Monroe A.,1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 20202020003048 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2020) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Monroe A.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020003048 Hearing No. 410-2018-00246X Agency No. 4K-300-0242-17 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s February 6, 2020, final order regarding an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. BACKGROUND During the period at issue, Complainant worked for the Agency as a City Carrier in Riverdale, Georgia. On September 8, 2017, Complainant filed a formal complaint claiming that the Agency discriminated against him based on disability and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity (numerous prior EEO complaints). 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020003048 2 By letter dated November 7, 2017, the Agency accepted the formal complaint for investigation and determined that the formal complaint was comprised of the following claim: [Complainant was] not provided the proper documentation needed to determine whether the checks [he] received on June 3, 2017, and July 6, 2017 were the proper amounts [he] should have been reimbursed for an over deduction of health benefit premiums by OWCP. After an investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. On April 24, 2019, the Agency filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Agency stated that the formal complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Agency reasoned that Complainant was not aggrieved because he was now in possession of the forms indicating his refund payment for health benefits. On June 6, 2019, Complainant filed a response asserting his complaint was not moot because he still had not received the form for the period after March 31, 2018. On that same day, the Agency filed an Updated Motion to Dismiss. Therein, the Agency stated that a delay in the health benefit refund was due to a dispute between the Agency and the Department of Labor (DOL) regarding access and disclosure of FECA information to the Agency for a period of almost three years. On January 13, 2020, the AJ issued an Order to Show Cause Why Summary Judgment Should not be Entered. Therein, the AJ stated that the Agency’s Updated Motion to Dismiss is construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment. The AJ stated that the Agency asserts that it discontinued automatic generation of reimbursement for health benefit premiums due to a disagreement with DOL. The AJ stated that many other employees did not receive the forms at issue due to this disagreement with DOL. The instant appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. 2020003048 3 In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Here, Complainant has failed to point with any specificity to particular evidence in the investigative file or other evidence of record that indicates such a dispute. For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in his favor. A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 2020003048 4 This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). Complainant failed to establish that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation. The Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The record contains a declaration under penalty of perjury from the Manager Health and Resource Management (HRM) for the Atlanta District (M1). Therein, the Agency asserts that it uses a database, ICPAS, to administer health benefit refunds. M1 states that each quarter, the Agency uploads to ICPAS the data needed to calculate and issue refunds. M1 asserts that DOL suspended the Agency’s access to the data needed to issue the refunds, which lasted three years. M1 stated that because Complainant had complained to HRM, she manually calculated his refunds and sent him the forms. The record is devoid of evidence that Complainant submitted a substantive response to the AJ’s Order to Show Cause. We find that Complainant failed to establish that the Agency’s reason was pretext for discrimination and/or retaliation. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final action implementing the AJ’s decision without a hearing finding no discrimination.2 2 Because we affirm the AJ’s decision for the reasons set forth herein, we need not address the AJ’s procedural dismissal. 2020003048 5 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 2020003048 6 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 17, 2020 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation