Milton Bradley Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 25, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 560 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Playskool, Inc., a Division of Milton Bradley Com-
pany and United Furniture Workers of America,
AFL-CIO and Noemi Dominicci
The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board , Retail , Whole-
sale and Department Store Union , AFL-CIO and
United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO
Cases 13-CA-9186,13-CA-9205, and 13-CB-2988
February 25, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
On June 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Paul E. Weil is-
sued the attached Decision and on July 2, 1971, an
Erratum thereto in this proceeding. Thereafter, the
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief. The Respondent Employer filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief in answer to the General Coun-
sel's exceptions. i
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and finds merit in the exceptions of the General
Counsel. The Board, therefore, adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order of the Trial Ex-
aminer only to the extent consistent with the Decision
herein.
As more fully set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the Furniture Workers Union has
since 1952 unsucessfully attempted to organize Play-
skool's employees.' In November and December 1968,
pursuant to petitions duly filed with the Board follow-
ing Playskool's refusal to submit to a card check by an
independent body, the Furniture Workers again lost
separate Board-conducted elections at Playskool's Sac-
ramento and Lawndale plants. Undaunted by the loss
of the aforementioned elections, the Furniture Workers
continued its organizational campaign and successfully
solicited a number of new authorization cards during
the period March-May 1, 1969. Although the cam-
' The Respondent Union filed a motion to strike the General Counsel's
exceptions, contending they failed to comply with Sec 102.46 (b) of the
Board's Rules and Regulations As the General Counsel's exceptions are in
substantial compliance with our requirements, and make clear his position,
we deny the Respondent Union's motion.
' Playskool, Inc., A Division of Milton Bradley Company, referred to
herein as "Playskool," is the Respondent Employer The Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as
"RWDSU," is the Respondent Union. United Furniture Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as the "Furniture Workers" is the
Charging Party.
195 NLRB No. 89
paign was kept on a low-key due to Playskool's demon-
strated reluctance to accord recognition on the basis of
a card check and the fact that the Board's rules nor-
mally preclude a second election prior to the expiration
of 1 year, the record reveals that Playskool's plant
manager was well aware of the Furniture Workers'
continuing organizational campaign and, in fact, had
discussions concerning same with leading organizers
for the Furniture Workers.
Notwithstanding the, aforementioned knowledge of
the Furniture Workers' continued interest, Playskool,
pursuant to a request from the RWDSU which had
recently commenced its own organizational campaign
among the employees of Playskool located in the Sac-
ramento and Lawndale plants, as well as a newly estab-
lished warehouse located in Des Plaines, 15,miles out-
side Chicago, agreed to a card check with the RWDSU
to be held on May 2, 1969, before a conciliator of the
Department of Labor, State of Illinois. Thereafter,
without informing the Illinois Department of Labor of
the Furniture Workers' continued interest, Playskool
and the RWDSU submitted a payroll list and a number
of authorization cards, respectively, to the Illinois De-
partment of Labor. On May 2, 1969, the Illinois De-
partment of Labor announced that the RWDSU did in
fact represent a majority of the Playskool employees
employed in the Des Plaines warehouse and Lawndale
and Sacramento plants. Playskool then recognized the
RWDSU as the majority representative, entered into
negotiations, and subsequently executed a collective-
bargaining agreement.
Although crediting the foregoing summary of events
leading up to Playskool's recognition of the RWDSU,
the Trial Examiner found that inasmuch as no "ques-
tion concerning representation" existed at the time of
recognition, Playskool was not in violation of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.' We disagree.
Contrary to the Trial Examiner, this Board has never
established any numerical percentage as a condition
precedent to establishing the existence of a question
concerning representation. In fact, the sole requirement
necessary to raise a question concerning representation
within the meaning of the Midwest Piping doctrine,' as
modified by the Board, is that the claim of the rival
union must not be clearly unsupportable and lacking in
substance.' That such is is not the case herein is obvi-
ous. Nor, again contrary to the Trial Examiner, do we,
in circumstances such as exist herein, require the rival
union to have a pending request for recognition, for the
Board does not require a party to perform a futile act.
' According to the Trial Examiner, a question concerning representation
exists only when the rival union represents a substantial number of em-
ployees, "normally 30 percent," and has pending a current demand for
recognition.
i Midwest Piping & Supply Co., Inc., 63 NLRB 1060.
5 CF. American Bread Company, 170 NLRB 85
PLAYSKOOL, INC.
The instant case presents a classic example of the
evils which the rule enunciated in Midwest Piping, su-
pra, was designed to prevent. Thus, as indicated above,
Playskool was well aware of the Furniture Workers'
continued interest in its employees and the fact that
within the preceding 8-month period the Furniture
Workers had secured enough cards to make the re-
quired 30-percent showing necessary to proceed to a
Board election. Additionally, we note that, although
the Furniture Workers subsequently lost the elections,
they did receive approximately 148 votes out of the 494
eligible voters employed in Playskool's Lawndale and
Sacramento plants. Further, the Furniture Workers
continued successfully to solicit additional authoriza-
tion cards in furtherance of their organizational ac-
tivity despite the defection of their chief organizer who
had seen fit to switch his allegiance to the RWDSU and
lead its newly formed campaign among Playskool's
mostly Spanish-speaking employees. In the light of all
these circumstances, we do not view the card check
made by the State of Illinois Department of Labor, in
the absence of participation by the Furniture Workers,
to be an accurate- barometer of the employees' senti-
ments.' This is particularly true in view of the record
evidence indicating that a number of employees had
seen fit to sign current authorization cards for both the
Furniture Workers and the RWDSU. Such cards, of
course, do not ultimately reflect the choice of the em-
ployees' bargaining agent. Novak Logging Company,
119 NLRB 1573.' Had Playskool fulfilled its obligation
and insured the participation of the Furniture Workers
in the card check conducted by the Illinois Department
of Labor, this infirmity, as well as other imperfections
in the cards proffered by the RWDSU, would have been
readily ascertainable.'
Therefore, contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find
that at the time of recognition a question concerning
representation existed and that the subsequent investi-
gation and resolution of that question was not attended
by appropriate safeguards. Accordingly, under the cir-
cumstances, we further find that Playskool's conduct in
recognizing and bargaining with the RWDSU con-
stituted illegal assistance within the meaning of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the' Act. We also find that the
RWDSU violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by ac-
cepting exclusive recognition and entering into a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Employer at a time
Intalco Aluminum Corporation, 169 NLRB 1034, enfd in part and set
aside in part 417 F.2d 36
Additionally, the record discloses numerous errors in the employee
complement lists submitted to the State of Illinois Department of Labor for
purposes'of verifying the RWDSU's claim of majority status.
Inasmuch as the RWDSU has commingled all authorization cards in its
possession, and in view of the evidence which shows some cards were forged
and others predated, it is impossible to determine at this time whether or
not the RWDSU did, in fact, represent a majority on May 2, when it was
accorded' recognition by Playskool
561
when there existed a real question concerning represen-
tation of the employees.
The Trial Examiner's dismissal of the 8(a)(3) portion
of the complaint with respect to Rosa Rosa was predi-
cated solely on the legality of the recognition and Play-
skool's contract with the RWDSU which we have
found to have been,unlawful. Accordingly, we find that
the termination of Rosa Rosa's employment, caused by
Playskool's illegal insistence that she execute an au-
thorization or checkoff card for the RWDSU, violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Playskool, Inc., A Division of Milton Bradley
Company, is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent RWSDU and the United Furniture
Workers are labor organizations within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By recognizing Respondent RWSDU, by execut-
ing a collective-bargaining agreement with RWDSU
containing a union-security clause, and by maintaining
in effect and enforcing the provisions of said contract,
at a time when a question concerning the representa-
tion of its employees existed, the Respondent Employer
has rendered and is rendering unlawful assistance and
support to RWDSU and has interfered with, coerced,
and restrained and is interfering with, coercing, and
restraining its employees in the exercise of Section 7
rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
4. By causing the discharge of Rosa Rosa by its
illegal insistence that she execute an authorization or
checkoff card for RWDSU, Respondent Employer has
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. By accepting recognition from Respondent Em-
ployer and by contracting with the Respondent Em-
ployer at a time when a question concerning the repre-
sentation of Respondent Employer's employees
existed, Respondent RWDSU restrained and coerced
and is restraining and coercing employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
We have found that the Respondent Employer
recognized the Respondent Union and thereafter en-
tered into an agreement with it on June 11, 1969, all
during the pendency of a genuine question concerning
representation of the employees covered thereby. By
such conduct, Respondent Employer has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exer-
cise of their right freely to select their own bargaining
562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representative and has accorded unlawful assistance
and support to the Respondent Union, in violation of
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. In order to dissipate
the effect of Respondent Employer's unfair labor prac-
tices, we shall order Respondent Employer to with-
draw and withhold all recognition from the Respond-
ent Union and to cease giving effect to the
aforementioned agreement, or to any renewal, modifi-
cation, or extension thereof, until such time as Re-
spondent Union shall have been certified by the Board
as the exclusive representative of the employees in
question.
