Mohawk Industries

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 20, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 1170 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1170
Mohawk Industries, Inc. and Union of Needletrades,
Industrial and Textile Employees, AFL–CIO.
Cases 10–CA–29489 and 10–CA–29582
August 20, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
TRUESDALE AND WALSH
On May 29, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Law-
rence W. Cullen issued the attached decision. The Gen-
eral Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent
filed exceptions and supporting briefs and answering
briefs. The General Counsel and the Charging Party
filed reply briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.

1 The Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel have
excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s es-
tablished policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credi-
bility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant
evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall
Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by: interrogating employee Silvers and creating
the impression of surveillance and threatening him with plant closure,
reprisal and the futility of selecting the Union; threatening employee
Rogers and others supervised by Crider with plant closure and threaten-
ing to get rid of union agitators and “ride them” once “this mess is
over”; threatening employees Tudor, Gladen, and Sutterbook that the
Respondent would discharge whoever removed antiunion literature
from the break room door; interrogating employee Atkisson and threat-
ening him with plant closure, job loss, and loss of benefits; interrogat-
ing employee King; threatening to close down the plant; threatening
employee Rapp with relocation of machinery; changing the telephone
policy; and threatening employee Baumgardner with a loss of benefits.
Further, no exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by issuing warnings to the heister
drivers, Roy King, Scott Gaylor (for distributing union literature), and
Billy Rapp. In addition, no exceptions were filed to the judge’s dis-
missal of the allegations that the Respondent violated the Act by issu-
ing a verbal warning to Scott Gaylor for poor production, and by re-
scinding Mike Fowler’s light duty assignment.
Because they would be cumulative, we find it unnecessary to pass on
the judge’s findings that the Respondent unlawfully threatened and
interrogated Rapp when Supervisor Clata Crider asked him if he knew
who had torn down antiunion literature from the break room door, and
when Rapp said he had done so, she asked him if he knew that he could
be discharged for it.
The Respondent filed a motion to withdraw certain exceptions con-
cerning the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3)
and (1) by discharging Rodney Atkisson and Chris Johnson because it
reached a settlement agreement resolving the matter with the Charging
Party. The Charging Party filed a response stating that it does not
oppose the motion and the General Counsel filed a response stating its
support for the motion. Accordingly, we grant the Respondent’s mo-
tion to withdraw certain exceptions and will not consider the judge’s
findings with respect to the discharges of Atkisson and Chris Johnson
any further herein. The General Counsel acknowledges that Atkisson
and Chris Johnson have already been paid full backpay including inter-
est, and have both waived reinstatement by the Respondent. Further,
the Respondent has confirmed, in writing, to both individuals that it has
expunged any reference to the discharges from its records. We have
accordingly modified the judge’s recommended Order to delete these
provisions and have substituted a new notice to employees referring to
the remedial action already taken by the Respondent.
1. We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting the revocation of
union authorization cards. The judge implicitly credited
employees William Doug Nicholson, Jerry Ray Tate, and
Mike Fowler, who testified that Supervisor Ricky Coats
solicited employees to get their signed authorization
cards back from the Union. At a regular employee meet-
ing, Coats told employees that he had an address to
which they could write to get their cards back. At the
same or another meeting, Coats told them that he had a
form employees could use if they wished to get their
cards back and that these forms could be obtained from
the Respondent’s office or employees could go to a par-
ticular hotel room (presumed by the judge to be the union
organizer’s room) to personally request the return of their
cards.
The Board declared in Vestal Nursing Center, 328
NLRB 87, 101 (1999), that

2 The General Counsel and the Charging Party both filed motions to
strike portions of the Respondent’s answering brief because the Re-
spondent includes, discusses, and relies on documents attached to it
(attachments A and B) that were not admitted into the record. In this
regard, we note that the judge found in the hearing that the Respondent
had not fully complied with the General Counsel’s subpoena and there-
fore directed that the Respondent provide requested documents, which
he ruled could be submitted by the General Counsel after close of the
hearing. The General Counsel submitted the documents into evidence
and asserts that they show that the Respondent subjected Edna Tudor
and Debra Johnson to disparate treatment. In its answering brief, with
attachments A and B, the Respondent attempts to respond to the docu-
ments submitted by the General Counsel. We find merit in the General
Counsel’s and the Charging Party’s motions and, accordingly, we strike
attachments A and B to the Respondent’s answering brief and give no
weight to the Respondent’s arguments relying on the attachments. We
also find no merit in the Respondent’s exceptions to the judge’s denial
of its motion to reopen the record to allow testimony concerning the
documents.
We adopt, however, the judge’s dismissal of the allegations that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by issuing Tudor and Debra
Johnson written warnings and discharging Johnson because the judge
credited the Respondent’s witnesses’ testimony that they had legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the disciplinary actions. The judge cred-
ited these witnesses while noting that, although the documents show
that there has been some disparity in the imposition of discipline, there
is also evidence that discipline has been imposed for producing defec-
tive carpet.
334 NLRB No. 135
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1171
[a]s a general rule, an employer may not solicit em-
ployees to revoke their authorization cards. Uniontown
Hospital Assn., 277 NLRB 1289, 1307 (1985). An
employer may, however, advise employees that they
may revoke their authorization cards, so long as the
employer neither offers assistance in doing so or seeks
to monitor whether employees do so nor otherwise cre-
ates an atmosphere wherein employees would tend to
feel peril in refraining from revoking. R. L. White Co.,
262 NLRB 575, 576 (1982). Thus, an employer may
not offer assistance to employees in revoking authori-
zation cards in the context of other contemporaneous
ULPs. Escada (USA), Inc., 304 NLRB 845, 849
(1991) (distributing a sample revocation letter to em-
ployees in the context of other unfair labor practices
unlawful).
Accord: Chelsea Homes, 298 NLRB 813, 834 (1990),
enfd. mem. 962 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinction drawn
between lawfully providing “ministerial or passive aid in
withdrawing from union membership” and unlawfully
“actively solicit[ing], encourag[ing], and assist[ing] such
withdrawals”).
Thus, the Board, in the context of unfair labor prac-
tices including interrogation and serious threats, found an
employer’s advice to employees that they had the right to
withdraw their signatures from authorization cards or
petitions on behalf of a union to be unlawful. L’Eggs
Products, 236 NLRB 354, 389 (1978), enfd. in relevant
part 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980). Likewise, in Chelsea
Homes, 298 NLRB at 834, the employer engaged in un-
fair labor practices that included threats and discrimina-
tory discharges and the Board found unlawful the em-
ployer’s provision of a sample form and preaddressed
envelope to assist employees in revocation. On the other
hand, in Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 NLRB No. 19
(2000), slip op. at 3, the Board refused to find a viola-
tion. In that case, the employer committed only a few
isolated unfair labor practices in a 200-employee unit
over a 4-month period and “neither tracked whether em-
ployees availed themselves of their right to revoke their
union authorizations nor assisted them in the revocation
process beyond simply telling them about the forms.” Id.
Here, Supervisor Coats told employees at one meeting
that one option for obtaining revocation forms was to
visit the Respondent’s office, giving the company an
opportunity to observe whether they “availed themselves
of their right to revoke their union authorizations.” Fur-
ther, the Respondent committed numerous and substan-
tial unfair labor practices close in time to the solicitation
to employees to revoke cards. Between April and mid-
June, the Respondent’s misconduct included unlawfully
threatening plant closure or relocation, discharge, loss of
jobs and benefits, and unspecified reprisals. It also
threatened employees that it had a list of union support-
ers and planned to “ride” the instigators and issue warn-
ings, and threatened them with the futility of selecting
the Union as their bargaining representative. Further, it
unlawfully interrogated employees and created among
them an impression of surveillance of their union activ-
ity. Finally, the Respondent discharged two employees
in violation of the Act. In these circumstances, there can
be no question under settled case law that the Respon-
dent’s solicitation of employees to revoke authorization
cards was an independent unfair labor practice.3
2. We agree with the judge that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing a ver-
bal warning to employee Brenda Furry for distributing
union literature in work areas and posting literature on
the bulletin board. Because the Respondent had no pol-
icy regarding literature distribution, it was obliged to
shoulder the burden of establishing that the distribution
interfered with Furry’s work or the work of other em-
ployees and was the true reason for the discharge. See
Miller’s Discount Department Stores, 198 NLRB 281
(1972), enfd. 496 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974) (employee
discharge and prohibition of solicitation unlawful where,
absent valid rule, employer was unable to show solicita-
tion involved such work interference); accord: Volks-
wagen South Atlantic, 202 NLRB 485, 491 (1973), enfd.
mem. 487 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1973). The Respondent
did not meet this burden. Although the Respondent did
have a policy restricting use of the bulletin board to au-
thorized information regarding the business of the com-
pany, we agree with the judge that the evidence shows
that the Respondent permitted employees to post, without
penalty, personal advertisements. See Venture Indus-
tries, 330 NLRB 1133 (2000) (employer unlawfully re-
moved prounion literature from the bulletin board where
it permitted employees to post other notices). Accord-
ingly, the Respondent, by singling Furry out for disci-
pline because she posted union literature, violated the
Act. See Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 271 NLRB 433, 440
(1984), enfd. 768 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1985).

3 Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not find the Respon-
dent’s solicitation of revocation to be merely “ministerial” and there-
fore distinguishable from the solicitation in Vestal Nursing Center,
supra. We recognize that the manner and number of times the em-
ployer in Vestal Nursing Center advised employees and offered assis-
tance differed from the manner and number in this case. However, the
cases are similar in a key respect: in both, the employer’s conduct in
advising employees that they may revoke their cards and offering its
assistance, in the context of its numerous unfair labor practices, unlaw-
fully created an atmosphere in which employees would tend to feel
peril in refraining from revoking their cards. E.g. R. L. White, supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1172
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Mohawk
Industries, Inc., Calhoun, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) and reletter the
subsequent paragraphs.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c).
“(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful warn-
ings issued to the heister drivers, employees Roy King,
Brenda Furry, Billy Rapp, and Scott Gaylor, and within 3
days thereafter, notify the employees in writing that this
has been done and that the warnings will not be used
against them in any way.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
Contrary to my colleagues, I do not find that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting
the revocation of union authorization cards.1 My col-
leagues rely on Vestal Nursing Center, 328 NLRB 87
(1999). In that case, the Board affirmed the administra-
tive law judge’s finding that the respondent’s efforts to
have employees revoke authorization cards were unlaw-
ful. Vestal, however, is distinguishable from the instant
case.
In Vestal, the respondent, inter alia, sent letters to its
employees urging them to revoke their cards, addressed
and mailed revocation forms to its employees’ homes,
and addressed, stamped, and mailed completed forms to
the union on the employees’ behalf.
Thus, in a letter sent to employees by Vestal, employ-
ees were told, inter alia:
You can revoke a card that you have signed by sending
the union a note saying: “I hereby revoke any authori-
zation card given to Local 200 SEIU.” Date it and sign
it and mail it to the union. Be sure to make a copy for
yourself. You also have the right to demand to have
the card returned to you.
In a second letter to employees, Vestal’s administrator,
Denise Johnson, first noted newspaper articles adverse to
the union and the arrest of a union organizer, then stated:

1 My colleagues find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s findings
that the Respondent, through Supervisor Clata Crider, unlawfully
threatened and interrogated employee Billy Rapp. I would dismiss
these allegations.
I am sure that the SEIU organizers withhold this infor-
mation about their Union when they try to push people
into signing membership cards. If you signed a card
without knowing all the facts and wish to revoke it, you
can. You can send the enclosed card revocation to the
Union, today. Be sure to keep a copy, because they
may say they never got it.
A revocation form was enclosed with this letter.
In a flyer prepared by Vestal, Johnson wrote:
If you signed a card—you can revoke it. Talk to your
co-workers. Ask them why this Union has to lie,
threaten and coerce you, and tell them you will not
support anyone who engages in these kinds of activi-
ties.
A Vestal employee asked Johnson about revoking her
card. Johnson gave her a revocation form, said that a lot
of employees were revoking their cards, and asked if she
(Johnson) could use her name. The employee said that
Johnson could do so, and Johnson named two other em-
ployees who she said were opposing the union. Johnson
gave the employee some extra revocation forms to take
with her. The employee filled out her own revocation
form in Johnson’s office. This form was mailed to the
union in an envelope provided by the respondent, which
also paid the postage. Johnson admitted giving revoca-
tion forms to two other employees (in addition to the two
she had named above) in her office, and both of these
forms arrived at the union in similar envelopes with Ves-
tal’s postage meter number on them. The revocation
forms of two other employees also arrived in Vestal
postage-metered envelopes with the same handwriting
for the return address. It would appear that this proce-
dure was followed with at least six revocation forms.
In the instant case, by contrast, Coats merely told em-
ployees that he had an address to which they could write
to get their cards back, that he had a form employees
could use if they wished to get their cards back, and that
these forms could be obtained from the Respondent’s
office or employees could go to a particular hotel room
(apparently the union organizer’s room) to request the
return of their cards.
In my view, there is a huge disparity between what
Vestal did and what the instant Respondent did. Among
other things, the Respondent did not send letters to its
employees urging them to revoke their cards. The Re-
spondent did not address and mail revocation forms to its
employees. The Respondent did not address, stamp, and
mail completed forms to the Union on the employees’
behalf. The Respondent did not give its employees de-
tailed instructions like the ones contained in Vestal’s
letters to its employees. The Respondent did not tell its
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1173
employees about newspaper articles adverse to the Union
or the arrest of a union organizer. The Respondent did
not tell its employees that union organizers withheld such
information about the Union from the employees. The
Respondent did not tell its employees that the Union tries
to push people into signing membership cards. The Re-
spondent did not tell its employees that the Union might
falsely claim never to have received revocation forms
sent to it. The Respondent did not instruct its employees
to ask their coworkers why the Union had to lie, threaten
and coerce employees. The Respondent did not instruct
its employees to tell their coworkers that they would not
support anyone who engaged in such activities.
My colleagues state that here, as in Vestal, the Re-
spondent created an atmosphere in which employees
would tend to feel peril in refraining from revoking their
cards. In light of the many differences noted above be-
tween Vestal and the instant case, I do not believe that
the General Counsel has shown that the Respondent’s
employees would reasonably tend to feel peril if they
declined to revoke their cards.
My colleagues also say that the Respondent advised
employees that they could revoke their cards, and that
Respondent offered assistance to the employees in this
respect. As to the former point, I do not believe that the
act of informing employees of their statutory rights is
unlawful. As to the latter point, the “assistance,” if it can
be called that, was minimal.
Finally, I recognize that the Respondent committed
other unfair labor practices. This conduct can and should
be remedied. However, it is a mistake to say that this
conduct renders unlawful the otherwise privileged con-
duct involved here.
The Respondent did not tell its employees that a lot of
employees were revoking their cards. The Respondent
did not ask its employees if it could use their names. The
Respondent did not name, to its employees, specific co-
workers opposed to the Union. The Respondent did not
give employees extra revocation forms to take with them.
The Respondent was not found to have had employees
filling out revocation forms in the office of a high-
ranking official of the Respondent, or to have given revo-
cation forms to employees in such an office.
These differences, in my view, render the instant case
more similar to Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 NLRB No. 19
(2000), also mentioned by my colleagues, than to Vestal.
Here, as in Mid-Mountain, there is no finding that the
Respondent tracked whether employees availed them-
selves of their right to revoke their cards. Also, as in
Mid-Mountain, the Respondent’s employees were not
required to go to their supervisors to obtain revocation
forms.
In sum, with respect to this allegation, the Respon-
dent’s activities were more similar to those of Mid-
Mountain, which simply told its employees about the
revocation forms, than to those of Vestal. The aid ren-
dered by the Respondent in this regard can, in my view,
fairly be described as ministerial. Accordingly, notwith-
standing the other unfair labor practices committed by
the Respondent, I would dismiss this allegation.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT engage in unlawful interrogation of
our employees concerning their union sympathies.
WE WILL NOT create the impression of surveillance
of our employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with plant
closure or relocation, discharge, loss of jobs and benefits,
unspecified reprisals that we have a list of union support-
ers and that the instigators are at the top of the list and
we plan to “ride them” and to issue warnings; and with
the futility of the selection of the Union as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative because we will not sign a
labor agreement and/or will shut down and/or relocate
because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT instigate, facilitate, and/or assist the
revocation of the employees’ signed union cards.
WE WILL NOT enforce an invalid bulletin board pol-
icy restricting the posting of prounion notices and the
distribution of prounion literature in nonwork areas while
posting and/or permitting the posting of antiunion notices
and the distribution of antiunion literature.
WE WILL NOT restrict telephone use in order to stem
the union campaign.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1174
WE WILL NOT discharge or issue warnings to or oth-
erwise discriminate against any of you for supporting the
Union of Needletrade, Industrial and Textile Employees,
AFL–CIO (UNITE) or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful warnings issued to the heister drivers, Roy
King, Brenda Furry, Billy Rapp, and Scott Gaylor, and
WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify each of them
in writing that this has been done and that the warnings
will not be used against them in any way.
Rodney Atkisson and Chris Johnson have waived their
rights to full reinstatement to their former jobs, and WE
HAVE made them whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits resulting from their unlawful discharges,
and WE HAVE notified them in writing that the dis-
charges will not be used against them in any way.

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC.

Katherine Chahrouri, Esq. and Karen N. Neilsen, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Townsell G. Marshall Jr., Esq. and Timothy A. Davis, Esq., for
the Respondent.
Lori M. Smith, Esq., for the Charging Party.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAWRENCE W. CULLEN, Administrative Law Judge. This
consolidated case was heard before me in Calhoun, Georgia, on
January 21, 22, and 23, 1997. An order consolidating cases,
amended consolidated complaint, and notice of hearing was
filed by the Regional Director for Region 10 of the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) on January 7, 1997. The
complaint in Case 10–CA–29489 is based on a first amended
charge filed by the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Tex-
tile Employees, AFL–CIO (the Charging Party, or the Union, or
UNITE) on January 6, 1997. The complaint in Case 10–CA–
29582 is based on a first amended charge filed by the Charging
Party on January 6, 1997. The complaint as amended at the
hearing, alleges that Mohawk Industries, Inc. (Respondent, or
the Company, or Mohawk) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Respondent has by
its answer filed on January 15, 1997, denied the commission of
any violations of the Act.
On the entire record in this proceeding, including my obser-
vations of the witnesses who testified here and after considering
the parties’ positions at the hearing and their briefs, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW1
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
Respondent was and has been at all times material, a Delaware
corporation, with an office and place of business in Calhoun,
Georgia, where it has been engaged in the business of manufac-
turing carpet, that during the past 12-month period Respondent,
in conducting its aforesaid business operations, sold and
shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to purchas-
ers outside of the State of Georgia and it has been an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Labor Organization
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at
all times material the Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES2
The Company operates a main complex and a distribution
center located in Calhoun, Georgia, and employs a total of 1700
employees including nonbargaining personnel at these two
facilities. The main complex is composed of a number of
buildings housing different departments. The carpet manufac-
turing process is initiated in the twisting department in which
single-ply raw yarn is twisted together and then heated to ob-
tain a finished product. It is then packed to send to the tufting
department. There is another building at the main complex
which is called the Spinning Plant. In the tufting department, a
creeler takes the cones of yarn from the cages in which they
have been transported and places them on a creel rack which is
attached to a tufting machine. The yarn is then threaded
through a number of needles which are used to sew the spools
of yarn into the backing of the carpet. Some of the tufting ma-
chines have overhead clutches through which the yarn is
threaded prior to the needles. The clutches are positioned side
by side for 12 feet which constitutes the width of the carpet.
There are approximately 3 clutches per foot, for a total of 36
clutches per machine. Each clutch has eight spools of yarn
threaded through it. After a carpet has been run, the remaining
scraps of yarn are wrapped around beams by warpers. The
beams are put into another type of tufting machine called a
beam machine. At various places in the production process,
forklifts called heisters are used to move the product around the
facility. Thus a pole heister moves rolls of carpet from tufting
machines to the tunnel area from where the carpeting is taken to
the printer for the dying process. Employees called heister
drivers are located in several departments. Respondent’s other
facility is the distribution center and includes several depart-
ments such as shipping, cut order, quality assurance, and rein-
spection. On the day shift at the distribution center there is a
group of 25 heister drivers in the shipping department under the

1 The General Counsel’s posthearing exhibits GC Exhs. 23(a)
through (d) and 24 through 46 are received. Respondent’s motion to
reopen the hearing is denied.
2 The following includes a composite of the credited testimony of the
witnesses at the hearing. All dates are in 1996 unless otherwise speci-
fied.
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1175
supervision of John Rainwater and another large group of heis-
ter drivers in the cut order department under the supervision of
Russ Jones.
In April 1996, the Union commenced an organizing cam-
paign to organize the production workers at Respondent’s two
facilities. The Union handbilled at Respondent’s facilities in
Calhoun on April 15. On May 13 the Union filed a petition to
represent approximately 900 employees at these facilities. The
parties entered into a stipulated election agreement and an elec-
tion was scheduled for June 22 and 24. On June 17 the petition
for an election was blocked and remained blocked at the time of
the hearing by the instant charges and consolidated complaint.
The complaint alleges and the General Counsel and the
Charging Party contend that during the course of the election
campaign between April and mid-June when organizing activ-
ity ceased, the Respondent committed numerous violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act including interrogation, threats, crea-
tion of the impression of surveillance and the solicitation of the
withdrawal of union authorization cards which had been signed
by employees and maintained a strong statement of antiunion-
ism in its policy manual, implied threats of plant closure in its
antiunion campaign literature, and also injected race and re-
gional differences into the campaign. The General Counsel
presented unrebutted credible testimony (much of it elicited
from current employees) supporting most of the various 8(a)(1)
allegations. The Respondent presented only very limited testi-
mony in an attempt to rebut the evidence of these violations and
contended that they were only alleged to have been committed
by a handful of supervisors whose conduct was not attributable
to Respondent and that these supervisors were not involved in
various employment disciplinary matters alleged as violations
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in this case. I found the unrebut-
ted testimony of the employees called by the General Counsel
to testify concerning the 8(a)(1) violations credible and find
that it established the violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to
the extent found in this decision.
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
its tufting supervisor, Clata Crider, as follows:
I credit the unrebutted testimony of current employee
Wesley Silvers that in May, Crider asked him where his nonun-
ion shirt was and he told her he wished to remain neutral and
that she then commented that they had not brainwashed him
and he repeated he wished to remain neutral. Respondent did
not call Crider as a witness. I find this inquiry and comments
by Crider were unlawful interrogation and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Rossmore House,
269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984), enfd. sub nom. Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.
1985). I further find that by her above comments Crider also
created an impression of surveillance which tended to be coer-
cive of Silvers’ Section 7 rights and that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Belcher Towing Co. v.
NLRB, 726 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984).
Silvers further testified that during this same conversation
Crider then stated that “I’ve been going to meetings and I’ve
heard from the horse’s mouth if people vote the Union in that
the Company will close, and if they didn’t close that they
would keep the people who voted no and let them work, and the
people that voted yes, they would keep them out on strike be-
cause the Company would not agree to no contract.” I credit
Silvers’ unrebutted testimony in this regard also and find that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the
threat of plant closure, Vesuvio Foods Co., 321 NLRB 328
(1996), and also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by convey-
ing an impression of surveillance and the threat of the futility of
selecting the Union as the employees’ bargaining representative
as the Company would keep the union supporters out on strike
as the Company would not agree to a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union. Refuse Compactor Service, 311
NLRB 12, 19 (1993); Overnite Transportation Co., 296 NLRB
669 (1989); and Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867 (1985).
Silvers also testified concerning a conversation with Creel’s
boss, Aileen Story, at which Crider was present which he
placed between April and August. As the General Counsel
contends in her brief, I find that this conversation occurred
between April and mid-June when the organizational activity
ceased. Silvers testified that as he was on his way to the break-
room, Story stopped him and said that he could jeopardize his
position by wearing a union pin which he had on his person at
the time. He disputed this as he was an hourly employee and
Story replied that “you know how this place is. They can find a
way to get rid of you.” Crider who was standing nearby nod-
ded her head in agreement. Silvers then removed his union pin.
I credit Silvers’ unrebutted testimony as neither Story nor
Crider were called to testify. The General Counsel notes that
no testimony was elicited to prove Story’s supervisory status
but contends that Supervisor Crider’s presence and nonverbal
acquiescence is sufficient to support a finding of agency attrib-
utable to management. I agree and so find. I find that the
threat of reprisal issued by Story and affirmed by Crider was
unlawful and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Current employee Carolyn Rogers, a tufting machine opera-
tor, testified that near the end of May prior to the Memorial
Day weekend that Crider came by making her rounds and told
her that “if the Union comes in, Jeff Lauderbaum (‘Respon-
dent’s President Jeffrey S. Lauderbaum’) would close (the)
tufting (department) down and move it elsewhere.” Former
operator Linda Hogan testified that in late spring or early sum-
mer, she and Carolyn Rogers were entering the breakroom as
Crider was standing near the door. Crider frowned at Rogers
who was wearing a prounion button. Hogan, who was also
wearing a union button told Crider that if she were not in su-
pervision she would be in favor of the Union also. Crider de-
nied this and told her that the Union would keep her out of a
job and starve her to death. Crider also stated that “if the Union
came in they’re going to close the Tufting department down.”
Current employee Cherri Coleman testified that in spring or
early summer she and other employees were seated at the
smoking table outside the breakroom talking about the Union.
Crider approached and said, “[I]f the Union comes in, the Com-
pany will close the doors.” Coleman also testified that a couple
of weeks later another incident occurred while she and other
employees were seated at the smoker’s table outside the
breakroom. On this occasion Crider stated that Respondent
“had a list of all the people who had sent in union cards, and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1176
that they had the names of the agitators at the top of the list
highlighted. . . .” Crider also said that “when this mess is over
. . . we’re going to ride them.” Current employee Edna Tudor
also testified to the second incident in early spring or summer
that she and three other employees including “Cherri” (Cole-
man) were seated at the smoking table outside the breakroom
wearing union buttons and pins. Crider was passing out antun-
ion T-shirts and an employee asked Crider for one. Crider said
she could not have one because she was a temporary employee.
Crider then said that the Respondent had “a list of all people
who had signed a Union card and their name is highlighted at
the top of the list.”
I credit the unrebutted testimony of Rogers, Hogan, Cole-
man, and Tudor. I find that in the initial incident testified to by
Rogers concerning Crider’s comment that Respondent’s presi-
dent would close the tufting department down and move it was
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Vesuvia, supra. I find
that Crider’s comment to Rogers in the second incident that the
Union would keep her out of a job and starve her to death as
testified to by Hogan and that if the Union came in, Respondent
would close the tufting department down as testified to by Ho-
gan and corroborated by Coleman were unlawful threats of job
loss and plant closure respectively and that Respondent thereby
also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I find that Crider’s
comments that they had a list of union supporters and that when
“this mess” (the organizational campaign) was over, Respon-
dent’s management was going to “ride them” created the im-
pression of surveillance and constituted a threat of reprisal
against the union supporters and were both violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Belcher Towing, supra.
Tudor also testified that on a Saturday evening in the spring
or summer prior to June 7, Crider stopped her, employees
Wanda Gladden, and Rachel Sutterbook, near the timeclock
and two other employees as they were leaving, and asked who
had removed antiunion literature from the breakroom door.
The employees denied having done so and Crider then said,
“[S]he was sure of one thing. That they would be fired who-
ever got them off because they was put up there by Manage-
ment.” I credit Tudor’s unrebutted testimony and find that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by this threat of
discharge.
Current employee Billy Rapp testified that in approximately
June or July, Crider approached him at his workstation and
asked him who had torn down antiunion literature from the
breakroom door. Rapp told her he had done so and Crider then
asked if he knew he could be discharged for doing this. He
responded no and asked her who had put this literature up and
Crider told him it had come directly from Respondent’s per-
sonnel department. I credit Rapp’s unrebutted “testimony and
find that Crider’s inquiry to Rapp concerning this literature was
an unlawful interrogation of his union activities Rossmore
House, supra, and that the threat of discharge was also unlawful
and find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by both the interrogation and the threat of discharge. I find
this incident occurred in June rather than July as the campaign
ended in June.
Former employee and alleged discriminatee Rodney Atkis-
son who was employed as a winder server on the third shift in
the spinning building testified that in April he was sitting in the
breakroom with other employees and Supervisor Robin Chat-
mon. During a conversation concerning antiunion literature on
the breakroom table, Chatmon asked him if he was seriously
considering voting for the Union and he replied in the affirma-
tive. Chatmon subsequently told the employees it was “fool-
hardy to vote for the union, that (if) the union came in the plant
could easily shutdown. People would be without jobs. It
would just be taking benefits away from the employees.” I
credit Atkisson’s unrebutted testimony and find that Respon-
dent unlawfully interrogated Atkisson concerning his union
sympathies and threatened plant closure, job loss, and loss of
benefits if the employees selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Rossmore House, supra; Vesuvio Foods Co., supra.
Current employee Roy King who is employed as a heister
driver in the tufting department under the supervision of J. R.
Parker testified that around the time of the commencement of
the union campaign in April, he was called into a meeting with
his supervisor, Parker, and Supervisor Laura Watts and was
asked how he felt concerning the Union. I credit his testimony
which was unrebutted for although Respondent called Parker
and Watts to testify, it did not inquire of either supervisor con-
cerning this incident. Further as the General Counsel asserts in
her brief, “The failure to examine a favorable witness regarding
any factual issue upon which that witness would likely have
knowledge gives rise to an adverse inference regarding any
such fact.” Flexsteel Industries, 316 NLRB 745, 757 (1995). I
accordingly find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by its unlawful interrogation of King concerning his union
sympathies, Rossmore House, supra.
Employee Rodney Atkisson also testified his supervisor,
Steve Eivers, asked him if he supported the Union at a meeting
with Eivers and another employee in April. Eivers then said if
the employees voted for the Union, “the plant would shutdown,
they had the funds to shutdown, pick up and leave. Himself,
including us would be without jobs” Atkisson also testified
concerning a second meeting with Eivers which he placed in
June at which Eivers informed him, he could now “legally” ask
Atkisson about the Union, and then “asked me how I was going
to vote and if I voted yes, the plant would definitely shutdown,
pick up and leave. There would be a lot of people without
jobs.” I credit Atkisson’s unrebutted testimony as Eivers was
not called to testify and I accordingly find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its unlawful interrogation
of Atkisson concerning his support of the Union and by the
threat of plant closure and job loss if the employees selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Rossmore
House, supra; Vesuvio Foods, supra.
Current employee and alleged discriminatee Scott Gaylor
testified that near the end of May he had a “vote no” T-shirt on
his work cart in his work area and that Supervisor Linda Wil-
liams approached and asked him why he had the “vote no” shirt
since she knew he supported the Union. Williams corroborated
this testimony and admitted asking “Scott, I thought you sup-
ported the Union?” and repeating the inquiry when he did not
affirmatively respond to her first inquiry. I find that Respon-
dent thereby unlawfully interrogated Gaylor concerning his
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1177
union support in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Ross-
more House, supra.
Current employees and heister drivers William Doug Nichol-
son, Jerry Ray Tate, and Larry Hall testified that Supervisor
John Rainwater threatened closure of Respondent’s facility at a
daily morning meeting of the shipping department heister driv-
ers on or about April 15. Nicholson testified that Rainwater
said the Respondent “probably would close down or maybe
move it to Dalton” (a nearby town). Tate testified that Rain-
water said the plant might shut down, close, or move to Dalton
if the Union came in. Hall testified Rainwater said, “[I]f Union
people were to come in that Mohawk Industries would and
could probably shut the plant down and relocate in Dalton, or
locate some other location and we could all be without a job.”
Rainwater acknowledged that in this meeting he mentioned the
union activity at the plant gate and admitted that he had related
his “personal experience” to the employees at this meeting as
he had been in a union and the employer had closed the plant
and changed names. In response to an inquiry on direct exami-
nation whether he had ever told employees in this meeting that
if the Union came in, the plant could or would close and be
moved to Dalton, he responded, “I have no idea.” I credit the
specific and mutually corroborative testimony of employees
Nicholson, Tate, and Hall which was not specifically rebutted
by Rainwater who acknowledged he had “no idea” whether he
had made the threat. I find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by Rainwater’s threat that Respondent would
shutdown or move if the Union came in. Vesuvio Foods, supra.
Current employee Billy Rapp testified that while he was
working on a creel in May, he asked Supervisor Ed Dotson
what the Respondent was going to do with several tufting ma-
chines which had been unbolted from the floor. Dotson re-
sponded Respondent “might be moving them to Galaxy (a re-
lated company) they’re waiting to see what the Union did first.
Dotson also noted that Galaxy had enough space for these ma-
chines. I credit Rapp’s unrebutted testimony as Dotson was not
called to testify. I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by Dotson’s threat of relocating the machinery if the
Union were selected as the employee’s collective-bargaining
representative, Vesuvio Foods, supra.
Current employee John Brown testified that on April 16
Gary McCarley, who is the supervisor over all of the five shifts
in the twisting department told him, “We’ve got the names of
the instigators. We’ll take care of (them) when it’s over.”
Brown placed this conversation at 10:30 a.m. near the tube
machine in the warehouse. Supervisor McCarley testified he
recalled a conversation with Brown concerning overtime but
denied having made any comments about union instigators. I
credit the testimony of Brown who is a current employee.
Flexsteel Industries, supra. I accordingly find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating the impression
of surveillance and threatening reprisals. Belcher Towing, su-
pra.
Current employees and heister drivers William Doug Nichol-
son, Jerry Ray Tate, and Mike Fowler testified that Respon-
dent’s supervisor, Ricky Coats, solicited employees to get their
signed authorization cards back from the Union. Nicholson
testified that around the end of April, Coats attended a regular
morning heister driver meeting and told the heister drivers that
he had an address they could write to obtain their union au-
thorization cards back. Tate testified that at one of the regular
morning meetings for the heister drivers, Coats told them that
he had a form that employees could use if they wished to get
their union card back, and that these forms could be obtained
from Respondent’s office or employees could go to room 121
of the Holiday Inn (presumably the union organizer’s room) to
personally request the return of their union card. Fowler testi-
fied that during an employee meeting, Coats told the employees
how to obtain the return of their union cards and said he had an
address to which the employees could send their request. Coats
testified that he was instructed by management to hold meet-
ings for employees during the election campaign and did so and
specifically held one on April 22. During this meeting he read
Respondent’s Exhibit 24 word for word as directed by team
member resources (the personnel department which was advis-
ing the Respondent on how to conduct its antiunion campaign).

NOTICE

SEVERAL PEOPLE HAVE ASKED HOW TO GET A
SIGNED UNION CARD BACK, SIMPLY WRITE THE
UNION A NOTE ON A POSTCARD TO THEIR MAIN
OFFICE IN NEW YORK CITY AS FOLLOWS:

I HEREBY CANCEL MY UNION CARD
PLEASE SEND IT BACK TO ME AT
(YOUR HOME ADDRESS)
SIGN YOUR NAME
PRINT YOUR NAME

SEND TO:
UNITE
1710 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, NY 10019–5299

Coats denied having made any other comments to the employ-
ees at the meeting concerning union cards other than reading
them the foregoing statement. However, he did admit making
other general statements at the meeting, including telling the
employees that Respondent’s Exhibit 24 would be posted on a
bulletin board for the employees. In this case the Respondent
presented no evidence that the assistance of the Respondent in
retrieving their union authorization cards had been sought or
requested by the employees. Thus, Respondent initiated, spon-
sored and participated in an effort to “assist” employees with
the revocation of their union authorization cards and provided
“both the method and the means” for employees to revoke their
union cards. I find that this conduct by the Respondent was
coercive and that it thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Adair Standish Corp. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1990),
enfg. 290 NLRB 317 (1988).
Three of the Respondent’s heister drivers testified that dur-
ing the first week of organizing activity in mid-April, Supervi-
sor John Rainwater announced a new policy restricting the use
of work area telephones at a morning meeting with the heister
drivers. This occurred at the morning meeting following two
consecutive daily meetings at which Rainwater had threatened
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1178
plant closure and had given the heister drivers a novel group
verbal warning for low production. In announcing the new
policy regarding use of telephones by the heister drivers, Rain-
water told the employees according to the testimony of em-
ployee William Nicholson that thereafter all calls must go
through him (Rainwater). Heister driver, Jerry Tate, testified
that at this meeting Rainwater told the employees that employ-
ees could no longer receive telephone calls on the job and that
all calls must go through him (Rainwater). Tate testified that
there had been no prior restriction and employees had been
previously permitted to receive calls directly while at work and
the calls had not been routed through a supervisor. Rainwater
admitted to this change of policy and contended that telephone
calls to the work area had been a problem prior to the policy
change and have been a continuing problem since the change. I
credit the unrebutted and corroborated testimony of Nicholson
and Tate as admitted to by Rainwater. I find that this change in
telephone use policy, given the timing of its occurrence during
the first week of organizing was coercive and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. House Calls, Inc.,
304 NLRB 311, 312–313 (1991).
Former employee James Baumgardner, who had been em-
ployed at Respondent’s distribution center during the period of
April 3–18 testified that on either April 16 or 17 at the end of
his shift, he was reading antiunion literature on the bulletin
board and was laughing when his supervisor Andy Tidmore
approached pointing his finger. Tidmore then said, “[I]f the
Union and the Company goes to negotiations you will lose all
of your benefits as an employee while they’re negotiating.”
Baumgardner told Tidmore that this would not occur and Tid-
more said he could bring a lawyer to prove it. They then ar-
gued the point and Tidmore then left. I credit Baumgardner’s
testimony which was unrebutted as Tidmore was not called to
testify. I find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by this threat of loss of benefits.
The 8(a)(3) Allegations
1. Animus
Respondent contends that the General Counsel has failed to
establish its animus against the Union and its supporters. It
argues that the 8(a)(1) violations, which were largely unchal-
lenged by Respondent (as no rebuttal was offered by Respon-
dent to counter the testimony of the General Counsel’s wit-
nesses concerning them), were isolated and committed by a
handful of supervisors. It contends that as the discipline lead-
ing to the 8(a)(3) allegations was imposed by supervisors
against whom there were no 8(a)(1) allegations, there has been
no showing of animus on the part of these supervisors or mem-
bers of management. It argues that the number of 8(a)(1) viola-
tions demonstrating antiunion animus were small in the context
of the overall work force of 1700 employees including nonbar-
gaining unit employees. I find however that there were a sub-
stantial number of instances of unlawful interrogation of em-
ployees and threats of job loss, plant closure, and discipline
coupled with disparate treatment of union supporters and their
efforts to distribute union literature and to post union literature
on its bulletin board. I do not subscribe to Respondent’s argu-
ments that the 8(a)(1) violations were limited to a small number
of management members who were operating on their own, and
whose conduct can now be disavowed as individual opinions
for which Respondent is not responsible. I find rather that the
unlawful activities of certain of its supervisors is properly im-
puted to Respondent. I thus find that Respondent’s animus
toward the Union and its supporters has been clearly estab-
lished in this case.
2. Verbal warnings to the heister drivers
Supervisor Rainwater issued a verbal warning to the day-shift shipping department heister driv-
ers under his supervision for low production as testified to by heister drivers Nicholson, Tate, and
Hall and as corroborated by Rainwater. The General Counsels contend in their brief that they are
not required to demonstrate the Respondent’s knowledge of any individual employee’s sympathies
to establish a prima facie case. The General Counsel must show that the mass action was taken to
discourage union activity. Davis Supermarkets v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1993), enfg. Davis
Supermarkets v. Commercial Workers Local 23, 306 NLRB 426 (1992). Respondent’s animus has
been established by the numerous instances of violations of Section 8(a)(1) as set out above and I
find that the General Counsel has established that Rainwater engaged in a course of conduct
designed to discourage union activities following the appearance of union organizers on April 15 by
the threat of plant closure in the regular morning meeting followed by the mass verbal warning the
next day and the restrictive telephone policy change the following day. I thus find that the General
Counsel has established a prima facie case that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by Rainwater’s issuance of the verbal warning to the drivers at the meeting for low production.
I do not credit Rainwater’s contention at the hearing that the employees low production was the true
reason for the issuance of the warning and that it would have taken place in the absence of the
unlawful motivation, W. F. Bolin Co., 311 NLRB 1118, 1119 (1993). I find that Respondent has
failed to rebut the prima facie case by the preponderance of the evidence. Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980); Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984). See International Carolina
Glass Corp., 319 NLRB 171, 174 (1995), citing Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981),
enfd. 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982), regarding a finding of pretext by an employer precludes the
necessity of showing that the action would have been taken in the absence of the proscribed motive.
Rainwater testified that on April 16, he had given the heister
drivers the verbal warning for low production as their produc-
tion for Monday, April 15, had dropped 2 or 3 points. He testi-
fied that he had reviewed a production report which he had in
his file for the date of April 15. Although all production reports
had been subpoenaed by the General Counsel, this report was
not furnished to the General Counsel prior to Rainwater’s tes-
timony at which time he testified he (Rainwater) had it in his
file. At the General Counsel’s request he produced the afore-
said production report for April 15, which was introduced into
evidence by the General Counsel. However, Rainwater testi-
fied that he had turned this document over to Respondent’s
attorneys. Respondent’s attorney in an on the record statement
commented that this production report had not been turned over
to him and that he himself had not pulled the documents to-
gether that had been produced in response to the General Coun-
sel’s subpoena. Rainwater also testified in response to the
General Counsel’s request whether there were any other pro-
duction records that would reflect this information. Rainwater
replied in the negative saying that he put them in the trash al-
though acknowledging that he does a production report every
day for each of the employees under his supervision. I find that
Respondent’s failure to furnish the General Counsel with these
reports in response to the subpoena calling for all documenta-
tion of production requirements and productivity of heister
drivers and Rainwater’s testimony that he only maintained the
production record for April 15, having trashed all the others,
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1179
supports the adverse inference that the other production records
would not have supported Rainwater’s testimony that the heis-
ter drivers actually had low production on April 15. Moreover,
I find that the timing of this warning given the day after the
initiation of the union leafleting at Respondent’s gates by the
union organizers supports the inference that the issuance of the
warning was in direct response to the union campaign. I thus
find that the issuance of the verbal warning to the heister driv-
ers was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. Verbal warnings issued to employee Scott Gaylor
Scott Gaylor testified that on April 22 he was issued a verbal
warning in the office of Supervisor Linda Williams with Super-
visor Burchett present for handing out union literature. Gaylor
was a known union supporter as demonstrated by the incident
in May when Williams questioned why he had a procompany
vote shirt since he was a union supporter. When he denied
having done this, Williams then told him that distribution man-
ager, Ricky Coats, had heard him talking to another worker
about the Union. When he disputed this charge also, Williams
told him the warning was for “loafing.” The verbal warning
was also noted on his personnel record. Gaylor testified that he
received a second warning a month later on May 22 from his
supervisor, Burchett, who told him he had been ordered by
Williams to issue Gaylor a verbal warning for low production
and that if it had been his decision he would not have issued
Gaylor the warning. Gaylor asked to meet with Williams and
protested the warning.
With respect to the April 22 warning, Gaylor testified he had
previously routinely talked with other employees without the
imposition of discipline as had other employees. With respect
to the May 22 warning for low production Gaylor testified that
he had previously been below production standards on several
occasions without the imposition of discipline. His testimony
is supported by Respondent’s Exhibit 22 which shows Gaylor
did not meet the 167 pieces per hour standard on five occasions
between January 1 and May 22. The Charging Party alleges in
her brief that the discipline on May 22 was for low production
which occurred in February. Respondent contended at the
hearing that employees were not disciplined for low production
in those instances where production was delayed because of
travel time or slow equipment.
Respondent does not dispute the fact that Williams was
aware of Gaylor’s support of the Union but claims that the
warning for low production was legitimate as Gaylor did not
meet the production standard of 167 pieces per hour. It argues
that the similarity between Gaylor and his coworker Gary
Easterwood is compelling. For the week ending February 17,
and March 16, both failed to make the production standard.
March 16 was the fourth time Easterwood did not meet the
production standard for unexplained reasons and Easterwood
was given a verbal warning at this time which was prior to the
start of the Union’s organizing campaign. It was only after
Gaylor accumulated two more low production weeks bringing
his total to four instances which were unexplained by travel
time or problems with the computer or equipment that Williams
instructed Supervisor Rex Burchett to issue the verbal warning
to Gaylor.
Analysis
I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by the issuance of the verbal warning to Gaylor on April 22
which was memorialized on his personnel record. I credit Gay-
lor’s testimony and find that the General Counsel has estab-
lished a prima facie case that Williams was aware of Gaylor’s
support of the Union and it was this support for which he was
initially being disciplined although the reason for the warning
was changed to “loafing” when Gaylor protested that he was
not handing out union literature and that he and other employ-
ees routinely talked to each other during worktime in the past. I
am convinced that the reason for this warning was Respon-
dent’s demonstrated animus toward any activities in support of
the Union. I find the Respondent has failed to rebut the prima
facie case by the preponderance of the evidence. Wright Line,
supra; Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., supra.
I find that the General Counsel has not established a prima
facie case of a violation of the Act by the issuance of the May
22 warning to Gaylor for poor production. Assuming arguendo
that a prima facie case was established, I find it has been rebut-
ted by the preponderance of the evidence. The issuance of the
warning to Gaylor for the fourth unexplained instance of low
production was the exact discipline issued to his coworker
Easterwood for his fourth unexplained instance of low produc-
tion. Thus there has been no showing of disparate treatment in
this instance. Sheraton Hotel Waterbury, 312 NLRB 304, 327
(1993); Wright Line, supra; Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., su-
pra.
4. Written warning issued to Roy King
Respondent’s unlawful interrogation of King concerning his
union sympathies was discussed above. Although at that time
King did not respond to the interrogation, he testified that in
early July he became an open union supporter wearing union
hats, buttons, and stickers at work. He also attended union
meetings and distributed union literature at the plant gates on a
few occasions. On or about July 18 King was issued a written
warning by Respondent’s supervisor, Laura Watts, for talking
to employee Billy Rapp who was an open union supporter. The
verbal warning was given to King because Supervisor Ed
Dotson had a problem with it as it was “interfering with his
(Rapp’s) work.” King, himself, was not on the clock when he
stopped by Rapp’s workstation while on the way to his own
work area. Rapp was on the clock but did not receive a warn-
ing. However, King testified that prior to this, almost nightly
he arrived early for work and stopped to talk to other employ-
ees including Rapp on the way to his work area without the
imposition of any discipline. This testimony concerning King’s
practice of stopping to talk to him almost every night was cor-
roborated by Rapp. King testified also that on another occasion
following the warning, he stopped and talked to employees J.
R. Stone and Boyd Eves who were well known opponents of
the union campaign but that on this occasion, when Supervisor
Dotson observed him talking to Stone and Eves who were both
on the clock, Dotson not only did not take any disciplinary
action against him, but also joined in the conversation. King’s
testimony which was corroborated in part by Rapp was
unrebutted and I credit it.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1180
Analysis
I find that the record amply established a prima facie case
that Respondent gave King the warning for talking to Rapp, a
known prounion employee because of King’s then recently
demonstrated support of the Union. Respondent’s knowledge
of King’s and Rapp’s support of the Union has been established
as has its animus toward the Union and its supporters. I find
that the imposition of the warning was a clear departure from
Respondent’s previous condonation of King’s talking to em-
ployees on his way to his work area and was motivated by the
Respondent’s animus toward the Union and its supporters as
part of an effort to stem suspected union discussions between
two known union supporters. This is in sharp contrast to the
subsequent instance wherein King’s talking to antiunion em-
ployees while they were on the clock was condoned by Super-
visor Dotson who joined in the conversation. I find the Re-
spondent has failed to rebut the prima facie case and the July 18
warning was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Wright Line, supra; Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., supra.
5. Verbal warning issued to Brenda Furry
This allegation concerns the issuance of a verbal warning to
former employee Brenda Furry on June 5. Furry who is no
longer employed by Respondent and now resides in Michigan
did not testify. However current employee John Brown did
testify concerning Furry’s union activities, Respondent’s
knowledge thereof and the imposition of discipline therefor.
Brown testified he had observed Furry place prounion literature
on the bulletin board by the timeclock in the Twisting Depart-
ment on five occasions and that she was observed doing so by
the third shift heat set supervisor on all five occasions and was
observed by the second shift heat set supervisor on two occa-
sions. Brown testified that on one of these occasions during the
midnight change of shift, he heard Supervisor Brackett tell
Supervisor Duke, “let’s do it.” He then observed them remove
the prounion literature that Furry had just put on the bulletin
board. Brown further testified that the next morning at about
7:58 a.m. he went to the supervisor’s office to turn in his pa-
perwork and was denied entry by Supervisor Duke. He then
heard Furry ask “what about the equal time on the bulletin
board’s law” to which Twisting Manager Ray Wright replied,
“[n]o one hangs anything up on the bulletin board except my-
self, my secretary, or supervisor.” Furry’s attendance record
contains a verbal warning issued to Furry on June 5 at 7:45
a.m.:

Ray Wright gave Brenda an oral warning for passing out lit-
erature in the work area. He told her he knew of 3 other times
she was told not to do this & she did it again on 6/4—He told
her disciplinary action would be taken if she did it again.

Wright testified at the hearing that Furry’s supervisor (un-
named) had informed him that she had distributed literature
away from the break area and had removed materials posted by
Respondent on a bulletin board and replaced them with unau-
thorized materials. Wright also testified that he had warned
Furry before against distributing material (union literature) near
the smoker’s table which he considered a work area. At the
time of this incident Respondent did not maintain a distribution
policy as the space underneath the heading “Distribution of
Literature Policy” in its policy manual is blank. With respect to
bulletin board use, Respondent introduced in evidence a written
policy providing that only authorized material may be posted.
However, the testimony of Brown which I credit establishes
that employees regularly posted advertisements for yard sales,
various items for sale, and revivals on one of the bulletin
boards near the timeclock which was the same bulletin board
on which Furry had posted the prounion literature. Wright
admitted that he had observed various notices on the bulletin
boards such as “[b]aby showers, motor-cross, tractor pulls, yard
sales, church revivals that sort of thing.” He testified he took
these materials down but admitted he permitted the posting of
thank you cards which were not related to work.
Analysis
I find that the General Counsel has established a prima facie
case that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by the issuance of the verbal warning to Furry for distribut-
ing union literature in work areas and for posting it on the bul-
letin board. Respondent’s animus toward the Union and its
supporters has been established as has Respondent’s knowledge
of Furry’s support of the Union and her activities on its behalf
by her distribution of union literature and the posting of it on
the Respondent’s bulletin board for which she was issued the
verbal warning. Respondent had no policy prohibiting the dis-
tribution of literature. Although the Respondent’s written bul-
letin board policy restricts the bulletin board use to authorized
information concerning the business of the Company, the testi-
mony of Brown amply demonstrates that various notices and
advertisements of personal interest to employees were regularly
posted. I do not credit Wright’s testimony that he routinely
removed these items in strict adherence to the policy. I find it
highly improbable that employees would continue to put no-
tices and advertisements on the bulletin board in violation of a
strictly imposed prohibition against doing so. Obviously, ad-
vertisements for sale of items could easily be traced to the
owner of said items who had posted the advertisements as
could many other notices. I further find it unlikely that if the
Respondent had routinely removed these items from the bulle-
tin board, that they would have reappeared with such regularity.
I note that Respondent presented no evidence of discipline of
other employees for distributing literature or posting notices on
the bulletin board. I further note the testimony of Wright that
he permitted the posting of “Thank You” notices. I find the
Respondent has failed to rebut the prima facie case established
by the General Counsel. I find the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the issuance of the verbal warning
to Brenda Furry. Wright Line, supra; Roure Bertrand Dupont,
Inc., supra.
6. Recission of employee Mike Fowler’s light duty assignment
This case involves an allegation that employee Mike Fowler
was discriminated against by Respondent’s removal of him
from light duty status on May 10, 1996, for making comments
at a meeting held for 15 to 20 employees by high ranking offi-
cials of Respondent’s management. Fowler had incurred tendi-
nitis in his left elbow in 1995, undergone surgery, and had been
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1181
out on workman’s compensation for the disability when he was
informed in December 1995 by Respondent’s human resource
manager for the Calhoun site, Sharon Brooks, that she had
found light duty work for him which carried a higher remunera-
tion than he received from disability under workmen’s compen-
sation alone. He commenced work on light duty status in De-
cember 1995 in the computer area but was transferred shortly
thereafter to the maintenance department when the light duty
work ran out in the computer area. He was restricted to lifting
no more than 5 pounds and pushing 7 pounds with his left arm.
In the maintenance department he was only to be required to fill
and wash heister batteries and perform some cleanup work.
However in the last week of April, Fowler advised Sharon
Brooks in team member resources, that he was performing the
regular maintenance duties of changing heister batteries, chang-
ing RFs, and headlights, in addition to his light duty assignment
and he contended that he should be receiving maintenance pay.
Brooks told Fowler he should not be performing work beyond
his medical restrictions. She testified she proceeded to notify
his supervisors of the restrictions and thought the matter was
resolved.
About a week later on May 8, Respondent conducted small
group meetings with its employees in order to answer several
questions that had been raised by employees and any other
questions or concerns of its employees. Fowler testified that
the meeting was conducted by three management representa-
tives “Jesse Leisure, and the Vice President of Aladdin Mo-
hawk, and the guy over Human Resources of Aladdin Mo-
hawk.” The meeting was attended by 15 to 20 employees.
General topics as to “what was going on inside the Plant” were
discussed at the start of the meeting and then the Union was
discussed. In response to a question by the General Counsel as
to what he recalled “being said about Unions in that meeting?”,
Fowler responded, “One question I asked was they stopped
gain sharing and gift certificates, and stuff like that.” He ad-
dressed his comments to Jesse Leisure who is in charge of the
distribution center. Leisure responded to his questions but
Fowler could not remember at the hearing what Leisure had
said. In response to a question by the General Counsel, “Aside
from gain sharing and the gifts that you said that the Company
had given, do you remember yourself . . . mentioning any other
topics?” Fowler testified, “I mentioned me being on light duty
work and regular maintenance work. Not getting paid for
maintenance.” Fowler testified further that 2 days later he was
called to Ricky Coates’ office and Jesse Leisure and Ricky
Coates were talking and then Jesse Leisure turned around and
said, “Hi Mike.” Fowler had never been introduced to Leisure
prior to this. After this he met with Coates and Sharon Brooks.
Brooks told him they had no more light duty for him and his
light duty status was terminated. Prior to this meeting he had
complained about not getting maintenance pay to heister de-
partment maintenance head, Glen Stanley, and his area supervi-
sor, John Haliday, and supervisor, Reese Jones. He was irri-
tated because his arm was hurting worse and they kept giving
him more work whereas Ricky Coates had told him, he would
only be required to water batteries and to wash them. He also
told Haliday and Stanley that it was dangerous to work on the
batteries.
Sharon Brooks testified that in the last week of April Fowler
came to her and told her he should be paid the same pay as a
maintenance person as he was actually doing the same job as a
maintenance person. She told him he should not be doing this
work which involves maintaining and fixing lift trucks and
changing batteries because this could lead to another injury or
worsen his existing injury. He was concerned that his manager
and supervisor would not work with him on this. She told him
she would talk with them. She rewrote the job description and
clarified his assigned duties to comply with his medical restric-
tions. She talked to the supervisor about it and considered it
settled. The Respondent then sought to introduce the light duty
job description she had prepared and the General Counsel ob-
jected on the ground that this had been subpoenaed and had not
been furnished by the Respondent. I sustained this objection.
Brooks also testified that about May 8, she was notified by her
supervisor, Joe Wilbanks, that at a meeting held at the distribu-
tion center, Fowler had once again complained that he was
working in a maintenance capacity and was not receiving main-
tenance pay. At that point she explained to Wilbanks what had
previously transpired with Fowler and they decided to termi-
nate his light duty restriction and place him back on workman’s
compensation as he was not working within his restrictions.
She was unaware of his union sentiments. Wilbanks was not
questioned by any of the parties concerning this matter.
Analysis
I find the General Counsel has failed to establish a prima fa-
cie case of a violation of the Act by reason of the termination of
Fowler’s light duty assignment. Initially I find that Fowler did
not testify that he made any statement concerning the Union or
his sentiments. It is a stretch to argue that his comments at the
meeting called to address employee questions and concerns,
would give rise to the conclusion that he was a prounion em-
ployee. Although these were certainly concerns over terms and
conditions of employment, they do not support an inference
that these questions labeled him as a union supporter. I further
credit Brook’s testimony that the removal of Fowler from his
light duty position was motivated by concerns for his medical
restrictions rather than because he was identified or perceived
to be a union supporter. I attach no significance to the fact that
Leisure had found out his name by the date of the May 10
meeting. I find that this allegation should be dismissed. Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980); Roure Bertrand Dupont Inc.,
271 NLRB 443 (1984).
7. Written warning issued to Billy Rapp
Employee Billy Rapp operated a tufting machine in the tuft-
ing department. Rapp was an active union supporter who wore
“Vote Yes” and “Union Yes” stickers, a UNITE button and hat,
and posted prounion leaflets on the bulletin board, passed out
union literature in the breakroom, and distributed leaflets at the
gate. He had received a threat of discharge from Supervisor
Clata Crider for removing antiunion literature from the bulletin
board. On June 12, 2 days after he had passed out union litera-
ture at the plant gate, he was called into the office and given a
written warning by Supervisor Ed Dotson in the presence of
Supervisor Clata Crider for running nine beams of the wrong
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1182
yarn. Rapp complained to Crider at the time that he thought it
was funny that “everybody is starting to get wrote up” and
Crider said, “they told us to start writing people up.” Rapp
testified that both Crider and Dotson then laughed. Rapp testi-
fied further that he did not believe he had run the wrong yarn.
Dotson told Rapp that the lot number of the yarn that Rapp had
loaded into the beam machine was mislabeled on the outside of
the bundle. The written warning reads:

Billy is being given this warning for running 9 beams on the
warper of the wrong yarn. Even though he saw was issued
out wrong, he didn’t compare to the lot number against the
worksheet before warping. These beams will have to be used
in preleader at a loss.

The Respondent contends that Rapp had a prior warning in
1993, which it relies on as grounds for the issuance of the writ-
ten warning in the instant case. However, Respondent’s disci-
plinary policy provides:

Major Offenses (Incident Reports) of six months standing or
more on service records of Team Members will not be con-
sidered in disciplinary cases.

Further, Human Resource Manager Sharon Brooks testified
that discipline such as warnings roll off an employees’ record
after 6 months. Thus I find that under the terms of Respon-
dent’s disciplinary policy and based on the testimony of Brooks
that the prior warning could not be relied on by Respondent in
considering the instant case. I further credit Rapp’s unrebutted
testimony that he did not believe he had run the wrong yarn and
I note that since the Respondent did not choose to call either
Dotson or Crider as a witness to support its contention that he
ran the wrong yarn, Respondent has failed to demonstrate that
Rapp did so. However, even assuming arguendo that Rapp did
run the wrong yarn, I find the issuance of a written warning was
at odds with its disciplinary policy that provides that a verbal
warning (as opposed to a written warning) is “to be used for
first signs of unsatisfactory work or conduct.” I also note that
there was no evidence presented by Respondent of any discipli-
nary action having been taken against the employee who origi-
nally mislabeled the thread. I also credit Rapp’s testimony
concerning Crider’s comments that the supervisors had been
told to start writing people up and the laughter of both Crider
and Dotson concerning Crider’s statement.
Analysis
I thus find that the General Counsel has established a prima
facie case of a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
Respondent by its issuance of the written warning to Rapp.
Rapp was a known union adherent who had previously been
threatened by Respondent’s management and who was disci-
plined during the peak of union activity and shortly after he
openly handbilled at the plant gate on behalf of the Union.
Respondent’s animus has been established and I conclude that
the adverse employment action (the written warning) was moti-
vated by Respondent’s efforts to stem the union campaign. As
Respondent did not call either Dotson or Crider, Rapp’s testi-
mony is unrebutted and I draw an adverse inference that the
testimony of Crider and Dotson would have been unfavorable
to Respondent’s position. I thus find Respondent has failed to
rebut the prima facie case by the preponderance of the evi-
dence. Wright Line, supra; Roure BertrandDupont, Inc., supra.
8. Written warning issued to Edna Tudor
Edna Tudor, a tufting machine operator in the tufting de-
partment received a written warning, on June 7, for running a
low loop line in over 800 feet of carpet on June 6. Tudor was a
known union supporter who testified without rebuttal that she
wore union buttons and stickers at the workplace. She had
previously been questioned by Supervisor Crider at the time-
clock as to who had taken down antiunion literature posted on
the bulletin board. Tudor had never received any discipline
prior to June 6. The Respondent’s stated policy in its employ-
ment manual provides that employees will receive verbal coun-
seling prior to being issued written warnings for lesser offenses
such as for workmanship. However, in the instant case, Tudor
was initially issued a “final” written warning for her first in-
stance of running a low loop line. Tudor had never received
any discipline of any kind prior to this. Tudor testified she was
running two clutch machines, 19 and 53, at the same time when
this incident occurred. Machine 53 was in a changeover going
from small cones of thread to larger cones. Machine 19 was in
a run down mode wherein it was running down small (little
bitty) cones of thread and was giving Tudor problems because
the clutches go “out on it and leaves you low lines and high
lines (defects on the carpet), and I was paying more attention to
19 than I was 53 because it was running better.” Machine 53
ran a low line. On the next day (June 7) when she came to
work, Supervisor Clata Crider told her she had run bad carpet.
Later that shift Crider took her to Supervisor Ed Dotson who
told her he hated to do it but “we’ve got to write you up for
running low line.” Tudor did not read the written warning but
signed it and returned to her job and then read it and saw that it
was a “final warning.” She then went to Crider and Dotson
who told her that he had to do what they told him to do. The
next day she saw Tufting Department Manager Dollie Daven-
port, and asked her why she had been issued a final warning
and Davenport said, “Well Edna . . . I would have bet my whole
pay day that you hadn’t been on that job when you run that low
line.” The next day or two she spoke to Davenport’s supervi-
sor, Site Manager Lou Childers and told him she had received
the final warning. He made notes in his notebook. She ex-
plained to him that she had been on two clutch machines and it
was almost impossible to run them. The next day Davenport
told her she was removing the “final” warning and told Dotson
to white out the “final” warning and bring her a copy. How-
ever, the written warning otherwise remained in place.
Respondent presented a September 17, 1991 memorandum
regarding the inspection of carpeting, which Tudor acknowl-
edged she had signed. The memorandum provides that carpet-
ing should be inspected every 5 minutes or 50 feet but is silent
concerning the operation of a clutch machine or when an opera-
tor is operating two machines at the same time as in this case.
Tudor testified that Machine 53 ran so fast that 50 feet is run
“before you can get back around the machine.” Tufting De-
partment Manager Dollie Davenport, testified she was called to
the printer (dye house) by the quality assurance department
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1183
where the employees were trying to determine why the carpet
was moving in and out on the selvage and she spotted a low
line (defect) which ran for over 800 feet. She returned to the
tufting department and told Second-Shift Supervisor Dotson to
look up who had run this carpeting and give them a “final”
warning. When she told him the machine it had been run on he
knew it was Tudor and she told him to give her a final warning
because she was upset that Tudor had run over 800 feet of car-
pet which “was a lot of carpet to be running with a solid line.”
The next day or so, she and her supervisor, Lou Childers, spoke
about it and she decided that Tudor deserved a “lesser warning
and that I was probably upset the day before,” and the warning
was reduced to a written warning. In response to questions on
cross-examination, Davenport testified that discipline should be
issued to an operator who runs over 50 feet of defect in carpet-
ing if they are running a single machine, but that if an operator
is running two different machines they may not be disciplined
for exceeding 50 feet of defective carpet but that whether the
machine is a clutch machine is not determinative as clutch ma-
chines are not more difficult to operate than other machines.
Analysis
The record established that Tudor was a known union sup-
porter and Respondent’s animus toward the Union and its sup-
porters and has been established. It has also been established
that Respondent issued Tudor a “final” written warning for
running over 800 feet of defective carpet well in excess of the
50 feet permitted under its 1991 memorandum. Further, the
timing of this warning is suspect coming as it did in the midst
of the union campaign and its close grouping with other disci-
pline to employees and the statement made to employee Rapp
by Crider and joined in by Dotson’s laughter to the effect that
Respondent’s management was issuing more frequent warn-
ings, particularly after the threat of Crider and other members
of management that it would do so. Under these circumstances
I conclude that the General Counsel has established a prima
facie case of a violation of the Act by the issuance of the “final”
written warning later reduced to a “written warning” to Tudor.
However, I find that the Respondent has rebutted the prima
facie case by the preponderance of the evidence as it has dem-
onstrated that it would have taken the action against Tudor even
in the absence of an unlawful motive. Initially, I credit Daven-
port that she was upset by the magnitude of the over 800 feet of
defective carpet, and this was the reason for the issuance of a
“final” warning to Tudor which, on reflection, and after discus-
sion with her supervisor, Childers, was reduced to a “written
warning.” Davenport candidly acknowledged that there is
some leeway beyond the 50 feet or 5 minutes check of carpet-
ing being run when an operator is running more than one ma-
chine. However, in this instance, Tudor ran over 16 times as
much bad carpeting as permitted by the 1991 memorandum and
in terms of time did not check the carpeting for a period of over
1 hour and 20 minutes. Under any circumstances, I find this a
major infraction under Respondent’s disciplinary policy which
would justify a written rather than a verbal warning. I shall
recommend that this allegation be dismissed. Wright Line,
supra, Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., supra.
9. The written warning and termination of Debra Johnson
The record established that Debra Johnson was a well known
supporter of the Union, who attended union meetings, wore
union buttons, distributed union literature, sang a union song to
her supervisor, and spoke up on behalf of the Union in a captive
audience meeting conducted by the Respondent on May 19. An
8-year employee, Debra Johnson had received a written warn-
ing for excessive tardiness on December 13, 1995. She re-
ceived a second written warning on May 20, for violations of
the attendance policy the day following the Respondent’s cap-
tive audience meeting held to combat the union campaign after
Director of Manufacturing Joe Yarbrough had angrily asked
what her name was when she spoke up on behalf of the Union,
called certain working conditions at Respondent’s plant, slav-
ery and asked permission to leave the meeting which was de-
nied. Neither warning is alleged as a violation in the complaint.
The Respondent has a 6-month-limitation on disciplinary action
wherein under the terms of its disciplinary policy, warnings roll
off of an employee’s disciplinary record after the completion of
6 months. This is in conformance with its disciplinary policy
wherein three warnings issued an employee in a 6-month period
result in termination. It is not necessary that the warnings are
of like kind (i.e., attendance related) but as in Debra Johnson’s
case, can result from a combination of different offenses, such
as attendance and poor workmanship. On June 4, Debra John-
son produced 400 feet of poor quality carpet when she did not
catch a “low line” (a major defect) while she was operating two
machines. It is standard operating procedure that tufting ma-
chine operators are required to inspect their carpet for defects
every 5 minutes or 50 feet. If the defects are discovered during
the tufting process the operator is to stop the machine, deter-
mine the cause, and fix the problem or call maintenance and to
send defective carpet to the mending frame. If the defective
carpet is not discovered during the tufting phase, it continues on
in the manufacturing process for dying, cutting, and packaging.
Once these steps have occurred, the carpet cannot be repaired
and must either be sold as second quality, cut up for sale as
scrap, or used as a preleader.
On June 12, Tufting Machine Manager Dolly Davenport was
informed by the reinspect department that she had some off
quality carpet. She went to the reinspect area, viewed the car-
pet, took a sample of the defective carpet and the finished roll
number which she inputed into the computer to obtain the work
in process (WIP) number whereupon she discovered that the
roll in question (WIP number 4500455) had been run by Debra
Johnson on June 4, 1996. At this point she left a note for then
Supervisors Laura Watts and J. R. Parker to give Debra John-
son a written warning for running the defective carpet and per-
mitting it to continue on in the manufacturing process. When
Watts saw Davenport’s note and instruction to give Debra
Johnson a written warning, she reviewed Johnson’s file and
noted that this would be her third warning within the 6-month
period and that she therefore needed approval prior to the issu-
ance of the warning which would result in termination under
Respondent’s disciplinary policy. Watts then called Davenport
who was home and left a message on her answering machine.
Davenport testified she was not aware that this would be John-
son’s third warning and she therefore went up the chain of
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1184
command to her supervisor, Lou Childers, on her next shift on
June 13 and discussed it with him. She and Childers then de-
cided in accordance with Respondent’s policy to issue the
warning to Johnson and left another note instructing Watts and
Parker to issue Johnson the third warning which would result in
Johnson’s discharge. They did so at the start of their shift on
June 13.
At the hearing Johnson testified that her machine had a prob-
lem that night and that she noted a wave in the first roll of car-
pet (roll #4500455) as she took over from the previous shift
operator. Johnson testified that she called attention to the wave
which was caused by the second shift having put the wrong
backing on the carpet. She testified that she called attention of
Watts and Parker to the problem and that Parker instructed her
to continue to run the carpet so he and a mechanic called to the
machine could discover and fix the problem and that Parker and
the mechanic spent a great deal of time working on her machine
while she ran the carpet that night. She testified that Watts had
also called Angie Nesbitt from quality control to determine the
cause of the problem. Watts and Parker denied that they were
aware of any problem on the first roll. Watts testified that she
noticed a wave on the second roll (#4500456) run by Johnson
and called Parker and Angie Nesbitt from quality control and
that she had Johnson stop the roll while she attempted to deter-
mine the cause. Watts also testified she was unaware of a me-
chanic having worked on the machine that night and did not
believe Parker was by the machine most of the night. Parker
testified he was not called to look at the carpet until the second
roll and that he did not spend a large portion of the shift by the
machine and did not recall a mechanic having worked on the
carpet that night. Neither Nesbitt nor the mechanics were
called by the parties. Watts is no longer employed by Respon-
dent and testified she left after she was married as she was un-
able to transfer to the day shift.
Analysis
I find that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by its discharge of Debra Johnson. Initially, I find
that the General Counsel has established that Johnson was a
known union supporter who engaged in protected concerted
activities on behalf of the Union in its campaign to represent
Respondent’s production employees. Respondent’s animus
toward the Union and its supporters has been established. The
discharge of Debra Johnson was an adverse employment action
closely related in time to the upcoming election and with sev-
eral other adverse employment actions taken against other un-
ion supporters. The combination of all of these elements dem-
onstrates a prima facie case that Respondent’s discharge of
Debra Johnson was motivated by animus directed against her
because of her engagement in concerted activities. I have noted
the disparity in the enforcement of Respondent’s disciplinary
policy (i.e., the failure to discharge employees for several seri-
ous offenses noted as intolerable offenses warranting dis-
charge). However, my review of the overall testimony of Dav-
enport, Watts, and Parker convinces me that Johnson was is-
sued the third warning for a legitimate reason related to her
failure to discover a serious defect. By all accounts she would
have discovered the defect if she had inspected the carpet every
50 feet or 5 minutes as set out in the standard. Johnson thus
failed to inspect the carpet roll #4500455 for a total of 400 feet
or 80 minutes giving rise to the written warning. It appears by
all accounts (Parker, Watts who has left the Company and has
no stake in the outcome of this case, and Davenport) that there
was no abuse of discretion or irregularity in the consideration
of and imposition of discipline. Thus Watts and Parker held off
on the issuance of the warning and Watts informed Davenport
that this would be Johnson’s third warning and Davenport told
her to hold off further until she reviewed the matter with her
supervisor, Childers, after which she left another note for
Parker and Watts to issue the warning and terminate Johnson
which they did. As the Respondent contends, there is no evi-
dence that Davenport was involved in any of the alleged 8(a)(1)
violations. I thus conclude that although the records set out in
posthearing. exhibits show that there has been some disparity in
the imposition of discipline there is evidence that discipline has
been imposed for producing defective carpeting. I conclude
that the General Counsel has established a prima facie case of a
violation of the Act by the issuance of the third warning to and
discharge of Debra Johnson. I find however that the prima
facie case has been rebutted by Respondent by the preponder-
ance of the evidence. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980);
Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984). I shall
recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
10. Discharge of Rodney Atkisson
Rodney Atkisson was employed at Respondent’s spinning
plant as a winder server on the third shift from midnight to 8
a.m. Atkisson had been initially employed by Respondent in
April of 1995, and discharged in October 1995 because of three
accumulated written warnings for attendance problems and
rehired by Respondent a month later. Atkisson suffers from
hypoglycemia, a form of diabetes from which he becomes weak
with a tendency to pass out and which can lead to a diabetic
coma, and there is substantial evidence in the record that the
Respondent had accommodated his extensive attendance prob-
lems, only some of which were medically related. Atkisson
testified that in April, shortly after the advent of the union cam-
paign, he was sitting at the break table discussing an antiunion
pamphlet about the Union with some of his coworkers. The
pamphlet showed the Union with weapons. He commented to
Supervisor Robin Chatmon that the Union was going to give us
(the employees) weapons to defend ourselves and laughed.
Chatmon became upset and asked him if he was seriously con-
sidering voting for the Union. He said, “yes,” and Chatmon
told him it would be foolhardy to vote for the Union as the
plant could shutdown, leaving employees without jobs and
taking away their benefits. Subsequently 2 weeks after the
advent of the union campaign, his supervisor, Steve Eivers, told
him and a coworker that if they voted for the Union, the plant
would shutdown and that Respondent “had the funds to shut-
down, pick up and leave. Himself, including us, would be
without jobs.” Eivers also asked him if he supported the Union
and he nodded yes in response. Subsequently in June he re-
quested a meeting with Eivers to discuss rumors from other
employees and several telephone calls he had received that if he
voted for the Union he would be discharged. He has no idea
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1185
who made the telephone calls as he did not recognize the voice.
At this meeting he reported the rumors and telephone calls to
Eivers. Eivers said, “[H]e had no idea where they was getting
their information from.” At this meeting Eivers told him “he
could legally ask me about the Union” and asked him how he
was going to vote and told him if he voted yes the plant would
shutdown, pick up and leave and there would be a lot of people
without jobs. He became upset as he had not asked to meet
with Eivers to talk about the Union. On this night, a Monday,
five or six employees came up to him on the shift, told him they
had heard he was terminated and inquired what he was doing in
the plant. Atkisson testified that the next night (June 4) the
rumors became worse as employees continued to approach him
and inquire what he was doing in the plant as they had heard he
had been discharged. An hour-and-a-half or 2 hours after the
start of the shift, he looked for his supervisor, Steve Eivers, but
was unable to locate him. He then wrote a note to Eivers which
said,

Steve,

I’m sorry about this, but I can not work in this situa-
tion. I’ll be back in the morning to talk with Robert.
(Wages)

Sorry,

Rodney Atkisson

He then clocked out and left after completing only 2 hours of
his shift. He came back to the plant the next morning but was
unable to speak with Robert Wages, a management official. He
was able to speak to Phil Riner and Freddie McClure, two
members of management. He attempted to explain to them his
reasons for leaving prior to the completion of his shift. “They
became rude and hostile towards me and told me that since I
had left I no longer had a job at Mohawk Industries. Freddie
McClure stood up and threw his arm up and told me to shut up
and get out of his office.” He then left and went to “what we
refer to as the Glass House” and spoke with Joe (Wilbanks).
He discussed the situation with Wilbanks who asked him if he
could return later to discuss the matter with Robert Wages
which he did later that day. He met with Wages with Wilbanks
present and explained what had led to his leaving his shift
early. Wages indicated he would look into the matter and
asked him to return the following week to discuss the matter
further. He did so and met with Wages again who told him, he
had investigated the matter and that the termination would not
be reversed.
Atkisson was absent eight times in the period of January
through March 1996, with one unexcused absence in January
and one in March. He received only verbal but no written
warnings during this period. In April 1996 he had two unex-
cused absences. In May he was absent 6 days with two of the
absences being unexcused. On April 15, 1996, the first day of
handbilling by the Union, he received a written warning for
excess absences. This warning followed his absences on March
29 and April 1, 1996, due to car trouble and on April 12, 1996,
for illness. On May 3, 1996, he was absent due to personal
problems and received another written warning for excess ab-
sences. On May 23, 1996, his Supervisor Steve Eivers re-
viewed his attendance problems with him following 3 days of
absence for illness on May 20, 21, and 22, and Eivers told him
he may be terminated if more attendance violations occur. On
June 4, 1996, Atkisson came to work and complained to Eivers
of phone calls he had received wherein he was told he “would
lose his job for sure,” according to his separation record filled
out by Eivers. This record further states that on June 4, Eivers
found a note on his desk from Atkisson which stated he “could
not work in this situation and left.” The note also stated that he
would return in the “morning to talk to Robert (Wages).” On
this record Eivers notes “6–5–96 Did not call in. Assumed
quit.” This record is also signed by Department Manager
Robert Wages. Phil Riner, the plant administrator for the spin-
ning plant testified that Atkisson was also absent on May 31,
1996, and he instructed his supervisor, Eivers, to ask Atkisson
to bring in medical documents the following day for review.
On June 3, Atkisson forgot his medical documents but was
allowed to work and worked the entire shift. On Tuesday, June
4, Atkisson left a note on Eivers desk and went home early.
Riner testified that this is grounds for termination. He testified
that management of Respondent considered Atkisson as having
resigned as he had left his job and not returned.
Analysis
The General Counsel and Charging Party contend that a
prima facie case of a violation of the Act has been established
by reason of the issuance of the third written warning and ter-
mination of Atkisson on June 5, noting that Atkisson’s prob-
lematic attendance record had long been tolerated by Respon-
dent and it was only after the advent of the union campaign and
Atkisson’s outspoken support of the Union that the April 15
and May 24 warnings were given to Atkisson and that he was
terminated on June 5, whereas Respondent contends he volun-
tarily quit. It must be noted at the outset that the timing of the
April 15 warning on the day of the advent of the union cam-
paign in conjunction with the threats and other evidence of
animus by Respondent’s supervisors and members of manage-
ment as found above support the finding of a prima facie case
of a volation by reason of the June 5 termination of Atkisson
because of his known support of the Union. While Atkisson’s
attendance record was undeniably poor, the evidence clearly
shows that his attendance problems were tolerated and his ill-
ness accommodated following his rehire after his termination in
1995. The issuance of the written warnings to Atkisson in
April and May and his termination in June by Respondent cor-
respond close in time to Supervisor Crider’s statement that
Respondent had told its supervisors to issue more warnings.
Moreover the continued issuance of threats of plant closure and
job loss by Supervisor Eivers during his meetings with Atkis-
son concerning his attendance problems reinforce Respondent’s
point that union supporters will be punished as predicted by
Crider that they would be put on a list and that management
would ride them. I find the campaign of rumors that Atkisson,
who I credit in this regard, was going to be terminated supports
the inference that the word was put out by Respondent’s man-
agement and that Respondent seized on Atkisson’s departure
from the plant during his shift as an early quit which I find it
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1186
was not. Rather I find that Respondent discharged Atkisson
because of his support of the Union. I find that the Respondent
has failed to rebut the prima facie case established of a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Wright Line, supra;
Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., supra.
11. The alleged constructive discharge of Chris Johnson
Chris Johnson was a well thought of employee who had been
employed as an outside inspector for a portion of his time as
well as an offline carpet inspector in the reinspect department.
However, once he declared his support of the Union, his out-
side inspection duties were transferred to another affiliate of
Respondent and he was relegated to the most unpleasant of
carpet inspection jobs, that of operating a manual roll to exam-
ine used carpets which were often soiled with animal urine and
feces, in order to determine whether they were defective or
salvageable. He was also told that he would suffer a reduction
in pay and a downgrade in his job. He testified that his status
as an employee with a bright future with Respondent as related
to him by Respondent’s management changed radically after
his open support of the Union with his prospects as an em-
ployee dim and that he therefore found his position untenable
and left his employment. The General Counsel and the Charg-
ing Party contend that he was constructively discharged.
Johnson was employed from November 1989 until June 20,
1996. At the time he left, he was an offline and outside inspec-
tor in the reinspect department with a rate of pay of $10.52 per
hour. His department was in the distribution center. Lead in-
spector jobs paid $12 per hour. His immediate supervisor was
Danny Hartline. He participated in union activities and about
the last week in May wore a union hat and patch which each
bore the name UNITE. Respondent’s management held group
meetings with the employees in his department. Prior to his
show of support for the Union, his supervisor, Danny Hartline,
had “come up and laugh, tell jokes, just talk about a little bit of
everything, on the job and off the job.” However, after his
show of support he “got a cold shoulder” from Hartline as “The
kind of one on one, we used to talk at a lot, kind of quit and the
only action that he had with me was relating to the job.” In
addition to his duties as an offline inspector and an outside
inspector he also performed a clerical job on the replacement
table. As an outside inspector he would travel to outside mills
to which Mohawk had sent 15 foot width carpets which Mo-
hawk did not generally do to an outside coater to have it coated.
He “would look at the quality of the carpet and the coating, rate
it as to first quality or second quality.” If it was second quality
he would document why it was second quality and what de-
partment that quality defect came from. He spent 1 to 4 days
per week performing the outside inspections. He also per-
formed offline inspection at Calhoun as the rolls of carpet came
off the coater in Calhoun and repaired defective carpets. He
did not spend much time performing this offline inspection and
repair work, “maybe once a week, sometimes twice a week.”
He performed the clerical portion of his job on the replacement
table the majority of the time. In this position, the heister
driver would put a roll of carpet on the table. Johnson would
then get the ticket off the roll and the screen, get an order num-
ber, go into another screen and it would tell him what the defect
was according to the customer. He would relay this informa-
tion to the lady running the table and they would both examine
the carpet to find any defects.
When he reported to work at 8 a.m. on June 9 following a
week of vacation, he was met by his supervisor, Danny Har-
tline, who told him there had “been a change in my job and that
they were cutting out outside inspecting.” He asked if there
was a problem with his job performance and Hartline said,
“[N]o, that everybody was happy with my job, . . . that it was a
decision made in upper management that they were going to let
Aladdin, which was already in Dalton, and—all the outside
coaters I went to were in Dalton and Chatsworth—they were
going to let the Aladdin inspectors, since they were already in
Dalton, let them go across town and do it versus letting me
come from Calhoun to get up there and do it. It was cheaper
for the company.” He asked Hartline if he had a job and Har-
tline said, “[H]e had a job for me. He put me on the rollup on
the return table.” The rollup job normally paid around $8 an
hour whereas he was then earning $10.52 an hour. He asked if
his “pay would get cut and he said not right now. But they
were in the process of evaluating jobs and that it would be my
job. If they evaluated it eight dollars ($8) an hour, that’s what I
would get.” When Hartline had interviewed him for the job, he
had told him “that if I kept my nose clean and done a good job
that I could go places in that position. That it had a lot of re-
sponsibilities and if I could prove myself to be good and able to
handle the job, that I could probably advance to a better posi-
tion.” Other employees who had held this job had been pro-
moted. At the time Hartline told him of the elimination of the
outside inspection work from his duties, he did not say anything
about the clerical duties he had been performing at the re-
placement table. However, this function was also eliminated
from his duties. He asked Hartline how long he would be on
the rollup job and Hartline said, “[M]aybe a week till when-
ever, he really didn’t know.” When he had performed the cleri-
cal job on the replacement table, he had the opportunity to work
with managers from other departments on a daily basis. The
rollup job that he was reassigned to was in a remote part of the
department and was regarded as one of the lowest dirtiest jobs
in the plant. The carpeting he was inspecting has a 7-year war-
ranty against wear and had been used by the customer for 2 or 3
years and was matting down and “could have animal urine,
feces, anything on the carpet. Just odor, nasty carpet.” This
job also required a lot of physical exertion as this rollup table
was not automated and he was required to stick a pole in the
roll wrapped around the core “to push it and pull it to keep it
running straight.” Sometimes the rolls were a 150 to 200 feet
long. The other rollup tables were automated. There was no
training for this job whereas he had been trained for 2 months
for his outside inspection duties which required a great deal of
paperwork. The rollup job required no paperwork. Johnson
performed the new duties on the rollup table until June 20 when
he telephoned Sharon Brooks in personnel and told her he was
not happy with his job, that he had been demoted for no reason
and asked her if there was something else in the mill. She said
she could offer him a job in shipping on the second or third
shift. He told her he had more seniority than most of the em-
ployees on day shift as transfer to the day shift is based on sen-
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1187
iority and he had been on days for 4 years. He told her that he
felt that after his 7 years of service, the Company did not re-
spect him any longer and that he was seriously thinking of leav-
ing. This telephone conversation had taken place while he was
at work and when he hung up he turned around and saw Danny
Hartline standing behind him. Hartline told him he should use
the pay phone and that he was on company time and he needed
Johnson on his job. Johnson was caught up with his work at
the time. Prior to this he had used this phone in the workplace
and had been observed by Hartline without comment. He
clocked out at the end of his shift on this date and has not re-
turned to work since. He had been working part time at a
trucking terminal and has worked full time for them since leav-
ing Mohawk. He left his employment with Mohawk because
he had gone from a job with a future to no security in his job.
While an employee of Respondent he had participated in com-
munity affairs as a volunteer on behalf of the Company at a
safety fair and wore the Company’s mascot uniform. He had
invited customers in and had served as a tour guide in the de-
partments in the mill to explain how their carpet was produced.
The Respondent had received a letter from a representative of a
group from British Columbia to whom he had given a tour of
the facilities. The letter stated in part, “The young fellow, Chris
Johnson, was an excellent tour guide and seemed genuinely
excited about working for Mohawk Industries.” He had held
the offline and outside inspection jobs about 2 years prior to the
hearing. On cross-examination he testified he spoke to Carl
Cothran, Hartline’s supervisor, after his conversation with Har-
tline. Cothran also told him that the outside inspection job
would be performed by an Aladdin employee in Dalton. Co-
thran told him sometimes you have to take a step backward to
go forward, that there would be a job for him but it may be
rollup. Cothran also told him the department was going to be
reorganized and that positions would be assigned based on
seniority. He (Johnson) said that would mean with his senior-
ity, he would end up a lift truckdriver and that he was making
more as a lift truck driver at Reeves Trucking where he worked
part time and that he might as well go over there. At the time
Mohawk had too many employees in his department. He did
not report to work on the day (a Friday) after his conversation
with Brooks and did not inform Hartline or Cothran he was
quitting but called Brooks the following Tuesday and told her
he was quitting. He acknowledged that prior to the elimination
of his inspector duties he had filled in and driven a forklift
when the driver was out and had helped the person doing the
rollup when he was not engaged in outside inspection work, but
contended he did not do the rollup work. There was always
someone on the rollup job. However there had been a person
assigned to this job but there had been two shifts and the Com-
pany eliminated the second shift and moved employees on the
second shift to the day shift and Hartline had too many employ-
ees on the day shift and had various employees perform the
rollup work. Johnson also testified that Hartline had told the
employees in the break room on several occasions that unions
had caused other mills to shutdown when they had moved in
and that unions did not do anything for employees but just hurt
the Company. The changes in Johnson’s job were communi-
cated to him by Hartline on June 9, 5 days prior to the election
scheduled for June 14. Carl Cothran testified the decision to
transfer Johnson’s duties to Aladdin was made at the end of
May.
Analysis
I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act by its constructive discharge of its employee Chris
Johnson. I credit Johnson’s testimony in its entirety and find it
fully supports the conclusion that the elimination of his outside
inspection duties, his clerical duties, and his offline inspection
duties and his assignment to the rollup table on a full-time basis
coupled with the bleak outlook given to him by Hartline and
Cothran that he would be relegated to a lower rated job and
probably demotion were calculated to punish him and push him
to quit once he made his support for the Union known in late
May. Respondent’s antiunion animus has been amply demon-
strated in this case as well as that of Johnson’s supervisor, Har-
tline, who threatened plant closure to Johnson and other em-
ployees if the Union were successful in its campaign and won
the election scheduled for June 14. As the General Counsel and
the Charging Party contend, the timing of Respondent’s actions
against Johnson almost immediately after Johnson’s open sup-
port of the Union only 4 days prior to the election supports the
inevitable conclusion that the actions taken against Johnson
were unlawfully motivated. I do not credit the testimony of
Cothran and Hartline that these changes in Johnson’s duties
were economically motivated. I found their testimony to be
contrived to cover up the real reason for the elimination of
Johnson’s duties as an outside and offline inspector and his
clerical duties and his transfer to the manually operated rollup
table. I do not grant the General Counsel’s motion to strike
Respondent’s exhibits of the mileage expenses or Cothran’s
and Hartline’s testimony. However, I do not credit their testi-
mony and I find that even assuming arguendo that the outside
inspection duties of Johnson’s were eliminated for valid finan-
cial reasons, there was no valid reason substantiated for the
removal of Johnson’s clerical and offline inspection duties and
his relegation to the rollup table.

To prove a prima facie case of constructive discharge, the
General Counsel must prove (1) the burdens imposed on [the
employee] were intended to cause and did cause a change in
his working conditions that were so difficult or unpleasant as
to force him to resign; and (2) such burdens were imposed by
the Company because of [the employee’s] union activities.
Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 NLRB 1068 (1968).
Once the General Counsel has proven a prima facie case of
constructive discharge, the burden shifts to the Company to
prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the change in
conditions.

Grand Canyon Mining Co., 318 NLRB 748, 760 (1955).
The Board’s two-part test in constructive discharge cases is:

First, the burdens imposed upon the employee must
cause, and be intended to cause, a change in working con-
ditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to resign.
Second, it must be shown that those burdens were im-
posed because of the employee’s union activities.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1188
Mfg. Services, 295 NLRB 254, 255 (1989), enfd. 902 F.2d 1009
(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222
NLRB 1068, 1069 (1976). See also Sheraton Inn Airport, 232
NLRB 670 (1977), Re: more onerous working conditions (such
as the rollup table in this case) can satisfy criteria for construc-
tive discharge.
I find that the General Counsel has established a prima facie
case of a constructive discharge. I find Respondent has failed
to rebut the prima facie case established by the General Coun-
sel. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980); Roure Bertrand
Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984), and that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by
(a) The unlawful interrogation of employee Wesley Silvers
by Supervisor Clata Crider concerning his union sympathies
and creating the impression of surveillance of employees’ un-
ion activities and threatening him with plant closure or keeping
the employees out on strike as the company would not agree to
a contract, thus, conveying the futility of the employees selec-
tion of the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(b) The threat of reprisal made to Silvers by Creel Boss,
Aileen Story, and affirmed by Supervisor Clata Crider.
(c) The threat of plant closure issued by Supervisor Crider to
employee Carolyn Rogers.
(d) The threat of job loss and plant closure issued to em-
ployee Carolyn Rogers and other employees by Supervisor
Clata Crider and the second incident wherein Crider told the
employees that Respondent had a list of all employees who had
signed union cards and had the “agitators” at the top of the list
with plans to “ride them” once “this mess is over.”
(e) The threat issued by Supervisor Clata Crider to employ-
ees Edna Tudor, Wanda Gladen, and Rachel Sutterbook that the
Respondent would discharge whoever had removed antiunion
literature from the breakroom door which had been posted by
the Respondent.
(f) The interrogation by Supervisor Crider of employee Billy
Rapp concerning his having removed antiunion literature from
the breakroom door and the threat of discharge issued by Crider
to Rapp for doing so.
(g) The interrogation by Supervisor Robin Chatmon of em-
ployee Rodney Atkisson concerning his union sympathies and
the threat of plant closure, job loss, and loss of benefits issued
by Chatmon to Atkisson if the employees selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative.
(h) The interrogation by Supervisors J. R. Parker and Laura
Watts of employee Roy King concerning his union sympathies.
(i) The interrogation by Supervisor Steve Eivers of employee
Rodney Atkisson concerning his support of the Union and the
threat issued by Eivers to Atkisson of plant closure and job loss
if the employees selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative.
(j) The interrogation by Supervisor Linda Williams of em-
ployee Scott Gaylor concerning his union support.
(k) The threat by Supervisor John Rainwater to the shipping
department heister drivers that Respondent would close down
the plant or move it if the Union “came in” (won the election).
(l) The threat issued by Supervisor Ed Dotson to employee
Billy Rapp that Respondent might relocate its machinery if the
Union were selected as the employees’ collective-bargaining
representative.
(m) The creation of the impression of surveillance of the
employees by Supervisor Gary McCarley and the threat of re-
prisals against union instigators issued by McCarley to em-
ployee John Brown.
(n) The instigation, sponsorship, and participation in an ef-
fort to “assist” employees with the revocation of their signed
union cards.
(o) The change in telephone policy announced by Supervisor
John Rainwater to the heister drivers.
(p) Threat of loss of benefits issued by Supervisor Andy
Tidmore to employee James Baumgardner.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by:
(a) The verbal warnings issued to the heister drivers.
(b) The verbal warning issued to employee Roy King.
(c) The verbal warning issued to employee Scott Gaylor on
April 22 for distribution of union literature.
(d) The verbal warning issued to employee Brenda Furry.
(g) The verbal warning issued to employee Billy Rapp.
(f) The discharge of Rodney Atkisson.
(e) The constructive discharge of employee Chris Johnson.
5. Respondent did not violate the Act by
(a) The verbal warning issued to employee Scott Gaylor for
low production on May 22.
(b) The recission of employee Mike Fowler’s light duty as-
signment.
(c) The written warning issued to employee Edna Tudor.
(d) The written warning and termination of employee Debra
Johnson.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices in conjunction with
Respondent’s status as an employer affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent, having discrimi-
natorily discharged and refused to reinstate employees, it must
offer them reinstatement and make them whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from
date of discharge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less
any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES 1189
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, Mohawk Industries, Inc., Calhoun, Geor-
gia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Engaging in unlawful interrogation of its employees con-
cerning their union sympathies, activities, and support of the
Union.
(b) Creating the impression of surveillance of its employees’
union activities.
(c) Threatening its employees with plant closure or reloca-
tion, discharge, loss of jobs and benefits, unspecified reprisals;
that it has a list of union supporters and that the instigators are
at the top of the list and that it plans to “ride them” and to issue
warnings; with the futility of the selection of the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative as it will not sign a labor
agreement and/or will shutdown or relocate.
(d) Instigating, facilitating, and assisting the revocation of
the employees’ signed union cards.
(e) Enforcing an invalid bulletin board policy restricting the
posting of prounion notices and the distribution of prounion
literature in nonwork areas while posting and/or permitting the
posting of antiunion notices and the distribution of antiunion
literature.
(f) Restricting telephone use in order to stem the union cam-
paign.
(g) Issuing verbal and written warnings to union supporters
and discharging union supporters and constructively discharg-
ing union supporters.
(h) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Rodney
Atkisson and Chris Johnson full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Rodney Atkisson and Chris Johnson whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the rem-
edy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharges, and the
unlawful warnings issued to the heister drivers, employees Roy
King, Brenda Furry, Billy Rapp, and Scott Gaylor and within 3
days thereafter notify the employees in writing that this has
been done and that the discharges and warnings will not be
used against them in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Calhoun, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 15,
1996.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
(g) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”