own
timecard. Greenblatt asked what clock he used to punch
in, and Hebron replied that when he rode to work with
another employee, Bessie Foster, he clocked in at the front
timeclock, but when he drove his own car to work, he used
the middle timeclock. Greenblatt told him that from then
on he would have to clock in at one clock, t..ld him to look
for his card, and walked away. Hebron apparently found
his card, punched in, and went to work, and has worked at
the plant ever since.14 Hebron testified that he had left his
12 I find no violation of the Act in Cox's relay to Bruce of the request of
other workers that Bruce stop soliciting them for the Union, for this could not
reasonably convey the impression that Cox was on her own initiative
keeping watch on union activities of Bruce or other union adherents I grant
Respondent's motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as
paragraph 12(b) thereof deals with this incident
13 I find this conversation from credited testimony of Higdon Green-
blatt admitted the conversation but denied only the specific interrogations
67
card in the middle rack when he clocked out the night
before, so that usually his card was in that rack the next
morning. However, he had ridden with Foster the first 3
days of that week so used the front timeclock, and when he
drove in his own car Thursday, August 5, he still used that
clock to check in but carved his card to the middle clock
so he could check out easier when going to his car in the
rear parking lot. When he rode again with Foster Friday
morning , he mistakenly went to the front clock to check in,
still assuming his card was in the front rack. This appears
to be a reasonable and credible explanation, from which I
am inclined to believe that Hebron made a natural mistake
in assuming his card was in the front rack, forgetting that
he had punched it out at the middle rack the night before.
Greenblatt admits he knew Hebron was on the employees'
organizing committee assisting the Union, so his abrupt
discharge of Hebron without inquiring first what he was
looking for at the front timeclock is persuasive evidence
that he was deliberately acting to get nd of a prominent
union adherent on the pretext that he was making some
sort of card count for the benefit of the Union, but
rescinded this action only after Hebron explained at some
length that he was seeking his own card, and why. In all the
circumstances, I find that Greenblatt's hasty action,
though immediately rescinded, was well calculated to
restrain employees in any union activities, and that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On August 12, after Bruce had visited the ladies'
restroom, Greenblatt was waiting for her when she
returned to her machine, and asked how long she had been
in there. She replied 10 to 15 minutes. He asked why she
was there so long, and she said she had been pasting
production tickets on her production sheet. He said it
should not take that long, that the bathroom was for "one
purpose only and you know what that is." She argued that
the women daily make up their production sheets in the
restroom, and it should not make any difference whether
she did it there or at her machine. He told her he wanted
her at her machine where he could see her; he added that
he did not "want to seem to be picking on you, but I do not
want you in the bathroom organizing for the Union." She
denied that she was doing that.15 Greenblatt testified that
he had heard reports that Bruce had been in the restroom
for extended periods up to 20 minutes soliciting for the
Union, and that this was why he told her to stop using that
room for organizing purposes. He had once before
complained to her about a long stay in the restroom, and
she had then given the excuse that she was only smoking a
"long cigarette." On the basis of reports he had received,
Greenblatt had a clear right to ask Bruce about her
apparent longer than normal visits to the restroom, which
might interfere with her regular work, after she had once
given him the "long cigarette" excuse , and when he
indicated after her ticket-pasting excuse that he was not
stated by Higdon, which denials I do not credit in light of other
interrogation of, and coercive conduct toward , employees by Respondent
found herein
14 These facts are found from credited testimony of Hebron , which is not
denied by Greenblatt, except for the words indicating instant discharge.
15 1 find this conversation from credited testimony of Bruce and
Greenblatt
68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trying to "pick on you" but did not want her to use the
restroom privilege as an excuse or place for union activities
during working hours, I must conclude that he was only
engaging in a legitimate business purpose of requiring an
employee to use working hours for work and not for union
activity. There is no proof that Bruce was in the restroom
on this occasion during her regular break time, in fact her
excuse to him that she was engaging in part of her work
duties while there indicates it was during her work hours. It
is well settled that an employer can insist that an
employee's worktime is to be used only for work and not
for union activity, and that he can properly impose
reasonable rules and discipline for this purpose.16 Hence, I
must conclude that Greenblatt's interrogation of Bruce
about her long stay in the restroom and warning not to use
it for organizing purposes, in the circumstances here
shown, had a legitimate business purpose and was not in
fact or inherently coercive or a restraint on employees'
legitimate union activities. I therefore find that Respon-
dent did not violate the Act in this instance and will
recommend that paragraph 15 of the amended complaint
based on this incident be dismissed.
On August 12, while Faye Higdon and supervisor Cox
were working near each other, Higdon asked Cox what she
thought the Union could do for the workers, whether it
would help Higdon get a better job. Cox, who had been in
a textile union before, replied that she did not think so, that
a union would not help the workers but only those who
were working for the Union. Higdon said that she only
wanted to protect her job, and Cox replied "You will not
have a job then," and that she was not going to pay her $10
union dues for nothing, that she had tried it once before.17
As Cox had been in a union before and told that to
Higdon, it is clear that her statement as to the value of a
union in the plant and whom it would help was her own
opinion, based on experience, and was stated in answer to
Higdon's request for her opinion. Hence, I do not consider
this opinion coercive or violative of the Act. Further, in its
context of Cox's views that a union would only work to
protect those who worked for it, Cox's remark that Higdon
would not have a job if the Union came in does not appear
coercive directly or indirectly; it does not reasonably seem
to be a coercive warning of a consequence of the advent of
the Union coming from the employer, because neither
Respondent nor its attitude toward the Union was
mentioned in the discussion; hence it is only speculation to
say that Cox was warning that employees or Higdon in
particular would lose their jobs if the Union came in; there
is nothing in the circumstances to indicate that Respondent
might make such a retaliation; the more likely inference is
that Cox was trying to warn Higdon that she would not
have job protection from the Union unless she joined or
worked for it. At best the remark is equivocal, so I
conclude that in its context it is not clearly a coercive
16 Peyton Packing Company, Inc, 49 NLRB 828, 843, 844, Republic
Aviation Corp v N LR B, 324 U S 793, N LR B v. United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO (Nutone, Inc), 357 U S 357, Walton Manufacturing
Company, 126 NLRB 697, 698 General Counsel cites no authority which
protects employees in the use of restroom pnvileges and time during
working hours for umon activity
11 This conversation is found from a composite of credible testimony of
Higdon and Cox Testimony of Cox at variance therewith is not credited
remark which violated the Act. I will recommend dismissal
of paragraph 16 of the amended complaint dealing with
this incident.
On August 12, supervisor Lois E. South from another
department had occasion to bring bedspreads to Bruce for
repairs. As she walked up to Bruce, the latter was talking to
another worker about a visit from a union agent. South
heard part of the discussion and told the other worker
"Tell Betty about the union at Humboldt, Tennessee, that
closed down once they got organized." The other worker
walked off, and South then disparaged unions, indicating
they had first been organized by foreigners, that they could
cause strikes affecting the national defense. She also
mentioned that at a nearby bag factory where she had
worked the owner had said during a union organizing
campaign that if a union came into it, he would close the
plant, and that sometime after it was organized the workers
were told it would close down, and the older employees
probably could not find jobs elsewhere while the younger
ones could, and that later it did close. South also said that
if workers wanted a union they should go to work in a
plant that already had a union . She also said that
unidentified officials of Respondent had said in the past
they would never permit a union in this plant, and she was
afraid the plant might close down and she would lose her
job.18 While South's recital of her experiences at another
plant and her obvious concern about her own job if
Respondent's plant closed down showed that she was
mainly concerned about her own future work prospects if
the Union organized Respondent's plant, her remarks also
show she was antiunion,i9 hence I conclude that her recital
of the threat of shutdown at another plant being unionized,
followed by its actual closure, coupled with the remarks
that Respondent's officials had made similar threats during
a past organizing campaign at this plant, were in sum well
calculated to coerce Bruce by warning her that organiza-
tion of this plant might result in its shutdown by its
antiunion owners and was well calculated to coerce and
restrain employees in their union activities. When coupled
with this clear threat, South's suggestion that union-
minded employees should quit and work at a unionized
plant was also fairly calculated to warn that union
adherents might in some way lose their jobs if the Union
came in and was also coercive. I find that by these remarks
of South, Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
I find from credited testimony of Bruce and admissions
of Levinson that on the morning of October 14, President
Levinson approached Bruce at her machine, while she was
wearing a prounion "Vote Yes" button on her clothing.
Levinson remarked that the button did not look very
attractive. She said she thought it looked pretty good. He
then asked why she was "for the Union" and how she was
doing on her job. She replied "Fairly well," complaining
iS This discussion is found on credited testimony of Bruce, corroborated
in part by admissions of South Testimony of the latter in conflict therewith
is not credited.
19 Bruce's version of the discussion indicates clearly that South injected
herself into the talk of the two workers , while South was vague about
whether Bruce had asked for her views about the Union . Hence , I cannot
find that Bruce "baited" South into antiunion remarks, as Respondent
suggests.
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 69
that she had been moved from job to job constantly at the
plant, that she could not work in the drapery department
because Supervisor Lambert did not like her. Levinson
explained Respondent at times moved workers to other
departments because of conflicts between them and
supervisors. He said employees could discuss such griev-
ances with Greenblatt at any time. She claimed one reason
she wanted a union was because Greenblatt let supervisors
run the plant, and past talks with Greenblatt about
grievances had not accomplished anything. Levinson said
if she got nowhere with Greenblatt she could go either to
Eli Heimberg (executive vice president of Respondent) or
Levinson himself. She said she saw Heimberg in the plant
only about once every 2 to 3 months. Levinson then said
Bruce had a legitimate complaint, but she should not have
let it go so far, that she had waited so long she had to
"resort to this," pointing to her union button. He then
asked "Have I changed your mind about this?" pointing to
the button, and she replied he had not.20 It is clear that in
this discussion Levinson was doing some last minute
electioneering, trying in a pleasant and nonthreatening way
to persuade a prominent union adherent to change her
mind about the Union, and that his two questions were
patently designed to find out why she favored the Union,
and then whether his arguments had changed her mind.
The interrogation was thus clearly improper, under well-
settled precedents, and I find that Respondent thereby
further violated the Act.
I find from uncontradicted testimony of Clara P.
Burcham that on October 14, Burcham took her usual
afternoon break in the cafeteria at 3 p.m. (about a half
hour before the polls opened) with Supervisor Nell
Freeman and another worker. As the three returned to
work about 3:10 p.m., Freeman told both workers "You all
know how to go in there and vote, write a big `No' on your
ballot." Burcham said they were not allowed to write
anything on the ballot. Freeman replied "You know what I
mean , a big X." Contrary to the claim of General Counsel,
I view Freeman's remark "You know how to go in there
and vote" as last minute suggestions and electioneering, not
as interrogation. I will recommend dismissal of paragraph
20 of the amended complaint dealing with this incident.
III. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
Objection 2
This objection charges that the Company interrogated
employees individually concerning their union activity. In
reviewing the proofs offered on this objection the Regional
Director considered only the Levinson-Bruce and Bur-
cham-Freeman discussions on the day of the election. I have
found that only Levinson's interrogation of Bruce that day
was coercive and violated the Act. However, this is the
only instance of interrogation within the crucial preelection
period. The Board has long held that a secret ballot
20 This conversation is found from uncontradicted and credited
testimony of Bruce
21 Louisiana Manufacturing Company, 152 NLRB 1301, 1314
22 Worzalla Publishing Co, 171 NLRB 219, 220
23 As the third speech finished before 3: 30 p in on October 13, there
appears to be no violation of the insulation of the 24-hour period
election, held under Government supervision and safe-
guards developed through the years, should not lightly be
set aside, and that it will exercise this power sparingly, only
in cases of excessive acts involving conduct "so glaring that
it is almost certain to have impaired the employees'
freedom of choice."21 In exercise of this caution, the Board
has held that a single instance of interrogation of an
employee (though possibly an unfair labor practice in
itself) does not warrant setting aside an election.22 I
recommend that Objection 2 be overruled.
Objection 5
This objection charges that the Employer held several
captive audience meetings of all employees during working
hours, in which (1) union representatives were denied the
right to answer employer arguments, and (2) the Employer
made remarks amounting to threats that selection of the
Union as representative of the employees would lead to
losses of benefits and jobs and probable plant closure. The
testimony of witnesses of both Union and Employer
establishes that the Employer convened three captive
audiences of employees in the plant during working hours
in the month before the election . The third meeting, on
which the Union mainly relies , was held October 13
between 2:30 p.m. and 3:20 p.m., with prepared speeches
delivered by Vice President Greenblatt and President
Levinson, and an extemporaneous speech of Attorney
William E. Fortas, in that order.23 While at least six
employees called by the Union gave testimony about
portions of the three speeches,24 I am satisfied that in the
main they were stating mainly their understanding,
impressions, and interpretation of what the three speakers
said; in few instances did they appear able to recall the
exact words stated by each speaker in context, and then
only by admission on cross-examination. Hence , I accept
as more accurate and reliable, and make findings on, the
written text of the speeches of Greenblatt and Levinson, as
corroborated in part by admissions of union witnesses.
While the exact texts of these speeches are set forth in full
as exhibits of Respondent, I summarize in turn the salient
portions and make findings of what Fortas said from his
testimony and that of various employees, in order to
analyze their effect and make findings thereon.
Greenblatt's opening speech, which was fairly short, was
mainly a review of various ways the Employer had tried to
aid its employees in the past. He belittled the Union's
approach to the employees, the nature of its agents, and
their conduct toward employees and noted the questiona-
ble character of their boasts and promises. He pointed out
that wages at the plant were better than the industry
average, and said they could be increased mainly by efforts
of the employees themselves. I find nothing in this speech,
whether considered in fragments or as a whole, which goes
beyond the confines of fair and legal statement of fact and
immediately preceding the election, imposed by the Board rule announced
in Peerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427 See Shop Rite Foods, Inc, 195
NLRB No. 14.
24 Hebron , Woods, Otis Harrell, Bernice Jordan , John Albert Smith, and
Mary Evelyn Hensley.
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
expressions of views and opinions , and that all of it falls
within the protection of the Section 8(c) of the Act.
Levinson 's speech , which took from 15 to 20 minutes for
delivery, is the main target under this objection . Levinson
stressed at the outset the concern of the Employer for the
welfare of its employees . He then related the history of two
prior union organization campaigns at the plant , in the first
of which the employees chose a union and then voted it out
after a year of experience with it . After explaining the
Union 's way of making promises to induce workers to help
them organize and to join the Union, he then cited
standard situations of poor treatment of employees which
would give rise to a need for a union , and then emphasized
that none of these conditions prevailed in Memphis:
employees had received steadily rising wages and other
benefits because the Employer was always concerned
about its obligation to take care of its employees and help
them with their problems . To illustrate this longtime
concern and its effect, largely for the benefit of newer
employees , he recited facts showing the expansion of the
plant from a small garage to the present large building.
He then stated his opinion that a union at Memphis
would not work "to our best interest," explaining that the
plant was competing in an industry which was almost 100-
percent nonunion , and paying wages 10-percent to 30-
percent lower than those at Memphis , so that the only way
the plant could remain competitive was by more expendi-
tures for mechanized operations , so that productivity per
worker was greater, and as their productivity rose, so did
their wages . In contrast , he argued that a union in the plant
in an industry which was 99.9-percent nonunion "could
cause problems" and "could place a "terrible burden on
our competitive position ." He said he knew this from the
Employer's experience at New Bedford , where a plant with
a capacity of 700 workers had only 225 working , because it
could not compete with other manufacturers, and it
"stayed alive" only through making special small lot items.
He then cited the example of an ILGWU local in a Fall
River plant , where the payroll had dropped in a few years
from 750 to 450, and explained that the owner had told
him the "high cost of the union" affected the operating
costs, so that "they are hard put to make ends meet and
this is why their plant and personnel has declined so
drastically."
Levinson then specifically contrasted these gloomy
experiences in two union plants with the facts at Memphis
by arguing "that is not to say that anything like that will
happen here . We hope that even if this union were
successful Memphis will continue to grow as it has in the
past ." He repeated that Memphis had grown from a small
garage-type plant of 35 workers to the present large plant
with almost 200 workers.
Levinson then explained the emergence of nonunion
contract fabricators in the industry who made garments so
cheaply that even the Employer had been forced to use
some of them to stay in competition with other textile
manufacturers , but emphasized the Employer was trying to
avoid expanded use of such nonunion contractors by
making Memphis more efficient in order to reduce costs,
and maintain its work force while earning better wages. He
noted there were only four union plants among 200 in the
industry , but again emphasized "So far we have been able
to compete with all because we try to be efficient and we
shall continue to do so , I hope."
Levinson then expressed the view that a union almost
always means higher costs which , on top of normal
business costs , "might become so burdensome that the
plant loses its competitive position ." He then reassured the
employees that "We will always strive under any condi-
tions to maintain our competitive position here."
He then repeated that Memphis had good management
with the welfare of the workers at heart , and expressed the
opinion that the Union could not do more for the
employees than management was already doing , except
make promises.
Levinson then explained the effect of the Federal freeze
on wage and prices on the business , giving the opinion that
present wages and prices could be changed only in
accordance with guidelines still to be issued. He argued
that a contract negotiated during the freeze could not be
carried out because it would force added costs on the
employer and force him to raise prices , and the Federal
Government would probably permit only small price
increases and small wage raises, so that many parts of any
contract agreed on could not be enforced , no matter what
the Union promised , and this would take time . Levinson
opined that the country would have a "managed economy"
for an indefinite period, so that both unions and employers
would "not be free to negotiate any more," with the
Government having the final say on wages and prices. He
emphasized that under these controls many promises made
by the Union could not be cared out.
Levinson then summarized his remarks in six short
sentences . The first four stressed that a union was not
needed because it would cost the workers money, and
management had an "open door" to listen to workers and
negotiate their problems because it wanted satisfied
workers with greater earnings . The fifth sentence empha-
sized only that rising costs which usually came with a
union in a nonunion industry "could put the plant in a bad
competitive position ." The last sentence mentioned the
indefinite freeze on "wages and benefits."
If some portions of Levinson 's speech are considered
alone, out of context , it can be argued with some merit that
he painted a bleak and terrifying picture to Memphis
employees that their plant competed almost alone in an
overwhelmingly nonunion industry, paying far higher
wages than most of its competitors , so that if the Union
came in and secured even higher wages and costlier
benefits , the "terrible burden" placed on Memphis might
well reduce its competitive position so as to bring it to the
sad condition of the unionized New Bedford and Fall
River plants , which were struggling to stay in operation
with greatly reduced work forces and uncertain workloads.
These groups of remarks might well put the workers in fear
that advent of the Union at Memphis, like the other two
plants, was certain to cause Memphis to lose work and
compel it to cut its work force drastically in order to
remain in operation, and that the Employer was fatalistic
and would not prevent this if the Union came in. These
portions of his speech would thus tend to have the same
fearful impact as the speech condemned by the Board in
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 71
Electro- Voice, Inc., 191 NLRB No. 96. However, there are
significant differences in the two situations which militate
against that conclusion for his whole speech. First, and
very important, is that he made no mention of the
possibility or actual occurrence of strikes, with actual
violence and inevitable job loss, at the two example plants,
arising from employee "surrender of their rights to a
notoriously strike-happy union," run by "irresponsible
dues-hungry union organizers" and "paid professional
union representatives for whom such practices were the
basis of promotion up the union ranks," as was done in
Electro-Voice. Hence the employees did not have that
dread prospect impressed on them. Second, while Electro-
Voice officials, like Levinson, compared the expansion of
their plant with the decline of its unionized plant
elsewhere, Levinson emphasized at least three times in
various phrasings that the Employer would do everything
possible to avoid a work andjob decline at Memphis even
if the Union came in: he noted the growth of work and
jobs at Memphis although there had been a union there
once before, the Employer's constant efforts to improve
operations there to remain competitive, and that the
Employer would strive to make Memphis continue to grow
despite any "burdens" placed on it by the Union which
might affect its competitive position. In sum, the main
thrust of his presentation was that, although he felt on the
basis of experience at two Massachusetts plants that
advent of the Union would not do much for the employees,
but would bring much greater problems to Memphis than
the Employer already had in trying to remain competitive,
the Employer would still work out some way to handle
them, remain competitive, and keep Memphis growing,
and that the Union could not do any more to accomplish
this for the employees than the Employer was already
doing.25 I think these repeated assurances, stated in
different ways and at various points throughout his speech,
were well calculated to allay any impressions of fearful
consequences which employees might otherwise have
gathered from other remarks relied on by the Union. When
his total remarks are considered in context with the
legitimate statements by Greenblatt about the Employer's
long-continued concern for employees at Memphis, the
fearful impacts found by the Union in the references to the
experiences at the unionized Massachusetts plants are still
further weakened. Considering the two speeches together
in all their aspects, I must conclude that they do not
reasonably rise to the effect of impressing fatally upon the
employees the futility of selecting the Union to improve
their present working conditions or of driving out of their
minds all other considerations except the fear of certain
loss of jobs and benefits if the Union came in, to an extent
that would prevent them from making a free choice in the
election. Insofar as Objection 5 is based on these speeches,
I recommend that it be overruled.
Fortas' speech first explained the mechanics of the
25 This legitimate opinion was also further strengthened in legitimate
fashion by Levinson's reference to the recent imposition of Federal wage
and price controls upon the ability of unions and employers to work out
wage increases in negotiations, indicating that their efforts might be finally
controlled by guidelines at that time unknown The Board has recently
recognized that the Executive Order imposing such controls "did create
serious impediments to the resolution of differences" insofar as increased
election procedure and the method of marking the ballots.
He then tried to answer questions which workers had
recently asked the Employer about the course of the
bargaining process. He said that if the Union won the
election, the parties would "start from scratch," that
"everything was subject to negotiation," that the workers
might get less than they were now getting, or end up with
the same as they had, or could get more, that there was no
way of knowing what they would get, because the Act
required the parties to negotiate in good faith, and in
negotiations "you do not know what you are going to come
up with." Regarding union authorization cards, he said
that if workers signed union authorization cards, they
could still vote "No." One worker asked him if employees
could still vote for the Union if they had not signed a card,
and Fortas replied that they could, that they could vote
"yes" or "no" as they desired. He also mentioned that
Tennessee was a "right-to-work" state, and no worker
could be required to belong to a union to keep his job.26
Fortas' remarks appear to be legitimate statements of
fact and expressions of opinion about the election process
and employees' rights thereunder which are protected by
Section 8(c) of the Act, except in one respect. When he
stated, in explaining the possible outcomes of bargaining
with the Union, that the employees might get less than
what the Employer was already giving them, this was
hardly a prediction of events beyond the control of the
Employer, for it cannot be assumed that the Union would
vary from the traditional demand of labor organizations
for higher wages and more benefits in bargaining, or would
readily agree to any decrease of wages or benefits, hence a
prediction that the employees might get less than present
benefits could only cause them to believe that, if the Union
came in, the Employer might well act or conduct
bargaining in such a way that they would eventually lose
benefits. After Greenblatt and Levinson had repeatedly
stressed the beneficence of the Employer and its longtime
concern for employees' welfare, this remark of Fortas
could only lead them to doubt whether that beneficence
would continue, and to believe that the otherwise benefi-
cent Employer would try to retaliate by taking away
benefits, if they chose the Union as bargaining agent. In
Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 1 82 NLRB 796, 803,
the Board held that similar predictions to employees in
preelection literature coerced employees under Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, and also constituted conduct requiring
that an election be set aside. On the basis of that decision, I
must find that Fortas' threat that the employees might
receive less than they presently received, if the Union
bargained for them, was coercive conduct adversely
affecting the results of the election. I recommend that
Objection 5 be sustained in this respect.
On the issue whether the Employer improperly denied
the union members the right to answer company argu-
ments during the speeches, I find from credible testimony
economic benefits were sought by a union . West India Manufacturing &
Service Co, Inc, 195 NLRB No. 203. See also U. S v Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company, Inc, and Local 117, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc,
U. S District Court, Maryland, April 19, 1972, not yet officially reported,
involving penalties on employer and union for violating guidelines
26 This speech is found from a composite of credible testimony of Fortas
and various union witnesses
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Greenblatt, Heimberg, Charles A. Threadgill, Hebron,
and Smith that during the three captive audience meetings,
particularly the third, union adherents Hebron, Smith, and
Otis Harrell positioned themselves in the center of the
grouped employees and deliberately tried from time to
time to "heckle" the speakers, interrupting them to inject
comments or try to ask questions; they admitted that "we
made it pretty confused, that is what we wanted to do," in
an effort to let the workers know they had something to say
but were not being recognized. When Hebron interrupted
Levinson's talk, he stopped to ask Hebron to let him finish
his speech, saying Hebron could ask questions or address
the workers after Levinson finished. When Hebron did the
same to Fortas, a company official asked him to wait until
Fortas was finished, and after Fortas ended his speech and
the workers were taking their usual afternoon coffee break,
Greenblatt asked Hebron during the break if he was an
attorney "that you can question the word of an attorney."
None of the three "hecklers" or any other employee asked
for the floor or tried to speak or ask questions at the end of
any of the speeches on October 13; at most Smith walked
up to Greenblatt at his office after the meeting was ended,
and asked him if a union agent was allowed to speak and
received some vague answer which he interpreted as a
negative. I find that there was no attempt by the Employer
to prevent employee representatives from speaking in
rebuttal or asking questions after any speech was ended,
hence the Employer did not engage in any coercive or
other improper conduct affecting the election in this
respect. Heath Company, 196 NLRB No. 29. I recommend
that Objection 5 be overruled in this respect.27
Objection 7
This objection charges that the Employer improperly
affected the election by effectively speaking to workers in
the voting line while waiting to vote. The record shows that
before and during the voting, the line of prospective voters
extended from the actual voting area in a supply room off
the cafeteria, along the adjacent edge of the cafeteria area
down to one end of a line of three plant offices opening on
one side of the lunchroom area, then turned left into a
reception foyer where it curved to the right a few feet away
27 Even if the record required a finding that the Employer had
deliberately denied union agents or adherents the right to respond during or
after the meeting, this would not be objectionable preelection conduct
requiring that the election be set aside. General Electric Company, 156
NLRB 1247
28 These facts are found from credited testimony of various witnesses of
the Union and Employer, and documentary proof
29 I find the facts as to the agreement from credited testimony of
Levinson and Greenblatt, as corroborated in part by testimony of Cameron
and Bruce Testimony of the union witnesses is not credited to the extent
that it purports to broaden the agreement to preclude all movement of
company officials outside their offices for any purpose for the 1-hour voting
period , because it is patent that the Union , in its all-out effort to show an
overpowering pollution of the "laboratory atmosphere" of the election by
any means, went far beyond the scope of Objection 7 by having Hebron
testify to the bathroom trip of Deener (which would require a double breach
of the voting line by a company official to answer an apparent call of
nature), although he had not mentioned this trip in his Board affidavit, and
adducing proof showing the mere presence of Greenblatt , Heimberg, and
Levinson in the factory or outside company offices during the voting, and
the presence of Levinson and Heimberg near the line of voters as it formed
at the outset , until warned away by Cameron . In none of these instances
from and around the receptionist's desk, and thence
through a door behind that desk into the factory area.28
In a preelection conference of union and employer
representatives with the Board agent conducting the
election, it was agreed by all parties that while the polls
were open, officials , agents, and representatives of both
sides would stay out of the lunchroom and supply room
area and away from the voting line, and that as the plant
offices were adjacent to two sides of the lunchroom area,
occupants of those offices who desired to use them would
remain in their offices with office doors closed during the
voting; however, it was also agreed that plant officials
could go anywhere in the plant, provided they remained
away from the lunchroom and supply room area and the
voting line.29
As soon as the polls opened and the voting line began to
form, some company officials including Levinson and
Fortas went to Greenblatt's office, while Greenblatt
himself went out into the factory, where he talked to other
company supervisors, and to some employees after they
voted. Before he went into Greenblatt's office, Levinson
stood in the supply room for a few seconds near the head
of the voting line, and when warned by union agent
Cameron he should not be there, he replied he was
"waiting on" Cameron, and when Cameron and other
union agents went outside the plant, Levinson went into
Greenblatt's office, and came out with Fortas only when
he learned the ballots were being counted after the polls
closed. Before she left, Cameron saw Vice President
Heimberg at the receptionist's desk and warned him he
should not be there. He replied he was waiting for her to
leave; when she left, he went out into the factory, where he
worked on material at a cutting table during the voting,
with his back to the voting line, at a point about 40 feet
from it.
While Greenblatt was in the factory during the voting, he
saw three new girls in the voting line. As he knew they were
not on the list of eligible voters, he walked over and told
them they were not eligible to vote, and could go home, so
they left the line. In the same period, Greenblatt talked to
at least one other worker in the factory after he had
apparently voted.30
At one point in the voting period, Supervisor Nell
(except Greenblatt's talk to three girls about their eligibility) is there proof
of what officials said to purported employees ; in the cases of Heimberg and
Freeman it is clear they spoke to no one at or near the voting line. The
Union produces no witnesses from the voting unit to indicate whom Deener
spoke to or what she said, significantly not calling Danovi or Laverne
Warner who were mentioned by Hebron and Smith as in discussion with
Greenblatt It is patent that the Union is reaching beyond the scope of its
Objection 7 to try to show that the mere presence of any company official
outside his or her office at any time during the voting, for any legitimate
purpose including natural purposes , is a potent pollution of the election
procedure This effort leads me strongly to doubt whether any Board agent
would impose such a broad restriction on company management during an
election as practically to imprison them in their offices during the voting,
depriving them of the use of the plant for normal business purposes, while
leaving union adherents who had already voted (like Hebron , Hensley, and
others) free to use the cafeteria or roam through the plant , after voting. The
Union did not call the Board agent (Mr Levy) to testify on this point
Hence , I credit the company version of the agreement as found above
30 I find Greenblatt's conduct from credited testimony of Woods,
Hebron , and Hensley, as corroborated in part by admissions of Greenblatt
Testimony of the latter at variance therewith is not credited.
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 73
Freeman was standing at her desk in the plant, but not
near the voting line , and she did not talk to anyone in the
line.3i
During the voting period , while the voting line extended
past the reception desk into the factory , Golda Deener,
office manager for both the Employer and Cameo
Curtains , the parent company of the Employer, and in
charge of the Cameo office staff at the plant , left her office
adjacent to the lunchroom area , walked down an aisle
along one line of offices32 to the reception desk where she
handed a telegram to the receptionist to send out, and then
returned by the same route to her office . On that trip, while
passing Greenblatt 's office , the last in the line, and
approaching the reception desk , she walked twice within
about 5 feet of the line of voters . These movements are
found from mutually corroborative testimony of Hebron
and Jordan , and admissions of Deener.
The two union witnesses also testified that on her way to
the desk, Deener spoke to several voters in the line as she
passed close to it , but not on her return journey. Neither
witness could recall to whom she spoke, or what she said to
them . Deener categorically denies any talk to workers in
the line . Her denial is supported by Barbara S. Roberts,
then receptionist for Cameo, who says that she watched
Deener both ways, and that Deener brought a telegram to
her and returned to her office without speaking to anyone
but Roberts . Hebron also testified that later in the voting
period , Deener again came out of her office , and went
down the aisle through the voting line to go to the ladies'
restroom (which is located to the right of the reception
desk in such a position that one coming from the offices
must go through the voting line to get to it), and that after
leaving the restroom , Deener went into the lunchroom area
for a cup of coffee (apparently breaching the line again),
where she chatted about 5 to 10 minutes with some man
sitting there , and returned to her office , but did not speak
to anyone in line on this occasion . Deener denies the
second trip entirely. As between the story of Deener,
presumably a partisan company official and that of union
partisans Hebron and Jordan , I accept Deener's version for
several reasons : ( 1) Her testimony appeared straightfor-
ward and sincere , and is supported by the only disinterest-
ed witness , Roberts, who has long been out of the employ
of the Employer, and whose demeanor and straightforward
adherence to her testimony under vigorous cross-examina-
tion impressed me that she was telling the truth; (2) I
consider it more likely than not that Deener left her office
once to send the telegram in the normal course of her
work , without making any remarks to anyone in the voting
line, because her job as a Cameo employee involves much
telegraphic communication and is mainly to oversee
records and statistics of production of the Employer for
Cameo , and she apparently has minimal contact with
actual production and employees in the plant ; and (3) the
rather limited testimony of the union witnesses which in
general terms placed Deener as speaking shortly only once
with an unknown number of unidentified employees,
coupled with Hebron 's last minute attempt to enlarge
Deener's mere contact with the voting line by his story of
the bathroom trip, which I have discredited, persuades me
that the Union was trying to convert a normal business
activity of a company official not in conflict with the
preelection agreement into an apparent "pollution" of the
election atmosphere much greater than that stated in
Objection 7.
In arguing the issue, both parties rely on Milchem, Inc.,
170 NLRB 362, where the Board recently delineated the
standards of conduct to be followed by parties during the
voting period in a Board election. In order to maintain the
purity of the election process, it ruled that parties to the
election must refrain from any conversation with prospec-
tive voters waiting to cast their ballots in the voting area or
the voting line, and that violation of this rule by either
party, regardless of the content of the remarks exchanged,
will in itself be ground for setting aside the election. The
Board in that case applied the rule to set aside an election
where a union agent engaged prospective voters in
conversation for several minutes near the voting line. The
Board set forth its rationale for the rule as follows (170
NLRB at p. 362):
... Careful consideration of the problem now
convinces us that the potential for distraction, last
minute electioneering or pressure, and unfair advan-
tage from prolonged conversations between representa-
tives of any party to the election and voters waiting to
cast ballots is of sufficient concern to warrant a strict
rule against such conduct, without inquiry into the
nature of the conversations. The final minutes before
an employee casts his vote should be his own, as free
from interference as possible. Furthermore, the stand-
ard here applied insures that no party gains a last
minute advantage over the other, and at the same time
deprives neither party of any important access to the
ear of the voter. The difficulties of recapturing with any
precision the nature of the remarks made in charged
atmosphere of a polling place are self-evident, and to
require an examination into the substance and effect of
the conversations seems unduly burdensome and, in
this situation, unnecessary. Finally, a blanket prohi-
bition against such conversations is easily understood
and simply applied.
This rule is nothing more than a preventive device to
enforce the ban against electioneering in polling places
normally applied in political elections and in our
representation elections. It serves the same purposes of
maintaining order and permitting voters to consult
their own consciences without interruption. Additional-
ly, by attaching a sanction to its breach, the rule assures
that the parties will painstakingly avoid casual conver-
sations which could otherwise develop into undesirable
electioneering or coercion. In our view, the restriction
here established gives every promise of having a
salutary effect on the conduct of elections and offers no
likelihood of abridging the rights of the parties
concerned.
We intend, of course, that our application of this rule
will be informed by a sense of realism. The rule
contemplates that conversations between a party and
31 This instance is found from uncontradicted testimony of Hensley, who 32 The aisle is formed by a low railing parallel to the line of offices and
observed Freeman from her workplace in the plant after she finished voting separating them from the lunchroom area proper
74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
voters while the latter are in a polling area awaiting to
vote will normally, upon the filing of proper objections,
be deemed prejudicial without investigation into the
context of the remarks. But this does not mean that any
chance, isolated, innocuous comment or inquiry by an
employer or union official to a voter will necessarily
void the election. We will be guided by the maxim that
"the law does not concern itself with trifles." We trust,
however, that the parties to the elections, in order to
obviate the sometimes troublesome task of defining
what is to be considered trifling, will take pains to
assure complete compliance with the rule by instructing
their agents, officials, and representatives simply to
refrain from conversing with prospective voters in the
polling area.
I find nothing reasonably tending to taint the election
atmosphere in (1) the mere presence of Levinson and
Heimberg for a few seconds near the voting line while
obviously waiting for union officials to leave the voting
area; (2) the silent presence of Nell Freeman at her factory
desk at a point removed from the voting line; (3) the mere
presence of Greenblatt and Heimberg in the plant at points
removed from the voting line, in pursuance of normal
management activities which may have involved talks with
employees not in the line; or (4) the single action of Deener
in leaving her office to send a business telegram without
speaking to voters in the lme.33
I must find, however, that Greenblatt violated the
preelection agreement found above by accosting three new
employees to advise them they were not eligible to vote.
Respondent claims his remarks were minimal and innocu-
ous. In one sense, his conduct appears to be a mere
technical violation, as his action apparently conformed to
the eligibility list agreed on by the parties beforehand, and
did not deprive the Union of votes which might have
added to its recorded total.34 Further, it is fair to assume
that the witnesses who heard Greenblatt talk to one or
more of the girls, and presumably other workers in line
nearby heard him discuss only the girls' eligibility to vote;
there is no proof that he was electioneering. However,
under the rule of Mrlchem, Inc., supra, I cannot consider his
remarks and actions as a casual, trifling, or innocuous
matter. His mere presence at the line, while discussing only
a matter of election eligibility with several workers, but
without the presence of a union agent or the Board officer
conducting the election, violated the rule. While it was not
last minute electioneering, his words and acts might well
convey to other voters the impression that the Employer
33 As the preelection agreement in terms and purpose was designed to
prevent improper electioneering in the supply room, which was the well
defined voting area, or at the voting line where it extended into the
lunchroom or factory areas, it would appear that presence of company
officials in the factory area or lunchroom area at points distant from the
voting line, in course of their normal business or rest activities, is not
sufficient to warrant setting aside the election Serv-Au, Inc, 183 NLRB No
32 This type of conduct also falls outside the type of conduct prohibited by
the rule of Mrlchem, Inc., supra See Stevenson Equipment Company, 174
NLRB 865, 867, Columbia Casuals, Inc, 180 NLRB 741, 752, Thomas
Cartage, Inc, 186 NLRB No 30; Gary Aircraft Corporation, 193 NLRB No
21
34 The Union does not claim that any of these girls, one being Bernice
Arnold, were improperly excluded from voting by Greenblatt
35 See also V,tronic, Incorporated 183 NLRB No 103 In Modern Hard
Chrome Service Co, 187 NLRB No 11, the Board explained that its
had some effective connection with, if not control over, the
election itself, insofar as Greenblatt appeared to be making
an apparent official ruling which excluded employees from
voting. This impression would tend to be strengthened by
his open discussion with Arnold; Greenblatt testified
without contradiction that when she asked about her own
eligibility, he said he was not sure, as he did not have the
voting list with him, but he called his office to have the list
checked, and then reported to her that "they" said she was
not eligible, so he then excused her and told her to go
home. This incident alone would strongly suggest to
nearby voters that management itself, as distinguished
from the Union, was acting in some manner for or in
concert with the Board official in the conduct of the
election. Greenblatt was obviously a man of education and
high intelligence, so it would have been a simple matter for
him to dispel any such impression, even if he desired to see
that ineligible employees did not waste their time standing
in line, by contacting the Board agent directly, preferably
in the presence of a union representative, and secure his
official ruling on the noneligibility of the three, so that
both he and a union agent could advise them of their
status. It would also have been simpler for him to remain
silent and leave their eligibility to be settled by challenge
from company or union observers, which was done in the
case of three other voters. The fact that he did none of
these rather obvious things makes his deliberate action that
much more reprehensible. I therefore find that Green-
blatt's remarks and action regarding the three new
employees violated the Milchem rule and was sufficient to
warrant setting aside the results of the election.35 I
recommend that Objection 7 be sustained in this respect.36
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found in Case 26-CA-4071 that Respondent
has engaged in various unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I will recommend that it be
Mrlchem rule is not limited to cases of proven electioneering actions and
statements , but also covers situations where an election observer talked to
voters as they approached the voting table, using words beyond "a mere
hello," in violation of admonitions of the Board election official , and even
went so far as instantly to offer a prospective voter money to buy a dunk,
when the employee casually remarked that it was hot and he wished he had
a beer The Board held such conduct clearly violated the bar on
electioneering, noting that a single vote might have swung the election the
other way In the case at bar, the Union lost the election by four votes (three
challenged ballots would not have affected the result), so it is a fair
inference that Greenblatt's quasi-official remarks and actions at the voting
line might well have had a last minute effect on more than four voters who
may have heard and seen him
36 In view of the above rulings sustaining Objections 5 and 7 in some
respects, I find it unnecessary to consider or make findings on other aspects
of the Employer's conduct shown in the record.
MONROE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 75
ordered to cease and desist from such conduct; since the
violations include interrogations of employees, threats of
loss of jobs through plant closure, discharge, and reduction
of benefits, if the Union came into the plant, and conduct
giving the impression of coercive surveillance, the order
should be in broad form.
Having found record evidence in Case 26-RC-4059
sufficient to sustain Objections 5 and 7 to conduct
affecting the results of the election, I shall recommend that
the election of October 14, 1971, be set aside.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
and the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
2. By interrogation of employees about their union
activities and sentiments , remarks creating the impression
that employees ' union activities were under surveillance,
threats of imposition of more strict working conditions,
and of loss of jobs through discharge or closure of the
plant, if the Union organized the plant, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in actual surveillance of
employee union activities or meetings, threatened to give
any employee "a hard time" because of his union activity,
warned employees against use of restrooms for union
activity, or questioned them about how they would vote in
a Board election, in violation of the Act, as alleged in the
amended complaint.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended: 37
ORDER
Respondent, Monroe Manufacturing Company, Inc., its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees in a coercive manner about
their reasons for wanting a union and their union activities.
(b) Giving employees the impression that it is keeping
their union or concerted activities under surveillance.
(c) Threatening employees that it will impose more strict
working conditions upon them if they chose the Union as
their bargaining agent.
(d) Threatening employees that the plant will be closed if
the employees chose the Union as their bargaining agent.
(e) Threatening employees that they would be discharged
if they engaged in union or concerted activities.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Memphis, Tennessee, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 38 Copies of said
notice , on forms to be provided by the Regional Director
for Region 26, shall , after being duly signed by an
authorized representative of Respondent , be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof , and maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Respondent shall take reasonable steps
to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing , within 20 days after receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.39
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the amended com-
plaint in Case 26-CA-4071 be dismissed with respect to the
allegations of paragraphs 7, 8, 11, 12(b), 13, 15, 16, and 20
thereof.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED in Case 26-RC-4059 that
Objections 5 and 7 to conduct affecting the results of the
election be sustained , and that the election of October 14,
1971, be set aside , and a new election held by said
Regional Director at a proper time.
37 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
38 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"i•osted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
39 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing , within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give
evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has
ordered us to post this notice, and we intend to carry out
the Order of the Board and abide by the following:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with or
restrains or coerces our employees in the exercise of
these rights.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees in a
coercive manner about their reasons for wanting a
union or about their union activities.
76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT give our employees the impression that
we are keeping their union or concerted activities under
surveillance.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we will
impose more strict working conditions on them if they
choose International Ladies' Garment Workers ' Union,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , as their
bargaining agent.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that our
Memphis plant will be closed if they choose the above-
named Union or any other union as their bargaining
agent.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge if
they engaged in union or concerted activities.
Dated By
MONROE MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal
Building, Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis,
Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.