Having found that the Respondent Employer dis-
charged Rosa Rosa in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act, we shall order that the Respondent
Employer offer employee Rosa Rosa immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and
privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings
she may have suffered by reason of her discharge by
payment to her of a sum of money equal to that which
she would have earned as wages from the date of her
involuntary termination to the date of offer of reinstate-
ment and in a manner consistent with Board policy set
forth in Senco Manufacturing Corp., 141 NLRB 1306,
1309, and Southern Coach & Body Co., Inc., 135 NLRB
1240, with interest as provided in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. We shall also order that
Respondent Employer preserve and make available to
the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to
facilitate the computation of backpay.
Having found the recognition of the RWDSU by
Playskool to have been invalid and the subsequent bar-
gaining agreement with its union-security provisions
likewise invalid, we shall order Respondent Employer
jointly and severally with Respondent Union to reim-
burse all present and former employees, except those
excluded below, for all initiation fees, dues, or other
moneys paid or checked off , pursuant to the unlawful
union-security agreements,' or any extensions, renew-
als, modifications, or supplements thereof, or any su-
perseding agreement. Reimbursement will not be or-
dered, however, for those employees who voluntarily
joined the RWSDU prior to June 11, 1969, the date on
which the union-security clause was executed.10
We have also found that Respondent Union accepted
recognition and thereafter on June 11, 1969, entered
into a collective-bargaining agreement with Respond-
ent Employer at a time when there existed a real ques-
' Interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to such
initiation fees, dues, or other moneys so checked off, to be computed in the
manner set forth in Seafarers International Union of North America, Great
Lakes District AFL-CIO, 138 NLRB 1142, fn. 2.
1° See Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc., 182 NLRB 657, Lianco Con-
tainer Corporation, 173 NLRB 1444.
tion concerning representation of the employees cov-
ered' thereby. By such conduct, Respondent Union has
restrained and coerced Playskool's employees in the
exercise of their right freely to select their own bargain-
ing representative in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act. In order to dissipate the effect of Respondent
Union's unfair labor practices, we shall order Respond-
ent Union to cease maintaining or giving effect to its
current recognition and collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Respondent Employer to the extent that it
covers Respondent Employer's plant and warehouse
employees, or any renewal or extension thereof, until
such time as the Respondent Union shall have been
certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of
the employees in question. In addition, we shall order
that Respondent Union jointly and severally with Re-
spondent Employer reimburse all present and former
employees in the manner and to the extent set forth
above.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that: -
A. Respondent Employer, Playskool, Inc., A Divi-
sion of Milton Bradley Company, Chicago, Illinois, its
officers, agents , successors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting or contributing support to the Respond-
ent Union, The Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Re-
tail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-
CIO, or to any other labor organization, by recognizing
such labor organization as the exclusive representative
of any of its employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining at a time when there exists a real question
concerning representation or in any other manner.
(b) Giving effect to, performing, or in any way en-
forcing the collective-bargaining agreement executed
with Respondent Union on June 11, 1969, or to any
modification, extension , renewal, or supplement
thereto, or to any checkoff authorization cards ex-
ecuted pursuant to said agreement , unless and until
Respondent Union has been certified by the National
Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of such employees; provided, however,
nothing herein shall require Respondent Employer to
vary or abandon any wage, hours, seniority, or other
substantive features of its relations with its employees
which have been established in the performance of this
agreement or to prejudice the assertion by employees of
any rights they may have thereunder.
(c) Encouraging membership in, or activities on be-
half of, The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Retail,
PLAYSKOOL, INC.
Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization, by discharging or in
any other manner discriminating against its employees
in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any
terms or conditions of employment.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
the right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist the aforesaid Union or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and
all such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from The
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-
CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, as the represent-
ative of its employees for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining unless and until the said labor organization has
been duly certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as the exclusive representative of such em-
ployees.
(b) Offer to Rosa Rosa immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may
have suffered as a result, of her constructive discharge,
in the manner, set forth herein in the section entitled
"The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon'request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Jointly and severally with Respondent Union
reimburse all present and former employees at Play-
skool's plants in Sacramento and Lawndale and the
warehouse at Des Plaines, Illinois, except those who
signed up for the RWDSU prior to the execution of the
union-security clause on June 11, 1969, for all initiation
fees, dues, arid other moneys, if any, paid by or with-
held from them pursuant to the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement executed on June 11, 1969, or
pursuant to any union checkoff authorizations ex-
ecuted before the date of compliance with the Order, in
563
the manner provided in "The Remedy" section of this
Decision:
(e) Post at its plants in Chicago, Illinois, and its
warehouse at Des Plaines, Illinois, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix A."" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 13, after being duly signed by the Respondent
Employer's representative, shall be posted by Respond-
ent Employer immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent Employer to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(f) Post at the same places and under the same condi-
tions as set forth in (e) above, as they are forwarded by
the Regional Director, copies of Respondent Union's
notice marked "Appendix B." Copies of said notice
shall also be sent by Respondent Employer to its em-
ployees.
(g) Mail signed copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix A" to the Regional Director for posting at
Respondent Union's offices and meeting halls.
(h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in
writing, within 20 days from the' date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent Employer has taken to com-
ply herewith.
B. Respondent, The Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment' Store Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint
Board, Retail, Wholesale and 'Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Accepting exclusive recognition as the represent-
ative of Respondent Playskool's employees at the Sac-
ramento and Lawndale plants and the warehouse
located in Des Plaines or entering into a collective-
bargaining agreement with Respondent Playskool as
the exclusive representative of these employees'at a
time when there exists a real question concerning repre-
sentation.
(b) Maintaining or giving effect to its contract of
June 11, 1969, with the Respondent Playskool, or to
any modification, extension, renewal, or supplement
thereto, or to any union checkoff cards executed pursu-
ant to said contract, unless or until it has been duly
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as ex-
clusive representative of such employees.
11 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be
changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD."
564 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc- APPENDIX A
ing Respondent 's Sacramento , Lawndale, and Des
Plaines employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by an agreement re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
necessary to "effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Playskool,
Inc., A Division of Milton Bradley Company, reim-
burse all present and former employees, except those
who signed up for RWDSU prior to the execution of
union-security clause on June 11, 1969, at Playskool's
plants in Sacramento and Lawndale and the warehouse
at Des Plaines, Illinois, for all dues and other moneys,
if any, paid by or withheld from them pursuant to the
terms of the union-security provision of the collective-
bargaining agreement executed on June 11, 1969, or
pursuant to any union checkoff authorizations ex-
ecuted before the date of compliance with this Order,
together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per an-
num.
(b) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix B."12 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 13, after being duly signed by Respondent
Union's president, shall be posted by Respondent
Union immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent Union to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Post at the same places and under the same condi-
tions as set forth in (b) above, as they are forwarded by
the Regional Director, copies of Respondent Play-
skool's notice marked "Appendix A."
(d) Mail signed copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix B" to the Regional Director for posting at
Playskool's plants and warehouse and for mailing by
Playskool to employees as provided herein.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent Union has taken to comply
herewith.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be
changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government'
WE WILL NOT assist or contribute support to
The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Re-
tail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
recognizing, or contracting with, such labor orga-
nization as the exclusive representative of our em-
ployees for the purpose of collective bargaining at
a time when there exists a real question concerning
representation or in any other manner.
WE WILL NOT give effect to our June 11, 1969,
agreement with The Retail, Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago
Joint Board, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO, or to any renewal, exten-
sion, modification, or supplement thereof, unless
and until said labor organization has been duly
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as
the exclusive representative of our employees, but
nothing herein shall be construed to require that
we vary or abandon any existing term or condition
of employment.
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in, or ac-
tivities on behalf of, The Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, and
Chicago Joint Board, Retail, Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, by discharging or in any other
manner discriminating against our employees in
regard to their hire or tenure of 'employment or
any terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to join or assist United
Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all
such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recogni-
tion,from The Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargain-
PLAYSKOOL, INC.
ing representative of our employees unless and
until said labor organization has been certified as
such by the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL offer to Rosa Rosa immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion; we will restore all rights of seniority and
other rights and privileges enjoyed by her; and we
will make her whole for any loss of pay and other
emoluments suffered by reason of our discharge of
her.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the Union,
RWDSU, reimburse all present and former em-
ployees, except those who signed up with the
RWDSU prior to the execution of the union-
security clause on June 11, 1969, for any initiation
fees, dues, or other moneys paid or checked off
pursuant to the aforesaid agreement with The Re-
tail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, or to any
extension, renewal, modification, or supplement
thereof, or to any agreement superseding it.
PLAYSKOOL, INC.,
A DIVISION OF
MILTON BRADLEY
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, Room 881, Everett McKinley Dirksen Building,
219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604,
Telephone 312-353-7572.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT accept recognition as the repre-
sentative of Playskool's employees or enter into a
contract with Playskool as the exclusive represent-
ative of these employees at a time when there ex-
ists a real question concerning representation.
565
WE WILL NOT give effect to our contract of
June 11, 1969, with Playskool, Inc., A Division of
Milton Bradley, or to any renewal, extension, or
supplement thereto, or to any union checkoff cards
executed pursuant to said contract, unless or until
we have been duly certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the exclusive representative of
such employees.
WE WILL, with Playskool, reimburse all present
and former employees, except those who signed up
with us prior to the execution of the union-security
clause on June 11, 1969, for any initiation fees,
dues, or other moneys paid or checked off pursu-
ant to our June 11, 1969, contract with Playskool,
or any renewal, extension, modification, or supple-
ment thereof.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees of the above-named
Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
THE RETAIL,
WHOLESALE AND
DEPARTMENT STORE
UNION, AFL-CIO
AND CHICAGO JOINT
BOARD RETAIL,
WHOLESALE AND
DEPARTMENT STORE
UNION, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60' consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, Room 881 , Everett McKinley Dirksen Building,
219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604,
Telephone 312-353-7572.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL E. WEIL, Trial Examiner: On June 13, 1969, United
Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called
the Charging Union, filed a charge with the Regional Direc-
tor of Region 13 of the National Labor Relations, hereinafter
called the Board, against Playskool, Inc., A Division of Mil-
ton Bradley Company, hereinafter called Playskool, alleging
acts and conduct in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act, hereinafter called the Act. Thereafter, on June 24, No-
emi Dominicci, an employee of Playskoo'l, filed a charge
against Playskool alleging further conduct in violation of the
566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Act. On September 11, 1969, the Charging Union filed a
charge against the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, and Chicago Joint Board, Retail, Whole-
sale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
jointly called the Respondent Union, alleging that the Re-
spondent Union engaged in conduct in violation of the Act.
Thereafter the Charging Union amended its charge against
the Respondent Union on September 25 and December 8,
1969, and its charge against Playskool on December 8, 1969.
On October 12, 1970, the Regional Director for Region 13
(Chicago, Illinois) issued an order consolidating all of the
cases set forth above and a consolidated complaint and notice
of hearing alleging that Playskool violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(2) of the Act by assisting the Respondent Union in the
organization of its employees , by recognizing Respondent
Union as the representative of its employees in three different
plants operated by Playskool at a time when Respondent
Union did not represent an uncoerced majority of the em-
ployees, and by thereafter engaging in a campaign of coercion
requiring its employees to sign authorization cards and dues
deduction cards for Respondent Union. The complaint also
contains an allegation that Playskool discriminated against
Noemi Dominicci by giving her less desirable employment
because she engaged in activities in opposition to the organi-
zation of Respondent Union and on behalf of the Charging
Union. The complaint also alleges that the Respondent
Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by restraining
and coercing employees and causing or attempting to cause
their discharge in the event they did not sign dues deduction
and union authorization cards for Respondent Union and by
demanding and receiving recognition from Playskool as the
representative of all the employees in a unit consisting of the
employees of three plants operated by Playskool at a time
when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of the em-
ployees in said unit.
By duly filed answers both Respondents admitted various
facts including the jurisdiction of the Board over the activities
of Playskool, admitted that Playskool had recognized Re-
spondent Union as an exclusive collective-bargaining agent
for the unit alleged in the complaint, but stated affirmatively
that the recognition took place after a certification and card
check by the Department of Labor of the State of Illinois
conducted on May 2, 1969, and that Respondent Union
represented an uncoerced majority. Respondents specifically
admitted that they had entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement on June 11, 1969, which contained a union-
security clause and that pursuant to the said agreement Play-
skool permitted representatives of Respondent Union to enter
on Playskool's premises to represent Playskool's employees.
Additionally Respondent Union admitted that its agents had
solicited employees of Playskool to sign dues deduction and
union authorization cards but denied that any coercion or
duress was employed in such solicitation. Respondent Em-
ployer specifically denied any discrimination against Noemi
Dominicci.'
On January 12, 1971, the General Counsel, by the Regional
Director for Region 13, issued an amendment to the con-
solidated complaint which in effect clarified the language of
the prior allegations and added a further allegation that dur-
ing the months of March and April 1969 Playskool con-
ducted 'meetings of its supervisors during which they were
' The General Counsel additionally alleged that Playskool had violated
the Act by permitting two employees of a plant in Massachusetts to take
leaves of absence to assist the Respondent Union to coercively organize the
employees with which we are here concerned . No evidence supporting the
allegation was received and the allegation was dismissed at the close of the
General Counsel's case-in-chief.
instructed to persuade employees to sign union authorization
cards for the Respondent Union. The complaint was further
amended at the hearing by the addition of an allegation that
Respondent Union restrained and coerced an employee, So-
phie McAuley, because of her testimony during the course of
the hearing. The allegation was denied by Respondent Union
and will be dealt with below.
After the issues were joined I conducted a joint conference
in Chicago among the parties, at the request of the General
Counsel, at which the various issues were explored and delin-
eated and provisions were made for the exchange of sub-
penaed data between the parties before the opening of the
hearing with adequate time to study such data. The hearing
was opened in Chicago on January 25, 1971, and continued
on various dates thereafter until February 26, 1971. All par-
ties with the exception of Noemi Dominicci were represented
by counsel. Mrs. Dominicci was present at the hearing. All
parties had an opportunity to call witnesses, examine and
cross-examine them, to adduce relevant and material evi-
dence, argue on the record, and file briefs. Briefs have been
received from the General Counsel and both Respondents.
Upon the entire record' in this matter and in consideration
of the briefs I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYER
Playskool is a Delaware corporation which operates two
plants in Chicago known as the Lawndale and Sacramento
plants, at which it manufactures toys and games. Playskool
is a division of Milton Bradley Company which also manufac-
tures toys and games in other plants and in other States.
Playskool annually manufactures and distributes toys, games,
and related products valued in excess of $1 million and annu-
ally ships its product valued in excess of $50,000 out of the
State of Illinois. Playskool is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The Charging Party and Respondent Union are both labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Playskool has operated plants in the Chicago area for many
years. The Charging Union, which has collective-bargaining
agreements with Playskool covering plants in Hampshire,
Illinois, and South Bend , Indiana, has attempted to organize
the employees of Playskool's Chicago plants since 1952 with-
out success. In 1968, in November and December, elections
were conducted by the Board separately among the em-
ployees of the Sacramento plant and of the Lawndale plant
on petitions filed by the Charging Union. The Charging
Union lost both elections. Prior to the elections the Charging
Union asked the Company for recognition based on a card
check but was referred to the Board. Milton Bradley Com-
pany purchased Playskool as a wholly owned subsidiary in
August 1968. Shortly prior to that time John W. Sharon had
been appointed personnel director with the function of estab-
lishing personnel policies and practices, wage and salary ad-
ministration, employment, labor relations, and organiza-
tional control. Sharon set up a centralized personnel function
standardizing forms, practices and procedures among the
various plants of Playskool, the two here involved, another
' Respondent Playskool's unopposed motion to correct the record, is
hereby granted
PLAYSKOOL, INC. 567
plant known as the Halsam plant ' located northwest of
Chicago and the Hampshire plant located some 60 miles
away.
On April 11, 1969, Playskool shut down a warehouse
which it had operated at a place called North Lake and
opened a new warehouse known as the Des Plaines ware-
house. The Des Plaines warehouse, which is about 15 miles
from the Playskool main office in Chicago, was designed to
provide warehouse space for the use of all the production
plants and resulted in the elimination of the North Lake
warehouse and a warehouse at the Hampshire facility. It was
opened with 26 or 28 employees, many of whom had been
hired prior to its opening and trained at the various
production plants for transfer to the Des Plaines warehouse.
When the Charging Union commenced its 1968 organizing
campaign its agents made house calls at the homes of the
employees of the Lawndale and the Sacramento plants. When
this came to the attention of Playskool, Personnel Manager
Sharon caused to be sent to all employees letters advising the
employees that they did not have to admit the union agents
and warning them against signing anything that they did not
fully understand. The letters also warned the employees that
if the Union had their names and addresses it would send paid
professional organizers who might attempt to pressure them
into signing up for the Union and agreeing to support it even
though they do not wish to do so.
Agents of the Respondent Union commenced making
house calls on the employees in March 1969. This immedi-
ately came to the attention of Sharon through the reports of
supervisors who were informed by the employees. On this
occasion, however, Sharon sent no letters to the employees
nor did he inform them of their rights of privacy or warn
them against the Union. Sharon caused meetings to be held
among the supervisors of the two plants; one he conducted
himself, the other was conducted by another company offi-
cial. At the meeting he conducted Sharon advised the super-
visors of the name of the union that was organizing the plant
and advised them that he had investigated and found that it
was a good union and did not call strikes or present many
grievances.
Sometime late in April Respondent Union contacted the
attorneys for Playskool and stated that it represented a
majority of Playskool's employees at the two production
plants, Lawndale and Sacramento, and at the newly opened
warehouse in Des Plaines, Playskool's attorney contacted the
Company and informed them of this statement and of Re-
spondent Union's request that it be recognized on the basis
of a card check. After communication between Sharon, Play-
skool's executives based in Chicago and Milton Bradley's
executives based in Springfield, Massachusetts, it was decided
that Playskool would agree to a card check with Respondent
Union and Playskool's attorney was so advised. He there-
upon made arrangements with Respondent Union for such a
card check to be conducted before a conciliator of the Depart-
ment of Labor of the State of Illinois. Sharon busied himself
with collecting the names of the employees presently em-
ployed in the two plants and the warehouse. He had no
independent recollection of the number of names submitted
for the purposes of the card check but in his opinion it was
around 502 or 503. He attended the card check with counsel
and other representatives of the Employer. The Union was
represented by Robert Anderson who brought a box of union
authorization cards which were turned over to the state con-
ciliator. After the card check, according to the testimony of
Sharon, he was advised by the conciliator that the Union had
' The employees at the Halsam plant are represented by a local of the
Teamsters Union
some 30Q valid cards out of 502 or 503 employees and that
a letter of certification would thereafter be issued.
Negotiations for a contract commenced in mid-May. Six or
seven negotiating meetings were held after which the parties
agreed on two separate contracts, one covering the Lawndale
and Sacramento production plants and the other covering the
Des Plaines warehouse as a separate unit . Both contracts
contained union-security clauses providing that all employees
must join within 30 days.
In July and August representatives of the Respondent
Union went to the Sacramento and Lawndale plants where
they addressed the employees in small groups, soliciting them
to sign dues deduction authorization cards and union author-
ization cards. At both plants they met resistance among the
employees and on occasions told employees that they would
have to sign cards or they could be terminated under the
terms of the union-shop clause in the contract. A visit for the
same purpose was made to the Des Plaines warehouse in
August.
There is no evidence that the failure of any employee to
sign either a union authorization card or a dues deduction
card resulted in any action being taken by Playskool to termi-
nate the employees. To the extent that the General Counsel
has alleged that employees were discriminated against by
being discharged for failure to sign such cards, the allegation
is unsupported on this record and I recommend that it be
dismissed.
B. Discussion and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that Playskool violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) of the Act by coercing the employees prior to
recognition to sign authorization cards for the Respondent
Union and that at the time of recognition Respondent Union
did not in fact represent an uncoerced majority of the em-
ployees in any unit. Before this issue is reached however the
issue is raised whether Playskool had not engaged in assist-
ance of Respondent Union simply by recognizing it all during
the existence of a question concerning representation. The
General Counsel argues that the Charging Union, although
it had lost the elections in November and December in the
two plants which constituted the bulk of the unit which Play-
skool thereafter recognized, had continued and was continu-
ing its organizational attempt, continued to have at least as
much support as it had theretofore, and that accordingly a
question concerning representation as between the two
unions existed. Of course the situation was somewhat com-
plicated by the fact that the Charging Union could not peti-
tion the Board for an election under the Board's procedures
which normally preclude the holding of a second election
within a year of an earlier election.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently said in Oil Transport Co. v. N.L.R.B. (76 LRRM
2609) enforcing a Board order at 182 NLRB No. 148;
(the employer) may not determine for his employees the
question of representation, thereby' avoiding the orderly
procedures required for determination of that question
. this Circuit has discussed at length the obligation of
the employer where there are competing unions and "the
situation [has] not crystalized," not to exert influence
thereby tipping the scales and depriving the employees
of their right to select their representative in a free con-
test between the rival organizations .... Cases of this
nature pecularily turn on the facts.
The General Counsel supported his argument with the
testimony of organizers Angilello and Szarek of the Charging
Union, that after they lost the election in October and
November they continued to contact the employees at the
plant, although not to as great an extent as they had before
568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the election. They had monthly meetings with the group of
employees who were active as a sort of organizing committee
and they signed up a few more employees although they made
no determined effort to organize anew in view of the fact that
they had theretofore been informed by Respondent that it
would not recognize them without a Board certification, and
until the year, or most of the year had elapsed since the last
election, a new petition could not be filed and new employee
support need not be memorialized by the signing of authori-
zation cards.
Respondents produced Joseph Coles who had been an or-
ganizer for the Industrial Unions Department of the AFL_
CIO assigned to assist the Charging Union in the 1968 organ-
izing campaign. Coles testified that after the elections in
December he met at the IUD headquarters with Robert,
Christenson, Angilello, and Szarek to analyze the campaign.
As they were leaving he heard Angilello say words to the
effect that the employees at Playskool did not want the Union
and he did not want anything more to do with them.' An-
gilello and Szarek were recalled in rebuttal and testified that
no such statement was made by them and that they at no time
proposed to walk away from the organization at Playskool.
They were supported in this testimony by Robert Christenson
who is identified as a United Steel Workers organizer but had
been employed by the Industrial Union Department of the
AFL-CIO at the relevant time. Christenson testified that he
was present at the meeting referred to by Coles and that he
did not hear Angilello say anything to the effect that the
furniture workers were giving up any attempts to organize the
employees of Playskool because they did not want to be or-
ganized. I credit the testimony of Angilello, Szarek, and
Christenson that no such statement was made by Angilello
and I further credit the testimony of Angilello and Szarek and
of various employees that the Charging Union continued its
interest in the employees of Playskool although certainly it
was not organizing with the same intensity that it had been
organizing prior to the election.
Generally the Board looks with disfavor upon recognition
based on a card check in a two-union situation.' Clearly the
rationale of the Board is based on the fact that in a two-union
situation during the heat, of conflicting campaigns employee
sentiment is 'not so crystalized in favor of one or the other
union that the inherent unreliability of authorization cards as
a method of determining majority status is overcome. But
Respondents' argue that in the instant situation there was no
heated rivalry. On the contrary, the campaign of the Charg-
ing Union, if it existed at all, was dormant and the only choice
under consideration by the employees was between no union
and the Respondent Union.
However this argument too is subject to qualification. A
large number of the employees of Playskool in the three
plants are Spanish-speaking persons, many of whom speak
little or no English.' It can well be questioned whether the
issues were in fact so clear to the employees especially in view
of the fact, that the Respondent Union Agents Galladora,
Anderson, and Coles spoke no Spanish. Additionally it could
very well have been a matter of confusion to the employees
that Joseph Coles who had appeared as an organizer for the
Furniture Workers in the last month of 1968 reappeared as
' Coles testified that in early April he was assigned to assist the Respond-
ent Union in its organizational attempt and did so both before and after
recognition.
' See Oil Transport Company, 182 NLRB No. 148, and the discussion
of this point therein.
6 It was necessary for interpreters to be used at the hearing with a large
number of the employee witnesses on both sides
an organizer for the Respondent Union in the spring of 1969.'
These factors do not in themselves appear to be dispositive
of the issue. Where the Board has almost uniformly required
that the employer maintain a position of strict impartiality is
in the specific type of a two-union situation where a question
concerning representation exists. The term "question con-
cerning representation" is a term of art in this field, it has a
very specific meaning. Two factors must be present. First the
union which raises the question must be able to show a sub-
stantial representation among the employees, normally 30
percent,, either by cards, petitions, or other evidence and
second, both unions must have demanded or requested recog-
nition from the employer. The Board usually speaks in terms
of "competing claims." In the instant case such a demand was
made by the Charging Union prior to the elections in 1968,
but those elections resolved at that time the then appearing
question concerning representation and no such question was
raised thereafter. Although the Charging Union manifested
its continuing interest by continuing, to conduct monthly
meetings with its employee organizers and occasionally pro-
curing the signature of an employee on an authorization card,
it made no contact with Playskool at any time prior to the
recognition in an attempt to raise the question.' Under these
circumstances it appears to me that the Respondent Union
and the Employer were in a position no different than a
single-union situation where the employer is free to recognize
the Union upon its satisfaction that the Union is majority
representative based on a card check or any other means that
the parties choose. An election could not be held among the
employees of the Lawndale and Sacramento plants until a
year had elapsed except under extraordinary circumstances
not here shown to exist.
Under all these circumstances I see no violation implicit in
the recognition by the Employer unless one of two factors
appears; either that the employees were subject to coercion by
either of the Respondents prior to recognition or that the card
check itself was erroneous and the Respondent Union did not
in fact represent a ,majority of the employees in the unit.
These then are the issues with which I am herein concerned.
The Alleged Prerecognition Coercion
The General Counsel contends that the evidence herein
shows that assistance to the Respondent Union began some-
time in April 1969. He contends that this assistance was
demonstrated by the fact that although Playskool had re-
quired the Charging Union in the past to demonstrate its
majority claims by election , each of which was lost, when
Respondent Union claimed to represent a majority, the Em-
ployer recognized it on the basis of a card check . This circum-
stance standing alone does not appear to me to be in anyway
tinged with illegality. It is not unlawful for an employer to
recognize a union on a card check nor is it unlawful for an
employer to insist on an election . In the circumstances of this
case I cannot find unlawful preferment by Playskool of Re-
spondent Union in its recognition after a ' card check con-
' It is not possible to assess whether the employees were confused By the
time of the hearing, after investigation by the General Counsel and the
Respondents, employees who were called to testify, appeared clearly to
understand the difference between the two unions No doubt polarization
has been accomplished by the pretrial investigative procedures attendent
upon the filing of the charge
8 I do not credit testimony of Dommicci and Galladora that petitions
were signed, prior to recognition, protesting recognition. From the tes-
timony of Dominicci and the contradiction thereto in her testimony on
cross-examination and her affidavit, and from the wording of the petition,
I conclude it was first promulgated after recognition It was never presented
to Playskool.
PLAYSKOOL, INC. 569
ducted by an impartial third party or in its determination
prior to the card check that it would recognize the Respond-
ent Union if the card check revealed it to be the majority
representative of the parties.
Playskool surely reacted differently toward the two unions.
In 1968 Playskool refused to recognize the Charging Union
on the basis of a card check. This can scarcely be held to be
unreasonable in view of the fact that on prior occasions
Board-conducted elections revealed that the Charging Union
did not in fact represent a majority of the employees as it
contended. Respondent admittedly investigated the Respond-
ent Union before it agreed to a card check and found that it
was a union that was not prone to engage in strikes and was
otherwise acceptable to it. It is not illegal for an employer to
reach the conclusion that it will not fight a union organiza-
tion. While the treatment accorded the two unions in differ-
ent years was disparate, I find no illegality attached thereto.
The General Counsel would have me find interference in
Playskool's failure to warn employees against union organiz-
ers coming to their homes as it had done during the inception
of the Charging Party's organizational campaign in 1968. I
know of no requirement that an employer has to contest the
union organization or in anyway take part in the employees'
determinations whether or not to organize.
The General Counsel would have me find restraint and
coercion in that Playskool advised the supervisors that they
should not contest the organization by Respondent Union
among the employees. To the extent that the testimony of
former Foreman Rubin Lopez might raise an inference that
Playskool instructed its supervisors to actively support the
organizational campaign of Respondent Union I reject such
an inference. There is no evidence that Lopez or any other
supervisor at any time prior to the recognition addressed any
employee with regard to their determination of whether or
not to sign a card for Respondent Union.
The record contains many instances of employees whose
cards signed on behalf of the Respondent Union bear dates
prior to recognition but who testified that they signed the
cards only in response to urging and sometimes threats that
they would not be allowed to continue working if they did not
sign the cards. This could be construed as evidence of prere-
cognition threats. In each of these cases I find that the coer-
cion took place long after recognition and after the entering
into of a contract bearing a union-security clause and the
cards were backdated by persons other than the signers.'
The General Counsel argues in its brief that additional
evidence of assistance by Milton Bradley, the owner of Play-
skool, was its grant of leaves of absence to two employees to
assist Respondent Union in its campaign. The allegation with
regard to this grant was dismissed at the close of the General
Counsel's case because the General Counsel adduced no evi-
dence in support of it. The record reveals that two'employees
of Milton Bradley's plant in Springfield, Massachusetts, took
leaves of absence at the request of Respondent Union's Inter-
national organization to assist in the campaign in Chicago.
There is no evidence whatsoever that Playskool or Milton
Bradley had any knowledge of the reason these employees
took a leave of absence or were even aware of the fact that
they were engaging in the organizational activities in
Chicago.
The General Counsel further submits "that it is more than
curious that Milton Bradley has a contract with RWDSU."
Curiosity can hardly be viewed as substantial evidence. It
' Throughout the hearing the General Counsel while adducing such evi-
dence declined to state whether his position was that the cards were signed
prior to the recognition, on the dates they bore, or after recognition and were
backdated.
might be noted that Playskool also has a contract with the
Charging Party. This does not appear to arouse the General
Counsel's curiosity.
Finally the General Counsel contends that Playskool inter-
fered with the organization by Respondent Union by permit-
ting its organizers to enter the plant for organizational pur-
poses prior to recognition. Quite aside from the fact that there
is no substantial evidence that this was done other than the
evidence of ex-Foreman Lopez who stated that he saw them
in the plant prior to recognition, equally there is no evidence
that at any time the Charging Union sought such a privilege. -
I cannot find disparate treatment under these circumstances.
As far as Foreman Lopez' testimony is concerned, he was so
obviously mixed up with regard to the time of various occur-
rences and unsupported by any credible evidence on the
record in his assertion in this regard that I do not credit him.
It is clear that in June, after recognition, representatives of
the Respondent Union were permitted in the plant and
walked through it, although there is no evidence that at that
time they engaged in any organizational activities. Later, in
July, after the Respondents entered into their contract, ad-
mittedly Respondent Union's organizers were permitted in
the plant and facilities were given them to sign up the em-
ployees both on union authorization cards and on dues de-
duction cards. I shall deal with this later.
I conclude that there is no substantial evidence on the
record on which I can find that prior to May 2, the date of
recognition, Playskool unlawfully assisted Respondent Union
or interfered with, coerced, or restrained any employee with
regard to Respondent Union's campaign.
The Card Check
We come now to the validity of the card check. The Gen-
eral Counsel contends that there is no evidence of what took
place at the card check. In this he is correct. The evidence
reveals that the card check was conducted by two representa-
tives of the State of Illinois in their offices, representatives of
no party were present while the cards were checked and
neither of the state officials were called to testify. However,
the witnesses called by Respondents testified that pursuant to
an agreement for a card check the Playskool officials gathered
together a list, on cards, of all the employees in the unit and
the representatives of the Respondent Union gathered
together all of the cards signed by employees of Playskool,
that the list and the cards were handed over to the state
conciliators and that thereafter one of the conciliators re-
turned the list to the Employer, the cards to the Union and
stated that the Union had in excess of 300 cards in a unit
consisting of something over 500 employees and that their
check revealed that the Union had cards for a majority of the
employees. The state conciliator further was quoted as telling
the Respondents that the result of the card check would be
confirmed by letter.'The record contains a letter purportedly
prepared by the conciliators and admittedly received by
counsel for Playskool.10
The union agents who took the cards to the card check
stated that they had no recollection of the number of cards
they took. Union Representative Anderson testified that
there were 340 or 346, Representative Galladora, who had
been instructed by Anderson to count the cards, testified at
10 No attempt was made to call the state conciliators as witnesses nor to
establish any foundation for the receipt of the letter other than as a docu-
ment recieved by counsel. I called the latter to the attention of the parties
and stated that I did not receive the letter as evidence of the result of the
card check, in view of the complete lack of foundation therefor. Neverthe-
less no party attempted to establish a foundation or even to have the letter
certified as an official report of a governmental agency.
570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
various times that the number was from a little over 300 to
a total of 325. Representative Sanzone, who accompanied
them to the conciliators' office, said that he understood that
they had 300 or 319. Playskool's personnel manager, John W.
Sharon, testified that he submitted an employee list in the
form of 3 by 5 cards and additionally a list of as many as 12
to 15 employees from the Des Plaines warehouse. He stated
that his recollection of the count was 502 or 503 and he did
not recall whether the figure included the warehouse em-
ployees or not. He also testified that after the card count the
conciliator told him that the Union had 300 cards and that
there were 503 in the unit.
The Regional Office issued a subpena sometime in 1969 for
the production of the Union's cards as well as for the
production of Playskool's list of employees as of May 2. In
July 1970, after litigation, the subpena was enforced. In the
interim period, according to the testimony of Respondent
Union's Agent Anderson, the cards of Playskool's employees
were kept in a box at the Union's offices and additional cards
were thrown into the box. When the subpena was enforced,
according to Anderson, all cards bearing dates prior to May
2 and including May 2 were furnished in response to the
subpena. It is clear from his testimony that the subpena was
not complied with inasmuch as no segregation of the cards
handed to the state conciliator was accomplished and the
intermingled cards were sorted out solely on the basis of the
date they bore. Testimony during the hearing convinces me
that many cards were backdated and that some cards, al-
though dated on May 2 or prior thereto, were not received
by the Respondent Union until after the card check. I can
draw no conclusion of illegality from the failure by Respond-
ent Union to comply with the terms of the subpena under the
circumstances shown here. Similarly a subpena issued in 1969
and was ultimately enforced in 1970 requiring Playskool to
submit to the General Counsel a copy of the list of employees
submitted by it to the state conciliation service. The list sub-
mitted pursuant to the subpena was not identical with the list
prepared from the cards presented at the hearing herein and
thereafter by letter Playskool informed the General Counsel
of additional changes that should be made to the list.
The General Counsel contends that by submitting authori-
zation cards in response to the subpena, that could not have
been those cards called for by the subpena, both Respondents
are guilty of a violation of Section 12 by attempting to deceive
the Board in its investigation of the unfair labor practices and
by willfully preventing, impeding and interfering with the
Board's duties in the investigation of these cases. General
Counsel further contends that these acts clearly violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel relies on the
Board's decision in Kohler Company, 128 NLRB 1062, 1100;
Frisch Contracting Service Co., 149 NLRB 29. I read neither
case as supportive of the General Counsel's contention herein
and indeed Frisch seems to contradict it. As the Board found
in Frisch the Section 12 issue is not before me.
Without regard to the actual lists furnished the concilia-
tors, the real issue is whether the Respondent Union repre-
sented a majority of the employees at the time of the card
check. While the General Counsel appears to contend that
there is no evidence of the validity of the card check, he made
no attempt to adduce evicence that it was invalid other than
to attack the list and the cards furnished the conciliator. The
only evidence on the record with regard thereto is that some-
thing over 300 cards were submitted to the conciliator who
found that some 300 of them were valid." It is apparent that
the cards furnished the General Counsel in response to his
subpena and identified by Union Agent Anderson as the
cards furnished to the conciliator to the best of his knowledge
include many cards that were in fact signed after the date of
the card check and include additionally five cards concerning
which the employees whose names they bear testified that
they did not sign and six duplicate cards. But the record also
reveals that in response to a subpena for the cards of Play-
skool employees collected by Respondnet Union after the
card check an additional group of cards was furnished which
included all the cards other than those furnished and iden-
tified as those handed the conciliator. These cards contained,
inter alia, some 395 undated cards. In view of the testimony
of Anderson that in response to the initial subpena he di-
rected his office employees to sort out all the cards bearing
dates of May 2 and prior thereto, and that in return of the
second subpena he furnished all of the remaining cards, it
appears that a necessary inference must be that among those
cards which were not supplied in response to the first sub-
pena, i.e., the 395 undated cards, were sufficient cards to have
enabled the conciliator to determine that there were 300 or
more valid cards. There is no contention that the unit ever
included over 550 employees. Accordingly 300 cards would
at any time constitute a majority of the then existing em-
ployee complement.
The General Counsel misinterprets the rule with regard to
the duty to go forward with the evidence. The General Coun-
sel contends that it is the duty of Respondents to prove that
the cards were valid and that the card check was validly
conducted. But this is not the case. In a recent decision,.
American Beef Packers, Inc., 187 NLRB No. 135, the Board
pointed out that the General Counsel therein completely
failed to prove the number of employees who had authorized
the union at the relevant time to represent them. As I read
that case, the General Counsel's burden is to prove that the
Union did not in fact represent a majority at the relevant
time. Here the General Counsel has done no more than attack
the cards which were presented by Respondent in response to
its subpena calling for the production of the cards furnished
the conciliator and proved that some of those cards clearly
could not have been furnished the conciliator. This does not
support a finding that the conciliator did not have what he
is reported to have stated that he had; i.e., over 300 or more
valid cards. The mistake in the General Counsel's contention
is the assumption that only those cards supplied in response
to the subpena need be considered. There is no evidence on
the record that the conciliator did not find 300 valid authori-
zations from the cards submitted to him. While it is obvious
that the General Counsel's burden would be very difficult, he
alleged that Respondent Union- did not have an uncoerced
majority and his proof does not support this allegation. While
the evidence reveals that the 347 cards furnished in response
to the subpena and claimed at the opening of the bearing by
Respondent Union to be the cards given the conciliator could
not all have been furnished the conciliator, his evidence
shows also that over 300 cards were furnished to the concilia-
tor, that the conciliator found 300 valid cards, and that more
than 395 additional undated cards exist. This being the situa-
tion, while I must find that the response to the subpena was
at best careless," I cannot reach an inference that there were
not 300 cards in existence. Accordingly there is no support
for the allegation that the Respondent Union did not repre-
sent an uncoerced majority as of the date of the card check.
This being the case, I can find no violation of Section 8(a)(2)
" This finding is based on the testimony of Sharon rather than on the
purported letter from the conciliators which as I have stated above bears no
foundation for that purpose.
11 Anderson testified that the cards were never segregated at the time the
subpena was served or thereafter because he did not feel that the subpena
would ever be enforced
PLAYSKOOL, INC. 571
in the recognition of the Union pursuant to the card check
under the circumstances of this case.
The General Counsel argues that under the rule of Clement
Brothers Company, Inc., 165 NLRB 698, enfd. 407 F.2d 127
(C.A. 5), that the post recognition conduct of Playskool in
restraining and coercing its employees to sign both authoriza-
tion and dues deduction cards for respondent union com-
pounded by the backdating of "a whole host of cards" in an
attempt to show execution prior to recognition relates back
to the recognition itself tainting the entire claimed majority
and rendering unnecessary the resolution by mathematical
formula. I agree that a mathematical resolution of majority
in the instant case is impossible because of the fact that the
General Counsel has shown that the cards produced in re-
sponse to his subpena and identified as those cards furnished
to the conciliator obviously contain many cards which were
backdated, others which were not received by the Respond-
ent Union prior to the card check, and a few which were not
signed by the persons whose name they bear. But as I have
pointed out above, the General Counsel has not sustained his
burden of disproving that in fact something over 300 valid
cards were placed in the hands of the conciliator." While I
do not condone the forgery of authorization cards by anyone,
no evidence appears on the record to reveal that this was done
by or with the knowledge of any agent of either Respondent.
Nor can I condone the backdating of authorization cards
which was clearly shown throughout the record. Neverthe-
less I cannot draw an inference that either the backdating or
the forgery of the cards or the, at least, careless selection of
cards supplied in response to the subpena and identified as the
cards given to the state conciliator had the effect of derogat-
ing from employee rights in the face of the evidence that
several hundred undated cards are in existence and that they
were, prior to the subpena enforcement, mixed with the cards
allegedly given to the conciliator and the further evidence
that the conciliator found in excess of 300 valid cards. Ac-
cordingly I cannot find that these elements would tend to
relate back to the recognition itself or taint the entire claimed
majority of the Respondent Union as contended by the Gen-
eral Counsel.
The General Counsel adduced a great deal of evidence to
show restraint and coercion by both Playskool and Respond-
ent Union's representatives after recognition and after the
entering into of the contract on June 11. This restraint and
coercion consisted of calling employees in groups or singly to
meeting places and to offices of the Company where they were
addressed by agents of the Union and told that they were now
in a union shop and would have to sign cards for the Union.
Additionally, evidence was adduced that Playskool's super-
visors informed employees that they would have to sign cards
or they would be subject to discharge or would have to stop
working there. Finally evidence was adduced and is admitted
13 My review of the evidence reveals that at least 38 of the 347 cards
identified as those furnished the conciliator were signed after the card check
and left undated. The dates on some of them were admittedly affixed by
agents of Respondent Union and with regard to others no identification of
the person who dated the cards is made, Attached hereto as Appendix A
is a list of the names of the employees whose cards I find to have been
backdated. I reach this conclusion after a consideration of all the evidence
in the case and consideration of the credibility of the witnesses who testified
with regard to such cards. In addition I find that the cards of Margie L
Dennison, Vera McGovern, and Rita Alberts were not signed by those
individuals and that the card of Santa Colon was signed by her husband and
there is no evidence that he was authorized to do so Furthermore the cards
of Madgeline Bostic, Lucille I. Eddy, Esther Martinez, Margaret Morrissey,
Clara Ociepka, Sara Rivera, and Alven Sobotka were mailed at a time too
late for them to have been in the hands of Respondent at the time of the
card check
that,the personnel employees of Playskool have made it cus-
tomary in hiring new employees to require them as a condi-
tion of employment to sign dues deduction or authorization
cards.
The latter is clearly unlawful under the Act (Campbell
Soup Company, 152 NLRB 1645) insofar as it required em-
ployees to join the union prior to the expiration of 30 days
after their hire and resulted in some cases in employees being
subjected to dues and initiation fee deduction from their
wages during that protected period.
More of a problem exists however with regard to the coer-
cion of employees after the expiration of 30 days to sign these
cards. The evidence adduced by the General Counsel from
employees reveals that in most if not all instances the union
agents to whom the employees were sent had with them two
kinds of cards, both dues deduction,and union authorization
cards and that in some if not all instances the employees were
informed that they must sign the dues deduction cards and
that they had to join the Union. Whether the union agents in
each instance carefully spelled out to the employees the
refinements that an employee need not actually join the
Union but must tender dues and initiation fees and that dues
and initiation fees need not be checked off if the employee is
prepared to make arrangements to send dues and initiation
fees directly to the Union without a checkoff cannot be ascer-
tained from this record. The union agents called to the wit-
ness stand testified that in essence these refinements were
pointed out to the employees. The testimony of a few of the
employees, would seem to support the union agents' tes-
timony. By and large the employees were not asked either on
direct or cross-examination the precise words used by the
union agents but their testimony was put in the more conclu-
sionary form that they would not be, permitted to continue
working unless they signed the cards. Throughout the hear-
ing it is noticeable that the employees appeared to associate
joining the Union with signing cards. This is of course not
unusual, since one union or the other had been distributing
cards over a long period of time.
Additionally many of the employees who testified are not
fully conversant with English. Some of them are almost to-
tally unable to speak or understand English and were interro-
gated on the witness stand through interpreters. It does not
appear that more than a very few of the employees could be
expected to have any sophistication whatsoever with regard
to labor relations, Under these circumstances the reports of
the employees reflect not only a difficulty in understanding
what was said to them on the occasion of their interviews with
union agents but an additional difficulty in understanding the
questions propounded to them on the witness stand and in
framing their answers thereto. I am not convinced that the
record reveals by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employees were required to do any more than the law permits
under the terms of a valid union-security contract.
The Board has many times held that it is violative for a
union to seek the discharge of an employee for failure to
comply with the union-security clause of a contract unless
and until it has given that employee an opportunity to comply
therewith and it is violative for an employer to discharge an
employee under the terms of a union-security contract at the
request of the union when that employer has reason to believe
the employee has not been apprised of his duties under such
contract. Here it appears to me that the Respondent Union
did no more than is required of it under the law to bring home
to the employees their duties under the contract to join or
tender dues and initiation fees to the Union. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case it was necessary for the union agents
to put their message into terms which are meaningful to the
employees whom they are addressing . I am not convinced
572 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the messages of the union agents to the employees either
assembled in groups or singly were violative of the Act and
I do not find that the circumstance of Playskool making space
and employees available to the union agents for this purpose
was violative of the Act. Accordingly I shall recommend that
the complaint be dismissed with regard thereto.
I have concluded above that Playskool has violated the Act
by its practice of requiring employees when hired to sign
union authorization or dues deduction cards or both. This is
surely coercive under the Act but it does not appear to me
to be the type of coercion that relates back to the initial
recognition and taints it. Accordingly I reject the General
Counsel's argument in that regard, based on the Clement
Brothers Company, Inc., decision (supra).
The Discharge of Rosa Rosa
Rosa Rosa was an employee who was apparently com-
pletely opposed to being required to sign an authorization or
checkoff card for Respondent Union. The evidence reveals
that she was sent to the office by her supervisor and informed
that she had to sign such cards in order to retain her job.
After hesitation and argument Miss Rosa signed the cards
and thereafter left her employment. There is no evidence that
she left for any reason other than the fact that she was re-
quired to sign the card, and she testified that this was her
reason for leaving. The General Counsel contends that be-
cause she was coerced and restrained to sign the cards and
quit because of such coercion and restraint that she was
constructively discharged. Inasmuch as I have found above
that the Respondents were not shown to have acted in excess
of their lawful rights in requiring employees to join the Union
and remit dues, I do not find that her voluntary termination
resulted from restraint or coercion unlawful under the Act
nor that under those circumstances it became a constructive
discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Accordingly I shall recommend the dismissal of the allega-
tion with regard to Rosa Rosa.
Noemi Dominicci
The General Counsel contends that Noemi Dominicci was
discriminated against by the Respondent Employer because
she engaged in activities on behalf of the Charging Union.
Noemi Dominicci was employed at the Sacramento plant of
Playskool working 4 hours a day on the floor as a production
worker and 4 hours a day helping in the office. Her work in
the office consisted of checking the workers' tickets, doing
some bookkeeping, and payroll work on timecards. She tes-
tified also that to some extent she was required to assist in the
hiring process of new employees and that she escorted them
from the personnel office to their work stations. While escort-
ing the new employees she took the occasion to inform them
of her opinion that Respondent Union was not good for the
employees and that they would have to get rid of it. There-
after at lunch and before and after work she would take
petitions which she was having signed to the new employees
for their signatures. On June 12 Personnel Manager Phil
Jimenez asked her if, it was true she was having the petition
signed by the new employees and asked why she was doing
this. She apparently delivered herself of a diatribe against the
Employer's treatment of the employees and of her and spoke
of the need of a union but that she considered that the Union
that had gotten in was trying to deceive the employees and
that it was good for the Company and for the bosses but not
for the employees. She accused the'Company of having fur-
nished the Respondent Union with the addresses of the em-
ployees so that its agents could go to their homes and collect
signatures. Jimenez denied knowledge with regard that. He
ended the conversation by telling her that she would have to
stop her activities or he would have to get her out of the office,
and informed her that the Company had ordered him to
either be a friend of the Company or a friend of the em-
ployees. Later that day according to Mrs. Dominicci's tes-
timony Jimenez told her that he had been ordered by the
main offices to take her out of the office and that she would
no longer work in the office.
According to Jiminez' testimony, in this interview, he told
Dominicci that she had no business passing the petition dur-
ing business hours and that she would have to stop it. To his
recollection he talked to her twice, the second time 3 or 4 days
after the first time. He stated that his recollection was that he
told 'her that her actions were uncalled for, that he did not
think she was doing the right thing, and that she might be in
the losing end of it. He testified that he made approximately
the same statements on both occasions. It appears that the
incident or incidents occurred immediately after the contract
between the Respondent Union and the Employer was
signed. To the extent that there is any difference between the
testimony of Dominicci and Jimenez, I discredit Dominicci.
In her cross-examination her evidence was revealed to be
erroneous in many respects. In attempting to account for the
errors as they appeared in her cross-examination, Mrs. Domi-
nicci shifted her ground to such an extent that little credit can
be given to any of the testimony she gave except to the extent
that it is corroborated by other more credible evidence. How-
ever from the two stones it is clear that Mrs. Dominicci was
removed from the office because of her participation during
working hours in the postrecognition campaign against Re-
spondent Union. The General Counsel contends that Play-
skool acted disparately by permitting Respondent Union's
organizers in July, August, and September to enter the plants
and sign up the employees on dues deduction and authoriza-
tion cards and by reducing Dominicci from her part-time job
as office girl for her activities." I do not find that this is the
normal disparate treatment case. The Employer with regard
to Mrs. Dominicci has a right to insist that his employees use
their working time for work. The employer who is a party to
a valid union-security contract has a duty to see to it that his
employees know of and are given an opportunity to comply
with the union-security clause before the employer discharges
them. These two duties appear to be in conflict in the instant
situation, but I believe that the conflict is more apparent than
real. The Employer in permitting the Respondent Union's
agents to come in to the plant during working hours for the
purpose of signing up employees to conform with their union-
security contract was satisfying its obligation to its employees
who had not theretofore joined the Respondent Union. If the
Employer had invited or placed its employees at the disposal
of an outside union in the face of an incumbent union it could
have been guilty of an unfair labor practice. Having found
that the Respondent Union was validly recognized, I find that
it achieved the status of an incumbent union. Playskool by its
recognition of Respondent Union was not required to open
the door to a free use of its, working time to any other union
for the purpose of dislodging the newly recognized incum-
bent. I find that the Respondent, as it contends in its brief,
took the minimum action in removing Mrs. Dominicci from
" General Counsel does not contend that Dominicci was out of the unit
on May 2 by reason of the fact that she was working part time in the office
However the General Counsel does contend that another employee, Lydia
Rodriguez, should not be considered part of the unit for the same reason
Rodriguez, it appears, spent 2 or 3 hours a day working in the office whereas
Dominicci spent 4 hours a day The description of the work of the two girls
appears to indicate that they were doing the same thing, Were Ito reach the
General Counsel's contention with regard to the unit, I would find that Miss
Rodriguez is a member of the unit as I find Mrs. Dommicci to be
PLAYSKOOL, INC. 573
the office to meet the problem occasioned by her use of her
position in the office to build up resistance among the new
employees to representation by the Respondent Union. Mrs.
Dominicci lost neither hours of work nor wages as a result
of the action of the Employer . I find no violation of Section
8(a)(3) or (1) in the Employer's actions. I shall recommend
that the complaint insofar as it pertains to Mrs. Dominicci be
dismissed.
Sophie McAuley
During the hearing the General Counsel amended the com-
plaint to incorporate an allegation that the Respondent
Union had coerced Sophie McAuley because of her testimony
at the hearing . The record reveals that Miss McAuley was the
employee who had originally informed the Charging Union
that the Respondent Union was organizing at the Company's
plant. She assisted the Charging Union thereafter in protest-
ing the recognition of the Respondent Union by signing a
petition and talking to other people about signing a petition
sponsored by the Charging Union . After attending two meet-
ings in August and September and refusing to sign a card for
the Respondent Union she signed one in September after
being told that she had to sign . At this point she signed a card
under protest. Thereafter she was elected chief steward for
the Respondent Union and was serving in that capacity at the
time of the hearing. She testified that she did not want to be
the steward . She also testified that at sometime after she
became steward Respondent Union 's Representative Gal-
ladora told her that he did not think it was right for her to
be talking to the Furniture Workers' representatives while
she was the Respondent Union 's shop steward . She answered
rather indelicately that if her job as steward was going to
stand in the way of talking to people she had known for so
many years they can "stick" their steward's job . This tes-
timony was given on February 2, 1971 . On February 9, 1971,
the General Counsel amended his complaint and Miss
McAuley took the witness stand to testify that on February
8 at the plant she was called from her work by Representative
Galladora just before the afternoon break and talked to him
in private. Galladora told her that he had brought her resig-
nations to sign which stated in effect that she was resigning
as chief shop steward because she was not representing Local
20 RWDSU and ended with a statement that she voluntarily
signed . She testified that Galladora was cool toward her and
did not say much except that he wanted her to sign it. She
asked if she could take the document with her. He declined
to permit her to do so and told her that she was not represent-
ing the Union . She answered that she understood that she was
suppose to represent the people . She informed him that she
already had resignation papers made out several months
before but declined to sign . He said "all right" and walked
away. The General Counsel contends that this amounts to
coercion of employees . He cites no authority for this proposi-
tion . I find no coercion of employees in this situation . I believe
that Mrs. McAuley 's testimony on the witness stand revealed
clearly that she was at all times opposed to the Respondent
Union and favored the Charging Union and her testimony on
the witness stand which was frequently incredible and largely
self-contradictory was more nearly that of an advocate on
behalf of the Charging Union than that of a neutral witness.
Under these circumstances I believe it is readily understanda-
ble that the Respondent Union would ask her to sign a resig-
nation . I find nothing coercive in the manner in which she
was asked to sign nor do I find any occasion for an allegation
that other employees were coerced thereby in view of the
privacy of the occasion and the fact that no one with the
possible exception of Miss McAuley made any other em-
ployee aware of what had happened . I shall recommend that
the complaint be dismissed with regard to this allegation.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent Playskool occurring in con-
nection with its operations have a close , intimate and substan-
tial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Playskool unlawfully as-
sisted the Respondent Union by obtaining employee signa-
tures to union membership and dues checkoff authorizations
by which employees were required to join the Union and pay
dues sooner than they would have been lawfully required to
do, I shall recommend that they be required to cease and
desist therefrom . I find no evidence that the Respondent
Union knew of Playskool 's action in this regard or in any way
participated in Playskool 's decision to do this which was
allegedly arrived at as a matter of convenience to Playskool's
personnel department . Accordingly I find no violation on the
part of Respondent Union.
I shall also recommend that any membership or dues
checkoff authorizations unlawfully obtained from employees
prior to the 30-day statutory period are not to be honored in
the future . If any deductions were made pursuant to dues
checkoff authorizations unlawfully obtained from employees
prior to the 30-day statutory period , I shall recommend that
Playskool reimburse to the employees from which such dues
were deducted all dues deducted for that first month. Under
the circumstance that the union -security contract is lawful on
its face and it appears therefore that the employees could
lawfully have been required to join the Union and pay dues
after the first 30 days, I shall not recommend that Respond-
ent Playskool reimburse the employees for such dues and
initiation fees if such were collected . If there are any em-
ployees who paid dues or initiation fees that worked less than
30 days Respondent Playskool shall reimburse such em-
ployees for the dues or initiation fees so deducted.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Playskool is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By its practice of informing prospective or newly hired
employees of the requirement that they must join the Union'
immediately and by furnishing new employees with union
cards and deducting from employees' pay union dues and
initiation fees during that first 30 days of employment and
forwarding said deductions to the Union, thereby assisting
the Union, Playskool has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By engaging in a practice whereby prospective or newly
hired employees are required to execute union membership or
dues checkoff authorization cards prior to the expiration of
the statutory 30-day period Playskool has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and
(3) of the Act.
5. Respondents have not engaged in further unfair labor
practices alleged.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
574 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A Agnes Matuszak Dorothy Soukup
Cecilia Monroe Evelyn StachnikJames Bates Josie Heard Jose Morales Beverly- StarzynskiGiovannina Bellio Inger Hultgren Jose Pavan Ethel TaylorMartha Bieschka Katheryn Johanson Perfecto Rivera Rose Tinghino
Kenneth Boecker Patricia Johanson Houston Rogers Carlos TrevinoAndrea Bonilla Maria Kovaks Dorothy Romanelh Castera VargasRegina Catalanotte Lillie Kubica Irma Schultz Friedrich Weber
Eugene Dutcher Rosemary Lind Norah Simpson Mary Wilszak
Maria Gorski Felix Lopez Ethel Sobotka Edward Zywicki
Katherine Hays Esther Martinez