Midland Rubber Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 20, 1954

108 N.L.R.B. 930 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

930 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local No. 2758, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in respect tothehireand tenure of employment of Joseph E. Welcome,
thereby encouraging membership in Respondent Union, Respondent Company has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent Company has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. By attempting to cause and causing Respondent Company to discriminate against Joseph
E. Welcome in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, Respondent Union has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
5. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act,,Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices areunfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendation-omitted from publication.]
MIDLAND RUBBER CORPORATION and OIL WORKERS IN-
TERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, Petitioner . Case No., 21-RC-
3334. May 20, 1954
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Arthur Hailey,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby
affirmed.
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. No quest;.on affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning
of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) *and (7) of the Act, for the
following reasons:
The Employer and the Intervenor' contend that a contract
executed on March 5, 1953, and extending by its terms from
October 2, 1952, to January 31, 1955, is a bar to the petition
herein, which was filed on September 28, 1953. The Petitioner
alleges the contract is invalid because, generally, (1) it was
not properly executed, and (2) the Intervenor is not a party to
the contract.
' International Union of Operating Engineers , Local 501, AFL.
108 NLRB No. 128.
MIDLAND RUBBER CORPORATION 931
As to ( 1), upon the expiration of an earlier contract, the
Employer and Local 2352 of the Intervenor ' s international
entered into negotiations . This resulted in an agreement which
was submitted to a meeting of the Local 235 membership on
February 20, 1953 . A majority of the membership present
approved this agreement . However , on March 5 , 1953 , before
the actual signing of the contract , a petition signed by a majority
of the employees in the unit , opposing the execution of the
contract , was handed to the union representatives . The presi-
dent and business manager of Local 235 , nevertheless , signed
the contract . Three of the Union's six -member negotiating
committee refused to sign . The provision in the bylaws of
Local 235 dealing with the execution of contracts provides only
for the signatures of the president and business manager of the
Local . There is no requirement therein that the membership
must approve a contract in order to validate it. Under these
circumstances , we find the contract to have been validly
executed.'
The contract was received in evidence and on its face shows
clearly that all the employees whom the Petitioner now seeks
to represent are covered by its terms . This is , of course, the
entire group for which the Intervenor was certified as exclusive
bargaining agent only 6 months before the contract was executed.
In these circumstances , we see no warrant , as does our dis-
senting colleague , for inquiring into the disagreements among
the employees as to the precise economic demands that should
be made upon the Employer by the duly selected majority repre-
sentative or by the regularly chosen officers of the Union .4
Indeed , the manner in which employees resolve disagreements
caused by conflicting interests within the limits of any appro-
priate bargaining unit are beyond the scope of the Board's
authority.5
Concerning ( 2), as stated above , the contract was entered into
by Local 235. The record shows that in May 1953 , this Local
merged with Local 63 of the same International to form the
Amalgamated Local 501 , the Intervenor herein. The Employer
was duly informed of this amalgamation , has recognized the
Intervenor as the successor of Local 235 , and has continued to
abide by the terms of the contract . We find , therefore , that the
Intervenor has succeeded to the rights of Local 235 as signatory
of the contract .6 In view of the foregoing , we find the contract
2 Local 235 was certified by the Board on September 22, 1952 , as a result of a consent
election (Case No. 21-RC-2679).
3See Avco Manufacturing Corporation , New Idea Division, 97 NLRB 645; Lever Brothers
Company, 96 NLRB 448. The contract itself is silent as to the mode of its execution.
4Cf., Queensbrook News Co., 98 NLRB 84.
5 Lewittes and Sons , 96 NLRB 775.
6 See The Mennen Company, 105 NLRB 677, and cases therein cited.
932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is a bar to the petition herein and we shall, therefore, grant the
Intervenor's motion to dismiss.
[The Board dismissed the petition.]
Member Rodgers, dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the Board majority in holding that
the Intervenor's contract is a bar to this proceeding. The con-
tract in question was signed by the president and business
manager of the Intervenor's predecessor with knowledge that
a majority of the employees in the affected unit had signed
a petition opposing the contract's execution. In addition, 3
members of a 6-member negotiating committee refused to
sign the contract. The contract stands, then, as one which
the employees had rejected before it had been signed. It is a
contract which represents, if anything, the will of the Inter-
venor's membership, not the will of the majority of the em-
ployees in the unit; and, this Board has often held, that a
statutory bargaining agent is required by the Act to represent
all members of the unit equally--not just those who belong to
the union. Wallace Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 332 U. S. 248; Bethle-
hem-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 53 NLRB 999.
To hold, as the majority does, that the contract here is a
bar is to frustrate not only the will of the employees, but is
also, in effect, a denial of the employees' statutory right to
collective bargaining on their behalf. "Contrary to a rather
general misconception, the [Act] was passed for the primary
benefit of the employees as distinguished from the primary
benefit to labor unions...." N. L. R. B. v. Hymie Schwartz,
146 F. 2d' 773, 774 (C. A. 5). Where, therefore, employee
interests conflict with those of a labor organization, the em-
ployee interests should, in my opinion, be regarded as para-
mount. Moreover, it can scarcely be said that a contract
executed against the will of the majority of the employees
achieves such stability in labor relations that it should operate
as a bar to a petition. If, in the interest of stable industrial re-
lations, employees are to be deprived of their right under the
Act to choose or change a representative, the conduct asserted
as a bar to such right should, at the very least be one whose execu-
tion a majority of the employees have not expressly opposed.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I would find that
the Intervenor's contract is not a bar.7
Member Beeson took no part in the consideration of the
above Decision and Order.
7 The cases relied upon by the majority are distinguishable, in the Avco case, 97 NLRB
645, there was no evidence that the employees had affirmatively rejected the contract. In
the Lever Brothers case, 96 NLRB 448, although a majority of the employees in a single
plant had rejected the contract, the majority of the employees in four plants, which was the
unit involved, had approved it.