Micron Technology, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 21, 20202019005904 (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/583,500 05/01/2017 William M. Hiatt 010829-8744.US03 6639 46844 7590 05/21/2020 PERKINS COIE LLP - Micron PATENT-SEA PO BOX 1247 SEATTLE, WA 98111-1247 EXAMINER BELL, LAUREN R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2816 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/21/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patentprocurement@perkinscoie.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte WILLIAM M. HIATT and KYLE K. KIRBY ________________ Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 Technology Center 2800 ________________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Micron Technology, Inc. is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 2 INVENTION The claimed invention relates to microelectronic devices. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below: 1. A packaged microelectronic device comprising: a die having a first side and a second side opposite to the first side, the die further having an integrated circuit positioned between the first and second sides; a bond-pad positioned on the first side of the die and electrically coupled to the integrated circuit; a passage extending completely through the die and extending through the bond-pad; an insulative layer deposited in the passage; a first conductive material deposited in a first portion of the passage adjacent to the first side of the die to form a conductive plug electrically connected to the bond-pad, wherein the first conductive material directly contacts the insulative layer between the first side of the die and the second side of the die; and a second conductive material deposited in a second portion of the passage in contact with the conductive plug to at least generally fill the passage from the conductive plug to the second side of the die, wherein the second conductive material directly contacts the insulative layer between the first side of the die and the second side of the die. Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.). Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 3 REJECTIONS Claims 1–3, 6, and 9–182 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Swan et al. (US 2003/0210534 A1; published Nov. 13, 2003) (“Swan”) and Hayasaka et al. (US 6,809,421 B1; issued Oct. 26, 2004) (“Hayasaka”). Final Act. 3–11. Claims 4, 7, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Swan, Hayasaka, and Jimarez et al. (US 2002/0092676 A1; published Jul. 18, 2002) (“Jimarez”). Final Act. 11. Claims 5, 8, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Swan, Hayasaka, and Bock et al. (US 2004/0087441 A1; published May 6, 2004) (“Bock”). Final Act. 11–12. Claims 1–20 stand rejected on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–20 of Hiatt et al. (US 9,653,420 B2; issued May 16, 2017) (“Hiatt I”).3 Final Act. 13. Claims 1–20 stand rejected on the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–20 of Hiatt et al. (US 8,084,866 B2; issued Dec. 27, 2011) (“Hiatt II”), in view of Swan and Hayasaka.4 Final Act. 13–18. 2 The Final Action indicates that a claim “21” is rejected over Swan and Hayasaka. Final Act. 3. There is no claim 21 pending on appeal (see Claims App.). We treat the Examiner’s inclusion of claim 21 as a harmless error. 3 We pro forma affirm the double patenting rejection in view of Hiatt I, which was not contested by Appellant (see Appeal Br. 9–20; Reply Br. 2–4). 4 We pro forma affirm the double patenting rejection in view of Hiatt II, Swan, and Hayasaka, which was not contested by Appellant (see Appeal Br. 9–20; Reply Br. 2–4). Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 4 ANALYSIS We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). Appellant’s Figures 5A and 5B, which provide inverted illustrations (Spec. ¶¶ 29, 33) of the subject matter of claim 1, are reproduced below with annotations to indicate claimed structural components: Figure 5A, above, shows a schematic cross-sectional view of a conductive interconnect being formed in a microelectronic device. Spec. ¶ 15. Figure 5B, above, is another schematic cross-sectional view of a conductive interconnect being formed in a microelectronic device. Spec. ¶ 15. Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 5 The Examiner finds that Swan teaches all of the limitations of claim 1, except a first conductive material “deposited in a first portion of the passage . . . to form a conductive plug . . . wherein the first conductive material directly contacts the insulative layer between the first side of the die and the second side of the die.” Final Act. 3–4; see Claim 1. Figure 5 of Swan, which the Examiner, inter alia, cites for support (Final Act. 3), is reproduced below, with annotations to indicate the Examiner’s findings: Figure 5, above, illustrates an integrated circuit die. Swan ¶¶ 2, 7–10. The Examiner finds that Hayasaka teaches the remaining limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 4. Figure 17B of Hayasaka, which the Examiner, inter alia, cites for support (Final Act. 4), is reproduced below, with annotations to indicate the Examiner’s findings: Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 6 Figure 17B, above, illustrates a sectional view of an embodiment for forming a chip for a multichip semiconductor device. Hayasaka 8:58–61. The Examiner further concludes that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s invention would have found it obvious to modify the device of Swan with the teachings of Hayasaka, “in order to bring the first conductive material into contact with the sidewalls of the passage and achieve a stronger bond of the first conductive material.” Final Act. 4 (citing Hayasaka 18:12–15). Appellant argues that the Examiner has failed to articulate reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have combined the teachings of Swan and Hayasaka. Appeal Br. 13–17; Reply Br. 2–4. In particular, Appellant argues that “there is no suggestion in Swan or elsewhere that a stronger bond between the contact 70 and the passage is needed.” Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 3. Namely, Appellant argues, “unlike the bump 8 of Hayasaka, the contact 70 of Swan is already firmly fixed to the die 10 by direct contact with the contact pad 16 and the upper end of the portion 64 of the conductive member” (Appeal Br. 14–15), and the modification would not result in “any appreciable increase in adhesion Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 7 (i.e., performance).” Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted); see also Reply Br. 2. Furthermore, Appellant contends, the modification would require an additional masking step, which would increase the manufacturing cost and complexity of the process of Swan. Appeal Br. 14, 16; Reply Br. 3–4. Appellant contends that the lack of rational reasoning to make the combination results in a conclusion that the Examiner has applied impermissible hindsight. Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 2. Appellant additionally argues that the modification would render the device of Swan unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, because removing the tantalum nitride layer 65 would allow migration of the conductive material of the contact 70. Appeal Br. 17–18. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007), quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Although the “teaching, suggestion, motivation” (TSM) test, under which a claim is obvious only if “‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art,” (KSR, 550 U.S. at 407) provides one rationale to determine obviousness, there are a number of other valid rationales for concluding that a claim would have been obvious. Id. at 418. Applying the guidance above, we find unavailing Appellant’s argument that neither Swan nor any of the other applied references indicates that improved adhesion is desirable or necessary (Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 3). In particular, Swan itself need not provide the motivation to combine. See Ans. 5. “The motivation [to combine references] need not be found in Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 8 the references sought to be combined, but may be found in any number of sources, including common knowledge, the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem itself.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner that Hasayaka provides an express motivation to combine, namely “the bump [i.e., first conductive material which forms a conductive plug] can be fixed more firmly than without the recess.” Hayasaka 18:14–15; see Final Act. 4. Here, the Examiner concludes that modifying the first conductive material of Swan to be deposited in a first portion of the passage to form a conductive plug, wherein the first conductive material directly contacts the insulative layer between the first and second sides of the die, results in: a decreased likelihood of disconnection between the first and second conductive materials. One would also readily recognize that if the first and second conductive materials become disconnected or loose, then the device fails because there is no longer an electrical connection interface. It follows that the stronger bond therefore results in a reduced rate of electrical failure, an extended life of the device, and improved performance. Ans. 3–4 (emphases added). Additionally, the Examiner concludes, and we agree, that: the stronger bond of the first conductive material would be of particular importance and relevance in consideration of lateral stresses on the device when packaged or stacked with other chips (as shown in Fig. 8 of Swan). It would be easily understood that if a lateral stress is applied to a recessed first conductive material (8) of Hayasaka, the first conductive material would be prohibited from moving laterally relative to the second conductive material (15) due to the presence of and contact with the sidewalls of the through hole. This is in contrast to the first conductive material (70) of Swan, which Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 9 would be more subject to lateral movement relative to the second conductive material (56 and 64) because there is no sidewall contact to prohibit such movement. In other words, it is easily envisaged that a horizontal force on the first conductive material (70) of Swan would more likely break it away from the second conductive material (64 and 56) than a similar horizontal force on a recessed first conductive material (the structure of 8 of Hayasaka). This would be easily envisaged regardless of the presence of contact pad (16) in Swan. Ans. 6 (emphases added). We disagree with Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s rationale amounts to hindsight assertions. Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 2. We are cognizant that our reviewing courts have not established a bright-line test for hindsight. In KSR, the Supreme Court guides that “[a] factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of argument reliant upon ex post reasoning.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court qualified the issue of hindsight by stating, “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. In reviewing the record here, we find Appellant has not identified any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Moreover, Appellant has not provided persuasive evidence that combining the respective teachings of the references would have been Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 10 “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art,” or that such a combination would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Nor has the Appellant provided any objective evidence of secondary considerations, which our reviewing court guides “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Examiner has instead proffered an articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings, particularly in the case of stacked dies and addressing problems with lateral forces and shear stresses present in those instances. Ans. 6. Appellant presents no persuasive arguments rebutting the Examiner’s findings. Reply Br. 2. We further agree with the Examiner that any alleged increase in manufacturing costs or complexity resulting from the combination would amount to a skilled artisan valuing enhanced reliability and recognizing that additional steps of masking, etching, etc. (see Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 3), are well-known and common manufacturing techniques for microelectronic dies. Ans. 7. Appellant’s argument that combining the teachings of Hayasaka with Swan would render Swan unsatisfactory for its intended purpose (Appeal Br. 17–18), is unavailing because: [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the other Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 11 without the exercise of independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, notably, the Examiner finds that Swan teaches that the tantalum nitride layer 56 acts as a barrier layer for preventing migration of copper, specifically, from the conductive member 60 into the silicon substrate 12. Ans. 8 (quoting Swan ¶ 24). Because Swan does not similarly teach the conductive member 70 as being copper (see, generally, Swan), then, Swan does not suggest that removing the barrier layer 56 would render the device incapable of performing as intended. Ans. 8. Appellant does not provide arguments to rebut the Examiner’s findings, and we are not persuaded that the combination of Swan and Hayasaka would render Swan unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. Based on the foregoing and by a preponderance of the evidence, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1. Arguments presented for independent claims 6, 12, and 17 refer to those presented for claim 1. Appeal Br. 18–19. Appellant indicates that claims 6, 12, and 17 contain “additional features,” but the merits of those features are not substantively argued. Id. Arguments presented for claims 4, 7, and 19 refer to those presented for claims 1, 6, and 17. Id. at 19–20. Arguments presented for claims 5, 8, and 20 refer to those presented for claims 1, 6, and 17. Id. at 20. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1–20. CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–20 as being obvious under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited combinations of references. Appeal 2019-005904 Application 15/583,500 12 We pro forma sustain the Examiner’s provisional OTDP rejection of claims 1–20. DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 6, 9–18 103(a) Swan, Hayasaka 1–3, 6, 9–18 4, 7, 19 103(a) Swan, Hayasaka, Jimarez 4, 7, 19 5, 8, 20 103(a) Swan, Hayasaka, Bock 5, 8, 20 1–20 Non-statutory (OTDP) (Hiatt I) 1–20 1–20 Non-statutory (OTDP) (Hiatt II, Swan, Hayasaka) 1–20 Overall Outcome 1–20 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation