Milan S.,1 Complainant,v.Sonny Perdue, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 11, 20180120180232 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 11, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Milan S.,1 Complainant, v. Sonny Perdue, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services), Agency. Appeal No. 0120180232 Hearing No. 531-2014-00370X Agency No. APHIS-2014-0019 DECISION On October 17, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 14, 2017, final order dismissing his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Environmental Protection Specialist, GS-0028-13, at the Agency’s work facility in Riverdale, Maryland. On December 9, 2013, Complainant filed an EEO complaint wherein he claimed that the Agency discriminated against him in reprisal for his prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when on September 27, 2013, management removed a portion of his duties. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120180232 2 The record reflects that Complainant and the Agency previously entered into a settlement agreement on September 19, 2013, regarding a prior complaint filed by Complainant. The agreement provided in part for the Agency: To reassign Complainant to the immediate supervision of …Chief, Environmental and Risk Analysis Services for as long as Complainant remains in his current position with the Environmental and Risk Analysis Services unit in PPD. Complainant’s duties under [Chief] will be commensurate with his position and may or may not include [Environmental Justice or EJ] duties. If [Chief] is out of the office, on detail, or leaves this position, Complainant will report to [Chief’s] assign or successor. The change in direct supervision will occur within ten (10) calendar days after the effective date of this Agreement. This provision does not restrict the Agency from any future reorganization or realignment of PPD. Complainant’s ongoing placement in this position will be subject to all laws, regulations, and policies of general applicability under the direction of APHIS. On October 22, 2013, Complainant alleged that the Agency breached the settlement agreement when management officials removed certain “prominent, prestigious, and desirable” duties from him, including several Point of Contact (POC) Consultant duties. On May 1, 2014, the Agency determined that it had not breached the settlement agreement. Complainant appealed and, in Complainant v. Dep’t of Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 0120142189 (Oct. 2, 2014), the Commission affirmed the Agency’s determination that it had not breached the settlement agreement. At the conclusion of the investigation of the instant complaint, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s Motion to Dismiss and issued a decision on September 6, 2017. The AJ applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel as grounds for dismissal. The AJ observed that the Agency persuasively argued that the same issue was raised in both the instant complaint and Complainant’s separate claim that the settlement agreement was breached. The AJ noted that in the breach claim Complainant alleged that the most prestigious and meaningful duties were taken away from him. According to Complainant, he lost the most desirable portion of his duties and they were not replaced by meaningful duties. Complainant further claimed that the removed duties comprised a significant portion of his workload. The AJ observed that the Commission ruled in the prior matter that the Agency removed duties, but assigned Complainant other duties which were meaningful, important and critical to the Agency’s mission. The AJ noted that the Commission stated that the assigned revised duties were commensurate with Complainant’s GS- 13 position. The AJ stated that she rejected Complainant’s argument that collateral estoppel does not apply because the Commission previously did not consider whether the removal of his duties was due to reprisal. 0120180232 3 Further, the AJ stated that by finding Complainant was assigned meaningful duties commensurate with his position, the Commission determined that the new duties do not constitute an adverse action. The AJ reasoned that this finding also was determinative that the reassignment of duties would not deter a reasonable person from engaging in EEO activity. The AJ found that even if collateral estoppel did not apply here, Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal. The AJ stated that Complainant cannot show that he suffered an adverse action in light of the Commission’s prior decision finding that the duties assigned to Complainant were meaningful. The Agency subsequently issued a final order wherein it implemented the AJ’s decision. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that the only reason the Chief had for removing his prestigious assignments after the settlement agreement was executed was punitive. Complainant argues that the Chief acknowledged the duties were not removed due to the quality of his work. According to Complainant, the removal of his duties and restricting him from interacting with other organizations and maintaining contacts violated the terms and conditions of his employment. Complainant argues that collateral estoppel does not apply and that he established a prima facie case of reprisal. In response, the Agency maintains that Complainant raised the exact same assignments were taken away in his breach claim as he has in the instant matter. The Agency notes that the Commission ruled in Complainant v. Dep’t of Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 0120142189 (Oct. 2, 2014), that the duties given to him after he settled his prior complaint were commensurate with his GS-13 position. The Agency reasons that our ruling in the breach claim concerning the assignments being commensurate with his GS-13 position precludes Complainant from stating that the assignments being taken away from him materially altered the terms or conditions of his employment. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). The AJ concluded that Complainant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the removal of his duties on September 27, 2013. 0120180232 4 According to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Parkland Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 430 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). A determination as to whether it is appropriate to apply the doctrine includes the following: (1) whether the issues presented in the present litigation were in substance the same as those resolved in the prior litigation; (2) whether controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the prior judgment; and, (3) whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion. See Snead v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., EEOC Request Nos. 05970577 and 05990239 (Mar. 25, 1999) (citing Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55). The record reveals that the Commission previously addressed in EEOC Appeal No. 0120142189 the matter of Complainant’s most prestigious and meaningful duties being taken away from him on September 27, 2013. Complainant believes that the matter at issue here is different in light of the fact that he is pursuing a reprisal claim rather than a breach claim. We find that the same matter of the removal of these duties on the identical date is again raised in the instant complaint. We discern no significant change in controlling facts or legal principles since the prior decision. We also see no special circumstances that warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion. Therefore, we agree with the AJ that the issues presented in the current matter are in substance the same as those resolved by the Commission in Complainant’s breach claim. In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to address the merits of Complainant’s reprisal claim. CONCLUSION The Agency’s final order is hereby AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 0120180232 5 A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. 0120180232 6 The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations October 11, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation