Mitsubishi Electric CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 22, 202014846125 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 22, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/846,125 09/04/2015 Keiko TADA 459560US20 DIV 4879 22850 7590 05/22/2020 OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. 1940 DUKE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 EXAMINER CHOUDHURY, FAISAL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2478 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/22/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM iahmadi@oblon.com patentdocket@oblon.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEIKO TADA, MITSURU MOCHIZUKI, MIHO MAEDA, and YASUSHI IWANE Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 Technology Center 2400 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 4 and 7–12, which are all of the claims pending in this appeal. See Final Act. 1, Appeal Br. 2. Claims 1–3, 5, and 6 1 We refer to the Specification, filed September 4, 2015 (“Spec.”); Final Office Action, mailed February 5, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed September 5, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed December 20, 2018 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed February 6, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). 2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 2 are canceled. Claims App. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was held in this appeal on May 13, 2020. A transcript of the oral hearing is being prepared and will be entered into the record in due course. We AFFIRM. Summary of the disclosure According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter relates to a Long Term Evolution (LTE) communication system (i.e., cellular communications). Spec. ¶ 1. Using persistent scheduling, upon detecting silence, a mobile terminal is allocated to a channel exclusive for the silent period and previously allocated resources are released. Abstract. Representative claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 4. A mobile communication system for performing radio communication, the mobile communication system comprising: a mobile terminal; and a base station including circuitry configured to allocate a radio resource with persistent scheduling to the mobile terminal by using a control signal of an upper layer, wherein the circuitry is configured to perform release of the radio resource using a control signal of a lower layer. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Wang Lee US 2008/0101286 A1 US 2009/0219868 A1 May 1, 2008 Sept. 3, 2009 Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 3 “Scheduling of LTE UL VoIP”, Nokia, 3GPP TSG-RAN WG2 Meeting #56bis, R2-070020, vol. RAN WG2, No. Sorrento, Italy, XP 050133137A, January 15–19, 2007, 4 pages (“Nokia”) The Examiner’s Rejections The Examiner rejects claims 4 and 7–11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nokia and Lee. Final Act. 3–5. The Examiner rejects claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nokia, Lee, and Wang. Final Act. 5–6. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erred and adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner. We add the following primarily for emphasis. The Examiner finds Nokia discloses the limitations recited by claim 4, including allocating a radio resource using a control signal of an upper layer (Nokia’s layer 3 (L3) radio resource control (RRC) signaling), but “fails to explicitly disclose . . . release of the radio resource using a control signal of a lower layer.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds Lee’s disclosure that a “radio-resource allocation release completion message may be transmitted via a control signal of the first or second layer” cures the noted deficiency of Nokia by teaching releasing of the radio resource using a control signal of a lower layer. Id. (citing Lee ¶¶ 6–7, 87, 90). According to the Examiner, the reason to combine the references is to release resources using the lower layer. Id. Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 4 Appellant contends the rejection is improper because: i) “nothing in Nokia discloses or suggest[s] that the release request would be transmitted using anything other than [L3] RRC signaling” (Appeal Br. 5); ii) “Lee at best only describes release of radio resources using L1/L2 signaling, and does not disclose or suggest allocating ‘a radio resource with persistent scheduling to the mobile terminal by using a control signal of an upper layer,’ and releasing ‘the radio resource using a control signal of a lower layer’” (id. at 5– 6 (emphasis omitted)); and iii) Because “Nokia describes using [L3] RRC signaling . . . in order to ‘reduce the amount of L1/L2 control signaling or even get rid of it completely,’” the reference teaches away from incorporating Lee’s use of L1/L2 to release resources, rendering their combination improper (id. at 6–7). The Examiner responds, finding Nokia’s stated advantages of using RRC (i.e., L3) signaling rather than L1/L2 signaling is disclosed in connection with allocation of resources, not in connection with the release of resources. Ans. 6. Furthermore, according to the Examiner, although “Nokia at section 2.3 also discloses . . . releasing [a] resource, [it] does not expressly disclose whether an upper layer or lower layer signal is also being used for releasing resource.” Id. Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error. In particular, Appellant’s contention (i) arguing Nokia fails to teach using a lower layer to release a radio resource (Appeal Br. 5) fails to address the Examiner’s finding that Lee, not the argued Nokia, teaches the disputed Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 5 limitation. Similarly, Appellant’s contention (ii) that Lee fails to teach allocating a radio resource using a control signal of an upper layer and releasing the radio resource using a control signal of a lower layer (id. at 5– 6) fails to address the Examiner’s finding that Nokia teaches the use of L3 (i.e., RRC) signaling to allocate a resource. Thus, Appellant’s arguments ignore that the rejection is based, not on Nokia or Lee separately, but on the combination of Nokia and Lee. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). We are also unpersuaded of error by Appellant’s contention (iii) alleging “one of ordinary skill is discouraged by Nokia from using the L1/L2 signaling described in Lee in order reduce signaling overhead and simplify allocation and release of resources, which is described by Nokia to be beneficial.” See Appeal Br. 6. As explained by the Examiner, Nokia discloses advantages (and, we note, disadvantages) of using RRC (i.e., L3) signaling to allocate radio resources, but does not include in the discussion advantages of using RRC signaling to release radio resources. Ans. 6. Appellant fails to provide sufficient evidence to persuade us that Nokia’s preference for using L1/L2 (i.e., lower layer) signaling for resource allocation would also apply to the release of resources. Furthermore, Nokia discloses both advantages and disadvantages of using L3 signaling. For example, while listing the “Pros” (i.e., advantages) of using L3 RRC signaling for resource allocation to include reduced signaling overhead and simplicity, Nokia also lists “Cons” (i.e., Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 6 disadvantages) including wasted resources, the need for a discontinuous transmission (DTX) detector at the base station (i.e., Node B), transport block (TB) size requirements, and maximum (i.e., “Max”) VoIP capacity limitations. Nokia § 2.2. Thus, rather than discouraging the use of L1/L2 signaling, Nokia discloses factors that might result in a qualified preference for using L3 RRC signaling instead of L1/L2 signaling. Even if Nokia had disclosed only advantages of L3 RRC signaling, merely “express[ing] a preference” falls short of discouraging one of ordinary skill in the art from following a particular path. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To teach away, the prior art must “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Teaching an alternative method does not teach away from the use of a claimed method. See In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433, 438 (CCPA 1965); see also Ex parte Shuping, No. 2008-0394, 2008 WL 336222, at *2 (BPAI 2008) (unpublished) (“‘[T]eaching a way is not teaching away.’” (citation omitted)). At most, Nokia discloses certain advantages to using L3 signaling for resource allocation that (i) may not be equally applicable to the release of resources and, in any case (ii) merely expresses a qualified preference for its use under certain conditions that does not amount to the argued teaching away. For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and, for the same reasons, the rejection of independent claims 9 and 10 together with the rejections of dependent claims 7, 8, 11, and 12 which are not argued separately with particularity. Appeal 2019-002557 Application 14/846,125 7 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 4, 7–11 103(a) Nokia, Lee 4, 7–11 12 103(a) Nokia, Lee, Wang 12 Overall Outcome 4, 7–12 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation