Monroe Building Construction Trades Council

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 24, 1971

189 N.L.R.B. 295 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

MONROE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL 295
Monroe Building Construction Trades Council,
AFL-CIO and Jack W. Roye. Case 15-CC-426
which have been duly considered. On the entire record, I
hereby make the following:
March 24, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND
KENNEDY
On January 7, 1971, Trial Examiner A. Norman
Somers issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision, Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a
supporting brief and the General Counsel filed a brief
in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that Respondent , Monroe Building Construc-
tion Trades Council , AFL-CIO, Monroe , Louisiana,
its officers , agents, and representatives , shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner 's recommended
Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NORMAN SOMERS, Trial Examiner: This case,
involving an alleged violation by Respondent of Section 8
(b) (4) (i) and (u) (B) of the Act, was submitted on a
stipulation providing for decision on stipulated facts by a
duly designated Trial Examiner in lieu of a hearing and the
taking of testimony. The record consists of the Stipulation,
the Charge (filed May 20, 1970), the Complaint and Notice
of Hearing (issued June 26, 1970), and the "Answer." (No
answer was in fact filed, in view of the Stipulation.) The
General Counsel and the Respondent have filed briefs
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
Jack W. Roye, the Charging Party, is an individual
engaged in Monroe, Louisiana, in the retail sale of fabrics
and patterns. His gross volume of business exceeds $500,000
a year and his annual receipt of materials from outside the
State exceeds $50,000.
W. B. Sanders is an individual operating as a general
contractor in Louisiana, who, under contract with Roye,
constructed a new building in Monroe for Roye. Sanders
receives at least $50,000 worth of materials a year from out
of the State.
Ryder Truck Lines is a motor freight carrier, whose
annual receipts for services in interstate transportation
exceed $50,000.
As stipulated, and hereby found, these three are
employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts as Stipulated
Early in 1970 Sanders , under a contract with Roye made
in December , began construction of a new building for
Roye in Monroe , Louisiana . The stipulation recites that "at
all times material herein Respondent has been engaged in a
labor dispute with Sanders " and "at no time material herein
has Respondent had any labor disputes with Roye, Ryder
or any other employer working on thejobsite."
When the building was being constructed , Respondent,
for 3 days in January and from March 24 to May 13,
picketed thejobsite with signs reading:
Employees of W. B . Sanders do not receive same wages,
benefits , or working conditions as do members of
Monroe Building Construction Trades Council,
AFL-CIO.
On May 13 Roye informed Respondent that he had
accepted the building as substantially completed (Roye
having so indicated to Sanders on May 7). From May 13 to
27 Respondent , while Roye's employees were at work in the
building, picketed it with signs reading:
This building was built by employees who did not
receive the same wages , benefits , working conditions, as
do members of Monroe Building Construction Trades
Council , AFL-CIO
As noted, the sign from May 13 to 23, unlike the sign
when the building was under construction, did not mention
the name of any employer.
From May 13 to 22, employees of Sanders continued
working on the building , performing such tasks as minor
finishing work and adjustments , but Respondent during
that period did not know of Sanders ' continued activity at
189 NLRB No. 54
296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the jobsite. During the 2 weeks of picketing from May 13
on, employees of two carvers, Ryder on May 13 and
another carrier (Red Line Transfer Storage Co.) on May 21,
appeared at the jobsite to make scheduled deliveries to
Roye, but on observing the picket line, refused to make the
deliveries to Roye because of the picket sign.
B. Discussion and Conclusion
The violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) imputed to Respon-
dent is not the picketing that occurred during construction,
i.e., prior to May 13, but the 2 weeks beginning May 13
after completion-at least after Roye, the neutral
employer, informed Respondent that he had accepted
completion of the building by Sanders, the primary
employer. The General Counsel's position is that the
completion of the building did not end Respondent's labor
dispute and thus its picketing of the premises of Roye
violated the secondary boycott provision of the Act, in view
of Respondent's failure from May 13 on to comply with the
limitations imposed on picketing of the premises of a
neutral or secondary employer, under the principles of
Moore Dry Dock.'
If Sanders, during the mopping-up period from May 13
to 22, could still be deemed to have been on the situs despite
Respondent's ignorance during those 9 days of the presence
of Sanders' employees, it was in default at least of
limitation (d) of Moore Dry Dock, supra, fn. 1, in not
naming any employer with whom it had the dispute.2 In
any event, during the remainder of those 2 weeks, when
Sanders was no longer at the Roye jobsite on any basis, it
had not met-as, in view of Sanders' total absence there, it
could not -any of the requirements of Moore Dry Dock,
and there was thus not even color of exemption from
Section 8(b)(4)(B) for the picketing of the premises of a
secondary or neutral employer of the kind here involved.
Respondent's defense, in substance, is that once Sanders
had completed the building, Respondent needed no
exemption from Section 8(b)(4) (B) because it was not
applicable, for there was no "primary" employer to whom
Roye was "secondary" or any dispute about which Roye
was "neutral." Then why did Respondent continue to
picket Roye's building? Respondent explains:
This latter picketing (from May 13 on) was not directed
against Sanders nor was it directed against Roye. It was
simply an announcement to the public of the conditions
under which the building had been built, nothing more,
nothing less.
Respondent asserts that in the light of the above not only is
Section 8(b)(4)(B) not applicable, but Respondent addition-
ally enjoys the protections of Section 8(d) of the Act and
also those of the First Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution.
Respondent cites not a single authority to support the
i Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 The four
limitations imposed as a condition for being immune from liability under
the secondary boycott prohibition despite the fact that the picketing occurs
on secondary premises are that (id, at 549)
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the sit us of dispute is
located on the secondary employer 's premises , (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary , employer is engaged in its normal business at
the ruus, (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the
location of the Titus, and (d ) the picketing discloses clearly that the
wide reaching propositions on which it bases its defense. All
one can vouch for in the assertion is that it was "nothing
less." The assertion that it was "nothing more," disregards
the line of authority over nearly 30 years, which has limited
the holding in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), that
equated peaceful picketing with free speech as protected by
the U.S. Constitution. Under subsequent decisions virtually
on the heels of the Thornhill case, the Supreme Court
recognized that picketing carries an impact which tran-
scends the language of the picket sign and is thus something
"more than free speech."3 As a result, picketing could be
constitutionally enjoined or prohibited by governmental
authority when the picketing provokes or tends to provoke
evils or mischief, which it is within the purview of the
governmental authority to try to prevent. This underlay the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), where it upheld a State court's
injunction of picketing of a store in support of a demand,
which, if successful, would force the owner to apply a racial
quota in staffing his help, in contravention of the State's
public policy against "arbitrary discrimination upon the
basis of race and color alone (instead of on) individual
qualification for the work to be done." The Supreme Court
held that the State could lawfully act to prevent such
mischief, and that the fact that the picketing contained a
communication to the public was not a barrier to the State
court's enjoining the picketing because of the mischief it
engendered. The Supreme Court noted that:
The Constitution does not demand that the element of
communication in picketing prevail over the mischief
furthered by its use in these situations.
Addressing itself to the claim that peaceful picketing is a
constitutionally protected mode of communication, the
Court, citing the concurrence in the Wohl opinion (supra,
fn. 3) stated (Hughes case, id. at 464-465):
But while picketing is a mode of communication it is
inseparably something more and different .. . .
Publication in a newspaper or by distribution of
circulars may convey the same information or make the
same charge as do those patroling picket line. But the
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it
produces consequences different from other modes of
communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from
appeals by printed words. [Emphasis added.]
