Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 21, 2020

15215824 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/215,824 07/21/2016 Fabio Andre PINTOS 359995.01 7556
69316 7590 07/21/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
WALTON, CHESIREE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FABIO ANDRE PINTOS and
THOMAS J. EYERMAN JR.
__________________

Appeal 2020-001614
Application 15/215,824
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JAMES P. CALVE, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges.

CALVE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the decision
of the Examiner to reject claims 1–8, 10, and 12–20, which are all pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 7, and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A method of storing calendar events for calendar
applications, the method comprising:
providing a set of available intent-time options;
receiving an input indicative of an event for a calendar
item;
in response to receiving the input, determining an
appropriate intent-time from the set of available intent-time
options; wherein the appropriate intent-time is determined to be
a trigger-based time;
identifying from the input any parameters suitable for the
appropriate intent-time; and
storing the event with an intent-time identifier according
to the appropriate intent-time and any of the parameters
identified from the input;
after storing the event, receiving a request to view a
calendar comprising the event; and
in response to the request to view the calendar:
reading the event, including the intent-time
identifier, from storage;
executing a function for the intent-time identifier
read from the storage to generate an actual time of the
event; and
providing the actual time of the event to a source
of the request to view the calendar.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–8, 10, and 12–20 are rejected as directed to a judicial
exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 1–4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Hazen (US 2015/0278199 A1, pub. Oct. 1, 2015), Tendjoukian (US 2007/
0016646 A1, pub. Jan. 18, 2007), and Carro (US 2006/0068812 A1, pub.
Mar. 30, 2006).
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Claims 5 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Hazen, Tendjoukian, Carro, and Zhu (US 2006/0224323 A1, pub. Oct.
5, 2006).
Claims 7, 8, 10, and 12–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Shen (US 2014/0229610 A1, pub. Aug. 14, 2014),
Tendjoukian, Carro, and Hazen.
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Shen,
Tendjoukian, Carro, Hazen, and Zhu.
ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility of Claims 1–8, 10, and 12–20
Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 9–20.
We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Examiner’s Determinations
The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites methods of organizing
human activity by managing personal relationships or interactions and
business relations. Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 4. The Examiner determines that
the claim lacks additional elements sufficient to integrate the abstract ideas
into a practical application but instead recites generic computer functions to
implement the abstract idea. Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 4–5.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues that the claims provide an improved structure for
storing a calendar event to overcome a problem in the storage and structure
of events by making a calendar event that retains a function executed after
the event is stored in response to a request to view the calendar so the event
is updated automatically. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant asserts a new structure
for storing events as an intent-time identifier is required. Id. at 11–13.
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Principles of Law
Section 101 of the Patent Act states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101. This provision contains an implicit exception: “Laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice
Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
To distinguish patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications, we first
determine whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id.
at 217. If they are, we consider the elements of each claim, individually and
“as an ordered combination,” to determine if additional elements “‘transform
the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application” as an “inventive
concept” sufficient to ensure the claims in practice amount to significantly
more than a patent on the ineligible concept itself. See id. at 217–18.
The USPTO has issued guidance about this framework. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to determine whether a
claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
listed in the Revised Guidance (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018) (“MPEP”)). Id. at 52–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and also (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then consider
whether the claim (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id. at 56.
Step 1: Is Claim 1 Within a Statutory Category?
Claim 1 recites a “method” which is within a statutory category of
35 U.S.C. § 101, namely, a process. Final Act. 8. Thus, we next consider
whether claim 1 as a whole recites a judicial exception.
Step 2A, Prong One: Does Claim 1 Recite a Judicial Exception?
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity. The Revised Guidance enumerates this concept
as certain methods of organizing human activity by managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions). Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Some of the steps also can be performed as mental
processes––concepts performed in the human mind. Id.
The invention relates to storing the date and time of a calendar event
in an “intent-time format” with suitable “parameters.” Spec. ¶¶ 3, 4. “The
intent-time can preserve the underlying intent of why the event is scheduled
at a certain time.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 13. “An identifier may be provided to indicate
the particular intent-time from the available intent-times provided by the
calendar application.” Id. ¶ 5. Intent-time formats include standard time,
astronomical-based, tide-based, and sports event-based times. Id. ¶ 21.
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The preamble of claim 1 recites this purpose broadly as “storing
calendar events for calendar applications.” Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.).
The first two limitations of claim 1 involve data gathering steps that
are a precursor to the organizational and mental process steps recited later in
the claim. They recite “providing a set of available intent-time options” and
“receiving an input indicative of an event for a calendar item.” Id.
The Specification describes intent-time options as including standard
time (e.g., start time, end time, time zone format), astronomical-based times
(e.g., sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset), tide-based times (e.g., high tide,
low tide), sporting-event based time (e.g., time based on the beginning or
end time of a sporting event), and transport-based time (e.g., time based on
departure or arrival or an airplane or train schedule). Spec. ¶ 21. These
options are used to organize a person’s activities into a calendar entry.
The Specification also describes “input indicative of an event for a
calendar item” as information relevant to an event such as date, time, or a
subject used to describe an event. Id. ¶ 16. Input can be a natural language
string received via a keyboard, touch screen, and mouse, or a verbal input
received via a personal assistant like Cortana®, Siri®, and Echo®. Id. ¶ 17.
The next steps organize this user activity into a calendar event by:
determining an appropriate intent-time from the set of
available intent-time options; wherein the appropriate intent-
time is determined to be a trigger-based time;
identifying from the input any parameters suitable for the
appropriate intent-time; and
storing the event with an intent-time identifier according
to the appropriate intent-time and any of the parameters
identified from the input;
Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.).
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Determining an appropriate intent-time is done by classifying input
against available intent-time options to save a user’s intent for an activity.
Spec. ¶ 18. An intent mapping processor can be used and can include a
classifier or state machine to identify a most relevant intentional time option.
Id. ¶ 19. A slot filler may be used to extract information to identify intent-
time and its parameters. Id. Parameters are offsets and conditions. Id. ¶ 18.
Notably, none of these features is recited in claim 1. Therefore, we do
not consider them in determining whether claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that the specification yields to the claim language
when identifying the focus of a claim); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As with
claim 1 of the ’187 patent, the problem is that no inventive concept resides
in the claims.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of the
Asserted Claims themselves.”); Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire
Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he important
inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.”).
A “trigger time” is a phrase coined by Appellant. “A trigger refers to
an event or occurrence upon which the actual time is based.” Spec. ¶ 15. If
a user inputs the phrase “I want to eat dinner after the Mariner’s game,” the
system can store the event in a sport time format rather than a time of 8 pm.
Id. ¶ 22. If a user inputs “wake me up half-an-hour before sunrise,” the
event can be stored in astronomical time format with an offset of 30 minutes.
Id. ¶ 45. A person who wants to be home before sundown every Friday can
create an event for every Friday, one hour before sunset. Id. ¶ 46.
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These examples illustrate how the method organizes user activities as
part of storing a calendar event. These steps can be performed as mental
processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion regarding what
a user inputs. For example, calendar events regarding sunrise or sunset can
be classified in astronomical time format while calendar events regarding
sports events can classified in a sports time format as a mental process.
Merely “receiving an input indicative of an event for a calendar item”
and classifying that input (“determining an appropriate intent-time”) based
on the set of “available intent-time options” with any parameters identified
from the input and storing the event recites an abstract idea when recited at
such a high level of generality. In Content Extraction, a claim to receiving
digitized documents, recognizing (extracting) portions of the digitized
documents, and storing data from said portions recited an abstract idea. See
Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National
Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As the court explained:
Applying Mayo/Alice step one, we agree with the district court
that the claims of the asserted patents are drawn to the abstract
idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the
collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a
memory. The concept of data collection, recognition, and
storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have
always performed these functions. And banks have, for some
time, reviewed checks, recognized relevant data such as the
amount, account number, and identity of account holder, and
stored that information in their records.
Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added).
Similar claims to extracting classification information from digital
data recited an abstract idea in TLI Communications. In re TLI Commc’ns
LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There, the court held:
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[T]he claims, as noted, are simply directed to the abstract idea
of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of “categorical
rules” to decide subject matter eligibility, . . . we have applied
the “abstract idea” exception to encompass inventions pertaining
to methods of organizing human activity. . . . Here, we find that,
like the claims at issue in Content Extraction which were
directed to “collecting data,” “recognizing certain data within
the collected data set,” and “storing the recognized data in
memory,” 776 F.3d at 1347, attaching classification data, such
as dates and times, to images for the purpose of storing those
images in an organized manner is a well-established “basic
concept” sufficient to fall under Alice step 1.
TLI, 823 F.3d at 613 (emphasis added); see Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The parsing and comparing of claims 1–3 and
9 are similar to the collecting and recognizing of Content Extraction, 776
F.3d at 1347, and the classifying in an organized manner of TLI, 823 F.3d at
613.”). Here, claim 1 classifies an event date and time as an intent-time.
Thus, if John is on a camping trip and asks Cortana® to “wake me up
half-an-hour before sunrise,” Cortana® schedules an event for “Tomorrow,
0:30m BEFORE SUNRISE A (lat,long)” at John’s location. Spec. ¶ 45. If
Kate wants to be home before sundown every Friday, the system creates a
calendar event for “Every Friday, 1H BEFORE SUNSET @ Kirkland, WA”
where Kate lives. Id. ¶ 46. The intent-times are astronomical-based times.
The claimed steps used to create a calendar event are mental processes
that a person would use to create a calendar event for the same trigger event.
A person could enter the calendar event into their calendar application or set
an alarm clock to the appropriate time to be reminded of the event. A person
could calculate as a mental process the parameter/condition offset to remind
them 30 minutes or one hour before the event as appropriate.
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Providing a calendar event customized to a user’s activities based on
input received from the user is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding
that “the claim relates to customizing information based on (1) information
known about the user and (2) navigation data” and a user’s location, which
is an abstract idea); see Bridge and Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
778 F. App’x 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (providing customized content based
on a user profile is an abstract idea); Spec. ¶¶ 4, 5, 13 (intent time preserves
the underlying intent of the event scheduled by a user at a certain time).
Essentially, these steps organize a user’s activities according to rules
regarding “available intent-time options” and “parameters” recited at a high
level of abstraction. Similar claims to generating tasks based on rules to be
completed upon the occurrence of an event were held to recite an abstract
idea in Accenture Global Services. See Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at
1344. An event processor was triggered by events associated with a change
in information from a customer to send an event trigger to a task engine,
which identified rules in a task library for the event and applied the customer
information to the rules to determine a task to be completed. Id. at 1338–39.
The claim limitations recited a database of tasks, a means to allow a client to
access those tasks, and a set of rules applied to a task on a given event. Id. at
1345.
Here, claim 1 receives user “input indicative of an event for a calendar
item.” Then, the method applies rules to determine an appropriate intent-
time from a set of available intent-time options that is a “trigger-based time”
and performs the task of storing the event according to the set of rules. See
Spec. ¶ 13 (the intent-time format allows detailed storage of information).
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The final limitations address how the stored event is displayed.
after storing the event, receiving a request to view a calendar
comprising the event; and
in response to the request to view the calendar:
reading the event, including the intent-time identifier,
from storage;
executing a function for the intent-time identifier read
from the storage to generate an actual time of the event; and
providing the actual time of the event to a source of the
request to view the calendar.
Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.).
The Specification indicates the time is calculated at a server or a client
device depending on the complexity. Spec. ¶¶ 47, 49. To display a calendar
view of a sunrise-based time event, a client calendar application or a service
may calculate the time so the event displays at the appropriate time in the
user’s calendar. Id. ¶ 50. For a tide-based time, a property of a naval station
name may be provided as an index to a tide table that can be accessed. Id.
¶ 51. Sunrise- and sunset-based times may be calculated different ways to
include calling an application program interface. Id. ¶ 52.
Such steps that convert an event from an intent-time to an actual time
without more recite an abstract idea. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d 1360, 1367
(holding a parser that transforms data from source to object code is abstract
absent evidence it improves computer functionality); Burnett v. Panasonic
Corp., 741 F. App’x 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding claims to converting
geospatial coordinates into a string of natural numbers is an abstract idea).
Notably, claim 1 recites only “determining an appropriate intent-time”
and “executing a function for the intent-time identifier read from the storage
to generate an actual time of the event” at a high level of abstraction. See
Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
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The method stores the time of an event as an appropriate intent-time.
Instead of listing a standard start or stop time, the method stores an “intent-
time identifier,” which the system uses to determine the actual time. A user
can store an event as a Mariner’s baseball game, and the system “execut[es]
a function . . . to generate an actual time of the event.” Appeal Br. 29
(Claims App.). The system determines the start time by consulting a sport
calendar as a person might do. See Spec. ¶ 22. People can determine times
for sunrises, sunsets, tides, sporting events, and transportation as mental acts.
Recited at this high level of generality, the method organizes human
activity information as an abstract idea. Our reviewing court has held:
We have recognized that “[i]nformation as such is an
intangible” and that collecting, analyzing, and displaying that
information, without more, is an abstract idea. Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353–54; see also id. at 1355 (noting claim
requirement of “‘displaying concurrent visualization’ of two or
more types of information” was insufficient to confer patent
eligibility). We have also held that claims directed to
displaying two different information sets sequentially are
abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to abstract idea of
“showing an advertisement before delivering free content”).
Similarly, we have held that claims directed to a single display
of information collected from various sources are abstract. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding claims which recited
creating a “dynamic document” using content from multiple
electronic records ineligible under § 101). Recitation, as in this
case, of the collection, organization, and display of two sets of
information on a generic display device is abstract absent a
“specific improvement to the way computers [or other
technologies] operate.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336.
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir.
2018). Here, an event is stored as intent time and displayed as actual time.
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Our reviewing court also has held in a similar context:
The focus of the asserted claims . . . is on collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis. . . . [W]e have treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
processes within the abstract-idea category.
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811
F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding claims to applying for a loan and
calculating a borrower’s credit grading to receive loan pricing information
all could be performed by humans without a computer).
The Revised Guidance provides similar guidance:
If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic
computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
mind.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14; see also Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding a method to verify
the validity of a credit card transaction recited a mental process because a
person could read records of Internet credit card transactions, write a list of
credit card numbers, and compare the list to credit card transactions).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity and mental processes as identified above.
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Step 2A, Prong Two: Integration into a Practical Application
We next consider whether claim 1 as a whole integrates the recited
judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (Revised Step 2A, Prong Two). We determine
that the claim lacks additional elements that improve a computer or other
technology. Any additional elements do not implement the abstract idea in
conjunction with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the
claim. They do not transform or reduce a particular article to a different
state or thing. They do not apply the abstract idea in a meaningful way
beyond linking it to a particular environment. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 and MPEP sections cited therein; Ans. 4–8.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that claim 1 recites a
method necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the storage and structure of events in the technical
field of calendaring. See Appeal Br. 11–12; Reply Br. 4–6. If an innovation
was developed in these areas, it is not recited in claim 1.
The Specification indicates that the claimed “intent-time identifier”
may be stored as a property of an event. Spec. ¶ 26. “The identifier may be
a human readable name of the type of intent-time or data that is used to map
to a human readable name of the type of intent-time.” Id. Stated simply, it
is “information” and “[i]nformation as such is an intangible.” Elec. Power,
830 F.3d at 1353. It does not improve computers or other technology. Nor
does it transform an article to a different state/thing. It is not integral to the
claim. It describes information stored for an event. “An identifier may be
provided to indicate the particular intent-time from the available intent-times
provided by the calendar application.” Spec. ¶ 26 (emphasis added).
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Paragraphs 13, 25, and 29 of the Specification are cited by Appellant.
Reply Br. 5; Appeal Br. 18. They describe the purpose of the intent-time as
allowing more detailed storage of information in a manner that can be easier
to manipulate, quantify, and access so that information about the underlying
intent for an event is saved. In other words, the intent-time format records
information about the event so “the calendar application can indicate at least
what the start time or end time for an event is based on.” Id. ¶ 13.
We are not persuaded that “an appropriate intent-time” or “intent-time
identifier” with “any parameters” recites a data structure that integrates the
abstract idea into a practical application. Indeed, Enfish LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), illustrates why claim 1 here does not
recite an improvement to computers or other technology. Enfish held that a
claim to a data storage and retrieval system for a computer memory was not
directed to an abstract idea because it recited more than storing, organizing,
and retrieving memory in a logical table. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336–37. The
claimed self-referential table (and its “means for configuring” algorithm)
functioned differently than conventional database structures. Id. at 1337.
In Enfish, the claim recited a new logical table with logical rows and
columns, each of which included an object identification number (OID) to
identify it. The OID acted as a pointer to the associated row or column and
was an important aspect of the self-referential table and its technical advance
over known data structures. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336–37. The “means
for configuring” allowed new columns to be created and added to the table
for immediate use. Id. The algorithm allowed the table to store information
for each column in rows of the same table so new columns could be added
by creating new rows in the table. Id. at 1338.
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Here, “an intent-time identifier” is recited as a property of an event.
An intent-time format is “not specifically recited in the claims.” Reply Br. 6
n.2 (asserting that, “The underlying purpose for the time of the event can be
considered the ‘intent’ of the event.”). Storing the purpose of an event as an
“intent-time identifier” does not improve computer structures or functions.
Nor does claim 1 recite a functional relationship of the identifier to an event
or the actual time generated by “executing a function” for the identifier. It
only stores the reason why events are scheduled at certain times. Spec. ¶ 4.
It is true that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to
computer technology just as hardware improvements can, and sometimes the
improvements can be accomplished through either route.” Enfish, 822 F.3d
at 1335. However, the claims must recite improvements to computers. See
Customedia Tech., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2020). In this regard, our reviewing court has advised the following:
Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of
manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a
patentable improvement in computer technology. In those
cases, “the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in
computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas
that use computers as tools.”
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (quoting Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354).
It is known in calendaring technology for calendar events to have “a
body indicating calendar properties and calendar components that specify
events.” Spec. ¶ 1. Other properties can be included to describe an event
including a summary, description property, descriptive text, a subject line
and any number of additional properties included in a file format. Id. Of
course, a person can look up the time of sunrises, sporting events, and tides.
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17
Appellant’s Figures 3A and 3B are reproduced below to illustrate the
informational nature/property of the claimed “intent-time identifier.”

Appellant’s Figure 3A above illustrates an event 301 labelled “dinner”
302 in a user’s calendar 310 starting at time 311 of 8 pm. Spec. ¶ 28.

Appellant’s Figure 3B illustrates sporting event-based “intent time”
information presented in window 325 in response to a user hovering over the
event. It indicates the sporting event on which the event time is based. Id.
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The claimed method writes a start/end time as an “intent-time” that is
calculated “in response to the request to view the calendar” by “reading the
event” and “executing a function.” Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.). There is
no indication this method improves computers or technology. To obtain an
actual time (Appeal Br. 15), the method must access a source of the actual
time of a sunrise or sporting event in real time. Spec. ¶¶ 45–47. None of
these steps is claimed beyond “executing a function” in some manner. The
EventTime is the actual time of an event and is “an abstract type.” Id. ¶ 32.
Nor does claim 1 recite features that facilitate search and manipulation
of this information. See id. ¶ 25. Even so, “filtering content is an abstract
idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing human
behavior.” BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
At best, claim 1 falls into that category of claim that recites a “result”
rather than a means of achieving the result. E.g., Ericsson, 955 F.3d at 1328
(“[T]he claims here do not ‘ha[ve] the specificity required to transform a
claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it.’
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018).”).
Generating an actual time of an event using unspecified rules for an
intent-time does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
See Accenture Glob. Servs., 728 F.3d at 1345 (“The limitations of claim 1
are essentially a database of tasks, a means to allow a client to access those
tasks, and a set of rules that are applied to that task on a given event. . . .
[T]he complexity of the implementing software or the level of detail in the
specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept
into a patent-eligible system or method.”).
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19
By reciting steps of “reading the event” and “executing a function” to
“generate an actual time of the event” as a mental process, the steps cannot
integrate the judicial concept into a practical application. “It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see id. at 1291 (“As
a matter of law, narrowing or reformulating an abstract idea does not add
‘significantly more’ to it.”); see also RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to
another abstract idea (encoding and decoding) does not render the claim
non-abstract.”); Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“But, a claim for a new abstract
idea is still an abstract idea.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding claims that improved an abstract
idea but did not recite the supposed computer improvements were not patent
eligible); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24 (“additional
elements” are claim features beyond the identified judicial exception).
“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson[, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)].” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at
1375; Versata, 793 F.3d at 1335 (“Courts have examined claims that
required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-
ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s
mind.”). Essentially, Appellant asserts the method is a business solution to
provide event times in a more useful format rather than a technological
improvement to computers or databases. Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 5–6.
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Even if this method improves event time information for a user, it
does not improve computers or other technology. Nor is it apparent how this
method improves computing efficiency when it does not recite how actual
event times are calculated beyond “executing a function.” This step is not
tethered in the claim or even the Specification. It includes a wide range of
things such as searching Bing, Google, or other data sources for the actual
time of an event. See Spec. ¶¶ 46–49. The claim presumes some network
connectivity to obtain current event times, but this feature is not claimed.
“The mere fact that the inventor applied coined labels to conventional
structures does not make the underlying concept inventive.” Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“And the recited dynamic document provides little more than an
unspecified set of rules for displaying and organizing MRTs in a user
interface akin to the generic interfaces we have elsewhere explained impart
no inventive concept.”).
Dynamic presentation of data in “real time” customized for a user
based on information known about the user such as a location does not make
a claim patent eligible. See Intellectual Ventures I, 792 F.3d at 1370–71
(“Requiring the use of a ‘software’ ‘brain’ ‘tasked with tailoring information
and providing it to the user’ provides no additional limitation beyond
applying an abstract idea, restricted to the Internet, on a generic computer.”);
Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 792 F. App’x 780, 787 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (“[T]he concept of synchronous communications and automatic
formatting for different handheld devices without more is an abstract idea.”).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 does not include additional
elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
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Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Include an Inventive Concept?
We next consider whether claim 1 recites elements, individually, or as
an ordered combination, that provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18. The second step of the Alice test is satisfied when the claim
limitations involve more than performance of well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry. Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56 (explaining that the second step of the Alice analysis considers
whether a claim adds a specific limitation beyond a judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” activity in the field).
The Examiner determines that the claims recite a generic processor
suitably programmed to execute the steps of the abstract idea without any
unconventional functions or a non-generic or non-conventional arrangement
of known, conventional piece. See Ans. 7–14.
Appellant argues that the claims amount to “significantly more” than
the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 19–20. Appellant also argues that just because
the Specification describes known components of a computer, the claims are
not automatically unpatentable where a “general purpose computer” is used
to implement a computer program/invention as in Enfish. Reply Br. 8.
The method may be performed on a personal computer, tablet, reader,
mobile device, personal digital assistant, wearable computer, smartphone,
laptop computer, desktop computer, or smart television. Spec. ¶ 54. A
processing system 505 may be one or more processors that transform or
manipulate data according to software instructions and can be general
purpose central processing units and other logic devices. Id. ¶ 55. A wide
range of volatile and non-volatile storage media may be used. Id. ¶ 57.
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We agree with the Examiner that the Specification’s description of the
computer system used to perform the claimed method indicates the method
is implemented by conventional components that perform known functions
of executing computer program code, which, in this case, comprises steps of
the abstract idea recited in claim 1. See Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.), Apr. 19, 2018, Section III.A.1.
Individually, the limitations of claim 1 recite the abstract idea that is
identified above performed on a generic computer processor used as a tool to
implement the abstract idea. As an ordered combination, these limitations
represent no more than the sum of their parts. They perform steps at a high
level of generality to collect and analyze data and perform calculations as
computers are known to do. They recite these steps as an abstract idea.
We are not persuaded claim 1 “requires a new structure for storing
events that includes an intent-time identifier and the unconventional step of
generating an actual time of the event in response to receiving a request to
view a calendar.” Reply Br. 9; see Appeal Br. 17–20. First, as discussed in
Prong Two, an “intent-time identifier” is a property of an event not a data
structure. See Spec. ¶¶ 4, 26, 27. Claim 1 recites storing an event with an
intent-time identifier and “any parameters suitable for the appropriate intent-
time.” Parameters are properties of an event. Spec. ¶ 18. Claim 1 recites
steps of storing an event with an “intent-time identifier” and “parameters”
that merely represent properties of the event at a high level of generality.
Known, conventional calendar file formats store calendar events with
information about properties of the event including a start time, an end time,
a summary/description, and additional properties. Id. ¶ 1.
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Indeed, the Specification indicates that available intent-times include
a standard time with a start time, end time, and time zone format. Id. ¶ 21.
Such a format could store event information as descriptive text in the item
such as an event is associated with a sunset for that day and location. Id. ¶ 2.
Furthermore, “executing a function for the intent-time identifier read
from the storage to generate an actual time of the event” is recited so broadly
that under a broadest reasonable interpretation it encompasses conventional
calendars that generate an actual time of an event when a user “request[s] to
view the calendar” by selecting a calendar icon. The calendar application
presents the actual time generated by executing a function in response to a
user requesting to view the calendar. See id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 30–35.
Executing a function for the intent-time identifier read from storage
essentially obtains the actual time from a particular source of information.
For a fixed time, there is no offset from the trigger time set by the user. Id.
¶¶ 35, 42. Astronomical phenomena-based times obtain times for a sunrise
and sunset for a location and date in various ways not described in detail in
the Specification. See id. ¶¶ 38, 39, 50–52. Tide-based times may be
obtained from a naval station listed by name that is included with the event
information. Id. ¶¶ 40, 41, 51.
Even if the steps are groundbreaking, innovative, or brilliant, that is
not enough for eligibility. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013); accord SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d at 1163 (“No matter how much of an advance in the finance
field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas,
with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.
An advance of that nature is ineligible for patenting.”).
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Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 lacks an inventive concept
sufficient to transform the abstract idea into patent eligible subject matter.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–8, 10, and 12–20 as directed to a
judicial exception under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 1–4
Rejected over Hazen, Tendjoukian, and Carro
Appellant argues the claims as a group. Appeal Br. 21–26. We select
claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner finds that Hazen teaches a method of
storing calendar events as claimed including receiving input, determining an
appropriate intent-time and storing the event with an intent-time identifier
and parameters (e.g., “Let’s meet tomorrow in Waltham for breakfast at 7 at
McDonalds” and pick up kids after school at paragraphs 31 and 37). Final
Act. 10–12. The Examiner relies on Tendjoukian to teach, “after storing the
event, receiving a request to view a calendar comprising the event, reading
the event, . . . and providing the actual time of the event to a requester,” as
recited in claim 1. Id. at 12–14. The Examiner relies on Carro to teach
executing a function for intent-time identifier read from storage to generate
an actual time of the event. Id. at 15.
The Examiner determines it would have been obvious to combine
these teachings to render obvious claim 1 to automatically schedule events
according to events and conditions occurring in the vicinity of the mobile
user as taught by Carro while seamlessly communicating calendar events
among multiple users according to capabilities of different devices anywhere
and anytime as taught by Tendjoukian. Id. at 14, 16; Ans. 18–19.

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Appellant argues that Hazen and Tendjoukian create a calendar event
in standard format rather than with an intent-time identifier as claimed. See
Appeal Br. 21–23. Appellant also argues that none of the references teach or
suggest, alone or in combination, the following limitations:
“after storing the event, receiving a request to view a calendar
comprising the event; and in response to the request to view the
calendar: reading the event, including the intent-time identifier,
from storage; executing a function for the intent-time identifier
read from the storage to generate an actual time of the event.”

Id. at 21.
We agree with the Examiner that Hazen and Tendjoukian, alone and
in combination, teach and suggest the claimed intent-time identifier. In this
regard, Hazen teaches a calendaring method that stores calendar events with
information about the underlying event that is related to the date and time of
the calendared event. For example, Hazen teaches that
The one or more slots in the text may include at least one of a
date, time, date/time, subject, location, duration, and
availability query, to name a few. The date slot may include
any words, terms, and/or phrases that are associated with a date.
In one example, a date may be a particular day, month, or year
at which some event happened or will happen. The time slot
may include any words, terms, and/or phrases that are
associated with a time. In one example, a time may be the time
relative to the date at which some event happened or will
happen. The date/time slot may include words, terms, and/or
phrases that include both a date and a time. The subject slot
may include any words, terms, and/or phrases that indicate the
presence of an event. The location slot may include words,
terms, and/or phrases associated with a location (e.g., a place
where an event has happened or will happen).
Hazen ¶ 24. An intent grammar module 124 defines rules associated with
the time, date/time, location, subject, and duration of an event. Id. ¶ 27.
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Furthermore, slot grammar module 124 may define rules for tagging
types of slots and locating the tagged slots in the text of a calendar event.
For example, in the text, “pick up the kids from school tomorrow evening,”
a parsing algorithm may identify and tag “tomorrow evening” as a date/time
slot type and “school” as a location slot type. Id. ¶ 31. In another example,
“Let’s meet tomorrow in Waltham for breakfast at 7 at McDonalds” an event
may be classified in a single location slot at Waltham and McDonalds at a
single date/time slot of tomorrow and 7. Id. ¶ 37; see also id. ¶ 36; Ans. 15.
Hazen thus generates and stores calendar events with intent-identifier
information about properties of the event to include the underlying event on
which the date and time of the event are based. The teachings correspond to
the claimed “intent-identifier” recited in claim 1. See Spec. ¶¶ 4, 24, 26.
Tendjoukian also discloses an intent-identifier as ItemRef that a server
uses to reference a calendar item that it sends to a client and also to maintain
a sequence of each data type of an item. Tendjoukian ¶ 72; Ans. 16–17. An
ItemRef for a calendar event is used to execute a function that determines
which calendar events to send to a client with the meeting title, start, and end
times for the event. Id. ¶¶ 121, 180. The ItemRef identifies a property of a
calendar event and is used to generate an actual time of an event. Id.
Hazen and Tendjoukian also generate an actual time for an event in
response to a user request to view a calendar as claimed. In response to a
user invoking visual indicator 210 for an event, event 240 is displayed with
the actual time. See Hazen ¶¶ 40, 41, Fig. 2. Tendjoukian teaches that once
calendar events are created and stored, they can be presented to a user in
response to a request to view a calendar with the actual time. Tendjoukian
¶¶ 30, 34, 56, 121, 180.
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Carro teaches to execute a function for an intent-time identifier read
from storage to generate an actual time of an event as claimed. Carro ¶¶ 35–
41; Ans. 17. Although Carro reschedules events automatically when a user
changes locations, Carro executes a function to compute a real time for an
event (e.g., sunset) in response to a request to create a calendar item. Id.
The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious in view of
the teachings of Hazen, Tendjoukian, and Carro to execute a function for an
intent-time identifier read from storage to generate an actual time of an event
as claimed where all three references teach different intent-time identifiers
as properties of an underlying calendar event time and execute a function for
the intent-time identifier to generate the actual time of an event. Hazen and
Tendjoukian do so in response to a user’s request to view a calendar item as
discussed above. Carro does so in response to a user changing locations and
when a user requests to view a calendar. See Carro ¶¶ 27–49, Figs. 2–6.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and claims 2–4, which fall
therewith.
Claims 5 and 6
Rejected over Hazen, Tendjoukian, Carro, and Zhu
Appellant does not present separate argument for the rejection of
claims 5 and 6, which depend from claim 1. See Appeal Br. 21–26. Thus,
we sustain the rejection of claims 5 and 6. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claims 7, 8, and 12–19
Rejected over Shen, Tendjoukian, Carro, and Hazen
The Examiner relies on Tendjoukian, Carro, and Hazen to teach the
features recited in independent claims 7 and 15 that correspond to features in
claim 1 and Shen to teach limitations regarding first and second sources that
request to view a calendar item. See Final Act. 22–29, 34–42.
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Appellant argues that Shen, Hazen, Tendjoukian, and Carro fail to
teach or suggest “in response to the request to view the calendar: read the
event, including the intent-time identifier, from storage; execute a function
for the intent-time identifier to generate an actual time of the event,” as
recited in claims 7 and 15. Appeal Br. 27–28. This argument is not
persuasive for the reasons discussed above for claim 1 and the teachings of
Hazen, Tendjoukian, and Carro regarding a similar limitation in claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 7 and 15 and claims 8,
12–14, and 16–19, which depend respectively therefore, and are not argued
separately by Appellant. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 10,
12–20
101 Eligibility 1–8, 10,
12–20

1–4 103 Hazen,
Tendjoukian,
Carro
1–4
5, 6 103 Hazen,
Tendjoukian,
Carro, Zhu
5, 6
7, 8, 12–19 103 Shen,
Tendjoukian,
Carro, Hazen
7, 8, 12–19
Overall
Outcome
1–8, 10,
12–20

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED