Michael Libes et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 25, 2019

11372904 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/372,904 03/09/2006 Michael Libes P8129US00 5623
11764 7590 07/25/2019
Ditthavong & Steiner, P.C.
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 305
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
DETWEILER, JAMES M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
docket@dcpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL LIBES and BRIAN LENT1
____________________

Appeal 2018-000730
Application 11/372,904
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–
38, and 42–49, which constitute all the claims pending in this application.
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13–21, 23, 26, 29, 33–35, and 39–41 have been
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify HERE Global B.V. as the real party in interest (App.
Br. 1).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ disclosed invention relates to advertising placement
systems for use with computing devices and more particularly, to systems
that support competitive bidding for placement of advertising to computing
devices (Spec. ¶ 2). Embodiments of the invention pertain to a computer
system and method for processing a search query directed to a collection of
pages in response to receiving a search query of a user, comparing keywords
of the search query and a concept hierarchy of the result pages and user
features against a set of bids for keywords, concepts, and user features
submitted by advertisers to identify matching bids, and selecting a winning
bid from among the matching bids (Spec. ¶ 8; see, e.g., claims 22, 25, 28,
31, 37, and 43). The system and method further allow advertisers to bid for
their own selected combination of keywords, page concepts, and user
features, such as user physical location, for targeting a highly focused
audience (Spec. ¶ 8). Exemplary independent claim 22 under appeal, with
key limitations emphasized and bracketed lettering added, reads as follows:
22. A computer method of processing a search query for
placing online advertisement at a computing device, the method
comprising:
receiving, by a processor, a search query of a user that is
directed to a collection of pages, wherein the collection of
pages has been pre-categorized by the processor into one or
more concepts of a concept hierarchy according to a similarity
of content, purpose, or meaning;
identifying, by a processor, one or more result pages
from the collection of pages in response to the search query and
user features criteria;
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determining, by the processor, a mapping of the one or
more result pages onto the one or more concepts of the concept
hierarchy;
identifying, by the processor, bid specifications at a
computer that match a logical combination of multiple bidding
criteria that include keywords of the search query, at least one
of the user features criteria, and at least one of the one or more
concepts of the concept hierarchy using Boolean operators,
wherein the concept hierarchy comprises terms that
specify multiple levels of similarity,
wherein a concept at a higher hierarchy level is
composed of one or more sub-concepts at a lower hierarchy
level such that the sub-concepts are included within the
concept,
[A] wherein each bid specification is received from an
advertiser,
[B] wherein each bid specification further includes a
bidding criterion specified by the advertiser,
[C] wherein the bidding criterion specified by the
advertiser comprises a plurality of differing bid values based on
a plurality of differing distances between a user geographic
location and a bid input location,
wherein the bidding criterion specified by the advertiser
further comprises a plurality of differing bid values based on
the concept hierarchy, and
wherein each concept at a higher hierarchy level and each
of the one or more sub-concepts at a lower hierarchy level have
differing bid values specified by the advertiser;
determining, by the processor, advertising revenue to be
expected from each bid specification that is identified as
matching the logical combination of the multiple bidding
criteria; and
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selecting, by the processor, a winning bid specification at
the computer for ad placement according to a bid specification
having a greatest expected advertising revenue from among the
identified bid specifications that match the logical combination
of the multiple bidding criteria;
wherein each of the bid specifications is received from a
corresponding advertiser prior to identifying bid specifications
that match a logical combination of the multiple bidding
criteria, and wherein each bid specification specifies a bid price
that is a conditional amount according to the logical
combination of the multiple bidding criteria and wherein the bid
price is based on the logical combination of the multiple
bidding criteria defined by a corresponding advertiser.
The Examiner’s Rejections2
(1) Claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter (abstract idea). Final Act. 11–17; Ans. 3–9.
(2) Claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Shkedi
(US 6,973,436 B1; Dec. 6, 2005) in view of Anick et al. (US 6,778,975 B1;
Aug. 17, 2004) ("Anick"), in further view of Llach (US 2004/0186776 A1;
Sept. 23, 2004), and in even further view of Mangold et al. (US

2 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 12, 28, 30, and 46
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter as
encompassing transitory computer-readable signals and rejected claims 22,
25, 28, 31, 37, and 43 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second
paragraph (Final Act. 10, 11, and 18). However, the Examiner withdrew
these rejections in the Answer (Ans. 3). Thus, these rejections are not before
us.
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2004/0186769 A1; Sept. 23, 2004) ("Mangold").3 Final Act. 19–136; Ans.
9–12.
Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 13–28)
and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–5), the following principal issues are presented
on appeal:
(1) Have Appellants shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2,
5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter?
(2) Have Appellants shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2,
5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) because the base combination of Shkedi, Anick, Llach, and
Mangold fails to teach or suggest limitations [A], [B], and [C] as recited in
representative claim 22?

3 Separate patentability (over the applied prior art) is not argued for claims 2,
5, 7, 10, 12, 24, 27, 30, 32, 36, 38, 42, and 44–49, and Appellants present
arguments as to non-obviousness primarily to independent claims 22, 25, 28,
31, 37, and 43 as a single group (see App. Br. 13 and 28; Reply Br. 5).
Independent claims 22, 25, 28, 31, 37, and 43 each contain similar
limitations related to bidding criterion specified by the advertiser comprises
a plurality of differing bid values based on a plurality of differing distances
between a user geographic location and a bid input location. Accordingly,
we select claim 22 as representative of the group of claims rejected over the
combination of Shkedi, Anick, Llach, and Mangold.
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ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’
contentions and the evidence of record. We concur with Appellants’
contention that the Examiner erred in this case.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
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concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
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Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of
the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
At a high level, the claimed invention recites targeted advertising
using bidding criteria from advertisers. See also Ans. 6 (finding that “[t]he
claimed invention is directed to improving the human experience, the
problem is a non-technical business problem”).
We determine that these claimed limitations relate to advertising and
commercial activities, i.e., targeted marketing and/or sales. As such, the
claimed invention recites certain methods of organizing human activity,
which is an abstract idea. See e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
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One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Targeted marketing
is a form of “tailoring information based on [provided] data,” which has
been previously held by the Federal Circuit to be an abstract idea, and a
concept that is a “fundamental practice” that dates back to newspaper
advertisments); Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D.
Cal. 2014), aff’d, 622 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that both
“targeting advertisements to certain consumers, and using a bidding system
to determine when and how advertisements will be displayed” are abstract
ideas); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(determining that using an advertisement as an exchange or currency is an
abstract idea).
Next, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine
whether additional elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement
to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
In the instant case on appeal, we determine additional elements of
claims 22, 25, 28, 31, 37, and 43 integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application, as the additional elements (pre-categorizing a collection of
pages into “one or more concepts of a concept hierarchy,” and “identifying .
. . one or more result pages from the collection of pages in response to the
search query and user features criteria,”) reflect technology improvement of
implementing a medical analytics engine and system based on predictive
analytics. See, e.g., claim 22; see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc.
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The
inventive concept described and claimed . . . is the installation of a filtering
tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable
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filtering features specific to each end user. This design gives the filtering
tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a
filter on the ISP server.”).
In particular, the technology improvement is directed to implementing
a search query process “for placing online advertisement at a computing
device” (see, e.g., claims 22, 25, 28, 43; see also Spec. ¶ 2).
Our determination is supported by the Specification, which describes
the technology improvement of the invention as providing “a more closely
targeted advertising scheme, particularly for mobile search, that is directed
to an audience of interest” (Spec. ¶ 7); allows advertisers to submit bids with
bid criteria so that “advertisers can specify the combination of keywords,
page concepts, and user features as being of most importance to them”
(Spec. ¶ 8); and provides “monitoring of search traffic and advertisement
placement” in order to determine advertisement performance (Spec. ¶ 95).
In addition, the recited “concept hierarchy” scheme allows for “specif[ying]
a predetermined categorization of pages that might be returned as search
results” (Spec. ¶ 9).
Because the additional elements of claims 22, 25, 28, 31, 37, and 43
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, we determine claims
22, 25, 28, 31, 37, and 43 are not directed to an abstract idea. See
Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2. For similar reasons, each of claims 2, 5, 7,
10, 12, 24, 27, 30, 32, 36, 38, 42, and 44–49 integrates the advertising
activities into a practical application, and are not directed to an abstract
idea.
Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24,
25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Issue (2): Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 19–136; Ans.
9–12) in light of Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief that the
Examiner has erred (App. Br. 13–28; Reply Br. 2–5). We disagree with
Appellants’ conclusions. With regard to representative claim 22, we adopt
as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the
action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 19–35), as well as the
Advisory Action mailed April 12, 2017 (p. 2), and (2) the reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 9–12) in response to
Appellants’ Appeal Brief, with one exception – that Gottfurcht (US
2005/0021387 A1; published Jan. 27, 2005) (see Final Act. 136 citing
Gottfurcht; see also Ans. 12), is not in any way part of the prima facie case,
as it has not been applied in the heading of the statement of the rejection.4
We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner as to the
obviousness rejection of claim 22, and provide the following for emphasis.
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Shkedi, Anick, Llach, and Mangold
because Mangold does not teach or suggest “wherein each bid specification
is received from an advertiser, wherein each bid specification further
includes a bidding criterion specified by the advertiser” (limitations [A] and

4 “Where a reference is relied on to support a rejection, whether or not in a
‘minor capacity,’ there would appear to be no excuse for not positively
including the reference in the statement of the rejection.” In re Hoch, 428
F.2d 1341, 1342 n.3 (CCPA 1970).

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[B]) (App. Br. 25–27). Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error.
The Examiner relies on Shkedi for teaching limitations [A] and [B], not
Mangold (see Final Act. 24; Ans. 10). The Examiner only relies on
Mangold for teaching limitation [C] (see Final Act. 33–35; Ans. 10–12).
Appellants’ argument focuses on the disclosure of Mangold while ignoring
the disclosure of Shkedi. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of
references. In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F .2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been
obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined
teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Appellants also argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22 as
being unpatentable over the combination of Shkedi, Anick, Llach, and
Mangold because Mangold does not teach or suggest “wherein the bidding
criterion specified by the advertiser comprises a plurality of differing bid
values based on a plurality of differing distances between a user geographic
location and a bid input location” (limitation [C]) (App. Br. 26; Reply Br. 3).
According to Appellants, it is the system in Mangold and not the advertiser
that specifies the bidding criterion in Mangold (App. Br. 26–27; Reply Br.
3–5) (citing Mangold ¶¶ 27, 40).
Appellants contend “the user of Mangold does not specify the
criterion because the user specifies the bid price, and then that price is
automatically adjusted based on a ‘some function’ defined in the system”
and “Mangold merely discloses altering payment established in an auction
based upon distance and this altering payment information can be stored by
the advertiser” (App. Br. 27; Reply Br. 3–5). Appellants have not persuaded
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us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds, “an advertiser-defined pricing
function, or advertiser-specified ‘price of increase’ (which results in a
second, different bid amount) amounts to at least a second bid price being
specified by the advertiser (not the system)” (Ans. 11) (citing Mangold
¶ 27). The Examiner further finds, “an advertiser can specify a first bid
amount associated with an advertising range . . . and can specify a second
bid amount . . . associated with a second ‘certain range’” (Ans. 11) (citing
Mangold ¶ 40). We agree with the Examiner that these citations teach or at
least suggests bidding criterion specified by the advertiser comprises a
plurality of differing bid values based on a plurality of differing distances
between a user geographic location and a bid input location (limitation [C]).
Appellants’ Specification (¶¶ 46, 47) describes the claimed “bidding
criterion specified by the advertiser” as being based on the “location of the
user” (see App. Br. 3 (Summary of Claimed Subject Matter)). Below, we
discuss Mangold’s descriptions of how bidding criterion specified by the
advertiser comprises a plurality of differing bid values based on a plurality
of differing distances between a user location and a bid input location.
Notably, Mangold describes an advertiser specifying location based
advertising preferences (¶ 21), inputting a bid location (¶ 22), and advertiser
established proximity bands or boundaries defining the location of a user
relative to an advertiser which determines the price an advertiser will bid (¶¶
25, 27, 31). Mangold also describes an advertiser storing information for
location based advertising and selecting an amount for which the advertiser
will pay a provider (¶ 36), and an advertiser storing information for location
based advertising, where the advertiser may pay a premium if a user within a
certain range of the advertiser clicks through (¶ 40). As described above,
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Mangold (see generally ¶¶ 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 36, 40) uses location
information between a user and advertiser (bidding criterion) and differing
bid amounts based on location information (limitation [C]).
Furthermore, Appellants have not rebutted or otherwise shown the
Examiner’s explanation of the teachings and suggestions of Mangold made
in the Final Rejection (see Final Act. 33–34), to be in error. Notably, the
Examiner (Final Act. 33–34) relies upon Mangold (¶¶ 3, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31,
36, 40) as teaching or suggesting limitation [C]. Appellants’ responses (see
App. Br. 25–28; Reply Br. 2–5) to the Examiner’s findings fail to
specifically address many of the Examiner’s citations of Mangold (¶¶ 3, 21,
22, 25, 31, 36), and are thus unpersuasive.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 22 applying Shkedi, Anick, Llach, and Mangold. We also sustain the
obviousness rejections of independent claims 25, 28, 31, 37, and 43, for
which Appellants rely on the same arguments (see App. Br. 13, 28; Reply
Br. 5). We also sustain the obviousness rejections of dependent claims 2, 5,
7, 10, 12, 24, 27, 30, 32, 36, 38, 42, and 44–49, for which Appellants rely on
the same arguments (see App. Br. 13 and 28; Reply Br. 5) (37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv)).

CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellants have shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2,
5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
(2) Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49 as being
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unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Shkedi,
Anick, Llach, and Mangold.

DECISION
For the reasons explained above, we (1) reverse the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–
49, under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and (2) affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims
2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30–32, 36–38, and 42–49. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) (“The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any
of the grounds specified constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of
the examiner on that claim, except as to any ground specifically reversed”).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED