Mody, Rustom et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 11, 2020

2019004154 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/190,694 06/23/2016 Rustom Mody BHI4-59930-US-NP 7699
44639 7590 12/11/2020
CANTOR COLBURN LLP-BAKER HUGHES, A GE COMPANY, LLC
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
BUTCHER, BRIAN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RUSTOM MODY, JOEL TARVER, GREG FOLKS,
MATHIAS SCHLECHT, HAROLD BRANNON, ERIK NORDENSTAM,
and TIMOTHY M. DONOUGHUE
____________

Appeal 2019-004154
Application 15/190,694
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1–14, 16, and 17. Final Act. 1.2 Claims 15 and 18–20

1 “Appellant” here refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Baker Hughes Incorporated.
Appeal Br. 1.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
November 16, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 2, 2019); the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 25, 2018) and the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed March 25, 2019); and the Specification (“Spec.,”
filed June 23, 2016 ). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and
Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents.
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are canceled. Appeal Br. 15–16 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, the claimed systems “relate to collection,
processing, and presentation of information.” Spec. ¶ 9. In particular, the
claimed subject matter relates to a wearable information gathering and
processing system including an information obtaining device, a processing
device, and an information-providing device coupled to the processing
device. Id. ¶ 3.
As noted above, claims 1–14, 16, and 17 stand rejected. Claim 1 is
the sole independent claim. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). Claims 2–14, 16,
and 17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Id. at 14–16.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is
illustrative.
1. A wearable information gathering and processing
system, the system comprising:
an information obtaining device, the information
obtaining device including a radio frequency identification
(RFID) reader, an infra red (IR) detector, a global positioning
system (GPS) receiver, a laser measurement device, microphone,
and camera;
a processing device, the processing device including at
least one of a voice recognition processor, a gesture recognition
processor, IR processor or measurement data processor
configured to process data from said information obtaining
device; and
an information-providing device coupled to the processing
device, the information-providing device including at least one
of a heads up display, a speaker, or a vibrator, wherein the GPS
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receiver provides a location of a wearer of the system and the
location of the wearer and a different location of a different
wearer of a different system are used to triangulate a location of
an object being detected by the system and the different system,
wherein
the data processor overlays information on the heads up
display3 based on the location of the wearer and the information
indicates hazardous material at the location or unauthorized
presence of the wearer in the location.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name4 Number Published/Issued Filed
Tremblay US 6,088,017 July 11, 2000 Apr. 24, 1998
Ebersole US 2003/0210228 A1 Nov. 13, 2003 Mar. 31, 2003
Arlinsky US 2007/0182950 A1 Aug. 9, 2007 Mar. 10, 2005
Sackner US 2008/0082018 A1 Apr. 3, 2008 Aug. 8, 2007
Hardage US 2010/0311513 A1 Dec. 9, 2010 June 4, 2010
Karmarkar US 2013/0054576 A1 Feb. 28, 2013 Nov. 15, 2011
Zishaan US 2014/0031082 A1 Jan. 30, 2014 Sept. 30, 2013
Wolf US 2014/0140575 A1 May 22, 2014 Nov. 19, 2013
Brancato US 2015/0054736 A1 Feb. 26, 2015 Sept. 18, 2014
Connor US 2015/0370320 A1 Dec. 24, 2015 June 11, 2015

3 Because claim 1 recites “the information-providing device including at
least one of a heads up display, a speaker, or a vibrator,” the data processor
only overlays information on the heads-up display if the information-
providing device includes a heads-up display. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.)
(emphases added).
