01976275
01-28-2000
Michael Mahoney, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Areas), Agency.
Michael Mahoney v. United States Postal Service
01976275
January 28, 2000
Michael Mahoney, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01976275
v. ) Agency No. 1-I-681-1064-96
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(S.E./S.W. Areas), )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the
basis of religion (Seventh Day Adventist), in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1>
Complainant alleges he was discriminated against when: (1) his request
for religious accommodation was denied; and (2) he was terminated from
employment with the agency during his probationary period. The appeal
is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following
reasons, the agency's decision is REVERSED.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Part Time Flexible Mailhandler (PTFM), at the agency's
Lincoln, Nebraska facility. Complainant belongs to the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, and his religious beliefs do not allow him to work on
the Sabbath Day. Complainant also averred that his Sabbath begins at
sundown on Friday, and extends until sundown on Saturday.
Complainant recalled in his affidavit that in November 1994, he
interviewed and was hired as a Part Time Flexible Carrier with the
Lincoln, Nebraska facility. Complainant stated however, that when he
learned that he would be required to work on the Sabbath, he informed the
Plant Manager that he would not be able to work because of his religious
beliefs. Complainant averred that the Plant Manager then told him that
he would have to resign his position, which he then did.
In March of 1996, complainant received a solicitation from the Lincoln,
Nebraska facility to come and interview for a PTFM position. Although
complainant stated he was skeptical due to his experience in 1994,
he was aware of other Seventh Day Adventists who worked at the agency,
so he was also somewhat hopeful that he could be accommodated.
The record reveals there were several other people at Complainant's
interview, including the same Plant Manager, his Confidential Secretary,
as well as the Human Resources Specialist (no religions specified).
Complainant averred that the Plant Manager spoke to him about the
job's responsibilities, benefits and his expectations of complainant.
Then, complainant was told to leave the room. When he returned, the
Human Resources Specialist asked complainant if he was, "the person who
resigned from a position before." Complainant responded affirmatively.
Complainant also averred as follows:
They stated I would have to work six days a week, four six hour days,
and two eight hour days. I told them that would be no problem, but
I could not work on the Sabbath. [The Human Resources Specialist]
then asked me if I could work evenings on Saturday, and I said yes,
or anytime on Sunday. They said that would be fine.
Complainant began working for the agency. On May 1, 1996, he received
his schedule that indicated he would be working at 2:00 p.m. on
Saturday, and off on Sunday. Complainant spoke with his Supervisor,
who then relayed the information to the Human Resources Specialist.
Complainant's Supervisor then spoke with complainant and told him that
no arrangements could be made. Before reporting to work on Friday,
complainant spoke with the Plant Manager, "explaining to him what was
stated during the interview and my religious beliefs." According to
complainant's affidavit, the Plant Manager then became angry, and stated
that if he could not work his scheduled days, he would have to quit.
Complainant averred that he left the Plant Manager's office with nothing
resolved, and then told his Supervisor he would have to leave at sundown,
and would not be returning on Saturday at 2:00 p.m. After getting in
touch with the Plant Manager, the Supervisor told complainant that if
he failed to report, he would be considered AWOL and would be terminated.
By letter dated May 7, 1996, the agency notified complainant
that effective May 6, 1996, he was separated from the agency for
"Unsatisfactory Record of Service" and "Failure to Report as Scheduled."
Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought
EEO counseling and, subsequently filed a formal complaint on August
12, 1996. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was
informed of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency.
When complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in
our Regulations, the agency issued a FAD.
In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on failure to
accommodate in that he failed to show that he had a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement. Rather, the agency
found that complainant had, "only made a bare assertion of his religious
belief, without supporting documentation." Furthermore, the agency found
that complainant failed to inform the agency of his religious belief,
"at the time he was hired."
The agency then examined the affidavits of those present at complainant's
interview in support of its position that complainant failed to inform
the agency of his religious beliefs at the time he was hired. In his
affidavit, the Plant Manager confirmed that complainant was told about the
need for flexibility and availability. The Plant Manager also recalled
that complainant confirmed during the interview that he would be able
to work all hours. As proof of this, he stated complainant mentioned
he was currently working weekends at his current job. According to
the Plant Manager's affidavit, he and the Human Resources Specialist
verified with complainant that he "would be available all hours and days"
as required by the Mailhandler position. He further averred that they
did not discuss complainant's religious beliefs.
The FAD also briefly mentioned the Human Resources Specialist's testimony,
but failed to include the portion of his affidavit wherein he stated that
during complainant's interview in 1996, he "[did] remember [complainant]
witnessing his religious beliefs and talking about not being able to work
on his Sabbath." The Human Resources Specialist also recalled that he
was familiar with complainant due to the events in November 1994. At that
time, he stated he figured complainant was a Seventh Day Adventist since
he had stated he was unable to work on Saturdays. The Human Resources
Specialist also averred that as far as he was concerned, complainant
appeared satisfied with the job offer.
An affidavit from the Plant Manager's Confidential Secretary is also
contained in the record, as she was present for at least part of the
interview. Therein, she stated that she could not recall "how or even
if `religious convictions' came up in the interview." She did remember
however, "wondering how [the job] wouldn't be a problem if [complainant]
was a Seventh Day Adventist." Furthermore, she stated that she did not
know how she became aware that complainant was a Seventh Day Adventist,
except that she knew complainant had also expressed an interest in being
a Carrier [in 1994]. In sum, the agency found that complainant failed
to establish a prima facie case because he failed to notify management
officials of his religion at the time he was hired.
Assuming that complainant established a prima facie case, the agency found
that it had shown that to permit complainant's absence from sundown Friday
until sundown on Saturday would create an undue hardship on the conduct
of the agency's business. Specifically, the Plant Manager reported that
the facility processes mail 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. Also,
according to the Plant Manager's affidavit, the facility's largest mail
volume is on Friday evenings, and therefore replacement workers, such
as complainant, are needed on the weekends, when regular Mailhandler's
have Saturday and Sunday off. He added that the position of a Part
Time Flexible Mailhandler is especially designed for this instance,
so as to avoid paying regular carriers overtime pay. The Plant Manager
also averred that, "allowing PTFS employees Friday, Saturday or Sunday
off while requiring Regular Schedule Mailhandlers to work, would be in
violation of the National Agreement with the Mailhandler Union."
Therefore, the agency found that since complainant only disclosed his
religion after he was made aware of the scheduling requirements of
the position, "to grant [complainant's] request at that point would
be an undue burden on the [agency], an undue burden that the [agency]
is not required to endure." As such, the agency found that it had not
discriminated against complainant when it denied him an accommodation
and terminated his employment.
On appeal, complainant maintains that it would have been easy for the
agency to have accommodated him. The agency does not make any contentions
in response to complainant's appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers may be liable
for failure to accommodate the religious practices of their employees
absent proof that such accommodation could not be made without imposing
an undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. Section
1605.2(b)(1). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he has a bona fide religious
belief, the practice of which conflicted with his employment, (2) he
informed the agency of this belief and conflict, and (3) the agency
nevertheless enforced its requirement against him. Heller v. EBB Auto
Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984). In the present case, we
find that complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination
based on religion. Specifically, complainant averred that he is a member
of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and that the tenets of the religion
require him to forgo work on the Sabbath, which runs from sundown on
Friday until sundown on Saturday.<2> Furthermore, he has identified
a practice of his religion which conflicts with the requirements of
the position, namely his need to forgo work on Friday nights and
Saturday days. Despite the agency's knowledge that complainant's
schedule conflicted with his religious beliefs, the agency implemented
the schedule. Therefore, we find that complainant has established a
prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to accommodate
his religion.
Once an complainant establishes a prima facie case, the agency must
show that it made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate his
religious beliefs and, if such proof fails, the agency must show that
the alternative means of accommodation proffered by complainant cannot
be granted without imposing an undue hardship on the agency's operations.
See Tiano v. Dillard Dept. Stores Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir.1998);
Redmond v. GAF Corporation, 574 F.2d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 1978); Cardona
v. USPS, EEOC Request No. 05890532 (October 25, 1989). Pursuant to
29 C.F.R. Section 1605.2(a)-(e), the Commission's "Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion" (the Guidelines), alternatives
for accommodating an employee's religious practices include, but are
not limited to, voluntary substitutes and swaps, flexible scheduling,
and lateral transfers and job changes.
Undue hardship does not become a defense until the employer claims
it as a defense to its duty to accommodate. Ansonia Board of Education
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986). In order to show undue hardship,
an employer must demonstrate that an accommodation would require more than
a de minimis cost. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
74 (1977).
As an initial matter, we note that we are not persuaded by the agency's
argument that complainant's failure to alert the agency of his religion
at the time of hiring, a fact which is largely disputed by the evidence
of record, renders his claim unsuccessful. Such logic would render
any individual who entered into a religion subsequent to the date he
was hired for a position unprotected by Title VII. Even assuming the
agency is correct that complainant failed to inform officials of his need
for an accommodation during the interview, the agency fails to indicate
what purpose this information would have served. According to the Plant
Manager's testimony, "a basic requirement of the position is flexibility;
to be available whenever needed to serve our mailing customers. We never
hire employees that cannot meet this most important basic requirement."
Therefore, assuming the agency's position is correct, according to
the facts in this case, complainant would simply have not been hired,
and would still have a claim of discrimination.<3> Although the agency
argues that complainant never told them of his need for the accommodation
during the interview, it fails to acknowledge that at the time complainant
alerted agency officials to his need for an accommodation, it failed
to satisfy its responsibilities pursuant to Title VII by making a good
faith effort to accommodate complainant's religious practices.
In any event, we do find that the evidence of record supports
complainant's claim that he notified the agency of his need for an
accommodation at the time of his interview. We credit complainant's
testimony wherein he stated that the agency's schedule would not be a
problem, provided that he could have his Sabbath off. The Human Resources
Specialist corroborated this statement. We further note that the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the notion that the Plant Manager was well aware
of complainant's religion at the time of the 1996 interview, due to his
experience with complainant in 1994. Given complainant's history with
the facility, we find it highly unlikely that he would agree to work for
the agency unless he was under the belief that he would be accommodated.
Moving on to the next stage of the analysis, we find no evidence in
the record, nor does the agency argue, that the agency engaged in any
effort to find complainant a reasonable accommodation for his religion.
Although required to do so, the agency did not consider voluntary shift
swaps, flexible scheduling, or lateral transfers to other facilities.
Instead, the agency summarily found that any accommodation would cause
an undue hardship on its operations due to the nature of the flexible
position. Such a per se rule would render flexible workers with less
protection under Title VII than regular workers.
In its FAD, the agency found that an accommodation for complainant
would require overtime pay to a Regular Mailhandler, or would violate
the National Agreement with the Mailhandlers. We find insufficient
evidence in the record to support the agency's position. Specifically,
the agency provided no documentation that would demonstrate that it would
be too costly to have a Regular Mailhandler work on a Saturday, or for
complainant to engage in some kind of swap in his scheduling. Indeed,
complainant averred that he would be willing to work on Saturday evenings
and Sundays. Furthermore, we find nothing in the Mailhandler's Agreement,
portions of which were supplied by the agency's investigator, to
support the position that such arrangements would violate the agreement.
To the contrary, the agency's own Personnel Operations Manual supports
complainant's position. It states, in pertinent part in Section 313.6,
that eligibles whose religion prohibits working on a specific day of the
week will not be omitted from consideration for such reason. Furthermore,
it states that, "if hired as a part-time flexible, reasonable efforts will
be made not to schedule duty on the eligible's Sabbath."<4> In sum, we
find that the agency failed to satisfy its burden of making a good faith
effort to accommodate complainant's religion. Furthermore, it failed
to prove that an accommodation would cause the agency an undue hardship.
Turning to complainant's disparate treatment claim of religious
discrimination when he was terminated from employment, we find that
applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation
v. Green, 411, U.S. 792 (1973), complainant proved that the agency's
reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination. Specifically,
the agency notified complainant that he was separated from employment
due to "Unsatisfactory Record of Service" and "Failure to Report as
Scheduled." However, the evidence overwhelmingly supports complainant's
claim that he was terminated when he failed to work on a day for which
he requested a religious accommodation pursuant to Tile VII. In fact,
when complainant attempted to discuss the matter with the Plant Manager,
the Plant Manager averred that he stated, "I was not interested in
[complainant's] religious beliefs and that working Friday nights was a
primary requirement of the position."
Accordingly, we find that the agency discriminated against complainant
when it failed to accommodate his religion, and terminated him after he
failed to report to work as scheduled. Therefore, after a careful review
of the record and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in
this decision, we REVERSE the FAD and direct the agency to take remedial
actions in accordance with this decision and order below.
ORDER
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:
Within thirty (30) calender days from the date on which this decision
become final, the agency shall reinstate complainant to the Part Time
Flexible Mailhandler position retroactive to the date of his termination.
Complainant shall also be awarded back pay, seniority and other employee
benefits retroactive to the date of the termination, along with any
incurred and reasonable attorney's fees.
The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay (with
interest, if applicable) and other benefits due complainant, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after
the date this decision becomes final. The complainant shall cooperate
in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits
due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency.
If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or
benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant for the
undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the
agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant
may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.
The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the
Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled
"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
The agency shall provide complainant with interim relief in accordance
with the paragraph below.
The agency shall provide complainant with a reasonable accommodation
of his religious beliefs. To accomplish this remedy, the agency shall
consider all possible methods of accommodating complainant's religious
beliefs, including voluntary substitution or swap, flexible scheduling,
or change of job assignment.<5> For more information, the agency is
directed to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. Part 1605.
The agency is directed to conduct training for complainant's Supervisor,
the Plant Manager, and the Human Resources Specialist, as to the
current state of the law on employment discrimination, particularly
the "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion" contained at
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. Part 1605. The agency shall address these
employees' responsibilities with respect to eliminating discrimination
in the workplace, providing accommodations, and all other supervisory
and managerial responsibilities under equal employment opportunity law.
The agency shall take appropriate preventative steps to ensure that no
employee is subjected to religious discrimination.
The agency shall post a notice in accordance with the paragraph below.
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the
agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant,
including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G1092)
The agency is ORDERED to post at its Lincoln, Nebraska facility copies
of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the
agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency
within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer
at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the
Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration
of the posting period.
INTERIM RELIEF (F1199)
When the agency requests reconsideration and the case involves a
finding of discrimination regarding a removal, separation, or suspension
continuing beyond the date of the request for reconsideration, and when
the decision orders retroactive restoration, the agency shall comply with
the decision to the extent of the temporary or conditional restoration
of the complainant to duty status in the position specified by the
Commission, pending the outcome of the agency request for reconsideration.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,660 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.502(b)).
The agency shall notify the Commission and the complainant in writing at
the same time it requests reconsideration that the relief it provides
is temporary or conditional and, if applicable, that it will delay
the payment of any amounts owed but will pay interest from the date
of the original appellate decision until payment is made. Failure of
the agency to provide notification will result in the dismissal of the
agency's request. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.502(b)(3).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the
complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall
be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R1199)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN
THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
January 28, 2000
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_________________________
_________________________
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., has occurred at this facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any
employee or applicant for employment because of that person's RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL
DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,
or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The United States Postal Service, Lincoln, Nebraska, facility
(hereinafter referred to as "facility") supports and will comply with
such Federal law and will not take action against individuals because
they have exercised their rights under law.
The facility has been found to have discriminated on the basis of
religion, when it failed to accommodate an individual's religious
practice, and when the agency subsequently terminated his employment.
The facility was ordered to reinstate the individual to a Part Time
Flexible Mailhandler position, provide interim relief, award him
all back pay, with interest and seniority, as well as other employee
benefits retroactive to the date he was terminated. The agency was
ordered to provide him with an accommodation for his religious practice,
and pay his reasonable attorney's fees. Furthermore, the agency was
directed to take appropriate steps to ensure that no employee is subject
to religious discrimination, to provide training to the responsible
officials on the current state of the law on employment discrimination,
and to post this notice.
The facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce,
or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her
right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in
proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.
_________________________
Date Posted: ____________________
Posting Expires: _________________
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2Although we are unaware of any requirement to provide specific
documentation of one's religion, as the agency found in its final
decision, we note that complainant supplied the agency with his pastor's
name, address and phone number.
3We note that the duty to accommodate one's religious practices extends
to employees and prospective employees. See 29 C.F.R. �1605.2(b).
4We also note that the Commission has found that where religious
accommodation would violate a collective bargaining agreement, the agency
must still make a good faith effort to determine whether permissible
alternatives exist. Colgan v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01965264 (June
9, 1998). The Commission has only found that where an agency finds
that voluntary shift changes and transfers to other facilities would
violate its seniority procedures, would there be an undue hardship on
the agency to accommodate an employee. See 29 C.F.R. �1605.2(e)(2).;
Colgan, EEOC Appeal No. 01965264; Hudson v. Dept. of Transportation,
EEOC Appeal No. 01860309 (August 10, 1987)
5A refusal to accommodate is justified only when an employer or labor
organization can demonstrate that an undue hardship would in fact
result from each available alternative method of accommodation. 29
C.F.R. �1605.2(c).