Mickie B.,1 Complainant,v.Sonny Perdue, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Forest Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 13, 20192019000356 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 13, 2019) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Mickie B.,1 Complainant, v. Sonny Perdue, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Forest Service), Agency. Appeal No. 2019000356 Hearing No. 551-2016-00161X Agency Nos. FS-2016-00090 and FS-2016-00553 DECISION On August 24, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 24, 2018, final order concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a GS-12 Architect at the Engineering Department for the Agency’s Northern Region in Missoula, Montana. On December 10, 2015, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint (Agency No. FS-2016-00090). On June 9, 2016, Complainant filed a second EEO complaint (Agency No. FS-2016-00553). In sum, the two complaints alleged that the Agency’s actions subjected her to unlawful discrimination on bases of sex (female), age (59), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity regarding three employment decisions: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2 2019000356 1. when the Agency failed to select failed Complainant for a temporary detail as a program manager on October 5, 2015 (Agency No. FS-2016-00090); 2. when the Agency issued Complainant a “superior” rating instead of an "outstanding” rating on October 23, 2015 (Agency No. FS-2016-00090); and 3. when the Agency failed to select Complainant for a GS-14 deputy director position on March 18, 2016 (Agency No. FS-2016-00553). The Agency investigation Agency No. FS-2016-00090 concluded on May 20, 2016. The Agency investigation Agency No. FS-2016-00553 concluded October 3, 2016. After both investigations, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of its report of investigation and a notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). For Agency No. FS-2016- 00090, Complainant timely requested a hearing on June 20, 2016. For Agency No. FS-2016- 00553, Complainant timely requested a hearing on October 17, 2016. On December 20, 2016, the assigned AJ consolidated both cases. On July 7, 2017, the Agency moved for a decision without a hearing. On July 18, 2017, Complainant responded opposing the Agency motion. On July 20, 2018, the AJ issued his decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding of no discrimination. The instant appeal followed. On appeal, Complainant contends the Agency improperly denied her alternative dispute resolution. Furthermore, Complainant contests the AJ’s grant of the Agency’s motion for decision without a hearing. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Ch. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an AJ’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Ch.9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). 3 2019000356 The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. Here, Complainant has failed to specifically point to particular evidence in the investigative file or to other material evidence that indicated such a dispute necessary for us to disturb the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing. For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor. In disparate treatment discrimination claims, a complainant must satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-part evidentiary test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Initially, a complainant must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1973). The next burden shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1931). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). However, the first step of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. If the agency articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action, then our factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713- 714 (1983). Claim 1 — October 5, 2015 Nonselection for Detail Complainant accused the Agency of making decision to selecting a far younger female engineer for the Environmental and Facilities Program Manager detail out of animus toward her age or retaliatory motivation. To carry this burden of persuasion, Complainant needed to prove the Agency’s proffered explanations were unworthy of credence. See Burdine at 256. Here, Complainant had to establish the Agency’s stated reasons its decision were pretexts masking age discrimination or retaliation. See Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 4 2019000356 (Dec. 6, 1996). The most effective way for Complainant to prevail was by proving “plainly superior” qualifications over those of the selectee. See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). We find Complainant failed to do so. On the contrary, the record supported the Agency’s position that the selectee was better qualified. For example, the selectee’s resume included a master’s degree and Agency leadership training that Complainant’s resume could not match. Claim 2 — October 23, 2015 “Superior” in lieu of “Outstanding” Performance Complainant argued that her performance at issue merited an outstanding rating, but her evaluator downgraded her performance to superior. Indeed, Complainant’s supervisor gave her the highest possible ratings on the critical elements of the evaluation. Nevertheless, the Agency asserted that Complainant’s superior evaluation was valid because she was only fully successful, as opposed to exceptional, in the non-critical component of “teamwork and partnership.” We find that Complainant has not shown this articulated reason to be pretextual. Although she disagreed with the ratings that she received, the record does not show that management justifications that are unworthy of credence. Additionally, Complainant has offered no evidence that similarly-situated employees who were younger, male or had no record of EEO activity had more favorable evaluations after performing at an equivalent level. Claim 3 — March 18, 2016 Nonselection for Promotion to Deputy Director We find that Complainant failed to show that she was non-selected for the GS-14 management vacancy based on unlawful criteria. Moreover, EEOC allows agencies greater discretion in choosing among qualified candidates for upper-echelon positions, such the one at issue in the instant complaint. See Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987). Finally, we have consistently held that just because an applicant has more years of experience does automatically make her qualified over others. See Macready v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 01991433 (Apr. 4, 2002). CONCLUSION Based on this thorough review of the entire record and all contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision adopting the AJ’s decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination. 5 2019000356 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 6 2019000356 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations August 13, 2019 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation