Misapplied Sciences, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 23, 2020

15002175 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/002,175 01/20/2016 Albert Han Ng 3081-011US1 1868
22897 7590 10/23/2020
Kaplan Breyer Schwarz, LLP
90 Matawan Road, Suite 201
Matawan, NJ 07747
EXAMINER
MIDKIFF, AARON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kbsiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ALBERT HAN NG, PAUL HENRY DIETZ, and
DAVID STEVEN THOMPSON
____________________

Appeal 2019-004485
Application 15/002,175
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. MCCARTNEY, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6, 8–22, and 24–31.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Misapplied Sciences, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
2 The Final Office Action also rejected dependent claim 7 (Final Act. 1, 4,
6), but Appellant canceled this claim on May 30, 2018 (cf. Appeal Br. 29).
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BACKGROUND3
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
multi-view displays, which can present different images to different people
(referred to as “viewers”) on a single screen. Spec. ¶¶ 2–5.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for operating a system including a multi-
view display, wherein the multi-view display is visible in a
viewing area comprising a plurality of viewing zones, the
method comprising:
detecting a presence and determining a location of a
plurality of viewers, including a first viewer and a second
viewer, in the viewing area of the multi-view display, wherein a
location of each viewer in the viewing region at any moment
defines, for each viewer, a personal viewing zone;
detecting a first interaction of the first viewer with the
system and a second interaction of a second viewer with the
system, wherein detecting the first interaction and second
interaction comprises capturing, via a sensing system, gestures
performed by respective first and second viewers, wherein the
gestures represent at least one of a command and a preference
of each of the first and second viewers pertaining to content,
which can be different for each of the first and second viewers;
generating first content based on the first interaction and
second content based on the second interaction;

3 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed January 20, 2016, which claims the benefit of at least one
earlier-filed application; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action, mailed
November 2, 2017; “Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed May
31, 2018; and “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 5, 2018.
Appellant elected not to file a Reply Brief.
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displaying, via the multi-view display, the first content to
the first viewer and the second content to the second viewer,
wherein the first content is viewable only in the first viewer’s
personal viewing zone and the second content is viewable only
in the second viewer’s personal viewing zone.
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 24–31 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Karaoguz (US 2011/0159929
A1, published June 30, 2011) (hereinafter “Kara”).4 Final Act. 4–12.
R2. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Kara and Levine (US 2012/0140048 A1, published June 7, 2012).
Final Act. 13–15.
R3. Claims 11–13 and 16–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over Kara and Reynolds (US 2003/0115096 A1, published
June 19, 2003). Final Act. 15–18.
R4. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Kara, Reynolds, and Thornton (US 8,461,995 B1, issued June 11, 2013).
Final Act. 18–19.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

4 The Final Office Action, Appeal Brief, and Answer refer to this reference
as “Kara,” so we use the same shorthand in this Decision.
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Anticipation Rejection Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 24–31
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 24–31 stand rejected as
anticipated by Kara. Final Act. 4–12. Appellant presents arguments
directed to independent claims 1 and 30, as well as various dependent
claims. See Appeal Br. 15–26. We address these claims in turn.
Independent Claim 1
Claim 1 recites “detecting a first interaction of the first viewer with
the system and a second interaction of a second viewer with the system,
wherein detecting the first interaction and second interaction comprises
capturing, via a sensing system, gestures performed by respective first and
second viewers.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.) (italicized portion referred to
in this Decision as “the disputed limitation”). Appellant contends that Kara
fails to teach the disputed limitation because Kara fails to disclose capturing
viewers’ gestures. Id. at 15–18.
For the disputed limitation, the Examiner points to paragraphs 191
and 221 of Kara. Final Act. 3, 5. Those paragraphs state, in relevant part,
that each viewer of Kara’s multi-view display “may utilize [a] remote
control device” to modify the content presented to that viewer (Kara ¶ 191),
and the “remote control device includes at least a user interface . . . [and]
one or more cameras and microphones” (id. ¶ 212). According to the
Examiner, Kara’s “first and second viewers provid[e] input—corresponding
to gestures—to respective remote controls to generate modifications applied
to each viewer’s respective view of media content.” Final Act. 5. The
Examiner concludes that the term “gesture, as understood by one having
ordinary skill in the art, is detectable input to which a corresponding
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function is assigned.” Id. at 3; see id. (further noting Kara’s system receives
user input via a button, “scroll pad, joystick, touch sensitive display, voice
recognition and the like” (citing Kara ¶ 202)).
Appellant alleges error in the Examiner’s construction of the term
“gesture.” Appeal Br. 15–18. Appellant contends that “a gesture is ‘a
movement of part of the body to express an idea or meaning’” and
distinguishes “the ‘contact’ that is occasioned by a user manipulating or
actuating a device that is, itself, a user interface.” Id. at 16. In support of its
proposed construction, Appellant quotes two dictionary definitions for the
word “gesture” and cites passages from the Specification. Id. at 16–18
(citing Spec ¶¶ 33–35, 38–39, 41–42, 51–52). Appellant also submits that
the Examiner fails to explain or support his construction. Id. at 16.
The Examiner responds that Appellant’s proposed construction is too
broad. Ans. 4 (“[S]uch an expansive interpretation encompasses far more
than intended by the instant application”), 5 (asserting that the term
“gesture” in the relevant art and in light of the Specification is “narrow[er]”
than Appellant’s general dictionary definition). In addition, the Examiner
appears to assert that Appellant’s argument misses the point, as it does not
consider capturing “the movements of the body parts . . . as input . . . and
subsequently performing an action/function/instruction.” Id. at 4 (emphasis
omitted). To that end, the Examiner provides an example of a “counter-
clockwise motion of a joystick (input/trigger) [that] performs a character’s
special move in a video game (function performed).” Id. The Examiner
states that the Final Office Action “dr[ew] analogy between [Kara’s use of a
remote control to provide input] and the claimed gesture,” and the claim
does not specify “the means by which a gesture is captured.” Id. at 5.
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We are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Kara
discloses the disputed limitation. See Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co.
of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if
each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or
inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”).
In particular, the Examiner erred in construing a “gesture” to be any
“detectable input to which a corresponding function is assigned.” Final
Act. 3. Claim 1 recites “detecting a first interaction of the first viewer with
the system . . . wherein detecting . . . comprises capturing . . . gestures” and
“generating first content based on the first interaction.” Appeal Br. 28. The
Examiner focuses the surrounding claim limitations in concluding that a
“gesture” is any input that triggers performance of a function (see Final Act.
3; Ans. 4–5); however, the Examiner’s interpretation fails to provide a
meaning for the term “gesture[]” itself.5
More importantly, the Examiner’s interpretation of the scope of the
disputed limitation is not consistent with the Specification, which provides
the following definition:
“acquire” or “capture” refer, in the context of a viewer’s
gesture, to the process of obtaining digital images or video of
the gesture(s) from a sensing system, which typically (but not
necessarily) includes a vision sensor, such as a camera.
Spec ¶ 25. Accordingly, the broadest reasonable interpretation6 of the
disputed limitation—i.e., “capturing, via a sensing system, gestures

5 We decline to adopt a particular construction of the term “gesture”
because construction of the phrase “capturing . . . gestures” is dispositive.
6 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
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performed by respective first and second viewers”—refers to a process of
obtaining digital images or video of the viewers’ gestures.
Applying this construction, it is clear that the cited portions of Kara
do not disclose the disputed limitation. See Kara ¶¶ 191, 212. Rather, Kara
discloses that a viewer controls the content displayed via a remote control
device.7 Id. ¶ 191. Kara also teaches that its remote control device may
include “one or more cameras” (id. ¶ 212), but the Examiner identifies no
disclosure of using this camera to obtain digital images or video of viewers’
gestures. Instead, the Examiner simply states that a camera theoretically
could be used to optically capture a gesture (see Ans. 7), but an anticipation
rejection requires the reference to actually disclose the claim’s limitations.
See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(To anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “[a] single reference must describe the
claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the
subject matter existed in the prior art.”).
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using
“the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into
account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
7 We further note that the Examiner did not sufficiently explain the finding
that Kara discloses a “gesture.” The Examiner describes an example of
moving a joystick in a particular way in order to input specific information
(Ans. 4); however, a traditional joystick determines the joystick’s movement,
without identifying a gesture of the user that resulted in that movement.
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disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, we reverse the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1.
Independent Claim 30
Claim 30 recites “optically captur[ing] interactions of the viewers
with the system, wherein the interactions are gestures of the viewers.”
Appeal Br. 32 (Claims App.). Appellant contends that Kara fails to teach
this limitation for at least the reasons discussed above with respect to
claim 1. Id. at 20. The Examiner similarly refers to the discussion of
claim 1. Ans. 7; see also Final Act. 11 (relying on same analysis).
For the reasons explained above with respect to independent claim 1,
we are also persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Kara teaches
“optically captur[ing] interactions of the viewers with the system, wherein
the interactions are gestures of the viewers,” as required by claim 30.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of
independent claim 30.
Dependent Claims 2, 5, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24–29, and 31
In light of our reversal of the rejections of independent claims 1 and
30, supra, we also reverse the anticipation rejections of dependent claims 2,
5, 6, 8–10, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24–29, and 31, as each of these claims depend
(directly or indirectly) from either claim 1 or claim 30.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 3, 4, 11–13, and 16–20
The Examiner rejected dependent claims 3, 4, 11–13, and 16–20 as
obvious over the combination of Kara with Levin, Reynolds, and/or
Thornton. Final Act. 13–19. Each of these claims depend (directly or
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indirectly) from either independent claim 1 or independent claim 30, and on
this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited
references (Levine, Reynolds, and Thornton), overcome the deficiencies of
Kara that were identified above in the discussion of the independent claims.
See Final Act. 13–19.
Accordingly, in light of our reversal of the rejections of independent
claims 1 and 30, supra, we also reverse the obviousness rejections of
dependent claims 3, 4, 11–13, and 16–20.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5, 6,
8–10, 14,
15, 21, 22,
24–31
102 Karaoguz 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–
10, 14, 15,
21, 22, 24–
31
3, 4 103 Karaoguz, Levine 3, 4
11–13, 16–
19
103 Karaoguz, Reynolds 11–13, 16–
19
20 103 Karaoguz,
Reynolds, Thornton
20
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–22,
24–31

REVERSED