That same factor which permits a State thus to enjoin
picketing where it produces the evils that a State can
constitutionally act to prevent provides the constitutional
basis for federal legislation illegalizing picketing where it
produces or tends to produce an evil which the Congress
can validly act to prevent. The prime example is the
secondary boycott provision of the Act itself, for in the pilot
cases on the subject (in 1951, when Section 8(b)(4)(B) had
dispute is with the primary employer
2 As has been held with Court approval, a union does not achieve
exemption from Section 8(b)(4)(B) under the Moore Dry Dock doctrine
unless it has met all four requirements See Plumbers Local Union No 509
(H L Robertson & Associates, Inc), 171 NLRB No 37 (TXD), enfd. 416
F.2d 1120 (C A D C ), and cases cited
7 Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wahl, 315 U S 769 ( 1946), concurring
opinion by Douglas, joined in by Black and Murphy Id at 776
MONROE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL 297
been Section 8(b)(4)(A)) unions there involved had been
found to have violated that provision despite a claim that
the picketing (as indeed other communcations) was free
speech within the protection of the First Amendment and
of Section 8(c) of the Act.4 At this stage, it is enough to
observe that we are past the stage where picketing can
tenably be defended on the ground that it is "nothing
more" than "simply an announcement to the public" and
by that token within the protection of section 8(c) of the
Act and the U.S. Constitution, whatever its consequences
on innocent persons. See also Giboney v. Empire Storage,
336 U.S. 490.
The only issue Respondent's position does present is
whether, as Respondent claims, the completion of the
building ended its dispute with Sanders, with the result that
the picketing, whatever its actual or potential injury to the
neutral employer, could not have had as a purpose "forcing
or requiring any person to cease . . . doing business with
any other person," within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(B).
Infra, fn. 7.
The Board passed on that question in the Salem Building
Trades Council case,5 which the General Counsel indeed
cites as "dispositive." There, after the builder completed
two buildings with two separate owners, the union picketed
each building with the sign:
This building built under sub-standard wages and
conditions by Reimann Construction Company
Salem Building Trades
Council
The Board, with court enforcement, found the union had
thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Acts The Board,
in reaching this conclusion in Salem, rejected the union's
defense that the completion of the building rendered it no
longer "possible to find that such picketing was to force or
require any person to cease doing business with any other
person within the language of Section 8(b)(4)(B)" and the
further defense that its picketing "was protected by the
publicity proviso to Section 8(b)(4) and the first amend-
ment."
Respondent here, just as it has made no effort to
distinguish or otherwise face up with the line of authority
undermining the constitutional and statutory basis for its
assertion of the free- speech protection for the picketing, so
too has it not undertaken to distinguish the instant case
from that of Salem Building. The ignoring of the Salem
holding is in the teeth of that case's direct treatment of the
very kind of defense which Respondent raises here.
Respondent presumably relies on the one factual variance
here from Salem. In Salem, the picket sign named the
builder referred to in the picket sign. Respondent here did
not name the builder.
Had Respondent not named Sanders in the picket sign
when the building was under construction, Respondent
would thereby have run afoul of the secondary boycott
4 N L R B v Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S
675, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v N L R B, 341 U S
694, N L R B v Local 74, Carpenters, 341 U S 707
6 Salem Building Trades Council (Cascade Employers Assn), 164 NLRB
23 (1967), enfd 388 F 2d 987 (C A 9, 1968)
6 The violation found was that of subsection (u) of Section 8(bx4XB)
The reason for not finding a violation also of (i) was that on the record
before it , the Board found that there was "[no] reasonable basis for
prohibition because, as stated in the Plumbers Local Union
case, supra, fn. 2, the omission of any one of the four
requirements of Moore Dry Dock as a condition of
immunity for picketing of neutral premises would have
rendered it vulnerable under Section 8(b)(4)(B). With the
building completed, the very omission of the builder's
name , which prior to completion would have condemned
Respondent under Section 8(b)(4)(B), is now, after
completion, urged by Respondent as its salvation. The logic
of Respondent's assertion is thus that the union's violation
of Section 8(b)(4)(B) in Salem stemmed from its having
disregarded three of the four requirements of Moore Dry
Dock, but that had it gone the whole hog, as has
Respondent here, and disregarded all four requirements, it
would have achieved the exonerating effect Respondent
claims for itself. The essence of that approach is thus that
while three wrongs, like the proverbial two, do not make a
right, a fourth additional wrong cleans the whole slate.
Respondent, after stating its "nothing more, nothing
less," thesis, continues:
There is actually no evidence that any effort was made
on behalf of respondent to contact Roye, or by any
means to pressure Roye into any promise for the future.
The fourteen day picketing was not an attempt to
involve Sanders. His name was removed completely
from any sign. No one reading the sign could know that
Sanders had built the building.
Since, under the holding in the Salem case, the "cease
doing business" objective within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(B) does not vanish with the completion of the
building, then it is no more relevant after completion of the
building than before that the union did not "actually"
contact the neutral employer or endeavor "by any means
[other than the picketing itself ] to pressure the neutral into
any promise for the future."
The statement that the "fourteen day picketing was not
an attempt to involve Sanders" assumes that if the builder's
name does not appear on the picket sign then by that token
he is not "involved." The two are not the same. Were they
the same, then, to repeat, the very omission of the name of
the builder in the picket sign from May 13 on, which
Respondent urges as its defense , would have been a defense
also if when the building was under construction,
Respondent's picket sign had not named the builder. And
the statement that "no one reading the sign could know that
Sanders had built the building" caps the sequence of
irrelevancies. As it happens, the accuracy of that assertion
is refuted by the fact that Roye himself would know who
erected his building, and so too would the members of the
public here appealed to that frequent this area and would
read into the new sign the name that had been appearing in
the earlier one. So for Roye and the members of the public
that had read the pre-May 13 sign, the realities are the same
here as they were in the Salem case , where the picket sign
concluding the [union's] conduct was calculated to invite neutral
employees to make common cause by engaging in work stoppages " The
underlying issue is the same whether the violation found is that of
subsection ( i) and (u) both, or either of them alone It is to be noted,
however, that in contrast with Salem, where no employee of any neutral
was inducted by the picketing to refuse to work or perform services, here,
as appears in the stipulation, Respondent 's picketing caused drivers of two
carriers to refuse to make deliveries to Roye
298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
named the builder. As to the members of the public who do
not know the identity of the builder referred to in the sign,
the failure to disclose his identity compounds, as previously
stated, the violation to which Respondent would have been
subject, if, like the union in Salem, it had disregarded the
first three requirements of Moore Dry Dock but had met the
fourth requirement by naming the builder. For the failure
to meet all four requirements undermines even further the
purpose of these requirements-that of "contain[ing] as
far as possible the inpact of such pressure on neutrals,"
since they are but an "accommodation [to unions whose
picketing of neutrals' premises would otherwise be a
violation ] designed to give reasonable scope to the right of
a union to exert pressure on the employees with whom it
has the dispute." See Plumbers Union Local, supra, fn. 2, 68
LRRM at 1073, and cases cited.
Since, as stated, Respondent has made no effort to
distinguish Salem on the basic ground on which the kind of
defense here asserted was rejected, namely, that the
completion of the building removed the existence of any
person with whom the picketed employer would by the
picketing be forced to "cease doing business," the issue of
liability could be regarded as decided on the authority of
the Salem case without more.
Some comment, however, may be appropriate in further
indication of its applicability here. The union in Salem
proceeded on the premise that the completion of the
building meant the end of the business relationship with the
builder. Respondent puts it somewhat differently and states
that with the building completed the "picketing was not
directed against Sanders." This, as stated, is hardly
accurate. The stipulation states that "at all times material
herein Respondent has been engaged in a labor dispute
with Sanders," and one of said "times material herein" is
the picketing from May 13 on, which is the very subject of
the violation here imputed to Respondent. Apart from that,
the import of the sign itself is Respondent's dispute with the
builder who is described as having constructed the building
under nonunion conditions. So on its face, the sign reveals
that its dispute with Sanders continues albeit he is not
specifically named. And in not naming Sanders, the
picketing was, as earlier stated, nevertheless directed
against Sanders and indeed against Roye--against
Sanders for having made the building under nonunion
conditions and against Roye, the picketed employer, for
having permitted his building to be constructed under
nonunion conditions
We come to the specific question of whether the picketing
of Roye had as a purpose that Roye "cease doing business
[with Sanders] or any other person "7 Respondent's claim
to the contrary is based, as stated, on a shrunken
conception of the term "cease doing business." This narrow
concept disregards the basic tenet that a statute of this
character should be liberally construed "in the interest of
effectuating its purpose and policies."8 The sign here did
7 Section 8(b)(4), in relevant part, provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for a union-
(s) to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person to engage in a refusal in the course of his employment
to handle commodites or to perform any services, or
(u) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person where in either case
an object thereof is-(B)forcing or requiring any person to cease
not exist in a vacuum. It had a purpose,just as did the sign
when the building was being constructed-to wage its
combat against Sanders as a builder under nonunion
conditions During that period of construction, however,
Respondent had met the conditions of immunity prescribed
by Moore Dry Dock of "direct confrontation with the
primary employer and his employees" (Salem, td at 36).
Here, with Sanders, the primary employer, being no longer
on the situs, there is not even a possibility of such
"confrontation," yet Roye, the neutral, is being pressured
by a sign, calculated by its tenor to cause employees of
carriers to refuse to make pickups or deliveries at Roye's
establishment and to cause members of the public to
withhold their patronage. If Respondent were to enjoy the
immunity it claims for such conduct, it would tend to defeat
the purpose of the statute of "shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures in controversies not
their own."N.L R B. v. Denver Bldg., etc., supra, In. 4 at 692.
Such a gap in the effectuation of the statute is required
only if the concept of "cease doing business" had the
constricted interpretation of that claimed by the union in
Salem and implied by Respondent here. Under such
interpretation, the term "doing business" has no wider
scope than a contract or course of action currently in
existence without regard to the potential use the neutral
might in the future have for the services of the builder
referred to in the sign.
In Salem, there happened to be a particularized basis on
which the neutral employers that were there picketed could,
in the future, have need for the builder's services. One
building was a motel that had been constructed for a
corporation owning and operating some 38 motels in 14
states. The other building was for a corporation owning a
shopping center, which on completion of one building in
the center, leased it to a person for use as an ice cream
parlor. These persons, of course, could understandably
have occasion in the future to have further use for a
building contractor. But the businessess in which these
companies were engaged were merely illustrative of the
basic proposition that the completion of the building for a
neutral does not terminate a business relation of the neutral
with the builder, and that a business relationship in terms of
the "cease doing business" concept as used in Section
8(b)(4)(B) embraces also the potential need for calling on a
building contractor's services in the future. Illustrative of
how Roye in the future could need the services of a building
contractor, such as Sanders, are repairs to the building, or
construction of an extension to the building, or adding a
new building based on expansion of the business. Neither in
Salem, any more than here, did the neutrals for whom the
buildings were constructed have "any specific future plans
of like nature." The Board, in Salem, stated that the issue
presented by the defense was "whether picketing in
furtherance of a primary labor dispute, conducted at
premises occupied solely by neutral employers, violates
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
producer, Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall
be construed to make unlawful , where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing
8 Local 825, International Brotherhood of Operating Engineers (Carleton
Brothers Co), 131 NLRB 452, 464, and cases cited in its in 18
MONROE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL 299
Section 8(b)(4)(B) despite the absence of a present business
relationship between the employers involved." (Emphasis
added) In concluding that it did, the Board stated (id. at
35):
In our view, the language of Section 8(b)(4)(B) is broad
enough to include attempts to preclude neutrals using
services of a construction contractor.5 To hold, as
Respondent would have us do, that upon the comple-
tion of one contract the neutral employers, by virtue of
their past business dealings, became fair game for
picketing pressures by a union seeking, as here, to
enforce its blacklist of the primary employer, would be
to apply that section in a manner inconsistent with both
its terms and the basic policy considerations underlying
its enactment.
5 Compare the handbilling involved in N L R B v Servette, Inc, 377
U S 46, 47
Accordingly, it is found that the picketing here had an
objective forbidden by Section 8(b)(4)(B)-that of forcing
Roye, the neutral employer, to refuse to use Sanders for
future construction services, and hence to "cease doing
business" with Sanders, in violation of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), in the same manner as in Salem.
Here, in addition, the picketing had an object, albeit not
its ultimate one,9 of forcing carriers, such as Ryder and the
other carrier, to cease doing business with Roye. The
ultimate object, of course, was to force Roye to cease doing
business with Sanders. The means used, exemplified by the
occurrences on May 13 and May 21, where employees for
the carriers refused to make a scheduled delivery at Roye's,
were those in which Respondent, within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(B), "Induce[d] or encourage[d] . . .
individual[s] employed by any person engaged in
commerce (here Ryder, as stipulated) to engage in . . . a
refusal in the course of [their] employment . . . to handle
. . . goods . . . or commodities or to perform any services"
with the proscribed objective. Respondent accordingly
violated (i) as well as (ii) of Section 8(b)(4)(B).10
IV. THE REMEDY
The finding that Respondent engaged in conduct
proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u)(B) of the Act calls
for the requirement that it both discontinue and refrain
therefrom and post the requisite notices.
9 The Board does not differentiate between intermediate and ultimate
objective in connection with a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) See Salem at
35, fn 4, and cases there cited
15 Respondents defense, by its breadth, embraces the claim which had
been made in the Salem case , that the picketing had the protection of the
publicity proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B) and the First Amendment In
rejecting this claim the Board stated (id at 36),
It is well settled that picketing which constitutes proscribed measures
for an unlawful objective is not privileged by the first amendment of
the Constitution and is not excused by the fact that it also may have
had and informational purpose 9
Nor do we view the identification of the building as the offending
product sufficient to convert Respondent's picketing into lawful
primary activity at a secondary boycott (Citing cases at its fn 10 )
The picketing here cannot be said to have any reasonably direct thrust
against the primary employer
Upon the findings above and the entire record, I state the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By inducing or encouraging individuals employed by
persons engaged in commerce to refuse in the course of
their employment to perform the services of making
deliveries to Roye with an immediate object of forcing the
employers of said employees to cease doing business with
Roye, and with an ultimate object of forcing Roye not to
use the construction services of Sanders in the future, and
thereby to cease doing business with Sanders, and by
otherwise threatening econmic injury to Roye with an
object of forcing Roye to cease doing business with
Sanders, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u)(B) of the
Act.
2. Said unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: u
ORDER
Monroe Building Construction Trades Council,
AFL-CIO, its officers , agents, and representatives shall:
1. Cease and desist from picketing the building or
premises of Jack W . Roye in Monroe , Louisiana , regarding
the working terms under which Roye 's building was
constructed , or otherwise inducing or encouraging employ-
ees of carriers to refuse to make pickups or deliveries at
Roye's building or handle goods or perform services, and
from inducing or encouraging members of the public not to
patronize Roye's business or other occupants of Roye's
building, and otherwise threatening, coercing or restraining
Roye, where an object is to force Roye not to use the
construction services of W. B. Sanders in the future, and
thereby to force Roye to cease doing business with Sanders,
or otherwise to force Roye not to make his own selection in
the future concerning whom to use in construction or
building services.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its office and meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."12 Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
9 See Houston Maritime Association ( 147 NLRB 1234 , enfd 342 F 2d
538, cert denied 382 U S 835 ) at 1246 , 1BEW Local 501 (Samuel
Langer) v N L R B , 341 U S 694, 705
As the Board there further observed , even if the picket sign created an
appeal for a consumer boycott of the so-called "product," it would in this
instance be of the building itself This, as the Board stated , "would of
necessity encompass the entire business of the neutral occupant's
premises " A boycott so sweeping is outside the protections of the publicity
proviso of Section 8 (b)(4)(B) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
N L R B v Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U S 58, 72
ti In the event no exceptions are foled as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations , and recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
i2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a
(Continued)
300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Furnish said Regional Director with signed copies of
the aforesaid notice for posting by Jack W. Roye, Ryder
Truck Lines, and Red Line Transfer & Storage Company, if
they be willing, at places where they customarily post
notices to their employees.
(c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.13
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of appeals
enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board "
13 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be midified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT picket the building or premises of
Jack W. Roye in Monroe, Louisiana, regarding the
working terms under which Roye's building was
constructed, or otherwise induce or encourage employ-
ees of carvers to refuse to make pickups or deliveries at
Roye's building or handle goods or perform services,
nor will we induce or encourage members of the public
not to patronize Roye' s business or other occupants of
Roye's building, or threaten, restrain or coerce Roye,
where an object in either case , is to force Roye not to
use the construction services of W. B. Sanders in the
future, and thereby to force Roye to cease doing
business with Sanders, or otherwise to force Roye not to
make his own selection in the future concerning whom
to use in construction or building services.
MONROE BUILDING
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
COUNCIL, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be
directed to the Board's Office, T6024 Federal Building
(Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana
70113, Telephone 504-527-6361.