Moca Systems, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 13, 2021

2021001624 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 13, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/232,112 08/09/2016 Daniel L. Leary MOCA-006AUS 7817
22494 7590 10/13/2021
DALY, CROWLEY, MOFFORD & DURKEE, LLP
SUITE 201B
ONE UNIVERSITY AVENUE
WESTWOOD, MA 02090
EXAMINER
MINOR, AYANNA YVETTE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/13/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
amk@dc-m.com
docketing@dc-m.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DANIEL L. LEARY, RICHARD K. WARE, DAVID W. ROLIN,
JASON A. WARLIKOWSKI, DOUGLAS B. TOLAND,
MARY-ANNE G. WOLF, MICHAEL N. CARR,
and ANNE E. F. ALVARADO
____________

Appeal 2021-001624
Application 15/232,1121
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
SHEILA F. McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judges.

McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6 and 8–21. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MOCA Systems,
Inc. Appeal Brief filed August 10, 2020, hereafter “Appeal Br.” 3.
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BACKGROUND
The invention relates to project simulations, such as those used for
construction projects, which include a work details table and a schedule
generator. Specification, hereafter “Spec.” ¶ 9. The schedule generator
includes push and pull processors, wherein the push scheduling process is
implemented with a simulation engine and the pull scheduling process is
implemented with a just-in-time (JIT) process. Id. ¶ 9, Fig. 1.
Representative claims 1 and 8 are the only independent claims, and
these claims are reproduced from pages 23–24 of the Appeal Brief (Claims
App.) as follows:
1. In a processor, a method of simulating a project comprising:
storing in a storage device, a work details table having a user-
determined number of columns with each of the columns having a
user-defined meaning;
defining precedence constraints in a precedence graph;
populating the work details table with data;
generating, by the processor, a data flow graph for the project,
wherein generating the data flow graph includes:
for each of a plurality of rows in the work details table,
generating a corresponding work detail actor node, and
running, by the processor, a simulation of the project using the
data flow graph, wherein running the simulation comprises
maintaining a list of events in chronological order, each of which
refers to a simulated time and an actor;
generating a schedule for the project based on the simulation of
the project and using a pull processor.

8. In a processor, a method of simulating a project comprising:
storing in a storage device, a work details table having a user-
determined number of columns with each of the columns having a
user-defined meaning;
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defining precedence constraints in a precedence graph;
populating the work details table with data; and
generating a schedule for the project via a simulation engine
and a pull processor,
wherein simulating the project via a simulation engine
comprises:
generating a model for the project;
setting a simulation time to a date which defines a start
date;
running a simulation and advancing the simulation time
wherein the advanced simulation time applies to the entire
model; and
maintaining a list of events in chronological order, each
of which refers to a simulated time and an actor,
wherein generating a model for the project comprises building
the model with a plurality of nodes connected via directed arcs to
provide a project specific data flow graph.

The Examiner rejects claims 1–6 and 8–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter and rejects claims 1–6 and 8–21 as
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Blackmon2, Covington3, and
Chua4. Final Action, hereafter “Final Act.” 3–22, mailed January 9, 2020;
Answer, hereafter “Ans.” 4–16, mailed November 10, 2020.
DISCUSSION
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include

2 US 2005/0171790 A1, published August 4, 2005.
3 US 2003/0083912 A1, published May 1, 2003.
4 US 2010/0010856 A1, published January 14, 2010.
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implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice,
573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible
include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products”
(Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (“Diehr”)); “tanning, dyeing,
making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at
182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and
manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
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statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”).  Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see also e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”). 
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].”’ Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The USPTO has guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101, in
accordance with judicial precedent. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”).
Under 2019 Guidance, a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea if the claim
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recites any of (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity, and (3) mental processes—without integrating such abstract
idea into a “practical application,” i.e., without “apply[ing], rely[ing] on, or
us[ing] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 52–55. A claim so
“directed to” an abstract idea constitutes ineligible subject matter, unless it
recites an additional element (or combination of elements) amounting to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Id. at 56.
With this context in mind, we evaluate the Examiner’s rejection of
representative claim 1.5 The Examiner finds that claim 1 is an abstract idea
“directed to a method of simulating a project” and listing steps of the claim,
that is the “storing,” “defining,” “populating,” “generating a data flow
graph,” “running,” and “generating a schedule” steps. Final Act. 4; Ans. 4
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner states that “[c]laims that recite a mental
process include a claim to ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.’” Final Act. 4. The
Examiner finds that “[t]hese limitations can be practically performed in the
human mind with paper and pen” and “the claims do not specify the
magnitude and complexity of the data or the projects.” Ans. 4–5. The
Examiner further finds that the claim is also directed to organizing human
activity, that is, managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people. Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 5.

5 Appellant argues § 101 issues to the claims as a group (Appeal Br. 9–14),
and we select claim 1 as representative of the claims for the consideration of
§ 101 issues. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Appellant argues that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea. Appeal
Br. 9–13. Appellant contends that the Examiner does not identify the
abstract idea of the claim because various claim limitations are merely
recited. Id. at 9. Appellant also argues that the Examiner fails to provide
any explanation for the finding that the claims may be categorized as a
method of organizing human activity. Id. at 9–10. Appellant further asserts
that the Examiner’s statement that the claims recite “collecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” is a
mischaracterization because the limitations provide a “novel technique” for
computing a program schedule using simulation and a “just-in-time”
process. Id. at 12 (citing Spec. ¶ 9). Appellant contends that the recited
steps, e.g., storing work details, defining constraints, and running a
simulation, are not “observations, evaluation, judgment, or opinion.” Id.
Appellant additionally asserts that the claims are not directed to a
mental process because the “claims include multiple steps that cannot
practically be performed in the human mind.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant
refers to the use of work details table which can include hundreds of items,
and for large and complex projects, “the size of the work details table would
be far greater.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 50, 124, Fig. 1B). Appellant argues that
due to the amount of data in the work details table that generating the data
flow graph and running the simulation would be entirely impractical. Id. at
12.
Appellant further argues that the claims do not recite a method of
organizing human activity because “they are not reasonably classified as
fundamental economic practices/principles, commercial/legal interactions, or
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managing personal behavior/relationships or interactions.” Appeal Br. 12.
Instead, Appellant asserts, the recited steps are for generating a schedule. Id.
As an initial matter, we do not find that the Examiner’s articulation of
what claim 1 is directed to is flawed because it includes a recitation of the
steps of the claims. The Examiner includes a description of the claim as
being “directed to a method of simulating a project,” that includes a listing
of steps of the claim; but the articulation nevertheless is that the claim is
directed to a method of simulation of a project. Final Act. 4; Ans. 4.
Additionally, “an abstract idea can generally be described at different levels
of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). We have considered the steps of the claim, that is, the “storing . .
. a work details table,” “defining precedence constraints,” “populating the
work details table with data,” generating . . . a data flow graph for the
project,” “running . . . a simulation of the project” and generating a schedule,
and find that they are all directed to a method of simulating a project.
Additionally, although Appellant argues that the type of simulation
processes are novel, as the Examiner finds, simulation processes fall within
analysis steps, which along with collecting information and then displaying
results of the analysis, are characterized as mental processes. See Final Act.
4.
We consider the Examiner’s finding that the elements performing the
steps of the claims may be performed by mental processes, and could be
performed in the human mind using paper and pen. Ans. 4–5. We find no
error with the Examiner’s finding that these steps could be performed by a
human as mental processes. This is because, as the Examiner finds, the
steps of populating a work details table with data, generating a data flow
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graph, maintaining a list of events in chronological order, and generating a
project schedule, can be practically performed in the human mind with pen
and paper. Id. Appellant argues that the process may be used for complex
projects involving large amounts of data (Appeal Br. 11–12), and although
the tasks would be more time consuming as complexity increases, the
essential question is whether a person, either mentally or with paper and pen,
could perform the steps recited in the claim. See CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover,
although Appellant argues that the process is novel and uses a simulation in
a “just-in-time” process and uses a pull processor, there is no explanation
why a human mind could not perform the claimed simulation at a particular
(just-in-time) time, or could not access (pull) and review data in performing
the analysis. More specifically, Appellant has provided no evidence that the
steps recited are beyond the mental capacities of an individual or require a
specialized computer or device. Steps that may be performed in the mind,
even if recited as being performed on a computer, are mental processes. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (noting, in holding that the claim recites an abstract idea, that
“with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing
in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a
human, mentally or with pen and paper”).
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that the limitations fall
within the abstract group of methods of organizing human activity. Ans. 5.
We agree with the Examiner that the claimed data flow graphs and project
schedule includes activities and instructions that a worker has to perform,
which involve managing personal behavior. Id. The claimed method of
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simulation of a project therefore involve “managing . . . relationships or
interactions between people,” such as “following rules or instructions,”
which is a method of organizing human activity. See 2019 Guidance, at 52.
We therefore conclude that representative claim 1 recites a judicial
exceptions to 35 U.S.C. § 101, that is, mental processes and a method of
organizing human activity, which are abstract ideas.
The next issue under the second prong of step 2A is whether
additional elements in representative claim 1 integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application, such as elements reflecting an improvement in
the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or
technical field.6,7
The Examiner finds that the additional elements of the claims are a
“processor,” “storage device,” and a software module labeled “pull
processor” that do not improve the functioning of a computer and only serve
as the computer on which the abstract idea is implemented. Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant contends that the claims “provide a novel method for generating a

6 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diehr.
7 The 2019 Guidance states that the analysis of an “integration into a
practical application” involves “[i]dentifying . . . any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those
additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether
they integrate the exception into a practical application.” 2019 Guidance,
54–55. Among the considerations “indicative that an additional element (or
combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical
application” is whether “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in
the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or
technical field.” Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). “[W]hether an additional
element or combination of elements integrate[s] the exception into a
practical application should be evaluated on the claim as a whole.” Id., n.24
(emphasis omitted).
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schedule for a project based on a simulation of the project, where the
simulation uses a data flow graph that is generated, by a processor,
according [to] a specific set of rules.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant asserts that
the additional elements impose a meaningful limit on any recited abstract
idea. Id.
We are not persuaded of error by the Examiner on the issue of
whether the additional elements in representative claim 1 integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. The Examiner finds, and we
agree, that the steps of representative claim 1 do not include improvements
to a technology or technical field. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 6–7. We agree with
the Examiner that the use of the computer elements and modules in the steps
of the claim merely use a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea and
do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Ans. 7.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that the additional recited elements
in the claim are generic in nature and do not improve the functioning of a
computer or any other technology. Id. at 6. For instance, as described in the
Specification, processing blocks, illustrated as functional information, may
be implemented in different ways known to a person of ordinary skill, such
as by circuitry or software. Spec. 88–89.
As a result, we conclude that representative claim 1 does not recite
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application, and, and discussed above, we find no reversible error with the
Examiner’s findings that representative claim 1 recites abstract ideas.
We now look to whether representative claim 1 contains any inventive
concept or adds anything significantly more to transform the abstract
concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216.
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The Federal Circuit has held that, after determining that the claim is
directed to an ineligible concept, we assess “whether the claim limitations,
other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was
directed, were well-understood, routine, and conventional.” BSG Tech LLC
v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We find no error
with the Examiner’s finding that the claim does not recite more that the
implementation of the abstract idea by a computer. Final Act. 5; Ans. 7.
Appellant does not assert that there is any unconventional use of a computer,
and the use of conventional computer components to perform conventional
steps to implement an abstract idea has repeatedly been found to not make
an abstract idea patent eligible. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (Instructing
one to “apply” an abstract idea and reciting no more than generic computer
elements performing generic computer tasks does not make an abstract idea
patent eligible.).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
conclusion that representative claim 1 is directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter.
35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues issues in a claim-specific manner. We address the
issues in a similar manner.
A. Claims 1–6, 9, and 11–21
The Examiner finds that claim 1 is obvious in view of the combination
of Blackmon, Covington, and Chua. Final Act. 6–14. Appellant argues that
this combination of references does not teach the recited limitations of
“generating . . . a data flow graph [which] includes: for each of a plurality of
rows in the work details table, generating a corresponding work detail actor
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node,” and “running . . . a simulation of the project using the data flow
graph, wherein running the simulation comprises maintaining a list of events
in chronological order, each of which refers to a simulated time and an
actor.” Appeal Br. 14–17.
For the “generating . . . a data flow graph . . . [and] generating a
corresponding work detail actor node” limitation, the Examiner finds that
Blackmon and Covington disclose generating a corresponding work detail
actor node for the rows in a work details table. Final Act. 11. The Examiner
further finds that although Blackmon and Covington do not include work
actor nodes, the Examiner contends that Chua does. Id. (citing Chua, Figs.
4, 5 (Assigned tasks N, A, and B)). The Examiner finds that Chua’s
Assigned tasks N, A, and B equate to a work detail actor node because the
Specification “does not explicitly provide a special definition of a work
detail actor (WDA) or a work detail actor node,” but refers to them as data
flow operators. Ans. 9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 13, 72). The Examiner further finds
that “[d]ata flow operators are interpreted as objects that represents data that
is used and/or actions/work that have to be performed in a process,” and
under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term the
combination of Blackmon, Covington, and Chua teach the claim 1
limitation. Id. at 9–10.
Appellant contends that the Specification discloses, a work detail
actor (WDA) is a specific structure that “models the allocation of resources
to a specific work detail” and “schedules the allocation of resources to the
work detail.” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 13). Appellant argues that
Chua’s assigned tasks N, A, and B do not perform any of these functions,
and instead are tasks in a schedule. Id. (citing Chua ¶¶ 70, 113–116).
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The Examiner finds that Appellant attempts to import functional
language from the Specification into the term “work detail actor” and the
term was not previously identified as having a special meaning and the
language that Appellant cites is not recited in the claim. Ans. 10–11 (citing
MPEP 2173.01 (I) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020)). The Examiner
finds that the plain meaning is applied in the absence of a special definition.
On this issue, we are persuaded of reversible error by the Examiner.
The Specification states that:
In accordance with a further aspect of the concepts described
herein, a method for generating a project schedule in response to
a given set of project data, resource limits, resource calendars,
and precedence is described. The technique uses two different
types of data flow operators in a discrete event simulation model.
One data flow operator is a work detail actor (WDA) and one
data flow operator is a precedence actor (PA). The PA operator
tracks satisfaction of precedence constraints and the WDA
operator models the allocation of resources to a specific work
detail and the scheduling of the work detail onset and
completion. The WDA schedules the allocation of resources to
the work detail in conjunction with a Resource Manager that
associates with each work detail a calendar of available resource
work days and work hours. Different calendars may be
associated with different work details and hence with different
WDAs.
Spec. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). MPEP § 2173.01(I) states that a claim is given
its “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art” and “the best source
for determining the meaning of a claim term is the specification.” MPEP
§ 2173.01(I). Here, the Examiner finds that a work detail actor node is
generally a data flow operator that is data used and/or actions or work that
have to be performed. Ans. 9. But this finding fails to account for the
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Specification’s disclosure that, not only is a work detail actor a data flow
operator, but it is also a specific type of data flow operator that models the
allocation of resources to a specific work detail and the scheduling of the
work detail onset and completion. Spec. ¶ 13.  There is no evidence
provided that Chua teaches this type of a data flow operator.
Accordingly, after considering Appellant’s contentions and the
evidence presented in this Appeal, we are persuaded that Appellant identifies
reversible error, and we therefore we cannot sustain the § 103 rejection for
representative claim 1. The prior art relied upon for the prior teaching of
dependent claims 2–6 and 12–21 (Final Act. 14–15, 17–22), fail to remedy
the deficiencies in the teachings for independent claim 1, and therefore we
cannot sustain the rejections of these claims. Further, claim 9 includes a
limitation similar to claim 1 (“node[] correspond[ing] to a work detail
actor”), with Examiner providing the same evidence for that limitation (id. at
17) as that relied upon for claim 1, and therefore we cannot sustain the
rejection of claim 9. Additionally, claim 11 depends from claim 9, and
therefore we cannot sustain the rejection of claim 11 because the Examiner
relied on the same deficient evidence as claim 1.
B. Claims 8 and 10
The Examiner finds that the combination of Blackmon, Covington,
and Chua teach the limitations of claim 8 including “simulating the project
via a simulation engine comprises . . . setting a simulation time to a date
which defines a start date.” Final Act. 16. The Examiner relies on
paragraph 28 of Blackmon for this teaching. Id. The Examiner finds that
paragraph 28 “refers [to] a project design module accessing a project
schedule in a project schedule database to define construction crafts,
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construction areas, and systems in the computerized simulation model, based
on attributes in the engineering data and project schedule.” Ans. 13. The
Examiner finds that in Figure 6 at step 610 “the fabrication prioritization
module creates an ordering schedule based on target installation data (e.g.
target installation dates (i.e. start date).” Id. (citing Blackmon ¶¶ 58–61)
(emphasis added).  The Examiner finds “that [] Blackman’s project schedule
is the simulation time which inherently includes a start and end date of a
project.” Id.
Appellant argues that nothing in paragraph 28 of Blackmon teaches or
suggests “setting a simulation time to a date which defines a start date.”
Appeal Br. 18–19. Appellant argues that there is no stated rationale or
evidence supporting the Examiner’s statement that the project schedule is
the simulation time which inherently includes a start date. Reply Br. 4,
mailed January 4 2021. Appellant argues that although Blackmon teaches
that constructible elements can be assigned target installation dates, it does
not disclose anything about “setting a simulation time to a date which
defines a start date.” Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further
contends that Blackmon does not necessarily set a simulation to a date which
defines a start date because its project schedule is used to compare actual
construction status to expected status. Id.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s findings on this issue
because Blackmon discloses the use of a fabrication prioritization module
that creates an ordering schedule based on the target installation date for
each constructible element in the computerized simulation model.
Blackmon ¶ 61. The target installation date therefore acts as the start time in
the simulation model, even if that date is used as the start date for back-
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calculating to an ordering schedule. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Examiner’s finding that Blackmon teaches “setting a simulation time to a
date which defines a start date.”
The Examiner also finds that “maintaining a list of events in
chronological order, each of which refers to a simulated time and an actor”
as recited in claim 8 is taught by Blackmon. Final Act. 12, 16. The
Examiner finds that Blackmon discloses running a simulation project that
includes a task detailing module that associates work steps to activities and
generates scheduled work tasks, that is, chronological events associated with
particular work crews. Id. at 12 (citing Blackmon ¶¶ 35–36, Fig. 2). The
Examiner also finds that Chua teaches the use of a data flow graph for
tracking and managing a project and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have added Chua’s features to Blackmon and Covington are used to
increase the efficiency of constraint-based project scheduling. Id. at 13.
Appellant asserts that Blackmon’s task detailing module does not
teach that individual steps generated are associated with particular actors as
required by the claim. Appeal Br. 16. Appellant also argues in Chua the
data flow graph is used for tracking and managing a project, which is
different than Blackmon and Covington’s use in running a simulation of a
project, so the Examiner has engaged in hindsight reasoning and does not
consider the claim as a whole. Id. at 17.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, we agree with the Examiner that
Blackmon discloses that its task detailing module generates work steps and
associates them with an activity; work packages include work steps
associated with a particular work crews or actors. See Ans. 11; Blackmon
¶¶ 35–36. For instance, paragraph 36 of Blackmon states that the
Appeal 2021-001624
Application 15/232,112

18

characteristic of work packages includes the time of work steps, and these
work packages are customized for specific work crews. Blackmon ¶ 36.  
Accordingly, there is support that Blackmon discloses the claimed list of
events that refers to a simulated time and an actor.
Additionally, we find no reversible error with the Examiner’s finding
that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to include Chua’s
use of a data flow graph in Blackmon to increase the efficiency of
constraint-based project scheduling. As the Examiner points out, Chua
discloses the advantages of the use of graphs showing the interaction of
among multiple project processes, which supports the rationale to combine.
Chua ¶ 2, Fig. 2.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Examiner’s finding that the
combination of Blackmon, Covington, and Chua teaches the limitation
“maintaining a list of events in chronological order, each of which refers to a
simulated time and an actor” of claim 8. Appellant makes no other
arguments directed to claim 8 or claim 10, which depend therefrom.
Accordingly, after considering Appellant’s contentions and the
evidence presented in this Appeal, we are persuaded that Appellant does not
identify reversible error, and we therefore sustain the § 103 rejection for
claims 8 and 10.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6 and 8–
21 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Appeal 2021-001624
Application 15/232,112

19

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–21 101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–21
1–6, 8–21 103 Blackmon,
Covington, Chua
8, 10 1–6, 9, 11–
21
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED