Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2021

2019006475 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/857,391 09/17/2015 Curt Carpenter 13768.964.6.1.1.1 7527
47973 7590 03/02/2021
WORKMAN NYDEGGER/MICROSOFT
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 1000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
EXAMINER
WENG, PEI YONG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2179
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docketing@wnlaw.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CURT CARPENTER, DEBORA EVERETT, DOUG KRAMER,
DEREK E. SUNDAY, and CHRIS WHYTOCK

Appeal 2019-006475
Application 14/857,391
Technology Center 2100

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
“Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC.” Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/857,391

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
The present invention relates to “[p]rocessing multiple inputs received
across simultaneously displayed applications.” Spec., Abstr. Claims 1
and 7, reproduced below, are illustrative of argued subject matter.
1. A computing device for processing multiple inputs
received across simultaneously displayed applications, the
computing device comprising:
one or more processors;
a display device; and
a storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions
that are executable by the one or more processors to configure
the computing device to perform at least the following:
display a first application on a first portion of the display
device, and simultaneously display a second application
on a second, different, portion of the display device, the
second application being different than the first
application;
receive a first user input in connection with the first
portion of the display device;
receive a second user input in connection with the second
portion of the display device, the first user input and the
second user input being received at substantially the same
time;
route the first user input to the first application based on
the first user input having been received in connection
with first portion of the display device; and
route the second user input to the second application based
on the second user input having been received in
connection with the second portion of the display device,
the second user input being routed to the second
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application substantially at the same time as routing the
first user input to the first application.
7. The computing device of claim 5, the executable
instructions including instructions that are executable by the one
or more processors to configure the computing device to:
route only user input from the first type of object to the first
application; and
route only user input from the second type of object to the second
application.
Appeal Br. 23–24.
Rejections2
Claims 1, 12, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Shen (US 2004/0046784 A1; Mar. 11, 2004).
Non-Final Act. 4–6.
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
ICEC2005 (Kishino, F. (2005). Entertainment Computing—ICEC 2005 : 4th
International Conference, Sanda, Japan, Sept. 19–21, 2005 : proceedings.
Berlin: Springer.) and Shen. Non-Final Act. 6–13.
OPINION
Anticipation Rejection of
Claims 1, 12, and 20 over Shen
Appellant’s arguments address claims 1, 12, and 20 as a group.
Appeal Br. 16–19. We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We are unpersuaded of error and therefore sustain this
rejection.

2 The Examiner withdrew the nonstatutory obviousness-type
double-patenting rejection of claims 1−20. Ans. 3.
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Appellant contends Shen does not teach the claimed applications.
Appeal Br. 16–19. Specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner does not
ascribe the as-follows, asserted meaning of “computer application” to the
claimed applications and thereby unreasonably reads them on Shen’s
selectable views (people, calendar, location, and events):
[R]ather than pointing to any portion within Shen that explicitly
discloses different applications, the Examiner instead
characterizes the Shen views . . . as being analogous to the
claimed “different applications.” . . .
. . . .
[T]he Examiner’s interpretation is not consistent with the
“ordinary and customary” meaning of the term[.] . . .
[The] ordinary and customary meaning of “computer
application” encompasses the concept of a particular piece of
computer software that can be installed and executed on a
computer system. Computer applications are frequently
described in terms of their general functionality. For example,
word-processing applications, web-browser applications,
photo-editing applications, etc. [T]he capabilities or
functionalities within an application are not commonly or
ordinarily referred to as “applications.” [I]t is not common or
ordinary to refer to something like “find-and-replace” within a
word-processing application as being a “find-and-replace
application.” Instead, such functionality is commonly referred
to as a tool, feature, menu, etc.
Appeal Br. 17–18 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further contends the
Specification comports with the argued interpretation of an “application” by
disclosing, as the only examples, software for general functionality:
[O]ne embodiment describes the first application being a
memory card game and the second application being a game of
minesweeper. . . . Appellant’s specification describes another
embodiment in which the first application is a calculator
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application while the second, different, application allows
navigating through web pages. . . .
In a third example, four . . . exemplary applications include a
memory card game, a word processing application, a second
memory card game, and a paint application.
Appeal Br. 18 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). And in reply to the
Examiner providing definitions of “application” as a software task (Ans. 13–
14), Appellant further contends Shen’s selectable views are nonetheless not
respective “applications” but rather comprised by one application:
[T]he Examiner appears to have taken the definitions that an
application “performs a particular task or set of tasks” and that
“utilities are all applications[]” . . . to reach the unsupported
conclusion that each of Shen’s control panel icons would be
associated with a view that is a “different application/program”
that each performs a different task. . . . [E]ven if Shen did
disclose that a view performs a task, this would not lead to the
conclusion that each of Shen’s views would correspond to a
different application. . . . [I]t is clear that a single application
could perform all functionality discussed by Shen. Absent any
teaching by Shen that different applications are used to perform
the disclosed functionality, it is simply unreasonable to
conclude that Shen teaches separate/different applications.
Reply Br. 2–3 (emphasis omitted).
We are unpersuaded of error because Appellant’s arguments do not
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s determinations. The Examiner presents
persuasive support for interpreting “application” as a software task, finds
Shen’s selectable views are respective software tasks, and consequently
reads the claimed applications on the views. Ans. 13–14. For support, the
Examiner presents the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of
“a program that performs a particular task or set of tasks” (id. at 13 (citing
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/application)) and TechTerms:
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The Computer Dictionary definition of “a software program that runs on
your computer” (id. at 14 (citing https://techterms.com/definition/
application)). Accord APPLICATION. The Authoritative Dictionary of
IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition (2000) 46 (“application . . . (5) A
computer program that performs some desired function.”). The briefs
contest the Examiner’s interpretation without persuasively rebutting the
support.
Appellant contends, in the Appeal Brief, that the term “application” is
known in the art as software for a “general functionality.” Appeal Br. 17–
18. However, this interpretation is not supported by evidence of a specific
meaning in the art and is therefore unavailing. See In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An assertion of what seems to
follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind
of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case[.]”).
Appellant further contends “the usage of the term ‘application’ within
Appellant’s specification also comports explicitly” with Appellant’s
interpretation of “application.” Appeal Br. 18. Support in the Specification
alone does not show error in the Examiner’s interpretation that “application”
is consistent with the Specification. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr.,
367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Claim terms are given their “their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification[.]”).
Moreover, rather than being inconsistent with the Specification, the
Examiner’s interpretation is consistent with the following: “The methods
and systems described herein have been discussed, in large part, with respect
to a multiple application system. However, the methods and systems may
further be implemented and applied to single application systems have
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multiple components.” Spec. ¶ 44. This is the scope of protection the
Specification describes as being sought—to protect a means of
simultaneously receiving inputs across multiple software entities regardless
of being labeled “applications” or “components” or another term. See also
Spec., Abstr. (The present invention relates to “[p]rocessing multiple inputs
received across simultaneously displayed applications.”). Appellant now, to
overcome prior art, contends “application” has a meaning that conveys a
narrower claim coverage. Appellant does not persuasively establish that the
narrower construction is required by either showing the Examiner’s
interpretation of “application” is not an ordinary meaning in the art or
showing the Specification’s usage of “application” presents a clear intent for
a different meaning. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]o deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of
a claim term to one of skill in the art, the patentee must, with some language,
indicate a clear intent to do so in the patent.”).
Appellant contends in the Reply Brief that Shen does not describe the
selectable views as respective applications, but rather as part of a single
application. Reply Br. 2–3 (quoting Shen ¶ 85). We agree. See Shen ¶ 85
(“[The] control panels . . . allow users to switch between views and control
the application[.]”). We are, nonetheless, unpersuaded. Weighing Shen’s
usage of “application” against the Examiner’s dictionary definitions does not
persuade us that the Examiner erred in finding the ordinary meaning of
“application” in the art encompasses Shen’s selectable views. See
In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832–33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Anticipation is not an
“ipsissimis verbis” test.).
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We add that, even assuming Appellant’s interpretation of
“application” is correct, the briefs do not distinguish Appellant’s
interpretation over Shen’s selectable views. As stated above, Appellant
interprets an “application” as software providing a “general functionality.”
Appeal Br. 17–18. Even assuming (arguendo) that is correct, the briefs do
not explain how to differentiate “general functionality” (asserted to be an
application) and non-general functionality, much less explain how Shen’s
selectable views lack “general functionality.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming because appellant “merely argued
that the claims differed from [the prior art], and chose not to proffer a
serious explanation of this difference.”); In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952
F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to
examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for
nonobvious distinctions over the prior art.”).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1–6 and 8–20
over ICEC2005 and Shen
Each of Appellant’s arguments against this rejection is repetitive of
those addressed above. Appeal Br. 19–21; Reply Br. 4. We are therefore
unpersuaded of error and accordingly sustain this rejection.
Obviousness Rejection of
Claim 7 over ICEC2005 and Shen
Appellant further contends as-follows for dependent claim 7:
[C]laim 7 explicitly requires that the computing system only
route input of a first type to the first application and only route
input of the second type to the second application. Even if,
arguendo, the references did teach two different applications,
there is nothing at all in the references that would suggest that a
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particular input type is somehow restricted to a particular one of
the applications, [as is] claimed.
Appeal Br. 21 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner responds:
The claim language does not require the first type of object to be
different from the second type of object. Furthermore, contrary
to the assertion made by the applicant, the claim does not require
input type to be restricted to a particular one of the application.
The claim merely requires that input to the first application being
routed to the first application and input to the second application
routed to the second application. Both the first object and the
second object can be a mouse [or] stylus.
Ans. 16 (emphasis omitted).
We disagree with the Examiner’s determination that the claimed first
and second types of objects can be the same object. The plain meaning of
“types” means different types (plural); otherwise, the objects would be one
type (singular). Moreover, the Examiner’s interpretation renders “type of” a
superfluous part of the claimed “first type of object” and “second type of
object.” Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms
of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”).
We agree, however, with the Examiner that Appellant’s argument is
not commensurate with claim 7’s scope. Contrary to Appellant’s argument,
claim 7 does not require the computing system to route only the first type of
input to the first application and only the second type of input to the second
application. Rather, we find the plain meaning of claim 7’s at-issue
recitations (“route only user input from the first type of object to the first
application” and “route only user input from the second type of object to the
second application”) is that only user input is routed from the two type of
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objects to their respective applications. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“A claim must be read in accordance with the precepts of
English grammar.”); see also HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., 667 F.3d
1270, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Modifiers should be placed next to the
words they modify.”). In accord with this claim interpretation, the Examiner
reads the claimed two types of objects on two different types of user inputs,
e.g., a mouse and stylus. Ans. 16.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 1–20.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 12, 20 102(b) Shen 1, 12, 20
1–20 103(a) ICEC2005, Shen 1–20
Overall
Outcome 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED