MICRO FOCUS LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 21, 2022

2020005396 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/303,254 10/11/2016 Ola Galkin 90283148 6607 146568 7590 01/21/2022 MICRO FOCUS LLC 500 Westover Drive #12603 Sanford, NC 27330 EXAMINER HU, XIAOQIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2168 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/21/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): software.ip.mail@microfocus.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte OLA GALKIN, GUY OFFER, HAIM SHUVALI, AND AMICHAI NITSAN Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN A. EVANS, JUSTIN BUSCH, and GARTH D. BAER, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-20. Appeal Br. 8, 15, 16. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM AND ENTER A NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.2 1 We use the term Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MICRO FOCUS LLC, “a wholly-owned affiliate of Micro Focus International Plc.” Appeal Br. 3. 2 Throughout this Decision, we refer to the Appeal Brief and Claims Appendix filed March 5, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”, “Claims App.”); the Reply Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims relate to quantifying and evaluating user experience for an application. Spec. ¶ 7. CLAIMS Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for evaluating user experience for an application, comprising: collecting, for each of a plurality of user sessions, a list of user event data items experienced from a perspective of a user device during that user session, wherein each collected list of user event data items includes response data items each indicative of a response time from a user device perspective; for each user session, discerning a session score based on an analysis of that user session’s list of user event data items and value data including a specified threshold response time and a weighting factor, each session score being associated with one of a plurality of users and being derived as a result of a subsequent calculation as a function of an intermediate score and the response data items, wherein the intermediate score is first derived as a result of a preliminary calculation; for each of a plurality of successive time periods: discerning, for each of the plurality of users, a user score as a function of session scores associated with that user for user sessions occurring during that time period; and discerning a time period score as a function of the user scores discerned for that time period; and reporting the time period score discerned for a selected one of the successive time periods. Claims App. 18. Brief filed July 15, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); the Final Office Action mailed October 17, 2019 (“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 15, 2020 (“Ans.”); and the Specification filed October 11, 2016, as amended November 20, 2018 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 3 REFERENCES Name3 Reference Date Ivanyi US 2010/0269044 A1 Oct. 21, 2010 Jenkins US 2012/0072570 A1 Mar. 22, 2012 Cohen US 2013/0036122 A1 Feb. 7, 2013 Vlachogiannis US 8,990,637 B1 Mar. 24, 2015 IH Monrad Aas, Guidelines for rating Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF), 10 Annals of General Psychiatry 2, 1-11 (2011) REJECTIONS AT ISSUE 1. Claims 1, 2, 4-7, 11, 14, 16, 17, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness based on Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, and Cohen. Final Act. 5-25. 2. Claims 3, 8, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness over as obvious over Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, Cohen, and IH Monrad Aas. Id. at 25-29. 3. Claims 9, 10, 15, 18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness over Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, Cohen, and Jenkins. Id. at 29-35. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1-20 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We are not persuaded of error. We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific arguments and findings primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellant’s arguments as they are presented in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief. 3 All citations herein to the references are by reference to the first named inventor/author only. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 4 CLAIMS 1-20: OBVIOUSNESS BASED AT LEAST ON IVANYI, VLACHOGIANNIS, AND COHEN Appellant argues the rejection of claims 1-15, 18, and 20 based on Claim 1. Appeal Br. 8-12; Reply Br. 2-8. Specifically, after presenting arguments regarding the alleged deficiencies in the rejection of Claim 1, Appellant asserts that “[i]ndependent claims 7 and 11 recite similar features to the features of independent claim 1 discussed above, and therefore Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis and Cohen also fail to render these claims prima facie obvious.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant therefore asserts that “[i]t is respectfully maintained that the rejections of independent claims 1, 7 and 11 and the claims that depend therefrom be reversed.” Appellant also asserts that “claims 3, 8 and 12-13 are not rendered obvious by Ivanyi in view of Vlachogiannis, Cohen, and further in view of IH Monrad Aas at least for the reasons discussed above with respect to independent claims 1, 7 and 11” (id. at 13), and that “claims 9-10, 15, 18, and 20 are not rendered obvious by Ivanyi in view of Vlachogiannis, Cohen, and further in view of Jenkins at least for the reasons discussed above with respect to independent claims 1, 7 and 11” (id. at 14). Therefore, we select independent Claim 1 as representative of claims 2-15, 18, and 20, which Appellant does not argue separately with particularity. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant, however, presents separate arguments for dependent Claim 16, and argues that Claims 17 and 19 recite similar features and should be reversed for similar reasons. Appeal Br. 12-14. Accordingly, we address those claims separately below. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 5 Claims 1-15, 18, and 20 In rejecting Claim 1, the Examiner finds Ivanyi’s method of calculating a Quality of Experience (QoE) score for each user activity teaches or suggests “for each user session, discerning a session score based on an analysis of that user session’s list of user event data items and value data including a specified threshold response time, and a weighting factor . . . each session score being associated with one of a plurality of users.” Final Act. 6-7 (citing Ivanyi ¶¶ 58, 60, 61, 63, 65, 101); see id. at 3-4; Ans. 3-7 (additionally citing Ivanyi ¶¶ 8, 42, 51, 100). Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because Ivanyi’s description of “determining a QoE experience score for a particular activity is not the same as discerning a session score that is based an analysis of a list of user event data items for a particular session and for a particular user associated with the session.” Reply Br. 7; see Appeal Br. 10. Appellant asserts that “[t]he alleged ‘session score’ (i.e., the QoE score for the network) of Ivanyi is not associated with one user or based on an analysis of that one user’s session event data items simply because each particular network action or activity can be associated with one user.” Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant, “[t]he term ‘user’ activity in Ivanyi does not mean the activity is associated with one particular user, or any particular session,” but instead “describ[es] that the activity is performed by any user, such as a user (which may be any user) performing web browsing, a user (which may be any user) downloading a file, a user (which may be any user) sending an email.” Reply Br. 7. Appellant explains that the “examples of individual user activity described in Ivanyi (e.g., uploading a file, receiving an email) are not the same as a user session,” and “[t]he behavior profiles [in Ivanyi] are Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 6 created for different patterns of different classes of users, [not for one user].” Id. at 8. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Rather, we agree with the Examiner that the cited descriptions of Ivanyi teach or at least suggest “for each user session, discerning a session score . . . , each session score being associated with one of a plurality of users.” For example, as the Examiner finds, Ivanyi describes “a method for establishing a quality of experience (QoE) score for a user activity from a plurality of user activities performed by a user over an IP network.” Ans. 5 (citing Ivanyi ¶ 42). This shows that Ivanyi’s QoE score may be established for one user activity performed by one user. The Examiner’s findings further show that Ivanyi’s user activity may be a secure session. Final Act. 6-7 (citing Ivanyi ¶ 58 (“activities that a user may engage in include . . . exercising secure sessions”)); see Ivanyi ¶ 43 (“The user activity is selected from the group consisting of web browsing, sending email, . . . and secure session.”). Consistent with the Examiner’s findings, we determine that the above descriptions of Ivanyi, when considered together, teach or at least suggest discerning a session score for each user session. And, even if Ivanyi were only to describe determining QoE scores across multiple users, discerning a session score for one user would have been obvious because one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Ivanyi’s system readily capable of determining a QoE score for just a single user performing a single secure session. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” whose “recourse to common sense” should not be denied.). Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 7 Appellant next argues that “Ivanyi, in the cited portions or in its entirety, does not appear to teach or suggest 3) discerning a session score based on value data that includes a specified threshold response time.” Appeal Br. 10; Reply Br. 9-10. In particular, Appellant asserts that “[t]he cited portions of Ivanyi do not teach or suggest a threshold, where a measured response time can be compared to the threshold to determine whether it is over or under the threshold,” but “instead only appear to describe predicting a (numerical) duration of an activity, and then utilizing the numerical value to determine a QoE measurement.” Reply Br. 10. We disagree with Appellant. Rather, we agree with the Examiner that Ivanyi’s description of calculating a QoE score based on base metrics, which include a predicted activity duration, teaches or suggests “discerning a session score based on . . . a specified threshold response time.” See, e.g., Ans. 8-9 (citing Ivanyi ¶¶ 63, 65). Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, Ivanyi’s predicted activity duration teaches or suggests a specified threshold response time because it is a specified amount of time, and Ivanyi tracks values above or below this measurement as part of its QoE determination. For example, Ivanyi describes that “[t]racking changes in the estimated amount of time for an activity (predicted activity duration) can give an additional measurement for the quality of user experience.” Ivanyi ¶ 67. For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative Claim 1 as well as independent Claims 7 and 11 and dependent Claims 2-15, 18, and 20 for obviousness based at least on Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, and Cohen. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 8 Claims 16, 17, and 19 Claim 16 depends directly from Claim 1 and further recites “collecting an application environment indicator for providing a comparison between two or more selected application environments.” Claims App. 25. According to Appellant, dependent Claims 17 and 19 recite similar features. See Appeal Br. 13-14. The Examiner finds Vlachogiannis’s description of “collect[ing] application launch report events and application abnormal termination report events for applications running in different environments and provid[ing] a comparison report of quality scores at different granularity level or bases” teaches or suggests the above limitation. Final Act. 24 (citing Vlachogiannis 2:38-4:45); Ans. 9-10 (additionally citing Spec. ¶ 27). The Examiner explains that Vlachogiannis’s “application launch report events and application abnormal termination report events correspond to ‘an application environment indicator.’” Final Act. 24. Appellant argues “Vlachogiannis does not teach or suggest an application environment indicator that indicates two or more different user devices, two or more different user locations, two or more different operating systems, and two or more different versions of the application.” Reply Br. 11; see Appeal Br. 13. Rather, according to Appellant: The application launch event reports, the abnormal termination reports, the quality score for each individual application release, and the comparison report of the quality scores between the different application releases of Vlachogiannis are not directed to indicating different environments, and do not constitute application environment indicators that are collected to provide a comparison between two or more selected application environments. Reply Br. 11. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 9 We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Rather, we agree with the Examiner that the cited descriptions of Vlachogiannis teach or suggest “collecting an application environment indicator for providing a comparison between two or more selected application environments” as recited. As the Examiner points out, Appellant’s Specification describes that “application environment indicators. . . . can include . . . two or more different versions of the application.” Ans. 9-10 (citing Spec. ¶ 27). Accordingly, Vlachogiannis teaches or suggests “collecting an application environment indicator” and, in particular, “two or more different versions of the application” because it describes collecting application launch report events and application abnormal termination report events for applications running in different application releases. See Ans. 10 (citing Vlachogiannis 2:37-3:45); Final Act. 24. Vlachogiannis also teaches or suggests that this data is collected “for providing a comparison between two or more selected application environments” because it describes computing quality scores for each of a plurality of different application releases based on data specific to each respective application release and comparing those scores across different application releases. Vlachogiannis 3:27-60. For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of Claims 16, 17, and 19 for obviousness based on Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, and Cohen. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION OF UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 We enter a new ground of rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). In particular, we newly reject claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 being directed to an ineligible judicial exception without significantly more. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 10 If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility, the Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101-i.e., evaluating whether the claim is directed to a judicially recognized exception. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). We also follow the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s revised guidance for applying the Alice framework when evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See MPEP §§ 2106.04, 2106.05 (incorporating USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) and USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (herein, we refer to these eligibility guidance publications and the sections of the MPEP incorporating this guidance as the “Guidance”). As part of our inquiry, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.”). The Guidance breaks this “directed to” inquiry (“Step 2A”) into two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea) (“Prong 1”), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application (“Prong 2”). MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). If we determine claims are directed to the judicial exception, we then examine “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 11 combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claims for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73); see MPEP § 2106.05(d) (directing us to consider whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation [or combination of limitations] other than what is well- understood, routine and conventional in the field” or “is no more than well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, which is recited at a high level of generality” (“Step 2B”)). Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 (Recite an Abstract Idea) Independent Claim 1 recites a method that collects user event data, discerns various scores based on the collected user event data, and reports certain discerned scores. Claims App’x 18. Independent Claim 7 recites a memory resource storing instructions that when executed cause a processing resource to implement a system for evaluating user experience, the instructions comprising modules for performing substantively the same method recited in Claim 1. Id. at 20-21. Independent Claim 11 recites a system for evaluating user efficiency for an application, the system comprising a collection engine and a scoring engine configured to perform steps similar to the method recited in Claim 1. Id. at 23. This characterization of the claims is consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed embodiments of the invention in the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 12 ¶¶ 7 (“Various embodiments described below can be used to quantify and evaluate user experience of an application. For each user session of a selected application, user event data items are collected.”), 8 (“Based on an analysis of the collected user event data items, a session score is calculated for each user session. . . . User scores are derived for each user. For a given time period, each user score is derived based upon a user’s associated session scores for sessions occurring within that time period. An experience score is derived based on a selected number of time period scores. The scores can be reported for use in objectively measuring user experience for the application.”). In our analysis, we refer to representative Claim 1, but the same analysis applies to independent Claims 7 and 11, which recite similar limitations. The steps of Claim 1 recite an abstract idea because representative Claim 1 recites mental processes similar to concepts the Federal Circuit previously identified as abstract. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III). For example, in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., the Federal Circuit concluded that claims drawn to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” were patent ineligible, and that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, a[re] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016).4 To the extent the Claims perform the recited steps on a 4 See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he realm of abstract ideas” includes “collecting information,” “analyzing information,” and “presenting the results.”); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “the collection, storage, and recognition Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 13 computer, this does not change our understanding of what the Claims recite. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson”); see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C) (“Claims can recite a mental process even if they are claimed as being performed on a computer.”). Accordingly, consistent with the Guidance, all pending claims recite an abstract idea because collecting data, analyzing the data, and providing certain results of the collection and analysis is a process that could be performed mentally or using pencil and paper. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III). In particular, Claim 1’s step of “collecting, for each of a plurality of user sessions, a list of user event data items experienced from a perspective of a user device during that user session, wherein each collected list of user event data items includes response data items each indicative of a response time from a user device perspective” merely “collects information” regarding user sessions from a user device, and Claim 1’s steps of “discerning a session score,” “discerning . . . a user score,” and “discerning a time period score” merely “analyz[es] the collected information.” See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d. at 1353-54. Some of the dependent claims recite of data” to be abstract); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[S]electing certain information, analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of the analysis” is abstract.); Content Extraction & Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that claims drawn to collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected set, and storing the recognized data were patent ineligible, noting that “humans have always performed these functions”). Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 14 additional steps that analyze the collected data, as discussed above. See id. Claim 1’s step of “reporting the time period score discerned for a selected one of the successive time periods” is similar to “displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” See id. at 1354. As discussed above, independent Claims 7 and 11 recite similar steps as Claim 1 and, therefore, also recite mental processes. Each of the dependent claims incorporate the limitations of one of Claims 1, 7, and 11, from which they depend and, therefore, recite these same abstract mental processes. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 (Integrate Into a Practical Application) Because Claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next determine whether the claims integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify “whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements in combination with the limitations that recited an abstract idea to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II) (emphasis added); see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). We determine the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, representative Claim 1 does not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) use a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 15 different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). As noted above, all the functional limitations are part of the abstract idea. The additional limitations beyond the abstract idea-i.e., (1) the “user device” of Claims 1, 7, and 11; (2) the “memory resource storing instructions,” “processing resource,” “collection module,” “scoring module,” and “reporting module” of Claim 7; (3) the “collection engine” and “scoring engine” of Claim 11; and (4) the “reporting engine” of Claim 13-are claimed and disclosed at a high level of generality as merely generic computer hardware for performing the recited functional limitations, which we identified above as being directed to an abstract idea. The recited processing devices are generic computer components performing generic computer functions-collecting, analyzing, and reporting data-that do not include a sufficiently particular algorithm for performing these functions. See FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1096 (“the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter”); MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (explaining that “[m]erely reciting the words ‘apply it’ (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea” by itself is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application); Spec. ¶¶ 9, 10, 40 (explaining that the invention can be carried out using generic hardware and software), Figs. 1-3. Dependent claims 2-6, 8-10, and 12-20 (1) add steps further detailing the data collected (claims 5, 15-17, 19), (2) add steps further detailing how Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 16 the collected data is discerned or analyzed (claims 2-6, 8-10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20), or (3) add insignificant extra-solution activity, such as details regarding information being reported (claim 13). Accordingly, the dependent limitations merely further refine the abstract idea or add insignificant extra-solution activity. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“we have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas”); SAP, 898 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that dependent claims reciting features that further narrow the abstract idea “add nothing outside the abstract realm”); see also BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“a claim is not patent eligible merely because it applies an abstract idea in a narrow way”). Thus, these dependent claims merely narrow the abstract idea by adding additional steps of using the collected information, but the additional limitations still are part of the abstract idea, which is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because, even to the extent that it narrows the abstract idea, it does not add any additional limitations beyond the abstract idea itself. See SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that dependent claims reciting features that further narrow the abstract idea “add nothing outside the abstract realm”); see also FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1097 (“The mere combination of data sources, however, does not make the claims patent eligible.”). As discussed above, the final reporting step is part of the abstract idea or, at most, it is merely insignificant post-solution activity that outputs the result of performing the abstract idea, which is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.05(g); see Apple, Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 17 Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming determination that merely printing or downloading generated menus are insufficient limitations to render eligible the otherwise ineligible process directed to generating menus); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components such as an “interface,” “network,” and “database” fail to satisfy the inventive concept requirement). Appellant’s claims are directed to the mental process of collecting data about user sessions, using the data to discern user session scores, user scores, and time period scores, and reporting the time period scores. Appellant’s invention therefore is directed to a data and business problem and an alleged data mining and business improvement. Appellant’s claims, read in light of the Specification, do not embody an improvement to a computer or other technology. Choosing which data to obtain and use for the general goal of discerning time period scores for user sessions does not recite any particular technological or computer improvement. Nor do Appellant’s claims embody a particular machine used to perform the method or transform an article to a different state or thing. Instead, the claimed subject matter identifies and analyzes information and outputs results. As noted above, collecting information, analyzing it, and outputting results of the analysis is an ineligible abstract concept. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d 1350. As such, Appellant’s claims, at most, improve the abstract idea itself. For at least these reasons, claims 1-20 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application and, accordingly, are directed to an abstract idea. Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 18 Guidance Step 2B (Inventive Concept/Significantly More) Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claims include an inventive concept. See MPEP § 2106.05(II). As stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework already are considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.05(II). Thus, at this point of the analysis, we determine whether the claims (1) add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. MPEP § 2106.05(I)(A). An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 56 (Jan. 7, 2019); Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’” (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218-19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73); see BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 19 ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” (emphasis added)). On the other hand, “[i]f a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290-91 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “[I]t is irrelevant whether [the claimed abstract idea] may have been non-routine or unconventional as a factual matter . . . narrowing or reformulating an abstract idea does not add ‘significantly more’ to it.” BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291. As explained above, the additional elements recited in the claims are the generic computing elements-a user device, memory resource storing instructions, processing resource, collection module, scoring module, reporting module, collection engine, scoring engine, and reporting engine. As supported by the lack of any detail regarding these components in Appellant’s Specification, the generic computer devices were well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Spec. ¶¶ 9, 10, 40, Figs. 1-3; see also MPEP § 2106.07(a)(III)(A) (“A specification demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of additional elements when it describes the additional elements as well-understood or routine or conventional (or an equivalent term), as a commercially available product, or in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. 112(a).”). Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 20 The evidence of record supports a finding that the computer elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional. For these reasons, we enter a new ground of rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed New Grounds 1, 2, 4-7, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19 103 Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, Cohen 1, 2, 4-7, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19 3, 8, 12, 13 103 Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, Cohen, IH Monrad Aas 3, 8, 12, 13 9, 10, 15, 18, 20 103 Ivanyi, Vlachogiannis, Cohen, Jenkins 9, 10, 15, 18, 20 1−20 101 Eligibility 1-20 Overall Outcome 1-20 1-20 RESPONSE This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be Appeal 2020-005396 Application 15/303,254 21 remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, Appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)