Michael P. Goodman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 25, 2019

14214245 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/214,245 03/14/2014 Michael P. Goodman 164877.00003 5477
26710 7590 10/25/2019
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKET
411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE
SUITE 2350
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202-4426
EXAMINER
KANAAN, MAROUN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pat-dept@quarles.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte MICHAEL P. GOODMAN and JEFFERY L. CARLSON1
_____________

Appeal 2018-008633
Application 14/214,245
Technology Center 3600
______________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1 through 16. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

INVENTION
The invention is directed to a method of creating a library of custom
digital product binders. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and
is reproduced below:

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the inventors
Michael P. Goodman and Jeffery L. Carlson. Appeal Br. 1.
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1. A method of creating a library of custom digital product
binders, comprising the computer-implemented steps of:
decoding, by a server hardware computing device
coupled to a network and comprising at least one
processor executing specific computer-executable
instructions within a memory, a plurality of digital
product binder content data corresponding to a
physical product binder;
executing, by the server hardware computing device, a
first database query to store, within a database
coupled to the network, the plurality of digital
product binder content, wherein each of the
plurality of digital product binder content is
associated in the database with:
a digital product binder; and
a digital product library comprising a plurality of
digital product binders including the digital
product binder;
decoding, by the server hardware computing device, from
a graphical user interface (GUI) on a client
hardware computing device:
a selection of a selected digital product binder
from the plurality of digital product binders
from said digital product library; and
a branding data to be associated in the database
with a custom digital product library;
executing, by the server hardware computing device, a
second database query associating the selected
digital product binder in the database with: said
custom digital product library; and said branding
data.

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REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
The Examiner has rejected claims 1 through 16, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–8.2
The Examiner has rejected claims 1 through 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 first paragraph as failing to comply with the written-description
requirement. Final Act. 8.
The Examiner has rejected claims 1 through 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112
second paragraph as being indefinite. Final Act. 9.
The Examiner has rejected claims 15 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
as being anticipation over Siddique (US 2013/0215116 A1, Aug. 22, 2013).
Final Act. 9–11.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Brief, the Examiner’s
rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1 through 16 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 first
paragraph, and 112 second paragraph. However, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).3

2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief, filed March 13,
2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 5, 2018
(“Answer”), and the Final Office Action, mailed November 30, 2017 (“Final
Act.”).
3 We note Appellant presents arguments directed to an obviousness
rejection. However, there is no rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the
appealed Final Rejection, and therefore there is no § 103 rejection before us.
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Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 66, 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
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the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”).
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim is directed to a
judicial exception because:
(1) the claim recites a judicial exception, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice,
or mental processes); and
(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.

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ANALYSIS
The Examiner determines that the claims are not patent eligible as
they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more.
Final Act. 2–8. Specifically, the Examiner concludes the claims recite a
concept, that of collecting and comparing known information, which is
similar to a concept identified as an abstract idea by the courts. Final Act. 3
(citing Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)). Further, the Examiner concludes that the claims, in addition to
the abstract idea merely recite generic components of a general-purpose
computer and that the claims do not provide an improvement to the
functioning of the computer. Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection is in error for several
reasons. Appellant argues that claims recite limitations in an ordered
combination and therefore are significantly more than conventional or
generic computer operations. Appeal Br. 8–10. Specifically, Appellant
asserts:
the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than a
computer algorithm, function, or method. Claim 1, considered
as a whole, includes a server hardware computing device
coupled to a network and processing computer-executable
instructions within a memory. These instructions cause the
claimed system to receive and decode digital product binder
content data corresponding to a physical product binder, and
executes a database command to store the digital product binder
content in association with a digital product binder and a digital
product library including digital product binder.

Appeal Br. 8–9. Further, Appellant argues that the claimed processor acts in
concert and integrates these features, thus is not a generic computer and
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amounts to significantly more than a generic computer. Appeal Br. 10–11.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s analysis does not adequately identify
the judicial exception. Appeal Br. 13–15. Appellant argues that the
Examiner only provides a high-level summary of the invention and fails to
consider the detail within the claimed elements. Appeal Br. 14. Further,
Appellant argues that the claimed invention is not previously known and
therefore an improvement to the computer, and industry and therefore not
abstract. Appeal Br. 15–17. Appellant asserts:
Specifically, the independent claims are directed to processes
for generating and accessing digital binders not seen in the
field. The specification as filed confirms that the invention
represents such improvements in computer-related technology.
Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues the claims are inextricably tied to a
computer and require an input from a physical device, and thus they are not
directed to an ineligible abstract process. Appeal Br. 18–19.
The Examiner has provided a detailed and comprehensive response to
Appellant’s arguments on pages 3 through 8 of the Answer. We have
reviewed the Examiner’s rejection and response to Appellant’s arguments,
and we concur with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims are directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter.
In the time period between filing the Appeal Brief and Answer, the
USPTO has promulgated revised guidance on the application of § 101. As
the Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s response rely heavily on the
guidance prior to January 7, 2019, we adopt the Examiner’s responses to
Appellant’s arguments and add the following applying the revised guidance.
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Abstract Idea.
As discussed above, the Examiner concludes the claim recites a
concept of collecting and comparing known information, which is similar to
a concept identified as an abstract idea by the courts. We concur with the
Examiner that representative claim 1 recites collecting/gathering information
and analyzing it (a mental process). Representative claim 1 recites
“decoding . . . a plurality of digital product binder content data
corresponding to a physical product binder”4 (a data gathering or
observation element); “executing . . . [a] query to store . . . the plurality of
digital product binder content” (also a data gathering step); “wherein each of
the plurality of digital product binder content is associated in the database
with: a digital product binder; and a digital product library comprising a
plurality of digital product binders including the digital product binder” (a
data analysis or evaluation element); “decoding . . . a selection of a selected
digital product binder . . . and [] branding data” (a data gathering or
observation element, branding is a data analysis step); and “executing . . . a
second database query associating the selected product binder in the
database with: said custom digital product library; and said branding data” (a
data analysis or evaluation element). We consider these limitations to recite
an abstract mental process. These steps can be performed in the human
mind as they are merely gathering data (digital product binders) and
organizing data to store in a database. See Classen, 659 F.3d at 1067 (claim
to collecting and comparing known information determined to be steps that

4 As discussed infra, the Examiner has interpreted the term “decoding” to be
“receiving.” See Answer 9.
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can be practically performed in the human mind), Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat, Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is
undisputedly well-known. Indeed humans have always performed these
functions.”). The fact that the product binder is digital, rather than a printed
or mental binder, does not preclude a determination that the claim recites a
mental process. See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc., v. Election Systems &
Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the
claimed steps of voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for
tabulation are human cognitive actions that humans have performed for
hundreds of years despite the fact that the steps in the claim were performed
on a computer). Thus, we consider the representative claim 1 to recite a
mental process, and thus an abstract idea.

Practical Application of the Abstract Idea
The Examiner finds that the additional claimed elements recite a
server, processor, and device, which are generic computer components and
do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5.
We concur with the Examiner’s determination that the additional limitations
of representative claim 1 recite “a server hardware computing device,”
“processor,” “a database,” and a “client hardware device.” Appellant’s
Specification discusses these elements generically and not with any
specificity (see, e.g., para. 98 of Appellant’s Specification). Further, the
Examiner states, “[c]reating a library of custom digital products is not a
technological improvement and does not offer a solution that is necessarily
rooted in computer technology.” Answer 6. We concur with the Examiner
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and do not find that Appellant’s Specification identifies the invention as an
improvement to the operation of the computer, but rather as discussed above
an improvement to an abstract idea, which is implemented using the
computer as a tool.
Appellant’s arguments asserting the claim is an improvement in a
computer cite to Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016). We do not consider this argument to be persuasive as Appellant’s
claims are unlike claims found patent eligible in Enfish, where the court
found the claimed data structures provided advances in existing computer
capabilities. The data structure of Enfish was “not simply directed to any
form of storing tabular data,” but instead, included a very specifically
defined means for configuring a logical data table that required a four-step
algorithm to render the table self-referential. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
Further, the Enfish court found “the plain focus of the claims is on an
improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks
for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Enfish, 822 F.3d
at 1336. Here, Appellant’s Specification discusses the benefits of the
invention, is to replace physical binders with digital binders, thus making it
cheaper and easier to update the binders. Thus, Appellant’s Specification
does not discuss the invention being an improvement to a computer or
another technology. See para. 6 of Specification.
Appellant’s argument that the claimed method is tied to computer
technology and recites physical devices to input data and thereby are not
abstract is not well taken. The Supreme Court has stated “merely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
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Nor does Appellant’s assertion that claim 1 is “directly analogous” to
claim 4 of the USPTO’s Subject Matter Eligibility Example 23 provide
reasoning supporting a determination that claim 1 is eligible due to its
additional limitations. Appeal Br. 8–9 (citing “the 2015 update,” i.e.,
USPTO Memorandum, July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility
Appendix I: Examples (July 2015), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-app1.pdf. In Example 23, claim 4
was determined to be eligible by improving the ability of the computer to
display information and interact with the user by altering the basic display
function of the computer to detect window overlaps and automatically
relocate text so as to maintain a display of all text during periods of
overlapping windows. July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples at 11–12.
Appellant does not assert that the additional limitations of claim 1 improve
the basic display function of the computer, but rather, that the additional
limitations store content in association with particular binders and libraries.
Appeal Br. 8–9. Appellant’s analogy to Example 3, which improved the
basic display capability of a computer by applying a blue noise filter, fails to
be persuasive for the same reason. Id. at 11–12.
Similarly, Appellant’s analogy to claim 2 of Example 21 is not
persuasive. Id. at 10–11 (citing July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples at
1–5. However, the eligibility of claim 2 of Example 21 derives from
addressing an Internet-centric challenge of alerting a subscriber with time-
sensitive information when the subscriber is offline by using an alternative
wireless communication channel. July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples
at 4. Appellant has not pointed to any similar feature in claim 1.
Appellant’s analogy to claim 1 of Example 4, which was determined to
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improve global positioning technology, also fails because Appellant has not
persuasively shown that claim 1 represents an improvement to any similar
technology. Appeal Br. 12; Examples: Abstract Ideas, 10–12, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples_
1to36.pdf. To the extent that Appellant draws analogies to USPTO
Examples, we concur with the Examiner’s determination that those
analogies do not provide persuasive reasoning to support Appellant’s
contentions of eligibility. Ans. 5–7.
Similarly, Appellant’s arguments that the claims recite an ordered
combination of specific rules and as such are patent eligible are not
persuasive. In McRO the court reviewed claims which use “a combined
order of specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is
then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized,
animated characters” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court found that the claims did not
“simply use a computer as a tool to automate conventional activity,” but
instead used the computer to “perform a distinct process” that is carried out
in a different way than the prior non-computer method to improve the
technology of (3-D animation techniques). See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16.
Here, as discussed above, the claim recites a mental process, and the use of
the computer is merely a tool to implement the mental process, a
conventional activity of organizing data. Thus, we do not consider the
claims to recite a practical application of the abstract idea.

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Significantly more than the Abstract Idea
Under the Memorandum, only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
The claims recite the use of generically claimed server hardware,
client hardware, processor, and a graphical user interface to store and
organize data. The Examiner has determined such activities of generically
claimed computer hardware to be well-understood, routine, conventional
activity. Ans. 3–5. Such a determination is supported by precedent. See,
e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1331, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that the activities of storing and retrieving
information in memory, and sorting information to be well-understood,
routine, conventional activity). Here, because the claims do not include
additional elements other than those that are well-understood, routine or
conventional, either individually or in ordered combination, Appellant’s
arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection.
In summary, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea; a method of collecting/gathering information and analyzing it
(a mental process). Further, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us
that the Examiner erred in finding that the claims are not: directed to an
improvement in the functioning of the computer or to other technology or
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other technical field; directed to a particular machine; directed to performing
or affecting a transformation of an article to a different state or thing;
directed to using a judicial exception in some meaningful way beyond
linking the exception to a particular technological environment such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial
exception. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded that the claims recite
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application or that supply an “inventive concept” sufficient to satisfy § 101.
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, of representative claim 1 and
claims 2 through 16 grouped with claim 1.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 112
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 16 as not complying with the
written-description requirement because the Specification does not
demonstrate Appellant had possession of the claimed “decoding” feature.
Final Act. 8. The Examiner states “[i]t is not clear if decoding means that
the system receives the code and then converts into intelligible language or
another format; or does it simply mean receive information.” Final Act. 8.
Further, the Examiner finds that claims 1 through 16 are indefinite as:
Claims 1-16 recite, “decoding ... a plurality of digital product
binder content”, “decoding ... a selection of a selected digital
product” and so forth. It is not clear to the examiner how the
system[] decodes a selection or a plurality of digital product
binder content. For purpose of examination, the examiner
interprets decoding to be receiving.
Final Act. 9.
Appellant provides one response directed to both rejections stating:
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As has been known in the art for decades, and as disclosed in
the specification as filed, a server hardware computing device is
configured to receive data transmissions from a network and
decode the data received. As such, the term “decoding” is
known to one of skill in the art, is disclosed within the
specification, and is sufficiently definite to define the scope of
the claims.
Appeal Br. 19.
We are not persuaded of error in either of the Examiner’s rejections
based upon 35 U.S.C. § 112. The written-description requirement serves “to
ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the
application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him;
how the specification accomplishes this is not material.” In re Wertheim,
541 F.2d 257, 262 (CCPA 1976). Here, as the Examiner identifies, decoding
is not mentioned in the originally filed claims or the Specification.
Appellant’s Brief, in the summary of the claimed invention section,
identifies that support for the first decoding limitation of representative
claim 1 is found in paragraphs 22, 24, 27, and 29 of the Specification and the
second decoding limitation is found in paragraphs 103 and 104 of the
Specification. We have reviewed these sections and do not find that they
discuss any form of decoding or receiving a coded transmission that would
require decoding as argued by Appellant. Thus, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as failing to meet the written-
description requirement, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph.
With respect to the definiteness requirement, the Examiner states “[i]t
is not clear to the [E]xaminer how the systems decodes a selection or a
plurality of digital product binder content.” Final Act. 9. We concur with
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the Examiner, if we construe the claim as the Examiner has construed it,
where “decode” means received, the claim is clear. However, if the claim
term is construed as Appellant has argued, “decode” is something that
happens to convert data in a received transmission. This alternative
interpretation, as the Examiner acknowledges is reasonable, however it
results in the claim having a very different scope as it involves converting
data. “[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claims
constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more
precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding
the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112 second paragraph.” Ex parte
Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); see also Ex
parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *2 (PTAB
Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential). Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 through 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 second paragraph as being
indefinite.

Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102
Appellant presents several arguments directed to the anticipation
rejection of claims 15 and 16. We do not reach these arguments. As
discussed above, we concur with the Examiner’s finding that independent
claim 15 is indefinite. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of claims 15 and 16, as the claims are ambiguous and to determine
the scope of the claims would require speculation. Our reviewing court has
said that it is wrong to rely upon speculative assumptions as to the meaning
of claims when considering a prior-art rejection. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859,
863 (CCPA 1962).
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 through 16 is affirmed.

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–16 101 Eligibility 1–16
1–16 112 Written Description 1–16
1–16 112 Indefiniteness 1–16
15, 16 102(a) Siddique 15, 16
Overall
Outcome
1–16

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED