MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 27, 2021

2020005102 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/737,695 12/18/2017 Takashi MATOBA 2257-0603PUS1 5778
2292 7590 10/27/2021
BIRCH STEWART KOLASCH & BIRCH, LLP
8110 Gatehouse Road
Suite 100 East
Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
EXAMINER
LUBIT, RYAN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/27/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mailroom@bskb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TAKASHI MATOBA, SHIGENORI SHIBUE, and
YOSHINORI ASAMURA
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695
Technology Center 2600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Herein, “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MITSUBISH
ELECTRIC CORPORATION. Appeal Brief 1.
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to “a luminance correction method . . . .
[for] an LED display device which displays thereon video information by
blinking control of a plurality of LEDs (Light Emitting Diodes) arranged in
[a] matrix.” Specification ¶ 1. Claims 11–22 are pending; claims 11 and 17
are independent. Appeal Brief Claims Appendix. Claim 11 is reproduced
below for reference:
11. An LED display device, comprising:
a first display which comprises a plurality of LED
elements;
a first driver to drive said plurality of LED elements of said
first display on the basis of a video signal received from a video
signal processor;
a second display which comprises at least one
measurement LED element equivalent to one of said plurality of
LED elements included in said first display;
a second driver to drive said measurement LED element
of said second display;
a luminance measurement device to measure a luminance
of said measurement LED element;
a luminance decrease rate storage of a storage device to
store therein a relation between a lighting time of said
measurement LED element and a luminance decrease rate of said
measurement LED element based on a measurement result of
said luminance measurement device;
a processing circuit configured to implement an
accumulated lighting time estimation process
to estimate an accumulated lighting time at intervals of a
predetermined time for each of said plurality of LED elements;
an average duty ratio storage of the storage device to store
therein an average duty ratio obtained by dividing said
accumulated lighting time which is estimated, by an accumulated
operating time for said plurality of LED elements;
the processing circuit further configured to implement:
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

3
a luminance correction coefficient calculation process to
obtain a luminance decrease rate with reference to said
luminance decrease rate storage and said average duty ratio
storage for each of said plurality of LED elements and calculate
a luminance correction coefficient from said luminance decrease
rate; and
a luminance correction process to control said first driver
to correct a luminance of each of said plurality of LED elements
on the basis of said luminance correction coefficient,
wherein said accumulated lighting time estimation process
calculates a first accumulated lighting time up to a time traced
back by said predetermined time from the present time for each
of said plurality of LED elements, by multiplying an
accumulated operating time of said LED display device up to
said time traced back by said predetermined time from said
present time by the average duty ratio of the LED element,
said accumulated lighting time estimation process
calculates a second accumulated lighting time from said
predetermined time from the present time up to said present time
for each of said plurality of LED elements, by multiplying an
accumulated operating time of said LED display device from
said predetermined time from the present time up to said present
time by a duty ratio of the LED element at said present time,
said accumulated lighting time estimation process
calculates an accumulated lighting time up to said present time
for each of said plurality of LED elements, by adding said first
accumulated lighting time and said second accumulated lighting
time,
said accumulated lighting time estimation process updates
said average duty ratio for each of said plurality of LED elements
by a value obtained by dividing said accumulated lighting time
up to said present time by said accumulated operating time of
said LED display device up to said present time and stores said
average duty ratio into said average duty ratio storage of the
storage device, and
said accumulated lighting time estimation process
performs calculation of said accumulated lighting time up to said
present time and update of said average duty ratio at intervals of
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

4
said predetermined time for each of said plurality of LED
elements.
References and Rejections
Claims 11–14 and 17–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Johnson (US 2005/0280766 A1; Dec. 22, 2005) in view of
Admitted Prior Art (“APA”) and Ichikawa (US 2006/0109389 A1; May 25,
2006). Final Action 5.
Claims 15, 16, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Johnson in view of APA and Ichikawa, and further in
view of Kurikko (US 2013/0147857 A1; June 13, 2013). Final Action 12.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 11 is
in error, because the rejection provides only “a cursory, superficial argument
as to how Ichikawa discloses all of the features of claim l1, which the
Examiner clearly admits that Johnson does not disclose.” Appeal Brief 8.
Appellant contends “[t]he Examiner has pointed to no specific structure or
reasoning for Ichikawa to teach or suggest the multiple paragraphs of the
[claims] and thus has simply failed to establish a prima facie case.” Appeal
Brief 11.
We are persuaded that the Examiner has failed to present a prima
facie case of obviousness.
[T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
“notify[ing] the applicant ... [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.”
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

5
As discussed above, all that is required of the office to meet its
prima facie burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis
of the rejection and the reference or references relied upon in a
sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of § 132.
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted); see also MPEP 2142 (“It is important for an examiner to properly
communicate the basis for a rejection so that the issues can be identified
early and the applicant can be given fair opportunity to reply.).
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Johnson fails to disclose a
majority of claim 11 (Final Action 7–9), but that “[t]he remaining limitations
of this claim that are not explicitly disclosed by Johnson are rendered
obvious in view of the teachings of Ichikawa” (Final Action 9). The
Examiner explains as follows:
While the specific language and elements recited in lines 17–25
and 29–48 have not been address[ed] word for word, merely
utilizing the duty ratio of Ichikawa in the pixel history calculation
of Johnson and subsequently updating the pixel history of
Johnson and making adjustments to driving signal 8
continuously or in intervals teaches / renders obvious these
recited features.
Final Action 10.
We agree with Appellant that such analysis is insufficient to establish
obviousness. See Appeal Brief 10. The Examiner does not explain how the
specific limitations of the claim at issue are rendered obvious by particular
teachings or suggestions in the cited references. Without enough detail to
understand how the combined teachings of the reference render the entirety
of the claim obvious, the analysis fails to be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing prosecution of the application. See Jung, 637 F.3d at
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

6
1362. Thus, the rejection in the Final Action does not present a prima facie
case of obviousness.
In the Answer, the Examiner explains that “going through each line of
claimed subject matter in lines 21–24 and 27–47 was unnecessary and would
have only led to more confusion and wasted time,” because “the Examiner
assumed that Appellant and Appellant's representative would have the
understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”2 Answer 6, 7. The
Examiner then provides additional discussion of the various limitations of
claim 11: “the Examiner will walk through the recitations of lines 21–24
and 27–47 [of claim 11] so that the Board can appreciate the scope and
meaning of these recitations and how they are rendered obvious in the
manner set forth in the Final Rejection.” Answer 7 (emphasis omitted); see
also id. at 7–12.
The Examiner’s reasoning—for not discussing the claim limitations—
conflates the hypothetical person of ordinary skill standard with the Office’s
notification requirements in carrying its procedural burden. Cf. Ryko Mfg.
Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Instead of
ascertaining what was subjectively obvious to the inventor at the time of
invention, the court must ascertain what would have been objectively
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at such time.”).

2 The Examiner further states, “[t]his assumption appears to have been made
in error.” Answer 6, 7. We note that, in rejecting claims, “[e]verything of a
personal nature must be avoided.” MPEP § 707.07(d); see also id. (“[t]he
impression that any part of an Office action fails to reflect the professional
judgment of the examiner or other employee authorizing the action should
not be created by the action.”).
Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

7
Further, in the new analysis of the Answer, the Examiner merely
provides an (admittedly extensive) construction of the claim limitations.
See, e.g., Answer 9 (“Lines 27–31 of claim 11 merely utilizes the equation
D = PW/T set forth above to calculate T,” and “[u]sing simple algebra. . .
the recitations of lines 27–31 of claim 11 contain nothing more than a well-
known relationship between duty ratio, pulse width [accumulated lighting
time], and a total period of a signal [accumulated operating time].”). The
rejection’s discussion of the prior art is limited to broadly describing the
cited references, without identifying the specific teachings relied on or how
these teachings would be combined by an artisan of ordinary skill. See, e.g.,
Answer 9 (“The mere disclosure in Ichikawa of adjusting a duty ratio to
compensate for brightness degradation is sufficient to teach these features in
combination with the cited disclosure of Johnson.”). Such analysis is
insufficient to meet the burden required of the USPTO. Cf. Jung, 637 F.3d
at 1363 (“Here, the examiner's discussion of the theory of invalidity
(anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky), and the
identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the
prior art reference by specific column and line number was more than
sufficient to meet this burden.”).
For the above reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner fails to present
a prima face case of obviousness with respect to claim 11, and for
independent claim 17, which is rejected under the same rationale. See Ans.
13 (“the grounds of rejection with regard to claim 11 apply fully and
completely to the recitations of claim 17”). We do not sustain the rejection
of these claims, or the rejections of the claims dependent thereon.

Appeal 2020-005102
Application 15/737,695

8

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
11–14, 17–
20
103 Johnson, APA,
Ichikawa
11–14, 17–
20
15, 16, 21,
22
103 Johnson, APA,
Ichikawa, Kurikko
15, 16, 21,
22
Overall
Outcome
11–22

REVERSED