Michael Morcillo, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast/Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 12, 2000
01a00343 (E.E.O.C. May. 12, 2000)

01a00343

05-12-2000

Michael Morcillo, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast/Southwest Area), Agency.


Michael Morcillo, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01A00343

) Agency No. 4H-335-0162-97

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service )

(Southeast/Southwest Area), )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) by the agency dated October 1, 1999, finding that it was in

compliance with the terms of the May 27, 1998 settlement agreement into

which the parties entered.<1> See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659, 37,660

(1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. � 1614.402); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that a Letter of

Warning dated 2/3/97 would be expunged from all of the complainant's

records consistent with a Step 3 resolve date 8/12/97. It was further

understood that complainant would be treated in a fair and equitable

manner consistent with the National Agreement, handbooks and manuals.

By letter to the agency dated August 18, 1999, complainant alleged that

the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that

the agency specifically implement the its terms. The agency responded

in a letter dated August 31, 1999, asking complainant to specify the

alleged violations. On September 5, 1999, complainant alleged that

the agency failed to treat him fairly and equitably consistent with the

settlement agreement. Complainant further stated that during the month

of September of 1998, a Responsible Management Official (position not

identified) or her immediate supervisor deleted complainant's lunch

location at Durango's Restaurant. Complainant further stated this

lunch location was an approved location similar to other employees at

his work location. Complainant also alleges that no other employees

have had their lunch location changed.

Complainant further stated that �since the arrival of [Supervisor A]

. . ., [complainant has] received multiple officials discussions for no

just cause.� Complainant went on to state that �in the same frame she

[Supervisor A] has yelled at me numerous times on the workroom floor.

On Thursday, August 19, 1999, the final two remaining lunch stops were

deleted and replaced by locations of Supervisor [A's] choice. This action

included denying me the use of my home as a lunch and comfort stop.

I need the use of my home to assist me with my disability, as I have for

the past two years on my route. No other employee in my work unit has

suffered this type of action. These actions are nothing but harassment

and inconsistent with the settlement cited above.�

In its October 1, 1999 FAD, the agency concluded that it had not breached

the settlement agreement. Upon inquiry into complainant's allegations,

Supervisor A conceded she had given complainant several discussions;

however, she stated that all the discussions were warranted and were

for just cause. Supervisor A denied yelling at complainant or any other

carrier on the workroom floor. Supervisor A explained that on the day in

question, she informed complainant that his home was not an acceptable

lunch/break location because of the distance involved (specifically,

2.8 miles from his route). After questioning Supervisor A's authority

to change his lunch spot, complainant explained to Supervisor A that

a previous supervisor had approved his lunch spot and that she had

no right to change it. Supervisor A informed the complainant that

he was no longer permitted to use his home as a lunch/break location

and offered him a choice of three lunch/break locations with handicap

facilities closer to his route to choose from. The complainant refused

all of the locations offered. Supervisor A informed complainant that

if he did not pick one of the locations offered that she (Supervisor A)

would pick the lunch/break location.

Supervisor A further stated that in a Step 1 grievance, she requested

that complainant provide documentation stating that there existed a

medical need for him to use his home for lunch/break spots. Complainant

allegedly refused to provide this medical documentation. Supervisor A

informed complainant that she was aware of complainant's condition, but

that if he had a medical need to go home, then she would require medical

documentation stating this fact. Since no medical documentation was

provided, complainant's home was disapproved as a lunch/break location.

Finally, the agency stated that the previous supervisor who had approved

of the complainant's home as a lunch/break spot was an acting supervisor

who had not properly checked the mileage before approving complainant's

home as a lunch/break location.

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a)) provides that any

settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties,

reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both

parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes

a contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, the record supports the agency's conclusion that it

is in compliance with the settlement agreement. The agreement explicitly

expressed that complainant would be treated in a fair and equitable

manner consistent with the National Agreement, handbooks and manuals.

Complainant allegations of harassment with regard to the change of his

home as an approved lunch/break location has failed to demonstrate how

this part of the agreement was breached. Finally, involving alleged acts

of harassment, allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violate

a settlement agreement are processed as separate complaints under 29

C.F.R. � 1614.504(c).<2> In light of the above, we affirm the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 12, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Equal Employment Assistant Date

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 Inasmuch as complainant identified other incidents of alleged

discrimination, he must initiate EEO counseling regarding any new

allegations within 15 days after he receives this decision, if he wishes

to pursue them and he has not already done so. The agency is advised

that if complainant seeks EEO counseling regarding any new allegations

raised on appeal within the above 15-day period, the date complainant

filed the appeal statement in which he raised these allegations shall

be deemed to be the date of the initial EEO contact, unless complainant

previously contacted an EEO Counselor regarding these matters. If there

has been a previous contact, the earlier date would serve as the EEO

counselor contact date. Qatsha v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request

No. 05970201 (January16, 1998); Parker v. Department of the Army, EEOC

Request No. 05960025 (August 29, 1996).