Milan W. Allen, Complainant,v.Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 12, 2007
0120072053 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 12, 2007)

0120072053

07-12-2007

Milan W. Allen, Complainant, v. Carlos M. Gutierrez, Secretary, Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)), Agency.


Milan W. Allen,

Complainant,

v.

Carlos M. Gutierrez,

Secretary,

Department of Commerce

(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072053

Agency No. 065400020

DECISION

On March 21, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's February

8, 2007, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

On January 3, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint claiming

discrimination based on race (African-American) and reprisal for prior

protected EEO activity when he was subjected to harassment/hostile work

environment, and the agency denied his requests for approval, i.e.,

(a) in June-July 2005, the agency denied his request for a two-year

Intergovenmental Personnel Act (IPA) assignment to manage the GLOBE

project at Texas Southern University; (b) in March 2006, the agency

denied his proposal for a NOAA Educational Mini-Grant to offset the

residential, travel, and per diem expenses of the IPA proposed in (a);

and (c) in April 2006, the agency did not approve his application to

serve as a representative to the Program Coordination Office for one year.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided his right

to request a hearing but did not do so. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).

The agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b)

and concluded that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to

discrimination as alleged.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

a Satellite Hydrologist at the agency's National Weather Service, NOAA,

facility in Chanhassen, MN. In 2004, complainant received an agency

fellowship to work in Washington, D.C. for ten months. The agency

explained, through the testimony of complainant's supervisors, its

reasons for denying complainant's requests, i.e., he had been away from

his assigned duty station for ten months beginning in September 2004, at a

substantial cost to the office; he was needed to perform the duties of his

position; and the office could not provide the supporting costs of the IPA

and detail to the Program Office. Complainant asserted that the agency's

reasons for denial of his requests were pretext for discrimination.

In his appeal submission, complainant argued that the GLOBE project was

important to NOAA, and his skills and assigned duties were not important

and not needed; in support, he presented his managers' criticism of his

performance and work product; selections from his personal log dated in

2004, and correspondence between the agency and the union dated in 2004.

Harassment Claim

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing,

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject

to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). It is

well-settled that harassment based on an individual's protected status

is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive; usually,

however, a single incident or a group of isolated incidents will not be

regarded as discriminatory harassment. Frye v. Department of Labor,

EEOC Request No. 05950152 (February 8, 1996); Backo v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996); see also

Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In this matter,

while complainant is a member of a protected class based on his race

and has filed a prior EEO complaint, he has not shown that the agency's

actions were based on racial animus or taken in reprisal. Further, we

find that they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the

level of illegal harassment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997), citing Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (harassment is actionable if

it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

complainant's employment). Moreover, complainant has not shown that the

alleged harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or

had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work

environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

work environment.1 See Humphrey v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11.

Although complainant's claims do not establish illicit harassment,

they are properly considered as claims of disparate treatment.

Disparate Treatment Claim

Generally, claims of disparate treatment, such as complainant's, are

examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell

Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester

Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324

(D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For complainant to

prevail, s/he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration

was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).

Once complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden then

shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency is successful, the burden

reverts back to the complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency's reason(s) for its action was a pretext

for discrimination. At all times, complainant retains the burden of

persuasion, and it is his/her obligation to show by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983).

To establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, a complainant

must show that: (1) s/he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency

was aware of the protected activity; (3) s/he was subjected to adverse

treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected

activity and the adverse treatment. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, supra); Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000). For purposes of further

analysis, we assume, arguendo, and without so finding, that complainant

established a prima facie case based on race and reprisal.

Once a complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden

of proceeding moves to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. We note that the agency's burden,

while not onerous, must provide a specific, clear, and individualized

explanation for the treatment accorded the complainant. Id. In the

matter before us, we find that the agency has met its obligation to

explain to complainant its reasons for not approving his applications

for details, i.e., the agency, through its local managers, stated that

he had been away for ten months and was needed to perform his assigned

duties and that the organization could not support the costs of his

requested details. Thus, the agency met its obligation and framed the

factual issue "with sufficient clarity so that [complainant] had a full

and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id.

The ultimate burden of persuasion now returns to the complainant to

demonstrate by preponderant evidence that the reasons given by the agency

for its actions are pretext, or a sham or disguise for discrimination.

The complainant must show that the agency's action was more likely

than not motivated by discrimination, that is, that the action was

influenced by legally impermissible criteria, i.e., race and reprisal.

Absent a showing that the agency's articulated reason was used as a tool

to discriminate against him, complainant cannot prevail. Complainant

argued that neither the type of work he performed nor his performance

of that work was important or essential to his managers, so that he

was not needed at the office and should have been allowed to detail.

Even if his contentions were true, complainant failed to address the costs

issue or explain how the agency would benefit from his service elsewhere.

For these reasons, we find that complainant has failed to demonstrate

that the agency's reasons, as stated above, were pretext. Based on a

thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including

those not specifically addressed herein, we find that complainant did

not prove by preponderant evidence that the agency discriminated against

him based on race or in reprisal.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is affirmed.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____7-12-07_____________

Date

1 See Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment

by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (rev. October 17, 2002).

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0120072053

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120072053