4 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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Mullins US 2016/0225191 A1 Aug. 4, 2016 Feb. 2, 2016
Lee US 2017/0094385 A1 Mar. 30, 2017 Feb. 23, 2015
Osman US 9,652,038 B2 May 16, 2017 Apr. 15, 2015
Hattori JP 08-164482 A June 25, 1996 Dec. 13, 1994
The Examiner rejects claims 1–14, 16, and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) as lacking adequate written description. Final Act. 2–3. Further,
the Examiner rejects:
1. claims 1 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole
(id. at 3–5);
2. claims 2–4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and
Hardage (id. at 5–7);
3. claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole,
Zishaan, and Tremblay (id. at 7–8);
4. claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Connor, and
Sackner (id. at 9);
5. claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and
Osman (id. at 9–10);
6. claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole,
Osman, and Brancato (id. at 10–12);
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7. claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and
Hattori (id. at 12–13);
8. claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Arlinsky (id.
at 13); and
9. claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Lee (id. at
13–14).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant and the Examiner focus their findings and
contentions on claims 1, 2, and 12; so do we. Ans. 4; Reply Br. 2. Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
for emphasis. We address the rejections below.
ANALYSIS
A. Inadequate Written Description
Section 112(a) provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .
(Emphases added.) As our reviewing court has explained,
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[t]he “written description” requirement implements the principle
that a patent must describe the technology that is sought to be
patented; the requirement serves both to satisfy the inventor’s
obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the
patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in
possession of the invention that is claimed.
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds the Specification fails to provide an adequate
written description for “the information indicat[ing] hazardous material at
the location,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 4–5. Original
claim 20 recites a system “wherein the information includes exit and hazard
information specific to the location.” Spec., 11 (emphasis added). The
Examiner finds original claim 20 provides written description support for
“hazard information,” but “hazardous material” is not supported in the
original disclosure. Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 4–5 (“The Specification does
support providing ‘hazard information[.]’”). For the reasons given below,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection.
Appellant acknowledges that “hazardous material” is not described in
the original disclosure in haec verba. Appeal Br. 4. Nevertheless, Appellant
contends that the original disclosure implicitly describes “hazardous
material.” Id. (citing MPEP § 2163(I)(B) (“[N]ewly added claims or claim
limitations must be supported in the specification through express, implicit,
or inherent disclosure”)). Specifically, the Specification discloses:
The sensors 210 of the boots 300 and suit 400 may include bio
data sensors 1400 that obtain biometric data from the wearer or
the wearer’s environment and display information (e.g., the
obtained data or instructions based on the obtained data) on the
glasses 120 or transmit the data via the network 150. The devices
140 may be used to alert the wearer when other forms of
communication are ineffective. For example, a vibrator 1050 in
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one of the boots 300 may vibrate to alert the wearer to a hazard.
Based on the biometric data or environmental data obtained with
the sensors 210, the wearer may be provided instructions on the
glasses 120 to leave an area with toxic gas or to stop activity
until blood pressure decreases.
Spec. ¶ 16 (emphases added); see id. ¶ 2 (describing notification of
“hazardous condition”); see also Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec ¶ 16). Appellant
contends that, although the Specification “does not explicitly recite
‘hazardous material,’ it implicitly supports the recitation of information
indicating hazardous material.” Appeal Br. 4. We disagree.
The Specification does not describe providing information to the
system wearer that there is “hazardous material at the location,” as recited in
claim 1. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). Instead, the Specification discloses
instructing the system wearer “to leave an area with toxic gas or to stop
activity until blood pressure decreases.” Spec. ¶ 16 (emphases added). That
is the Specification describes providing the system wearer with
“instructions” as to what to do, but not necessarily information indicating
why. Id.; see also Ans. 5 (“[T]he information (i.e. hazard information) may
be instructions to avoid/mitigate a hazard (i.e. leave an area or stop an
activity), but does not support that the hazard ‘information indicates
hazardous [material]’ (underlining added to emphasize the word - material-
).”). Moreover, to the extent, the Specification may suggest informing the
system wearer that there is “toxic gas” at the wearer’s location, “toxic gas”
is only a single example of “hazardous material.” On this record, we are not
persuaded that the disclosure of this single example of a hazardous material
supports a claim reciting overlaying information indicating any possible
hazardous material on a heads-up display. See MPEP
§ 2163(II)(A)(3)(a)(ii); see also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v.
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Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Claims
directed to a functionally defined genus of antibodies were not supported by
a disclosure that “only describe[d] one type of structurally similar
antibodies” that “are not representative of the full variety or scope of the
genus.”).
Because Appellant fails to show adequate written description
supporting the disputed limitation, as recited in claim 1, we are not
persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for lack of adequate written
description. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim
1 for lack of written description. Moreover, because claims 2–14, 16, and 17
depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, we also sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of those dependent claims for lack of written description
B. Obviousness of Claim 1 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole
As noted above, the Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole.
Final Act. 3–5. In particular, the Examiner finds that Karmarkar teaches or
suggests the majority of the limitations of claim 1. Id. at 3–4 (citing
Karmarkar ¶¶ 80, 94, Figs. 1, 11). Nevertheless, the Examiner finds
Karmarkar does not teach or suggest “the location of the wearer and a
different location of different wearer of a different system are used to
triangulate a location of an object being detected by the system and the
different system” [and] “wherein the data processor overlays information on
the heads up display based on the location of the wearer and the information
indicates hazardous material at the location or unauthorized presence of the
wearer at the location,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 4. The Examiner,
however, finds the Wolf discloses “imaging platforms 100, which can be
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head-mounted imaging capturing devices, where each imaging platform
utilizes a GPS or other location providing device to triangulate the location
of a tag 542 which is in the detection range of sensor 120 of each imaging
platform 100.” Id. (citing Wolf ¶ 78). Further, the Examiner finds Mullins
discloses, “overlaying location-specific information on and [heads-up
display (HUD)]” (id. (citing Mullins ¶ 20)) and Ebersole discloses, “the
utilization of augmented reality of overlay a display of dangerous
material/hazards onto a real world view” (id. (citing Ebersole ¶¶ 19, 118)).
Consequently, the Examiner also finds Mullins and Ebersole teach or
suggest, “wherein the data processor overlays information on the heads up
display based on the location of the wearer” and Ebersole teaches or
suggests “the information indicates hazardous material at the location.” Id.
at 5. Ultimately, the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Wolf,
Mullins, and Ebersole to teach or suggest the limitations of claim 1 missing
from Karmarkar. Id. at 4–5.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because the
Examiner fails to articulate how and why a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have modified Karmarkar’s teachings in view of the
teachings of Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to achieve the limitations of
claim 1. Appeal Br. 5–9; see KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
418 (2007). We disagree.
With respect to Wolf, Appellant contends:
While the imaging platform 100 is shown as an aircraft in Wolf,
paragraph [0051] states that the imaging platform 100 can also
be a head-mounted image-capture device or hand-held image-
capture device (paragraph [0051]). At paragraph [0078], Wolf
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states that an RFID tag 542 includes a transponder that
broadcasts its location. Wolf then describes that three imaging
platforms 100 can communicate with each other to triangulate
the location of the RFID tag 542. As clarified at paragraphs
[0075] to [0079] of Wolf, the RFID tag 542 acts as a “do-not-
track” flag that identifies an area to be obscured in the image
obtained by the imaging platform 100.
Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added). This contention is inaccurate.
Wolf discloses, “[t]ag 542 detects an interrogation signal from sensor
120 and responds with its coordinates and do-not-track flag setting. In
various examples, tag 542 only responds if the do not track flag has been
applied; in other examples, tag 542 responds whether or not the flag has
been applied.” Wolf ¶ 76 (emphasis added). Thus, we are not persuaded
that Wolf is limited to RFID tags with a do-not-track flag setting.
Appellant notes that the Examiner finds that “one having ordinary
skill in the art would want to estimate the location of an RFID tag.” Appeal
Br. 7 (quoting Final Act. 5). Appellant further contends that
This asserted reasoning that one of ordinary skill would have
been motivated to modify the goggles 110 of Karmarkar to
facilitate triangulation, along with two other goggles 110, of an
RFID tag lacks any rational underpinning. . . . There is nothing
about the systems or methods of Karmarkar that suggests any
reason to have three goggles 110 being used together or locating
an RFID tag.
Id. (emphasis added).
Karmarkar discloses that augmented reality goggles 110 may record
the location of an object in the wearer’s field of view. Karmarkar ¶¶ 6, 25,
29. Nevertheless, the Examiner relies on Wolf, not Karmarker, to teach or
suggest using multiple goggles to triangulate the location of the RFID tag.
Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds Wolf discloses, “[f]or example, three
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imaging platforms 100, each with a GPS or other device that provides the
location of imaging platform 100 to respective processor 186, can
communicate with each other to triangulate the location of tag 542 within
the detection range of each of them.” Wolf ¶ 78 (emphasis added). Thus,
the Examiner relies on the combined teaches of Karmarkar and Wolf to
teach or suggest this limitation. Appellant improperly challenges
Karmarkar’s and Wolf’s teachings individually, instead of as part of the
combination of references relied upon by the Examiner. See In re Merck &
Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426
(CCPA 1981)).
In KSR, the U.S. Supreme Court explains, “[u]nder the correct
analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining
the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Here, we are
persuaded that using triangulation between multiple HUD goggle wearers to
locate an object was a problem solved by the claimed systems, and the
Examiner finds Wolf shows that this problem was known at the time of the
present application and solved by Wolf. Thus, we are persuaded that the
combined teachings of Karmarkar and Wolf teach or suggest the disputed
limitation and that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have
had reason to combine their teachings to achieve the disputed limitation.
With respect to Mullins and Ebersole, Appellant contends the
Examiner employs the same conclusory approach for the additional
proposed modifications in the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 7. In
particular, Appellant contends,
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Mullins is directed to head mounted display (i.e., heads-up
display (HUD)) calibration. The Examiner cites paragraph
[0020] of Mullins as teaching “overlaying location-specific
information on and HUD” ([Final Act. 4]). Mullins states, at
paragraph [0020], that when eye-tracking is used to identify a
region of interest, “the HUD may want to render a preexisting
model for the region and project overlay onto the real world or
overlay location-specific information.” Ebersole is directed to
augmented reality (AR) situational awareness. At cited
paragraph [0019], Ebersole states that AR technology overlays
“a display of otherwise invisible dangerous
materials/hazards/other objects onto the real world view.” At
cited paragraph [0118], Ebersole discusses an exemplary
“display which a user may see in a hazmat training situation, with
the green overlay indicating the region where hazardous
materials are.”
Id. Appellant then contends:
The goggles 110 of Karmarkar track the eye movement of the
user 100 and record what the user 100 sees. The Examiner has
not discussed why one of ordinary skill would have looked to
Ebersole to increase situational awareness in a system that has
the intended purpose of identifying digital content using
bioresponse data.
Id. Again, we disagree.
Initially, with regard to claim 1’s recitation that “the data processor
overlays information of the heads up display based on the location of the
wearer based on the location of the wearer and the information indicates
hazardous material at the location,” the Examiner finds that, in view of
Mullins’s and Ebersole’s teachings, “one having ordinary skill in the art
would want to supplement the real world environment.” Final Act. 5. As
noted above, Mullins discloses, “[w]hen the region of interest is identified
by eye tracking, the HUD may want to render a preexisting model for the
region and project overlay onto the real world or overlay location-specific
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information.” Mullins ¶ 20 (emphasis added); see Final Act. 4. Moreover,
with respect to real-world display overlays, Ebersole discloses:
For example, hazards and the corresponding representations may
be stationary three-dimensional objects, such as buoys, signs or
fences. These representations can be used to display a safe path
around potentially hazardous phenomena to the user. They could
also be dynamic (moving) objects, such as fog or unknown
liquids or gasses that appear to be bubbling or flowing out of the
ground.
Ebersole ¶ 118; see Final Act. 4. Thus, Mullins teaches or suggests
overlaying location specific information on an HUD, and Ebersole teaches
or suggests that the overlaid information may indicate hazardous material at
the location. Together, Mullins and Ebersole teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. Moreover, as with the claimed systems, Ebersole discloses that
overlays of hazardous phenomena increase “situational awareness.” Final
Act. 5 (quoting Ebersole ¶ 118); see also Spec. ¶ 2 (“In addition, information
must be provided or exchanged for the safety and security of workers in
environments that are not amenable to conventional forms of
communication. For example, when a hazardous condition arises on an oil
rig, a broadcast over a public announcement system may not be effective due
to noisy equipment.”). Thus, the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, and Ebersole solve a problem known at the time of the application
and solved by the claimed systems.
On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, and Ebersole; and we sustain that rejection. Because Appellant
relies solely on its challenge to the rejection of claim 1 to overcome the
rejections of dependent claims 5–11, 14, 16, and 17, we also are not
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persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting those claims as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole, alone or in
combination with other references. Therefore, we sustain those rejections of
dependent claims 5–11, 14, 16, and 17 as well. Appeal Br. 9–12; see Ans. 4.
C. Obviousness of Claims 2–4 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole,
Zishaan, and Hardage
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 2–4 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and
Hardage. Final Act. 5–7. Claim 2 depends directly from claim 1, and
claims 3 and 4 depend directly or indirectly from claim 2. Appeal Br. 14
(Claims App.). The Examiner finds the combined teachings of Karmarkar,
Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole teach or suggest all of the limitations of
claim 2, except “an extremity fitted device, wherein the vibrator is disposed
therein and is configured to alert a wearer of a hazard based on the
processing device determining the hazard.” Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner
finds, however, that Zishaan discloses the use of a vibrator to alert a user of
a hazardous condition (Zishaan ¶ 92) and Hardage discloses placement of
such a vibrator in a glove (Hardage ¶¶ 43–46). Final Act. 5–6. Thus,
“because one having ordinary skill in the art would want to utilize more than
one perception of sense to provide different channels for alarm recognition,”
the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have
had reason to combine the teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole,
Zishaan, and Hardage to achieve the systems of claims 2–4. Id. at 6.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 2–4
by asserting that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated
to augment the system and method of identifying digital content
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using bioresponse data5 in Karmarkar “to utilize more than one
perception of sense to provide different channels for alarm
recognition.” To be clear, there is no alarm recognition - and
none that is asserted — in Karmarkar at all. The purported
motivation lacks any rational underpinning.
Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis added). Appellant, however, does not contest that
Zishaan discloses a vibrator alarm for detecting hazardous conditions. Id.;
see Zishaan ¶¶ 92; see also Zishaan ¶ 14 (“In a further subsidiary aspect,
said unit further comprises a vibrator alarm for causing the unit to vibrate
provided a harmful category of pre-determined levels is identified.”).
Moreover, the Examiner relies on Hardage to teach or suggest the placement
of an additional vibrator alarm in an extremity, e.g., a glove. Final Act. 5–6;
see Hardage ¶ 46. In particular, Hardage discloses that the vibrator may be
one of a plurality of alarm indicators. See Hardage ¶¶ 43 (“Other physically-
detectable signals such as audible and visible signals may alternatively be
used and are within the ambit of the present inventive concept, however, the
vibration signal is more preferred because an audible signal may distract
others and a visible signal may detract from the user’s swing as the user
watches an indicator for the visible signal.”), 45 (“In a further subsidiary
aspect, said unit further comprises a vibrator alarm for causing the unit to
vibrate provided a harmful category of pre-determined levels is identified.”).
The Examiner relies on the teachings of Zishaan and Hardage, not
Karmarkar, to teach or suggest the additional limitations of dependent
claims 2–4. Final Act. 5–6; see Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097; Keller, 642 F.2d at

5 Appellant asserts that Karmarkar is directed to identifying digital content
using bioresponse data. Appeal Br. 9, 11. Nevertheless, as the Examiner
finds, Karmarkar describes sensors capable of collecting a variety of data
types. Karmarkar ¶ 94; see Final Act. 3.
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426. Here, Zishaan and Hardage teach or suggest the solution to a problem
known at the time of the application and addressed by the claimed systems.
Spec. ¶¶ 2, 16; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Thus, we are persuaded the
Examiner has shown that Zishaan and Hardage teach or suggest the
additional limitations of claim 2 and that a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have had reason to combine their teachings with those of
Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to achieve the systems, recited in
claim 2. We sustain the rejection of claim 2, and, because Appellant does
not contest the rejection of claims 3 and 4 separately, we also sustain the
rejection of those claims.
D. Obviousness of Claims 12 and 13 over Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins,
Ebersole, and Hattori
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 12 and 13 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and
Hattori. Final Act. 12–13. Claim 12 depends directly from claim 1, and
claim 13 depends directly from claim 12. Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins,
and Ebersole teach or suggest all of the limitations of claim 12, except
“wherein the IR detector is configured to determine a temperature during
welding.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner finds, however, that Hattori
discloses “an infrared sensor 37 that takes in radiation from a welding
process, so that temperature information can be displayed on an HUD 39
according to the radiation.” Final Act. 12 (citing Hattori ¶¶ 26–28). Thus,
“because one having ordinary skill in the art would want to monitor the
integrity of a weld,” the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Karmarkar,
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Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori to achieve the systems of claims 12 and
13. Id. at 12–13.
Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 12 and 13
because:
Regardless of what the Hattori reference teaches, the purported
motivation to modify Karmarkar — which, again, is directed to
identifying digital content using bioresponse data6 — “because
one having ordinary skill in the art would want to monitor the
integrity of a weld” ([Final Act. 12]) is utterly lacking in any
rational basis.
Appeal Br. 11. We disagree.
The Specification explains, “[a]s one exemplary use, the IR
sensor 1100 may be used to monitor temperature and size of the heat
effected area during welding so that adjustments could be made to the
welding process, as needed.” Spec. ¶ 12. Hattori discloses, “[t]he welding
current value I or the temperature value T of a weld zone is reported to a
worker’s ear via the earphone 365 between this welding operation of a series
of [sic] by the sound by female voice, and to the HUD indicator 39.” Hattori
¶ 32. Hattori explains:
Since a welding current value, the temperature value of a weld
zone, and temperature distribution can be recognized visually
with the HUD indicator 39, [i]t can weld at the exact welding
current value I and the welding temperature T (welding current
value I), viewing the state of a welded section, and causing
aggravation of a welding condition like before and decline in
working efficiency is lost.
Id. ¶ 33; see id. ¶¶ 31, 50, 51.

6 See supra note 5.
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Here, Hattori teaches or suggests the solution to a problem known at
the time of the application and addressed by the claimed systems. Hattori
¶¶ 31, 33, 50, 51; see Spec. ¶ 12; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need
or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in
the manner claimed”). Thus, we are persuaded the Examiner has shown that
Hattori teaches or suggests the additional limitations of claim 12 and that a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine
Hattori’s teachings with those of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole to
achieve the systems, recited in claim 12. We sustain the rejection of
claim 12, and because Appellant does not contest the rejection of claim 13
separately, we also sustain the rejection of that claim.
DECISIONS
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1–14, 16, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking adequate written description.
2. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 1 and 17 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar,
Wolf, Mullins, and Ebersole.
3. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 2–4 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Hardage.
4. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 5 and 6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, Zishaan, and Tremblay.
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5. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf, Mullins,
Ebersole, Connor, and Sackner.
6. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 8 and 9 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, and Osman.
7. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 10 and 11 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar,
Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, Osman, and Brancato.
8. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claims 12 and 13 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar,
Wolf, Mullins, Ebersole, and Hattori.
9. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, and Arlinsky.
10. The Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, and Lee.
11. Thus, on this record, claims 1–14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–14, 16, and 17.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1–14, 16,
17
112(a) Written Description 1–14, 16, 17
1, 17 103 Karmarkar, Wolf, 1, 17
Appeal 2019-004154
Application 15/190,694

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Mullins, Ebersole
2–4 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Zishaan, Hardage
2–4
5, 6 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Zishaan, Tremblay
5, 6
7 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Connor, Sackner
7
8, 9 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Osman
8, 9
10, 11 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Osman, Brancato
10, 11
12, 13 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Hattori
12, 13
14 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole,
Arlinsky
14
16 103 Karmarkar, Wolf,
Mullins, Ebersole, Lee
16
Overall
Outcome
1–14, 16, 17
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED