Miron & Sons Laundry

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 16, 2002

338 N.L.R.B. 5 (N.L.R.B. 2002)

MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 1
B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry and
Amalgamated Service & Allied Industries Joint
Board, UNITE, AFL–CIO. Cases 2–CA–33596
and 2–CA–33783
September 16, 2002
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, COWEN, AND BARTLETT
On June 20, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Davis issued the attached decision. The General Counsel
filed a limited exception and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exception and
brief and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions1 and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, B & M
Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry, Bronx, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following between paragraphs 2(a) and
2(b) and renumber paragraphs accordingly.
“(b) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the in-
formation requested by the Union on February 20, 2001
and April 17, 2001.”
2. Substitute the following for former paragraph 2(c),
now paragraph 2(d).
“(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Bronx, New York facility, in both English and Span-
ish, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”12
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respon-
dent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to

1 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the judge’s find-
ings that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
2 The General Counsel excepts only to the judge’s failure to include
in the recommended Order a provision providing that the notice to
employees be posted in both English and Spanish. The record indicates
that a majority of the Respondent’s employees are primarily Spanish
speaking. The Respondent has not responded to the General Counsel’s
exception. We find merit to the General Counsel’s exception and shall
order that the notice be posted in both English and Spanish. See Baby
Watson Cheesecake, Inc., 320 NLRB 779 (1996). We also add par.
2(b) to the recommended Order because the judge inadvertently failed
to include an affirmative remedy for the Respondent’s failure to pro-
vide information, and we substitute a new notice to conform to current
standard Board language.
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since December 1, 2000.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to sign the Union contract.
WE WILL NOT refuse to pay you union contract wages,
refuse to give you union contract benefits, or refuse to
apply the union contract to your hours and working con-
ditions.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to furnish information
relevant and necessary to the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten union representatives with
physical violence if they do not leave our premises.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL sign the union contract.
WE WILL pay you the union contract wages, give you
union contract benefits, and apply the union contract to
your hours and working conditions, with retroactive pay.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information requested by the Union on February 20,
2001, and April 17, 2001.

338 NLRB No. 2
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2
B & M LINEN CORP. D/B/A
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY

Eric Brooks, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Miron Markus, pro se, for the Respondent.
Ursula Levelt, Esq. (Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C.), New
York, New York, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a
charge and an amended charge filed in Case 2–CA–33596 on
February 16 and April 10, 2001, respectively, by Amalgamated
Service & Allied Industries Joint Board, UNITE, AFL–CIO
(Union), and based upon a charge filed in Case 2–CA–33783
on May 21, 2001 by the Union, a complaint was issued on Feb-
ruary 13, 2002 against B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons
Laundry (Respondent).
The complaint alleges that the Respondent agreed to be
bound to the terms of an agreement reached by the Union and
the Laundry Industry Multi-Employer Bargaining Group (As-
sociation), and to execute a collective-bargaining agreement
embodying those terms, but has failed and refused to do so.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent has failed to
continue in effect all the terms and conditions of that agreement
without the Union’s consent. The complaint further alleges that
the Respondent failed to provide requested information. Fi-
nally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent’s president
Miron Markus (Markus), in the presence of employees, threat-
ened the Union’s business representative, with physical vio-
lence if she did not leave the Respondent’s facility.
Respondent’s answer, as amended at the hearing, denied the
material allegations of the complaint. On February 27, 2002, a
hearing was held before me in New York, New York. Upon
the evidence presented in this proceeding, and my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses and after consideration of the
briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the
following1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
A. B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry
and Related Businesses
The complaint alleges that various companies with which the
Respondent is affiliated constitute a single-integrated business
enterprise and a single employer.2 The answer denies that alle-

1 One day after General Counsel filed his brief, Markus requested an
extension of time to file a brief, explaining that he had been out of
town. I granted the request over General Counsel’s objection, but I
permitted General Counsel to file a reply brief, which he has done. A
copy of the Order granting Respondent’s request has been received in
evidence as General Counsel’s Exhibit 33. I grant General Counsel’s
unopposed motion to strike portions of Respondent’s brief which con-
tains factual assertions as to which no evidence was presented.
2 B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Linen Service; B & M
Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Linen Co.; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a
gation except for B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons
Laundry.
As to the other entities except for Laundry Joint Venture,
Markus testified that he is the sole shareholder, sole officer and
president. The companies operate from the same location, 310
Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York, and are involved in the
same business—providing laundry services to individuals and
commercial businesses throughout the New York City metro-
politan area. The companies have the same employees, super-
visors, office staff, telephone and fax numbers, tax identifica-
tion number, and operate with the same trucks, equipment and
supplies, have the same insurance policies, file one tax report,
and have a single workers compensation and unemployment
policy. The hiring and discharge process is the same for all
companies, and Markus negotiates with the Union.
Based upon the above evidence, I find that all of the listed
companies, except Laundry Joint Venture, constitute a single-
integrated business enterprise and a single employer within the
meaning of the Act.
The Respondent provides laundry services valued in excess
of $50,000 directly to enterprises located within New York
State, which themselves meet a direct test for the assertion of
jurisdiction, including the Warwick Hotel and the Regent Wall
Street Hotel. The Respondent annually purchases and receives
products, goods and materials at its Bronx, New York facility,
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside New
York State. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
B. Laundry Joint Venture
Markus denied that his companies are affiliated with Laun-
dry Joint Venture. He testified that in the early 1990’s he
moved his companies to a building owned by Joseph Karten.
He stated that Karten attempted to have him agree to pay his
debts and affiliate Laundry Joint Venture with Markus’ compa-
nies. Markus refused, but admits signing a document in behalf
of Karten. In October, 1993, Markus signed, as president, a
quarterly Federal Tax Return for Laundry Joint Venture, and in
August, 1994, signed, as president and sole shareholder of
Laundry Joint Venture, an answer to a Federal lawsuit brought
by the Union. Markus also testified that in 1996 or 1997, the
Internal Revenue Service advised him that Karten listed all of
the employees of Laundry Joint Venture under his name, and he
had to pay $17,000 from his personal account in apparent satis-
faction of the claim by the IRS.
In August, 1996, Region 2 of the Board issued a letter which
closed, upon compliance, various cases against “Laundry Joint
Venture, Inc. & Miron and Son Linen, Inc., a Single Em-
ployer.” Accompanying the letter was a settlement agreement

Miron & Sons Linen, Inc.; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons,
Inc.; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Blanchevoye Laundry; B & M Linen
Corp. d/b/a Blanchway Laundry; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron &
Sons Laundry; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry Ser-
vice; B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry Joint Venture; B
& M Linen Corp. d/b/a Laundry Joint Venture, Inc.; and B & M Linen
Corp. d/b/a Walton Laundry, Inc.
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 3
notice to employees which stated that the employer agreed to
bargain with the Union and furnish requested information to it.
Based upon this evidence, I cannot find that Laundry Joint
Venture is a single-integrated business enterprise and a single
employer with Markus or his companies. The evidence as to
the circumstances surrounding Markus’ involvement with
Laundry Joint Venture is stale. His signature on documents
which are eight and nine years old, and later the compliance
documents cannot support a finding as to the relationship be-
tween the companies at the time the complaint issued. The
complaint alleges that Laundry Joint Venture is a single em-
ployer with Markus’ companies at the time the complaint was
issued. The evidence does not support such a finding.
C. The Labor Organization Status of the Union
The Respondent denied that the Union is a statutory labor
organization. Wilfredo Larancuent, the Union’s manager, testi-
fied that the Union is an amalgamation of about 13 laundry
local unions in the New York metropolitan area. The Union
represents about 5000 employees through approximately 100
collective-bargaining agreements. The Respondent’s amended
answer admits that the Union is the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its unit employees, and that it has
had collective-bargaining agreements with the Union.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. The Alleged Failure to Execute an Agreed-Upon Contract
a. Facts
The Respondent entered into collective-bargaining agree-
ments with the Union in 1987, 1990 and 1996. The Respon-
dent’s amended answer given at the hearing admits that the
Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate unit, and has been recognized
as such by the Respondent. The amended answer further ad-
mits that such recognition has been embodied in successive
collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is in
effect from November 28, 2000 to November 27, 2003. The
answer also admits that the Union, by virtue of Section 9(a) of
the Act, has been, and is, the exclusive representative of the
unit. The admitted appropriate bargaining unit is as follows:

All full-time and regular part-time inside production employ-
ees and drivers employed by the Respondent excluding man-
agers, assistant managers, and executives.

The 1996 agreement stated that the prior contract expired in
1983 but the parties’ collective-bargaining relationship contin-
ued thereafter. The 1996 agreement also stated that it would
expire on March 14, 1999, but would automatically renew in
the absence of notice that changes in it was desired.
Union agent Larancuent testified that the Union had diffi-
culty, over the years, in obtaining the Respondent’s compliance
with the terms of their agreements.
In 2000, Larancuent visited Markus who denied that he had
an obligation to recognize the Union. Larancuent believed that
the simpler course of action would be to organize the employ-
ees rather than base the obligation to bargain upon the past
collective-bargaining history and the prior contracts. Accord-
ingly, the employees signed cards for the Union and Larancuent
demanded recognition. Markus refused. The Union picketed
for recognition and distributed leaflets at the Respondent’s
customers’ premises.
On June 27, 2000, Markus signed a Recognition Agreement
which stated that the Respondent recognized the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative for all its production and
maintenance employees, including drivers, employed at its
plant located at 310 Walton Avenue, Bronx; the Respondent
and the Union agree to meet further for the purpose of bargain-
ing in good faith and to execute an “individual” bargaining
agreement.
Markus who believed that the term “collective-bargaining
agreement” in the Recognition Agreement meant that the Re-
spondent was considered a part of the Association, insisted
upon the term “individual bargaining agreement.” Accordingly
the term “individual bargaining agreement” was inserted in the
Recognition Agreement at Markus’ request.
The Association’s contract with the Union was due to expire
in November, 2000, and negotiations were ongoing between
those parties. In July, 2000, Larancuent sought to obtain a
“me-too” agreement from independent employers such as the
Respondent who were not members of the Association. Such
“me-too” agreements would obligate the signer to be bound to
whatever agreement the Union reached with the Association in
their bargaining.3 Accordingly, Larancuent asked Markus to
sign a “me-too” agreement and left the document with him.
One or two days later, Markus faxed to the Union the “me-
too” agreement with extensive modifications. Larancuent could
not understand the modifications and requested a meeting.
Prior to the meeting, the Union sent letters to the Respondent’s
customers in which it referred to the Respondent as a “sweat-
shop,” and warned that pickets may appear at their premises
and their customers’ premises. The Union urged the customers
to cancel their orders “until the labor dispute is settled.”
On about September 15, 2000, Larancuent, the Union’s at-
torney and Markus met. Larancuent asked Markus to sign the
“me-too” agreement. Markus refused, explaining that he could
not agree to be bound by the terms of the Association agree-
ment which have not been set, and which were due to be com-
pleted two months later in November. Larancuent replied that
the terms did not matter since the Union would be asking the
independent employers to agree to the same terms agreed upon
by the Association. Markus again refused.
After a discussion, Markus signed an agreement in which he
agreed to be bound to the current Association contract from
September 1, 2000 until November 28, 2000, its expiration
date. The agreement Markus signed also provides that prior to

3 “Me-too” is misspelled in the transcript as “meet to.” General
Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript in this regard is
granted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4
November 28, 2000, the parties would agree on a contract
which would be “separate” from the Association agreement.
On November 28, 2000, the Association and the Union
reached agreement upon the terms of a new collective-
bargaining agreement. The following day, at Larancuent’s
request, Union representative Maria Martinez visited Respon-
dent and asked him to sign a “me-too” agreement in which he
would agree to be bound by the contract reached between the
Association and the Union. Markus refused to sign it because
he was not a member of the Association. Markus testified that
it was possible that Martinez told him at that time that the Un-
ion and Association reached agreement on the terms of a new
contract.
On November 29, Larancuent called Markus and explained
the terms of the Association agreement, which included wage
increases, minimum rates of pay, new contribution rates to the
health and welfare fund, new language concerning health,
safety and immigrants’ rights, and a new arbitration procedure.
Markus replied that the Association must have been “crazy” to
agree to those terms since by doing so they would be putting
themselves out of business. Larancuent replied that the indus-
try had ten good years and now must share its profits with its
employees, adding that he would visit the shop shortly.
On about December 1, Larancuent and Martinez met with
Markus. They discussed all the terms of a “me-too” agreement,
which Larancuent asked him to sign. Markus said that it was
“tough” and “very difficult” to sign it, and he could not “really
do this.” Larancuent obtained an agreement from the Union’s
Insurance Fund which would permit the Respondent to con-
tinue paying its current contribution rate of 8.5 percent until
April 1, 2001. The new rate of 10 percent which was part of
the Association agreement was effective for Association mem-
bers on January 1, 2001, but Larancuent agreed to permit the
Respondent to continue paying 8.5 percent until April 1, 2001.
Larancuent testified that once the Insurance Fund agreed to
keep the Respondent’s rate at 8.5 persent, he and Markus
reached agreement on the full terms of a contract. On Decem-
ber 1, Larancuent sent a letter to the Respondent’s customers, at
Markus’ request, which stated that the Respondent and the
Union have “entered into a collective-bargaining agreement.”
The letter asked that any communications previously received
regarding honoring the “pending strike” against Respondent be
disregarded since the “matter has been settled.”3 Markus testi-
fied that they agreed that the “base” contract would be the As-
sociation agreement plus the changes that he requested.
On December 1, Larancuent faxed Markus a copy of the
“me-too” agreement. The following day, December 2, Markus
signed it and faxed it to the Union.4 The agreement provides,
in relevant part, that the Respondent and the Union are cur-
rently parties to a collective-bargaining agreement effective
through November 27, 2000, and that they seek to apply the

3 Larancuent had threatened to send a letter to the Respondent’s cus-
tomers if no agreement was reached on December 1.
4 Markus denied faxing the agreement to Larancuent. He said that
they discussed the document in person and Larancuent signed it in front
of him. I need not resolve this discrepancy since it is clear that Markus
signed the document.
industry standards to their agreement. The agreement further
states:

2. The Employer and the Union shall be bound by a suc-
cessor collective-bargaining agreement reached by and
between the Union and the [Association].
3. In the period between November 28, 2000 and the
date on which the Union and the [Association] reach
a final agreement, the Employer shall be bound by
and shall implement the terms of any interim agree-
ment reached between the Union and the [Associa-
tion] or between the Union and the most appropriate
employer member or members of the [Association] as
determined by the Employers sector of the laundry
industry. Except that Miron & Sons Line [sic] Ser-
vice shall continue to contribute 8.5% of payroll to
the [Union] Insurance Fund until April 1, 2001.
Thereafter the Employer shall contribute 10% of pay-
roll to the [Union] Insurance Fund until November
28, 2001. Thereafter the company shall contribute
11% of payroll to the above-referred Fund. (Empha-
sis is in original and reflects the parties’ agreement to
depart from the Association contract regarding the
dates of the increases in the Insurance Fund contribu-
tions.)
4. The parties shall enter into a written collective-
bargaining agreement embodying all of the agree-
ments, modifications and changes agreed to by the
parties.

About 2 weeks later, in mid-December, Martinez brought
two copies of a Stipulation to Markus. The Stipulation is a 25-
page document which lists the changes in the Association
agreement. Terms not included in the Stipulation continue
unchanged in the Association contract. The Stipulation pro-
vided that is in effect from November 28, 2000 to November
27, 2003. It includes provisions for wage increases, minimum
wage rates, and an increase in the Insurance Fund contribution
rate to 10 percent beginning January 1, 2001. The Stipulation
did not contain the modification agreed to by the Union, pursu-
ant to which the Respondent would pay a contribution rate of
only 8.5 percent until April 1, 2001.
Markus told Martinez that he needed to read the Stipulation
and was going on vacation, but that when he returned he would
give her the signed copies. Martinez returned in early January,
2001. Markus told her that he signed the two copies but could
not find them. He asked her to bring two more copies. In late
January she gave Markus another two copies of the Stipulation.
Markus told her that he found the other copies. Martinez asked
for the old copies, noting that Markus had told her at her last
visit that he signed them. Markus refused, saying he had to
read them again, and asked for the new copies. Martinez gave
him the two new copies and told him that she would return after
they were signed. Markus testified that he was asked to sign
the Stipulation.
On February 6, Martinez visited the shop and asked Markus
for the signed copies. He replied that he had no time to read
them and did not sign them. She gave him a letter which stated
that the Respondent agreed to a collective-bargaining agree-
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 5
ment which became effective on November 28, 2000, and con-
firmed that Martinez asked him to sign two copies. The letter
noted that she would return on February 13 and expected to
receive two signed copies of the contract.
Martinez visited the shop on February 13 and was told by
Markus that he had not signed the contract. She gave him a
copy of an unfiled unfair labor practice charge which alleged
that “the employer has failed to execute the agreement that was
negotiated and agreed to by both parties.” Markus took the
charge, walked away and then returned, asking Martinez what
the charge meant. She explained that he failed to sign the con-
tract. He shook the paper in front of her and said in an angry,
high voice that he would file a charge against Larancuent. The
charge against the Respondent was filed three days later, on
February 16, in Case 2–CA–33596.
On November 21, 2001, Union business representative Jo-
seph Isidore gave Markus two copies of the “blue book” which
is the bound-booklet copy of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and the Association which runs from
November 28, 2000 through November 27, 2003. Isidore also
gave him a side letter signed by Larancuent which amended the
Association agreement to state the terms of the reduced Insur-
ance Fund contributions: effective September 1, 2000—8.5
percent; effective April 1, 2001, 10 percent; and effective
November 28, 2001—11 percent. Isidore asked him to sign the
documents. Markus refused, saying he had an appointment
with the Union in 2 days and if he had to sign them, he would
sign them then. Markus testified, admitting that Isidore brought
the “blue book,” and also stated that perhaps Isidore asked him
to sign it.
The purpose of the side letter was to correct the omission in
the Stipulation that the parties had agreed to a delayed Insur-
ance Fund contribution rate. Larancuent stated that Markus did
not at any time refuse to sign the contract on the ground that the
Stipulation did not contain the different Insurance Fund contri-
bution rate agreed to between the Respondent and the Union.
He stated that when such omissions occur they are immediately
corrected by modification of the document or side letter such as
was done here.
On November 23, Larancuent and Union Attorney Ursula
Levelt met with Markus. Larancuent told Markus that the laun-
dry industry in New York City is heavily organized and that
since virtually all the area laundries were paying the rates set
forth in the Association contract, the Respondent should do so
also, and that altering the terms of the Association contract
would give the Respondent an “advantage” over his competi-
tors. Markus admitted being asked to sign the contract, and
responded by asking them if they thought he was “stupid.”
Markus said that he had some “issues” and began to discuss
each section of the contract. Larancuent took notes during the
ensuing 1-1/2 hour meeting.
Following the meeting, in a letter to Markus dated November
30, Larancuent summarized the changes proposed by Markus,
and also set forth the Union’s position on each suggested
change. Markus proposed changes in 28 sections of the con-
tract, including reductions in the amount of wage increases,
hiring rates, vacations and holidays. The Union agreed to only
one of the Respondent’s proposals. It agreed that the contract
would be printed in English only at no cost to the Respondent
whereas the original contract provision provided that it would
be printed in English and Spanish with the Respondent bearing
half the cost of printing. Larancuent’s letter advised Markus
that “the Union must maintain the standard established during
negotiations with the Industry last year. If we were to agree to
your proposals we would be undermining those standards and
giving you an unfair advantage over the other laundries.”
Larancuent asked for Markus’ immediate response. There is no
evidence that Markus responded to the letter. The Respondent
has not signed the contract.
Markus testified that he sought the Union agreement so that
employees would be able to receive medical coverage. He
attempted to obtain private medical coverage but found that the
Respondent could not afford it.
b. The Respondent’s defense
Markus testified that when he received the “me-too” agree-
ment he decided not to have an attorney review it. Markus
emigrated from the Soviet Union 24 years ago at age 40. His
two sons helped him occasionally with written documents,
including a pre-trial affidavit and writing two statements of
position during the investigation of this matter. Markus con-
ducts his business in English, and he has oral agreements with
his customers, the vast majority of which were concluded in
English. He also signs various documents related to his busi-
ness which are in English. He conceded that in July, 2000, he
reviewed, with help from his sons, the “me-too” agreement sent
to him by the Union, and made extensive changes to that
document.
Markus testified that the “me-too” agreement he signed on
December 2 was only a “temporary agreement that avoid any
future problems.” He stated that he signed it without a full
understanding of its terms. He asked Larancuent to explain a
“couple of things,” including what the minimum wage rate was
before 1996. Larancuent did so and then asked Markus to sign
it. Markus then told him that he did not understand “every-
thing” that was written. However, Markus did not ask his sons
to review that agreement. His purpose in signing was to “com-
promise.”
Markus stated in his written answer to the complaint that on
December 13, 2000, he participated in a lengthy meeting with
Larancuent, the Union’s attorney, and Martinez. This appar-
ently refers to the meeting nearly one year later, on November
23, 2001. Markus stated that the Union agreed to accept his
proposals to change the Association contract to (a) reduce the
hiring rate of new employees; (b) eliminate a guaranteed 35-
hour week; (c) give employees a day off instead of paying them
overtime pay; (d) reduce the Insurance Fund contribution rate
beginning November 29, 2001 to 10 percent instead of 11 per-
cent; and (e) require that the union representative inform him
who she wished to speak to and the employee would then be
relieved from duty for five minutes.
I cannot credit Markus’ testimony. First, there is no evi-
dence that a meeting occurred on December 13, 2000. At that
time, the Union was attempting to have Markus sign the Stipu-
lation. Rather, I find, in accordance with Larancuent’s testi-
mony, that this meeting occurred 11 months later, on November
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6
23, 2001. At that time, a lengthy meeting occurred at which
Markus discussed the matters set forth above. Thereafter,
Larancuent sent a letter rejecting all of Markus’ proposals but
one.
I cannot rely upon Markus’ testimony. In his answer he
stated that he has “no . . . knowledge” of the Association.
However, his testimony at hearing indicated a familiarity with
the Association, including knowledge that it represented indus-
try employers and his knowledge that he was never a member
of it, and chose to be an “independent” employer and “sepa-
rate” from it. He also indicated his understanding of the Asso-
ciation by stating that he wished to negotiate an “individual
contract” with the Union. He also incredibly denied having
“any valid contracts or agreements with the union,” although he
agreed that he signed the “me-too” agreement with it.
The Respondent’s answer states that the “me-too” agreement
that Markus signed on about December 1, 2000, was an agree-
ment only for an “individual contract.” It states that by signing
the agreement Markus did not agree to and “will not adhere to”
the Union-Association collective-bargaining agreement.
However, the Respondent’s amended answer, made orally at
the hearing, admits that it recognized the Union most recently
in a collective-bargaining agreement in effect from November
28, 2000 to November 27, 2003. The amended answer also
admits that the Respondent, by executing the “me-too” agree-
ment on about December 1, 2000, agreed that it would be
bound to the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement reached by the Union and the Association and would
execute a collective-bargaining agreement embodying those
terms.
2. The alleged failure to implement the terms of the contract
The contract, which runs from November 28, 2000 through
November 27, 2003, provides for various increased terms and
conditions of employment. For example, an across-the-board
wage increase was to be given to unit employees on November
28, 2000 and on November 28, 2001. Markus admitted not
having given such an increase, however he gave some employ-
ees wage increases on January 1, 2002 although not required by
the contract. Markus conceded not paying all employees at a
minimum rate of $6 per hour effective November 28, 2000 as
required by the contract, nor did he pay employees earning less
than $7 per hour a 25-cent-per-hour wage increase on March 1,
2001 or June 1, 2001, as provided by the contract.
Pursuant to the contract, employees’ work schedule is Mon-
day through Friday. The Respondent’s employees work Mon-
day through Saturday. Nor are the Respondent’s workers guar-
anteed a minimum number of working hours per week as re-
quired by the contract. The Respondent’s workers receive 1
week of vacation with 1 to 5 years of seniority rather than the
contract’s provision which calls for 1-week vacation for those
having 1 to 3-years seniority. Similarly, Respondent’s employ-
ees who are employed for 5 to 10 years get 2-weeks vacation
compared to the contract’s term of 3 weeks for those employed
at least 10 years. The Respondent’s employees who have been
employed for 10 to 20 years get 3 weeks of vacation whereas
the contract provides for 3 weeks for 10 years service and 4
weeks for 20 years of service. The Respondent does not give
employees a holiday on their birthday, does not provide a
“good health day,” does not pay employees when they are serv-
ing on jury duty, its drivers do not punch a timeclock, and re-
quires maintenance employees to pay for their tools if they are
lost. In contrast, the contract provides for those benefits and
terms and conditions of employment.
The Respondent has not made payments to the Insurance
Fund for the past several months prior to the hearing. The con-
tract provides that such payments must be made.5
3. The alleged refusal to provide information6
The complaint, as amended, alleges that by letters dated Feb-
ruary 20, 2001 and April 17, 2001, the Union requested that the
Respondent provide it with the dates of hire, hours of work,
rates of pay, and social security numbers of all employees.
During Martinez’ visit to the shop on February 13, Markus
gave her two checks—one for union dues and the other for the
Insurance Fund. However, no list was provided to identify to
which employees those checks applied.
On February 20, 2001, Martinez visited the shop. She gave
Markus a letter thanking him for the dues check given to her on
February 13, but stated that no list of employees was provided
so that the proper employee account could be credited. The
letter requested a list of all unit employees’ names, social secu-
rity numbers, dates of hire, regular schedule of hours, and the
employees’ hourly rate of pay during the weeks of November
20, 2000, December 18, 2000, and February 12, 2001. The
letter noted that the information was necessary in order to “con-
firm” that the Respondent was “abiding” by the contract be-
tween it and the Union that became effective on November 28,
2000. Markus told Martinez that it was illegal for him to reveal
the social security numbers and other information regarding the
employees.
On April 17, 2001, Martinez sent a letter to the Respondent
asking for the “names of current employees, date of hire, social
security number, and the names of all supervisors.”
Union representative Isidore visited the shop on May 5,
2001, and requested a list of employees’ names, social security
numbers, dates of hire and rates of pay. Markus asked his sec-
retary to prepare the list. She presented a document to Isidore.
The list contained 34 names, including four people listed as
supervisor, and one as manager. The social security numbers,
dates of hire, and wage information were not included for four
employees noted as part-time employees.7
The Respondent’s answer admits that part-time employees
are included in the unit. No wage information was provided for
Lucia Martinez.
In addition to the information given to Isidore in May, the
Union received two other documents containing some, but not
all of the information requested. One list contained 25 names
and social security numbers, and the other contained 39 names

5 The Respondent’s answer to the complaint, that it “executed every
aspect of the agreement” is accordingly not accurate.
6 General Counsel’s unopposed motion in its brief, to withdraw from
the complaint the allegation that the Respondent failed to supply “the
names of all unit employees” and their “dates of birth” is granted.
7 Dalia Alveraz, Janie Drain, Angelo Payero, Ileana Ramrez, and
Modesto Vargas.
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 7
including five supervisors. That list contains social security
numbers, starting dates, “salary 11/2000” and “salary
3/1/2001.”
None of the documents provided by the Respondent to the
Union contained the requested information of hourly wage rates
during the weeks of November 20, 2000, December 18. 2000,
or February 12, 2001. Nor do any of the documents contain the
requested information concerning the employees’ regular
schedule of hours.
Larancuent testified that the Union needed the information
requested in order to properly represent the unit employees.
Thus, the dates of hire were necessary because the contract
provides for overtime and certain benefits such as vacations and
sick days based upon seniority. The dates of hire would show
whether the employee receiving those benefits was entitled to
them in advance of another worker. The dates of hire are also
important to establish whether the proper minimum rate was
being paid. The information concerning the hourly wage rates
for the three periods of time was necessary because the contract
provided for across-the-board wage increases effective in No-
vember and December, 2000. The information for February,
2001 was needed to establish the base rate for the employees in
comparison with the March 1, 2001 contractual wage raise.
The employees’ regular schedule of hours was requested so that
the Union could determine whether the Respondent was com-
plying with the contract’s requirement that employees have
such a schedule, and in order to establish whether overtime pay
was properly paid after the employee worked the regular
schedule. Supervisors’ names were needed so that the Union
would know who had the authority to resolve grievances and
who it could communicate with in the shop. Social security
numbers were necessary because Union membership records
list the employee by social security number, and also because
employees with the same name could be positively identified
by their social security number.
B. The Alleged Threat to Union Representative Martinez
Union representative Maria Martinez was assigned to repre-
sent the employees employed at the Respondent’s premises.
She visited the shop regularly to speak to the workers concern-
ing their grievances which included lack of overtime pay, no
break, no schedule of work, and incorrect pay.8
As set forth above, Martinez visited the shop on February 13
and gave Markus a copy of an unfiled charge which was later
filed on February 16. The charge, which alleged the Respon-
dent’s unlawful refusal to sign the contract, was mailed to the
Respondent on Thursday, February 22.
Martinez testified that at about 1:00 p.m. or 1:30 p.m. on
February 26, 2001, she visited the facility and began speaking
to the employees on the shop floor. Markus approached her in
a very angry manner, holding folded papers in his hand. He
told Martinez to leave, “get out of here fucking union.” He
stopped the machines and told the employees to “go home now,
because the fucking union want [sic] you to get hurt on the job;

8 Markus testified that the Respondent does not have an official
breaktime because two employees perform one job which permits them
to take a break whenever they want.
that’s what the fucking union is doing to you and this fucking
lady got to get out of here now; get out of here now; fucking
lady, if you don’t want me to physically do something to you.”
There were 30 to 45 employees present at the time.
Martinez stated that she was shocked, panicked and afraid,
and saw the employees with their mouths and eyes open “in
shock.” She told Markus not to try to do anything to her. At
that moment he was pounding his fists on the table ten or more
times while holding the papers, yelling “get out of here, get out
of here. He was just crazy.” He continued to say “get out of
here, fucking lady; get out of here, fucking union; I don’t want
the union; I’m going to take the fucking union out of the shop
and that’s what I’m going to do.” He also told her that “you’re
going to get hurt on the job; this is for your safety.” The ma-
chines were off for about 20 minutes when they were turned on
and the employees resumed their work.
Markus then told his supervisor to call the police. The police
told Martinez to leave since she was on private property. She
showed them the Union contract and told them that she was
permitted to be on the premises while the employees were at
work. The police told her that she had to visit the shop before
or after work or during a break or lunch period. Martinez pro-
tested that she had the right to come to the shop at any time, but
she left the premises at the request of the police.
Martinez testified on cross-examination that prior to that day,
Union official Larancuent told her not to talk to employees
while they were working, but at the same time told her that she
should speak to them if she had to. However, she believed that
her job required her to talk to the workers during their work
time because they did not have a regular work schedule, a regu-
lar lunchtime, or a break from work.9 Martinez stated that since
the workers take lunch one or two at a time she could not wait
until everyone was at lunch in order to talk to them since she
has other shops to visit.
Martinez added that in the past when she asked Markus for
permission to speak to the employees he refused because they
were too busy. She admitted that Markus twice asked her to
leave the employees alone. Previously, Markus called the po-
lice in protest of her speaking with employees. On those occa-
sions he told her that the employees were too busy, she could
not talk to them now, and asked her to leave the employees
alone, and to leave the premises. Martinez refused, saying that
that was her job and that she must stay and speak to the em-
ployees.
Larancuent testified that Markus told him and Martinez that
she was not permitted to speak to any employees when they
were working. Markus demanded that Martinez ask for per-
mission to speak to a worker and then he would permit the
employee to speak to her outside the work area. Markus
claimed that Martinez could get hurt by the machinery while
speaking to the workers. Larancuent said Martinez is a laundry
employee and would not get injured. Further, he said that the
Union did not want to “isolate” an employee for discussion
with the Union representative because that would identify the
9 Markus testified that employees could not eat lunch together be-
cause that would cause production to stop in the middle of a work-
cycle, but generally they have lunch between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8
employee who wished to speak with the Union. No agreement
was reached regarding that issue.
Markus testified that his main concern is the safety of the
employees. He often told the Union’s representatives not to
speak to employees when they are working, and advised that
they could speak to everyone at one time and he would provide
time for them to do so. He even told them that they could
speak with the workers separately, when not at work, as long as
they requested permission. During the parties’ negotiations on
November 23, 2001, Markus requested that language in the
parties’ contract include that “Union rep not allowed to talk to
employees while they are working.” Larancuent rejected that
language.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Refusal to Execute the Contract
Section 8(d) of the Act requires the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party. The question to be decided is whether the parties
reached complete and final agreement on all material terms of
the tentative agreement. If they did, the Respondent’s refusal
to execute a contract is a violation of the Act as an unlawful
refusal to bargain. It is only a written contract embodying
agreed terms which the Board may require the company to sign.
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). If there was no
agreement or “meeting of the minds,” then it is not unlawful for
an employer to refuse to execute the written contract it received
as the Board has no authority to order an employer to execute
an agreement it has not accepted. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
The obligation to execute a collective-bargaining agreement
does not arise unless the parties have reached a meeting of the
minds as to all substantive issues. The General Counsel has the
burden of showing that such a meeting of the minds existed. In
determining whether the General Counsel has made that show-
ing, the Board is faced with the issue of intention: did the par-
ties intend to have a contract? The Buschman Co., 334 NLRB
441, 442 (2001).
I find that the evidence establishes that the Respondent and
the Union intended to have a contract. The “me-too” agree-
ment signed by Markus on December 2 states unequivocally
that the Respondent agrees to be bound by the successor collec-
tive-bargaining agreement reached with the Union and the As-
sociation, and that the Respondent agreed to enter into a written
contract “embodying all of the agreements, modifications and
changes agreed to by the parties.” The sole modification to the
Association agreement was the Union’s agreement to delay the
date for the increase in contributions to the Insurance Fund.
On several occasions, the Union presented to the Respondent
the Stipulation and the full 2000–2003 collective-bargaining
agreement between the Association and the Union. The Union
asked the Respondent several times to sign them, and it is un-
disputed that the Respondent has refused to sign those docu-
ments.
The Board has held that once the parties have executed a
memorandum of understanding (MOA), “they are also obli-
gated to execute a full collective-bargaining agreement which
incorporates the terms agreed to in the MOA, which include
other documents referred to in the MOA.” Teamsters Local
617 (Christian Salvesen), 308 NLRB 601, 602 (1992); Fayard
Moving & Transportation, 290 NLRB 26, 27 (1988); Gollin
Block & Supply Co., 243 NLRB 350, 352 (1979).
It should also be noted that the Respondent’s amended an-
swer, made orally at the hearing, admits that it has recognized
the Union most recently in a collective-bargaining agreement in
effect from November 28, 2000 to November 27, 2003. The
amended answer also admits that the Respondent, by executing
the “me-too” agreement on about December 1, 2000, agreed
that it would be bound to the terms of the successor collective-
bargaining agreement reached by the Union and the Associa-
tion and would execute a collective-bargaining agreement em-
bodying those terms.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Respondent’s failure
and refusal to sign the Stipulation and the complete bound col-
lective-bargaining agreement referred to as the “blue book” is a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The fact that the Union failed to include in the Stipulation its
agreement to delay the increase in contributions to the Insur-
ance Fund does not excuse the Respondent’s failure to sign the
contract. First, the Respondent did not raise that matter when it
repeatedly refused to sign the documents. Second, the Union
cured its error by sending a side-letter on November 21, 2001
making the correction. The Respondent persisted in its refusal
to sign the contract.
I reject the Respondent’s argument that Markus did not un-
derstand the meaning of the “me-too” agreement. It is clear and
unambiguous on its face. It provides that the Respondent
agreed to be bound by the successor agreement reached be-
tween the Association and the Union and the Respondent
agreed to enter into a written collective-bargaining agreement
embodying all of the agreements, modifications and changes
agreed to by the parties. Further, any reasonable reading of the
“me-too” agreement would lead the reader to believe that the
parties intended to be bound by the Association agreement with
any changes agreed to between the parties with respect to that
agreement.
I have considered Markus’ argument that he did not under-
stand the meaning of the “me-too” agreement and believed that
it was just a temporary agreement to eventually enter into an
individual contract with the Union. The plain language of the
short “me-too” agreement contains no such language, and could
not reasonably have led to such an interpretation. Markus has
some facility with the English language. He conducts his busi-
ness in English. He represented the Respondent at the hearing,
testified in English, examined documents shown to him, and
cross-examined the General Counsel’s witnesses. Although his
sons helped him in the past with translations, they were not
present at the hearing. His understanding of the contract was
made clear when on November 29, Larancuent explained all the
terms of the Association contract and Markus replied that it was
too expensive for him, and that the Association members must
have been “crazy” to agree to it.
It is apparent that the Union applied lawful, economic pres-
sure upon Respondent by contacting its customers. The Re-
spondent was motivated, through the use of such pressure, to
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 9
“compromise” with the Union upon the Union’s promise to
inform the customers that the matter had been settled. At about
the time the Respondent signed the “me-too” agreement, the
Union did advise the Respondent’s customers that the parties
had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement. It appears
that once this pressure was relieved, the Respondent sought to
evade the responsibilities it had voluntarily undertaken to honor
its agreement to be bound to the Union-Association contract
and to sign it.
B. The Refusal to Honor the Terms of the Contract
The evidence is clear, as set forth above, that the Respondent
has not honored the terms of the Union-Association contract. I
reject the Respondent’s reasons for not doing so—the needs of
his business require a reduced hiring rate, wages not in accor-
dance with the contract, shorter vacation time, and other rea-
sons.
The Board has held that an employer’s refusal to pay the
wage rates set by its contract “affects what is perhaps the most
important element of the many in the employment relationship
which Congress remitted to the mandatory process of collec-
tive-bargaining under the Act” and amounts to striking a “death
blow to the contract as a whole, and is thus, in reality, a basic
repudiation of the bargaining relationship.” Oak Cliff-Golman
Baking Co., 207 NLRB 1063, 1064 (1973); Williams Pipeline
Co., 315 NLRB 630, 631 (1994).
An appropriate remedy for the Respondent’s failure to exe-
cute the contract is to require the Respondent to give retroactive
effect to the terms of the contract it unlawfully failed to exe-
cute. Gadsden Tool, Inc., 327 NLRB 164 (1998); Sands Hotel
& Casino, 324 NLRB 1101, 1111 (1997).
C. The Refusal to Provide Requested Information
The evidence is clear that the Respondent failed to provide
the Union with requested information concerning its employ-
ees’ hours of work and rates of pay for the weeks of November
20, 2000, December 18, 2000, and February 12, 2001. In addi-
tion, the Respondent failed to provide the union with the social
security numbers for employees Dalia Alvarez, Janie Drain,
and Angela Payero. The Respondent also did not provide the
Union with the dates of hire for Alvarez, Drain, and Payero.
Information concerning employees’ dates of hire, hours of
work and wage rates are presumptively relevant because they
concern the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.
Great Southern Fire Protection, 325 NLRB 9, 14 (1997). Al-
though employees’ social security numbers are not presump-
tively relevant, I find that the Union has demonstrated their
relevance. ABF Freight System, 325 NLRB 546 (1998). Here,
as in ABF, the Union needs such information in order to locate
and accurately identify the individuals entered into its com-
puter, and because workers with the same name could be posi-
tively identified by their social security number. All of the
above information is necessary and relevant to the Union’s
obligation to represent the unit employees.
I accordingly find that the Respondent’s failure to provide
the requested information violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
The Alleged Threat to Union Representative Martinez
The complaint alleges, and the Respondent denies, that Mar-
kus, in the presence of employees, threatened Martinez with
physical violence if she did not remove herself from the Re-
spondent’s facility.
I credit Martinez’ testimony. She testified as to specific, de-
tailed facts involving an incident which made an obviously
strong impression upon her. In contrast, Markus did not deny
threatening her. He only denied physical contact with Marti-
nez, which has not been alleged.
Markus demanded that Martinez leave the premises or face
physical harm. Her visit and speaking to the employees in-
volved Union representation and Union matters. The threat
was made in the course of her speaking to an employee con-
cerning Union business. “Few actions have a more direct ten-
dency to coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory
rights than threats of physical harm and genuine acts of physi-
cal violence.” New Life Bakery, 301 NLRB 421, 428 (1991).
I find that by threatening Martinez with physical violence,
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Dayton
Hudson Corp., 316 NLRB 477, 482 (1995).
It is true that the Respondent had an ongoing complaint that
Martinez interfered with production and disturbed employees
while at work. Martinez has admitted speaking to the workers
during work-time, and has also admitted being told by Union
official Larancuent that she should avoid doing so if possible.
The Respondent’s main concern is that if the employees are
distracted while working on the machines which are very hot
they may get hurt and Martinez may get hurt. It was apparently
for that reason that the machines were shut when Markus inter-
rupted Martinez’ conversation with the employee. Notwith-
standing Martinez’ interest in speaking to the employees about
their working conditions, such interest must yield to the Re-
spondent’s right to have its employees work without interrup-
tion and distraction. If break or lunch time is unavailable to the
Union’s representatives they must find another time to speak to
the workers—such as by telephone to the worker’s home or a
visit to her home.
The Respondent certainly has a legitimate and proper con-
cern about the safety of Martinez and the employees. The Re-
spondent could properly demand that she not speak to employ-
ees while they were working. However, the Respondent could
not properly threaten Martinez with physical harm if she did
not cease speaking to the workers or if she did not leave the
premises. If such a threat was permissible, then physically
forcing her to leave would also be permissible.
Rather, when Martinez or another Union representative
impermissibly speaks to employees while they were working,
the Respondent must take the action it did ultimately take on
February 26—call the police and have her removed from the
premises. It could not legitimately threaten her with physical
harm if she did not leave the premises.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons Laundry is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10
2. Amalgamated Service & Allied Industries Joint Board,
UNITE, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all material times, the Union has been, and is, the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the following appro-
priate collective-bargaining unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act:

All full-time and regular part-time inside production employ-
ees and drivers employed by the Respondent excluding man-
agers, assistant managers, and executives.

4. By failing and refusing to sign the Union-Association
contract which is effective from November 28, 2000 to No-
vember 27, 2003, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to apply the terms of the contract
set forth above to the unit employees, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation it requested, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
7. By threatening a Union representative with physical vio-
lence if she did not leave the Respondent’s premises, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. These unfair labor practices affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to execute
the Stipulation and the “blue book” which is the bound copy of
the Union-Association 2000–2003 agreement with the modifi-
cation that the contributions to the Insurance Fund be in the
manner as agreed to by the parties and as set forth in the “me-
too” agreement signed in early December, 2000, and in the
Union’s side-letter dated November 21, 2001. In addition, I
shall recommend that, upon execution of those documents, the
Respondent give retroactive effect to their provisions and make
whole the bargaining unit employees, with interest, for any
losses they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent’s
failure to execute and effectuate all terms of the agreement,
including retroactive wage increases. Backpay shall be com-
puted in accord with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971); and Kraft Plumbing
& Heating, 252 NLRB 891 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1981), with interest as set forth in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
I shall also recommend that the Respondent be directed to
provide the Union with all information requested by the Union
that it has not yet provided.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
ORDER
The Respondent, B & M Linen Corp. d/b/a Miron & Sons
Laundry, Bronx, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to execute the collective-bargaining contract be-
tween the Union and the Association which is effective from
November 28, 2000 to November 27, 2003.
(b) Refusing to give effect to, and applying the contract
terms referred to above to its unit employees.
(c) Refusing to supply the information to the Union which it
requested, except that it need not supply the information which
it has already provided.
(d) Threatening Union representatives with physical violence
if they did not leave the Respondent’s premises.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Execute the 2000–2003 collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Association with the modifications
agreed to between the Respondent and the Union; give retroac-
tive effect to its terms and conditions of employment to De-
cember 1, 2001; and make employees whole, with interest, for
any losses they may have suffered as a result of the Respon-
dent’s refusal to execute and abide by the agreement, including
the payment of retroactive wage increases, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in the Bronx, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall

adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
MIRON & SONS LAUNDRY 11
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since December 1, 2001.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.