Mody, Rustom et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 11, 20202019004154 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/190,694 06/23/2016 Rustom Mody BHI4-59930-US-NP 7699 44639 7590 12/11/2020 CANTOR COLBURN LLP-BAKER HUGHES, A GE COMPANY, LLC 20 Church Street 22nd Floor Hartford, CT 06103 EXAMINER BUTCHER, BRIAN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/11/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte RUSTOM MODY, JOEL TARVER, GREG FOLKS, MATHIAS SCHLECHT, HAROLD BRANNON, ERIK NORDENSTAM, and TIMOTHY M. DONOUGHUE ____________ Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JAMES B. ARPIN, and GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–14, 16, and 17. Final Act. 1.2 Claims 15 and 18–20 1 “Appellant” here refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Baker Hughes Incorporated. Appeal Br. 1. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed November 16, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 2, 2019); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 25, 2018) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed March 25, 2019); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed June 23, 2016 ). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 2 are canceled. Appeal Br. 15–16 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE According to Appellant, the claimed systems “relate to collection, processing, and presentation of information.” Spec. ¶ 9. In particular, the claimed subject matter relates to a wearable information gathering and processing system including an information obtaining device, a processing device, and an information-providing device coupled to the processing device. Id. ¶ 3. As noted above, claims 1–14, 16, and 17 stand rejected. Claim 1 is the sole independent claim. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). Claims 2–14, 16, and 17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Id. at 14–16. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is illustrative. 1. A wearable information gathering and processing system, the system comprising: an information obtaining device, the information obtaining device including a radio frequency identification (RFID) reader, an infra red (IR) detector, a global positioning system (GPS) receiver, a laser measurement device, microphone, and camera; a processing device, the processing device including at least one of a voice recognition processor, a gesture recognition processor, IR processor or measurement data processor configured to process data from said information obtaining device; and an information-providing device coupled to the processing device, the information-providing device including at least one of a heads up display, a speaker, or a vibrator, wherein the GPS Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 3 receiver provides a location of a wearer of the system and the location of the wearer and a different location of a different wearer of a different system are used to triangulate a location of an object being detected by the system and the different system, wherein the data processor overlays information on the heads up display3 based on the location of the wearer and the information indicates hazardous material at the location or unauthorized presence of the wearer in the location. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following references: Name4 Number Published/Issued Filed Tremblay US 6,088,017 July 11, 2000 Apr. 24, 1998 Ebersole US 2003/0210228 A1 Nov. 13, 2003 Mar. 31, 2003 Arlinsky US 2007/0182950 A1 Aug. 9, 2007 Mar. 10, 2005 Sackner US 2008/0082018 A1 Apr. 3, 2008 Aug. 8, 2007 Hardage US 2010/0311513 A1 Dec. 9, 2010 June 4, 2010 Karmarkar US 2013/0054576 A1 Feb. 28, 2013 Nov. 15, 2011 Zishaan US 2014/0031082 A1 Jan. 30, 2014 Sept. 30, 2013 Wolf US 2014/0140575 A1 May 22, 2014 Nov. 19, 2013 Brancato US 2015/0054736 A1 Feb. 26, 2015 Sept. 18, 2014 Connor US 2015/0370320 A1 Dec. 24, 2015 June 11, 2015 3 Because claim 1 recites “the information-providing device including at least one of a heads up display, a speaker, or a vibrator,” the data processor only overlays information on the heads-up display if the information- providing device includes a heads-up display. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (emphases added). 4 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 4 Mullins US 2016/0225191 A1 Aug. 4, 2016 Feb. 2, 2016 Lee US 2017/0094385 A1 Mar. 30, 2017 Feb. 23, 2015 Osman US 9,652,038 B2 May 16, 2017 Apr. 15, 2015 Hattori JP 08-164482 A June 25, 1996 Dec. 13, 1994 The Examiner rejects claims 1–14, 16, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking adequate written description. Final Act. 2–3. Further, the Examiner rejects: 1. claims 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole (id. at 3–5); 2. claims 2–4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage (id. at 5–7); 3. claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Tremblay (id. at 7–8); 4. claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Connor, and Sackner (id. at 9); 5. claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Osman (id. at 9–10); 6. claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Osman, and Brancato (id. at 10–12); Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 5 7. claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori (id. at 12–13); 8. claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Arlinsky (id. at 13); and 9. claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Lee (id. at 13–14). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant and the Examiner focus their findings and contentions on claims 1, 2, and 12; so do we. Ans. 4; Reply Br. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the rejections below. ANALYSIS A. Inadequate Written Description Section 112(a) provides: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . . (Emphases added.) As our reviewing court has explained, Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 6 [t]he “written description” requirement implements the principle that a patent must describe the technology that is sought to be patented; the requirement serves both to satisfy the inventor’s obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The Examiner finds the Specification fails to provide an adequate written description for “the information indicat[ing] hazardous material at the location,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 4–5. Original claim 20 recites a system “wherein the information includes exit and hazard information specific to the location.” Spec., 11 (emphasis added). The Examiner finds original claim 20 provides written description support for “hazard information,” but “hazardous material” is not supported in the original disclosure. Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 4–5 (“The Specification does support providing ‘hazard information[.]’”). For the reasons given below, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection. Appellant acknowledges that “hazardous material” is not described in the original disclosure in haec verba. Appeal Br. 4. Nevertheless, Appellant contends that the original disclosure implicitly describes “hazardous material.” Id. (citing MPEP § 2163(I)(B) (“[N]ewly added claims or claim limitations must be supported in the specification through express, implicit, or inherent disclosure”)). Specifically, the Specification discloses: The sensors 210 of the boots 300 and suit 400 may include bio data sensors 1400 that obtain biometric data from the wearer or the wearer’s environment and display information (e.g., the obtained data or instructions based on the obtained data) on the glasses 120 or transmit the data via the network 150. The devices 140 may be used to alert the wearer when other forms of communication are ineffective. For example, a vibrator 1050 in Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 7 one of the boots 300 may vibrate to alert the wearer to a hazard. Based on the biometric data or environmental data obtained with the sensors 210, the wearer may be provided instructions on the glasses 120 to leave an area with toxic gas or to stop activity until blood pressure decreases. Spec. ¶ 16 (emphases added); see id. ¶ 2 (describing notification of “hazardous condition”); see also Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec ¶ 16). Appellant contends that, although the Specification “does not explicitly recite ‘hazardous material,’ it implicitly supports the recitation of information indicating hazardous material.” Appeal Br. 4. We disagree. The Specification does not describe providing information to the system wearer that there is “hazardous material at the location,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). Instead, the Specification discloses instructing the system wearer “to leave an area with toxic gas or to stop activity until blood pressure decreases.” Spec. ¶ 16 (emphases added). That is the Specification describes providing the system wearer with “instructions” as to what to do, but not necessarily information indicating why. Id.; see also Ans. 5 (“[T]he information (i.e. hazard information) may be instructions to avoid/mitigate a hazard (i.e. leave an area or stop an activity), but does not support that the hazard ‘information indicates hazardous [material]’ (underlining added to emphasize the word - material- ).”). Moreover, to the extent, the Specification may suggest informing the system wearer that there is “toxic gas” at the wearer’s location, “toxic gas” is only a single example of “hazardous material.” On this record, we are not persuaded that the disclosure of this single example of a hazardous material supports a claim reciting overlaying information indicating any possible hazardous material on a heads-up display. See MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(3)(a)(ii); see also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 8 Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Claims directed to a functionally defined genus of antibodies were not supported by a disclosure that “only describe[d] one type of structurally similar antibodies” that “are not representative of the full variety or scope of the genus.”). Because Appellant fails to show adequate written description supporting the disputed limitation, as recited in claim 1, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for lack of adequate written description. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 for lack of written description. Moreover, because claims 2–14, 16, and 17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those dependent claims for lack of written description B. Obviousness of Claim 1 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole As noted above, the Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole. Final Act. 3–5. In particular, the Examiner finds that Karmarkar teaches or suggests the majority of the limitations of claim 1. Id. at 3–4 (citing Karmarkar ¶¶ 80, 94, Figs. 1, 11). Nevertheless, the Examiner finds Karmarkar does not teach or suggest “the location of the wearer and a different location of different wearer of a different system are used to triangulate a location of an object being detected by the system and the different system” [and] “wherein the data processor overlays information on the heads up display based on the location of the wearer and the information indicates hazardous material at the location or unauthorized presence of the wearer at the location,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 4. The Examiner, however, finds the Wolf discloses “imaging platforms 100, which can be Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 9 head-mounted imaging capturing devices, where each imaging platform utilizes a GPS or other location providing device to triangulate the location of a tag 542 which is in the detection range of sensor 120 of each imaging platform 100.” Id. (citing Wolf ¶ 78). Further, the Examiner finds Mullins discloses, “overlaying location-specific information on and [heads-up display (HUD)]” (id. (citing Mullins ¶ 20)) and Ebersole discloses, “the utilization of augmented reality of overlay a display of dangerous material/hazards onto a real world view” (id. (citing Ebersole ¶¶ 19, 118)). Consequently, the Examiner also finds Mullins and Ebersole teach or suggest, “wherein the data processor overlays information on the heads up display based on the location of the wearer” and Ebersole teaches or suggests “the information indicates hazardous material at the location.” Id. at 5. Ultimately, the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to teach or suggest the limitations of claim 1 missing from Karmarkar. Id. at 4–5. Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because the Examiner fails to articulate how and why a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have modified Karmarkar’s teachings in view of the teachings of Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to achieve the limitations of claim 1. Appeal Br. 5–9; see KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). We disagree. With respect to Wolf, Appellant contends: While the imaging platform 100 is shown as an aircraft in Wolf, paragraph [0051] states that the imaging platform 100 can also be a head-mounted image-capture device or hand-held image- capture device (paragraph [0051]). At paragraph [0078], Wolf Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 10 states that an RFID tag 542 includes a transponder that broadcasts its location. Wolf then describes that three imaging platforms 100 can communicate with each other to triangulate the location of the RFID tag 542. As clarified at paragraphs [0075] to [0079] of Wolf, the RFID tag 542 acts as a “do-not- track” flag that identifies an area to be obscured in the image obtained by the imaging platform 100. Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added). This contention is inaccurate. Wolf discloses, “[t]ag 542 detects an interrogation signal from sensor 120 and responds with its coordinates and do-not-track flag setting. In various examples, tag 542 only responds if the do not track flag has been applied; in other examples, tag 542 responds whether or not the flag has been applied.” Wolf ¶ 76 (emphasis added). Thus, we are not persuaded that Wolf is limited to RFID tags with a do-not-track flag setting. Appellant notes that the Examiner finds that “one having ordinary skill in the art would want to estimate the location of an RFID tag.” Appeal Br. 7 (quoting Final Act. 5). Appellant further contends that This asserted reasoning that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the goggles 110 of Karmarkar to facilitate triangulation, along with two other goggles 110, of an RFID tag lacks any rational underpinning. . . . There is nothing about the systems or methods of Karmarkar that suggests any reason to have three goggles 110 being used together or locating an RFID tag. Id. (emphasis added). Karmarkar discloses that augmented reality goggles 110 may record the location of an object in the wearer’s field of view. Karmarkar ¶¶ 6, 25, 29. Nevertheless, the Examiner relies on Wolf, not Karmarker, to teach or suggest using multiple goggles to triangulate the location of the RFID tag. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds Wolf discloses, “[f]or example, three Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 11 imaging platforms 100, each with a GPS or other device that provides the location of imaging platform 100 to respective processor 186, can communicate with each other to triangulate the location of tag 542 within the detection range of each of them.” Wolf ¶ 78 (emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner relies on the combined teaches of Karmarkar and Wolf to teach or suggest this limitation. Appellant improperly challenges Karmarkar’s and Wolf’s teachings individually, instead of as part of the combination of references relied upon by the Examiner. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981)). In KSR, the U.S. Supreme Court explains, “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Here, we are persuaded that using triangulation between multiple HUD goggle wearers to locate an object was a problem solved by the claimed systems, and the Examiner finds Wolf shows that this problem was known at the time of the present application and solved by Wolf. Thus, we are persuaded that the combined teachings of Karmarkar and Wolf teach or suggest the disputed limitation and that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine their teachings to achieve the disputed limitation. With respect to Mullins and Ebersole, Appellant contends the Examiner employs the same conclusory approach for the additional proposed modifications in the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 7. In particular, Appellant contends, Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 12 Mullins is directed to head mounted display (i.e., heads-up display (HUD)) calibration. The Examiner cites paragraph [0020] of Mullins as teaching “overlaying location-specific information on and HUD” ([Final Act. 4]). Mullins states, at paragraph [0020], that when eye-tracking is used to identify a region of interest, “the HUD may want to render a preexisting model for the region and project overlay onto the real world or overlay location-specific information.” Ebersole is directed to augmented reality (AR) situational awareness. At cited paragraph [0019], Ebersole states that AR technology overlays “a display of otherwise invisible dangerous materials/hazards/other objects onto the real world view.” At cited paragraph [0118], Ebersole discusses an exemplary “display which a user may see in a hazmat training situation, with the green overlay indicating the region where hazardous materials are.” Id. Appellant then contends: The goggles 110 of Karmarkar track the eye movement of the user 100 and record what the user 100 sees. The Examiner has not discussed why one of ordinary skill would have looked to Ebersole to increase situational awareness in a system that has the intended purpose of identifying digital content using bioresponse data. Id. Again, we disagree. Initially, with regard to claim 1’s recitation that “the data processor overlays information of the heads up display based on the location of the wearer based on the location of the wearer and the information indicates hazardous material at the location,” the Examiner finds that, in view of Mullins’s and Ebersole’s teachings, “one having ordinary skill in the art would want to supplement the real world environment.” Final Act. 5. As noted above, Mullins discloses, “[w]hen the region of interest is identified by eye tracking, the HUD may want to render a preexisting model for the region and project overlay onto the real world or overlay location-specific Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 13 information.” Mullins ¶ 20 (emphasis added); see Final Act. 4. Moreover, with respect to real-world display overlays, Ebersole discloses: For example, hazards and the corresponding representations may be stationary three-dimensional objects, such as buoys, signs or fences. These representations can be used to display a safe path around potentially hazardous phenomena to the user. They could also be dynamic (moving) objects, such as fog or unknown liquids or gasses that appear to be bubbling or flowing out of the ground. Ebersole ¶ 118; see Final Act. 4. Thus, Mullins teaches or suggests overlaying location specific information on an HUD, and Ebersole teaches or suggests that the overlaid information may indicate hazardous material at the location. Together, Mullins and Ebersole teach or suggest the disputed limitation. Moreover, as with the claimed systems, Ebersole discloses that overlays of hazardous phenomena increase “situational awareness.” Final Act. 5 (quoting Ebersole ¶ 118); see also Spec. ¶ 2 (“In addition, information must be provided or exchanged for the safety and security of workers in environments that are not amenable to conventional forms of communication. For example, when a hazardous condition arises on an oil rig, a broadcast over a public announcement system may not be effective due to noisy equipment.”). Thus, the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole solve a problem known at the time of the application and solved by the claimed systems. On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole; and we sustain that rejection. Because Appellant relies solely on its challenge to the rejection of claim 1 to overcome the rejections of dependent claims 5–11, 14, 16, and 17, we also are not Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 14 persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting those claims as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole, alone or in combination with other references. Therefore, we sustain those rejections of dependent claims 5–11, 14, 16, and 17 as well. Appeal Br. 9–12; see Ans. 4. C. Obviousness of Claims 2–4 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 2–4 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage. Final Act. 5–7. Claim 2 depends directly from claim 1, and claims 3 and 4 depend directly or indirectly from claim 2. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole teach or suggest all of the limitations of claim 2, except “an extremity fitted device, wherein the vibrator is disposed therein and is configured to alert a wearer of a hazard based on the processing device determining the hazard.” Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner finds, however, that Zishaan discloses the use of a vibrator to alert a user of a hazardous condition (Zishaan ¶ 92) and Hardage discloses placement of such a vibrator in a glove (Hardage ¶¶ 43–46). Final Act. 5–6. Thus, “because one having ordinary skill in the art would want to utilize more than one perception of sense to provide different channels for alarm recognition,” the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage to achieve the systems of claims 2–4. Id. at 6. Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 2–4 by asserting that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to augment the system and method of identifying digital content Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 15 using bioresponse data5 in Karmarkar “to utilize more than one perception of sense to provide different channels for alarm recognition.” To be clear, there is no alarm recognition - and none that is asserted — in Karmarkar at all. The purported motivation lacks any rational underpinning. Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis added). Appellant, however, does not contest that Zishaan discloses a vibrator alarm for detecting hazardous conditions. Id.; see Zishaan ¶¶ 92; see also Zishaan ¶ 14 (“In a further subsidiary aspect, said unit further comprises a vibrator alarm for causing the unit to vibrate provided a harmful category of pre-determined levels is identified.”). Moreover, the Examiner relies on Hardage to teach or suggest the placement of an additional vibrator alarm in an extremity, e.g., a glove. Final Act. 5–6; see Hardage ¶ 46. In particular, Hardage discloses that the vibrator may be one of a plurality of alarm indicators. See Hardage ¶¶ 43 (“Other physically- detectable signals such as audible and visible signals may alternatively be used and are within the ambit of the present inventive concept, however, the vibration signal is more preferred because an audible signal may distract others and a visible signal may detract from the user’s swing as the user watches an indicator for the visible signal.”), 45 (“In a further subsidiary aspect, said unit further comprises a vibrator alarm for causing the unit to vibrate provided a harmful category of pre-determined levels is identified.”). The Examiner relies on the teachings of Zishaan and Hardage, not Karmarkar, to teach or suggest the additional limitations of dependent claims 2–4. Final Act. 5–6; see Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097; Keller, 642 F.2d at 5 Appellant asserts that Karmarkar is directed to identifying digital content using bioresponse data. Appeal Br. 9, 11. Nevertheless, as the Examiner finds, Karmarkar describes sensors capable of collecting a variety of data types. Karmarkar ¶ 94; see Final Act. 3. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 16 426. Here, Zishaan and Hardage teach or suggest the solution to a problem known at the time of the application and addressed by the claimed systems. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 16; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Thus, we are persuaded the Examiner has shown that Zishaan and Hardage teach or suggest the additional limitations of claim 2 and that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine their teachings with those of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to achieve the systems, recited in claim 2. We sustain the rejection of claim 2, and, because Appellant does not contest the rejection of claims 3 and 4 separately, we also sustain the rejection of those claims. D. Obviousness of Claims 12 and 13 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 12 and 13 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori. Final Act. 12–13. Claim 12 depends directly from claim 1, and claim 13 depends directly from claim 12. Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole teach or suggest all of the limitations of claim 12, except “wherein the IR detector is configured to determine a temperature during welding.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner finds, however, that Hattori discloses “an infrared sensor 37 that takes in radiation from a welding process, so that temperature information can be displayed on an HUD 39 according to the radiation.” Final Act. 12 (citing Hattori ¶¶ 26–28). Thus, “because one having ordinary skill in the art would want to monitor the integrity of a weld,” the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Karmarkar, Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 17 Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori to achieve the systems of claims 12 and 13. Id. at 12–13. Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 12 and 13 because: Regardless of what the Hattori reference teaches, the purported motivation to modify Karmarkar — which, again, is directed to identifying digital content using bioresponse data6 — “because one having ordinary skill in the art would want to monitor the integrity of a weld” ([Final Act. 12]) is utterly lacking in any rational basis. Appeal Br. 11. We disagree. The Specification explains, “[a]s one exemplary use, the IR sensor 1100 may be used to monitor temperature and size of the heat effected area during welding so that adjustments could be made to the welding process, as needed.” Spec. ¶ 12. Hattori discloses, “[t]he welding current value I or the temperature value T of a weld zone is reported to a worker’s ear via the earphone 365 between this welding operation of a series of [sic] by the sound by female voice, and to the HUD indicator 39.” Hattori ¶ 32. Hattori explains: Since a welding current value, the temperature value of a weld zone, and temperature distribution can be recognized visually with the HUD indicator 39, [i]t can weld at the exact welding current value I and the welding temperature T (welding current value I), viewing the state of a welded section, and causing aggravation of a welding condition like before and decline in working efficiency is lost. Id. ¶ 33; see id. ¶¶ 31, 50, 51. 6 See supra note 5. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 18 Here, Hattori teaches or suggests the solution to a problem known at the time of the application and addressed by the claimed systems. Hattori ¶¶ 31, 33, 50, 51; see Spec. ¶ 12; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed”). Thus, we are persuaded the Examiner has shown that Hattori teaches or suggests the additional limitations of claim 12 and that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine Hattori’s teachings with those of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to achieve the systems, recited in claim 12. We sustain the rejection of claim 12, and because Appellant does not contest the rejection of claim 13 separately, we also sustain the rejection of that claim. DECISIONS 1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1–14, 16, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking adequate written description. 2. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole. 3. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 2–4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage. 4. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Tremblay. Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 19 5. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Connor, and Sackner. 6. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Osman. 7. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Osman, and Brancato. 8. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori. 9. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Arlinsky. 10. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Lee. 11. Thus, on this record, claims 1–14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–14, 16, and 17. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed 1–14, 16, 17 112(a) Written Description 1–14, 16, 17 1, 17 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, 1, 17 Appeal 2019-004154 Application 15/190,694 20 Mullins, Ebersole 2–4 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, Hardage 2–4 5, 6 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, Tremblay 5, 6 7 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Connor, Sackner 7 8, 9 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Osman 8, 9 10, 11 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Osman, Brancato 10, 11 12, 13 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Hattori 12, 13 14 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Arlinsky 14 16 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Lee 16 Overall Outcome 1–14, 16, 17 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation