Michael L. Weiland et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2019

12395013 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/395,013 02/27/2009 Michael L. Weiland 064359/500748 3575
139885 7590 12/31/2019
HERE Global/Alston & Bird
Bank of America Plaza
101 South Tryon Street, Suite 4000
Charlotte, NC 28280-4000
EXAMINER
WILLIAMS, TERESA S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptomail@alston.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MICHAEL L. WEILAND, PAUL T. FORD,
SUZANNE M. MCGRATH, and VOJISLAV SAMSALOVIC

Appeal 2018-000624
Application 12/395,013
Technology Center 3600
____________

BEFORE DAVID M. KOHUT, BETH Z. SHAW, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 11–20.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2016). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Here Global B.V. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claim 10 was previously canceled.
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INVENTION
The present invention relates to “providing navigation guidance, and
more particularly, relates to representing an address in a database to provide
separation of routing and addressing.” Spec. 1:4–6. Claims 1 and 15 are
representative of the invention and are reproduced below.
1. A navigation system comprising:
a processor and a non-transitory memory coupled
therewith, the memory having stored therein at least one point
address record that includes data for representing an address of
a building in a geographic area, the data for representing the
address comprising:
a first identifier attribute for identifying data
associated with an addressed link, wherein the addressed link is
a link representing a portion of a road associated with the
address;
a second identifier attribute for identifying data
associated with a routing link, wherein the routing link is a link
representing a portion of a road associated with a travel-to point
for the address, the portion of road associated with the travel-to
point being different from the portion of the road associated
with the address; and
data representing at least one of an address number
and a building name; and
wherein the navigation system further comprises
computer executable program code stored in the memory and
executable by the processor to cause the processor to allow a
user to select the address, using the addressed link, for
computation of a route thereto and compute the navigation
route to the address based on the travel-to point for the address
associated with the routing link.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).
15. A computer implemented method for providing
navigation guidance to an end-user of a navigation system
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comprising a processor and a non-transitory memory coupled
therewith, the method comprising:
receiving, by the processor, from the end-user of the
navigation system a request for guidance, wherein the request
includes address information and guidance type, wherein the
address information is associated with geographic data stored in
a database representing a display point and with geographic
data stored in the database representing a routing point different
from the display point;
using, by the processor when the request identifies map
display as the guidance type, the address information to retrieve
the geographic data from the database representing the display
point;
using, by the processor when the request identifies
routing as the guidance type, the address information to retrieve
the geographic data from the database representing the routing
point; and
providing, by the processor, the end-user with at least one
of a map display using the display point data and route
guidance using the routing point data.
Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.).

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Finn et al. US 7,660,666 B2 Feb. 9, 2010
Natesan et al. US 6,691,128 B2 Feb. 10, 2004

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–9 and 11–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–4.
Claims 1–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Finn. Final Act. 5–10.
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Claims 11–14, 17, and 18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Finn in view of Natesan. Final Act. 11–
14.

OPINION
The § 101 Rejection of Claims 1–9 and 11–20
Principles of Law
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas’” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden,
56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at
69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.

USPTO Guidance
After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer
mailed, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“PTO Guidance”), updated by USPTO,
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
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documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (jointly referred to as
“PTO Guidance”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance
Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the
availability of the October update).
The PTO Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all
patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019.
PTO Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. Under that guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (Step 2A, Prong One); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018) (Step 2A, Prong
Two).
Id. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then conclude the
claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and, in Step 2B, look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality,
to the judicial exception.
Id. at 56.
There is no dispute that all of the claims on appeal fall within a
category of statutory subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”); PTO Guidance, 84
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Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (“Step 1”). We therefore turn to the further issues raised
by the PTO Guidance and Appellant’s arguments.

Representative Claims
Appellant argues claims 1–9 and 11–20 as a group. Appeal. Br. 4–10;
Reply Br. 7–13. Independent claims 1 and 9 are system claims that are
similar in scope, and, therefore, we select claim 1 as representative of the
group comprising claims 1–9 and 11–14. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Independent claim 15 is a method claim that differs slightly in scope from
claims 1 and 9. Where necessary, we address claim 15, which is
representative of the group comprising claims 15–20, separately from claim
1.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (PTO Guidance Step 2A)
Step 2A, Prong One
Under step 2A, prong one, of the PTO Guidance, we first look to
whether claim 1 recites any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes). PTO Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54. As relevant here, the
Guidance identifies the following as mental processes: “concepts performed
in the human mind,” such as “an observation, evaluation, judgment, [or]
opinion.” Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
The Examiner finds “[c]omputing navigation routes based on address
link and routing links is an abstract idea because it is using categories to
organize, store[] and transmit[] information.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner
further clarifies that computing navigation routes “is [an] abstract idea
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because it is collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis” (Ans. 14), and that a “human
incorporating knowledge of entrances into navigation . . . to assisted [sic]
travelers with additional pedestrianly travel or travel beyond a building
address used in a driving route is already done mentally” (Ans. 17). As
explained in the following paragraphs, we agree with the Examiner that
claim 1 describes an abstract idea, because the claim recites mental
processes in various limitations.
The Specification describes, “[i]n many cases, the position of an
addressed location in the real world is not the same as the travel-to position.”
Spec. 12:17–18. By separating addressing and routing, the Specification
discloses “a user of navigation and/or map-related services receives more
accurate information regarding an address of interest.” Id. at 3:21–23.
Based on this disclosure, claim 1 recites a navigation system that uses the
travel-to point of an address to provide a user with routing information, i.e.,
a navigation system comprising a processor and a non-transitory memory
coupled therewith, the memory having the following data stored therein:
at least one point address record that includes data for
representing an address of a building in a geographic area, the
data for representing the address comprising:
a first identifier attribute for identifying data associated
with an addressed link, wherein the addressed link is a link
representing a portion of a road associated with the address;
a second identifier attribute for identifying data
associated with a routing link, wherein the routing link is a link
representing a portion of a road associated with a travel-to point
for the address, the portion of road associated with the travel-to
point being different from the portion of the road associated
with the address; and
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data representing at least one of an address number and a
building name.
The navigation system is configured to allow a user to enter an
address and, using the above data, compute a navigation route to the
destination based on the travel-to point for the address, i.e.,
wherein the navigation system further comprises
computer executable program code stored in the memory and
executable by the processor to cause the processor to allow a
user to select the address, using the addressed link, for
computation of a route thereto and compute the navigation
route to the address based on the travel-to point for the address
associated with the routing link.
Simply put, claim 1 broadly encompasses (1) a user entering an
address into a navigation system, (2) the navigation system correlating that
address to an actual travel-to location based on data stored in the system, and
(3) generating navigation directions to the travel-to location. In other words,
claim 1, given its broadest reasonable interpretation, recites providing more
accurate directions to an exact location beyond the location’s street address,
i.e., an observation and evaluation of an address and location. The PTO
Guidance identifies an evaluation performed by a human mentally, or with
pen and paper as could be done here by writing out exact directions to a
location, as a mental process, and, thus, an abstract idea. See PTO
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14–15; see also Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the
exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”); see also Peschke Map Techs. LLC v.
Rouse Props. Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 881, 887 (E.D. Va. 2016) (claims
directed to “an electronic map navigation system that enables a user to
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‘locate a particular store through the use of location and layout information’”
are directed to an abstract idea).
For the above reasons, claim 1 can reasonably can be characterized as
reciting a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A,
prong one, of the PTO Guidance.
Claim 15 is a method claim that recites the following conditional
language:
using, by the processor when the request identifies map
display as the guidance type, the address information to retrieve
the geographic data from the database representing the display
point;
using, by the processor when the request identifies
routing as the guidance type, the address information to retrieve
the geographic data from the database representing the routing
point; and
providing, by the processor, the end-user with at least
one of a map display using the display point data and route
guidance using the routing point data.
Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
We note that conditional steps employed in a method claim need not
be limiting if, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the method need
not invoke those steps. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847 (PTAB
April 28, 2016) (precedential) (holding “[t]he Examiner did not need to
present evidence of the obviousness of the remaining method steps of claim
1 that are not required to be performed under a broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim . . . .”); see also In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr.,
367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he PTO is obligated to give
claims their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.”). Here,
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the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 15 includes the request for
guidance being one of routing or, in the alternative, map display.
Although claim 15 requires only one request or the other (i.e., routing
or map display) under Schulhauser, for completeness, we address both
alternatives under Step 2A, Prong One. When the request provides route
guidance using the routing point data, claim 15 recites the same abstract idea
as identified in claim 1: an evaluation performed by a human mentally, or
with pen and paper as could be done here by writing out exact directions to a
location, which is a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. See PTO
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14–15. When the request provides a map
display using the display point data, claim 15 recites a similar abstract idea:
an observation and evaluation of an address on a map, which is an
evaluation that could be performed by a human mentally, or with pen and
paper by drawing the map, which is a mental process, and thus an abstract
idea. Id.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Having concluded that claims 1 and 15 recite a judicial exception, i.e.,
an abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claims
recite “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application” (Step 2A, Prong Two). PTO Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues the claims are directed to a specific improvement to
a navigation system, and an improved specific application of providing
navigation information to an end user. Appeal Br. 4–10. Specifically,
Appellant contends
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the claimed invention improves upon the technical field of
computer implemented navigation by providing a system which
can accurately route a user to location where the routing may lead
to a different location than where the address of the location may
indicate or where it may be displayed on a map
representation. . . . The claimed invention provides technical
solution, i.e. multiple function-based data representations, to the
technical problem of enabling different address based functions,
e.g. user selection of an address, meaningful display of that
address and appropriate routing to that address, which require
different data therefore.
Id. at 7.
Appellant contends the claims recite technical improvements
analogous to those recited by the claims of Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014); and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 20–24. We disagree,
and distinguish these cases from the instant claims.
The claims in Enfish recited a “specific improvement to the way
computers operate,” i.e., an improved database configuration that permitted
faster and more efficient searching. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–33, 1336. The
Federal Circuit has explained that the claims in Enfish “did more than allow
computers to perform familiar tasks with greater speed and efficiency” and
“actually permitted users to launch and construct databases in a new way.”
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The Federal Circuit has also explained that the claims in Enfish “focused on
an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other
tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Secured Mail
Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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In contrast to the claims in Enfish, the claims here use a computer in its
ordinary capacity to perform computation of route guidance or map display.
See Appeal. Br. 17–20 (Claims App.); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. The
claims here do not recite an advance in hardware or software that, for
example, causes a computer itself or a database itself to operate faster or
more efficiently. Appellant argues the claims provide an improvement in
computer technology because the “addressed link and the routing link for an
address may be efficiently and quickly identified by the accessing of single
address data record.” Reply Br. 11. The Specification, however, does not
disclose any improvement to computer functionality itself that would be
analogous to Enfish. The Specification discloses increased accuracy in
representing an address using an addressed link and a routing link (see Spec.
3:21–23), but Appellant has not identified, nor can we find, any support for
the single data record efficiently and quickly identifying the address link and
routing link that would indicate an improvement in computer technology.
The instant claims are also not analogous to the claims in DDR
Holdings. There, the Federal Circuit determined that certain claims satisfied
Mayo/Alice step two because “the claimed solution amount[ed] to an
inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-centric problem,” i.e.,
a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59.
The Federal Circuit explained that the patent-eligible claims specified “how
interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result . . .
that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily
triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. The court reasoned that
those claims recited a technological solution “necessarily rooted in computer
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technology” that addressed a “problem specifically arising in the realm of
computer networks.” Id. at 1257.
According to the Federal Circuit, “DDR Holdings does not apply
when . . . the asserted claims do not ‘attempt to solve a challenge particular
to the Internet.’” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
873 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The claims here do not
attempt to solve a challenge particular to the Internet. See Appeal. Br. 17–
20 (Claims App.); see also Ans. 18. The claims require a memory that
stores data, but do not require the system to be connected to a network and
do not recite transmissions between different devices. See Appeal. Br. 17–
20 (Claims App.). Appellant argues the use of a geographical database
necessarily roots the claims in computer technology (Reply Br. 12),
however, under DDR Holdings, this argument is not persuasive because the
claims do not address a problem specifically arising in the realm of
computer networks. See Appeal. Br. 17–20 (Claims App.); see also Ans. 18
Regarding McRO, the Federal Circuit’s decision was based on the
claims being directed to an improvement in computer animation, and, thus,
did not recite a concept similar to previously identified abstract ideas.
837 F.3d at 1316. The court relied on the specification’s explanation of how
the claimed rules enabled the automation of specific animation tasks that
previously could not be automated. Id. at 1313. The McRO court indicated
that it was the incorporation of the particular claimed rules in computer
animation that “improved [the] existing technological process,” unlike cases
such as Alice where a computer was merely used as a tool to perform an
existing process. Id. at 1314. Here, the claims are not directed to a process
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that could not previously be automated, rather, they are directed to inputting
more accurate data into a known process of providing navigation guidance.
See Spec. 1:9–3:23.
Appellant also argues the claims provide meaningful limitations
regarding the additional data elements in the geographic database that go
beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment and neither preempts nor ties up the use of an
abstract idea. Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 12. Appellant contends that the
claims do not preempt “the entire idea of computer implemented
navigation.” Appeal. Br. 5–6. This argument does not persuade us of
Examiner error. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its
absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v.
Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering
a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and
made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong Two, we find the claims do not
recite “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.” PTO Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).

Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (USPTO Guidance Step 2B)
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether the
claims add any specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. PTO Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(d). Here, the Examiner finds “the abstract
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idea is performed using a generic computer, wherein the generic computer
performs functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional (i.e.
gathering geographic data for a navigational display).” Ans. 14. The
Examiner further finds “including things like the location of entrances or
parking lots into GPS navigation field at the time of the invention would be
well-known, routine and conventional, by performing basic data gathering
operations that any generic computer would be expected to do.” Ans. 15.
The Examiner concludes “the additional elements [of the claims] when
considered both individually and as an ordered combination do not amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea.” Ans. 16.
Appellant argues the use of separate, different address and routing
data is a specific implementation that is not well understood, routine, or
conventional. Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 11–12. We disagree. As discussed
in Step 2A, the use of separate, different address and routing data is directed
to a mental process and, thus, an abstract idea. At Step 2B, we look for
claim limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field. As additional elements, the
claims recite a navigation system comprising a processor, memory, and
database. Appeal Br. 17–20 (Claims App.). Appellant’s Specification
discloses “all of the components [in the navigation system] may be
conventional . . . and the manufacture and use of these components are
known to those of skill in the art.” Spec. 7:3–5. The conventional
components described include a global position system (GPS) 112, a
processor 104, a storage medium 118, a geographic data database 116
(described as a database published by “NAVTEQ North America, LLC”),
and navigation software 110. Spec. 5:1–6:23. Thus, the Specification does
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not describe, and Appellant has not pointed out, any additional disclosure of
the claimed navigation system beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional in the field of navigation.
Moreover, the claimed processor and memory of the navigation
system operate to collect, process, and communicate data. See Appeal
Br. 17–20 (Claims App.); see also Ans. 14–19. Court decisions have
recognized that generic computer components operating to collect, process,
and communicate data are well understood, routine, and conventional to a
skilled artisan. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 226; Symantec, 838 F.3d
at 1316–20; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1164–5
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715–
16 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
Based on BASCOM, Appellant further contends an “inventive
concept can be found in the nonconventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pieces.” Appeal Br. 10 (citing BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016));
see also Reply Br. 11–12. The claims in BASCOM recited a “specific
method of filtering Internet content” requiring “the installation of a filtering
tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable
filtering features specific to each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1345–46, 1350.
The instant claims, however, do not resemble the claims in BASCOM
because they do not require any nonconventional computer, network or
display components, or even a non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces. As discussed above,
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Appellant’s Specification describes a conventional arrangement of the
navigation components. Spec. 5:1–7:5.
For these reasons, we determine that the limitations of claims 1 and
15, when considered both individually and as an ordered combination, do
not recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the
judicial exception within the meaning of the PTO Guidance. PTO Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55; MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in this section, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

The § 102(b) Rejection of Claims 1–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 over Finn
Appellant argues claims 1–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 as a group. Appeal
Br. 11–14; Reply Br. 2–6.3 We select independent claim 1 as representative
of the group comprising claims 1–9, and select independent claim 15 as
representative of the group comprising claims 15, 16, 19, and 20. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Independent Claim 1
Appellant argues Finn does not disclose
representing an address using data comprising [an] addressed
link representing a portion of a road associated with an address
and a routing link representing a travel-to point for the address
different from the address location where addressed link is used
to for selection of an address by a user and the routing link is
used to compute a route thereto.

3 In the Reply Brief, Appellant presents arguments only for independent
claims 1, 9, and 15 as a group (Reply Br. 2–6), and does not argue the merits
of the dependent claim rejections (Reply Br. 6).
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Appeal Br. 11 (emphases added). Appellant argues Finn does not use
separate data for address selection and for navigation routing as claimed. Id.
at 13. Rather, Appellant contends, Finn’s system “computes a route to the
address and then effectively appends the additional ‘path’ which is stored in
the disclosed location map database, leaving the user to manually follow the
path once they have been routed to the address location by the navigation
system.” Id. at 12 (citing Finn, col. 8, 1. 54–col. 9, l. 5). According to
Appellant
Finn computes a route to an address of a location and then may
provide additional information to guide the user to a specific
point away from that address location if necessary . . . [b]ut
nowhere in Finn does it state that where the address location is
different from what the routing location should be, e.g. the street
address of a mall [versus] the actual location of a store in a mall,
that the system of Finn computes a route to actual location of the
store as opposed to computing a route to the street address and
then providing additional information, such as the mall footprint
or appending a stored path to the initial routing.
Appeal Br. 13. Appellant concludes “[t]here is no teaching or suggestion
that Finn in fact computes a route to particular feature represented in Finn’s
location map database.” Id. at 14.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. The
Examiner finds, and we agree, that Finn describes a navigation system
comprising a core database 220, which has data representing an address of a
location (i.e., basic data 250) and a travel-to point that is different from the
address (i.e., extended data 260). Ans. 3–4, 20 (citing Finn, Fig. 1; col. 2, l.
63–col. 3, l. 12; col. 3, l. 41–col. 4, l. 9). Finn discloses the basic data 250
represents public roads and addresses (col. 3, l. 46–50), and extended data
260 represents features that connect to the public roads, such as an access
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road on private property to reach parking for a point of interest (col. 3, l. 62–
65). Thus, we agree Finn’s road address data 250 and travel-to parking data
260 are different data.
Further, we agree that Finn discloses using the different, separate data
for address selection and for navigation routing as claimed. Specifically,
Finn, col. 3, 1. 14–21, recognizes that “sometimes a building has a street
address on the public road network, but is actually located some distance off
the public road network, e.g., across a parking lot or driveway” and a user
can “search for the street address to find the actual location of the building.”
See Ans. 4. Thus, a user can enter the road address data 250 and receive
guidance to the travel-to point in data 260.
Regarding Appellant’s argument that Finn computes a route to the
address and then effectively appends the additional “path” which is stored in
the disclosed location map database (Appeal Br. 12), we are not apprised of
Examiner error because the claims do not preclude such a route
computation. Claim 1 requires the navigation system to “compute the
navigation route to the address based on the travel-to point for the address
associated with the routing link.” See Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.)
(emphasis added). Figure 5 of the Specification discloses an embodiment
where an “addressed link” 506 is different than a “routing point” 504.
Spec. 15:10–15; Fig. 5. In such an example, a user would be routed to the
location via First Street, then would continue driving on the unnamed mall
street to find parking at routing point 504. Spec. 15:16–21. In view of this
embodiment, we agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable
interpretation, consistent with Appellant’s disclosure, of computing the
navigation route to the address “based on” the travel-to point destination
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does not preclude routing a user to the destination via an intermediate
location (e.g., via First Street), as long as the routing includes the final
travel-to point (e.g., the location on the unnamed mall street). See Ans. 20;
Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1369.
As cited by the Appellant, Finn discloses calculating a route from the
user’s current position to the access point on the public road network, and
then calculates the path from the access point to the ultimate destination.
See Appeal Br. 12 (citing Finn, col. 8, l. 54–col. 9, l. 5). Finn’s system then
generates route guidance to travel along the public road network as well as
to travel along the path (i.e., private parking lot roads) to the ultimate
destination. Id. We agree with the Examiner that, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation of claim 1 as discussed above, Finn discloses
allowing a user to select the street address of a location (see col. 3, l. 14–21),
using the addressed link (i.e., street address, basic data 250), for computation
of a route thereto and compute the navigation route to the address based on
(i.e., “including a path to”) the ultimate travel-to point for the address
associated with the routing link (i.e., parking lot, extended data 260).
Appellant’s further attempt to distinguish the claims by arguing Finn
does not disclose a travel-to point directly to an actual location or entrance
of a store in a mall (see Appeal Br. 13) is not persuasive. Although
Appellant’s Specification provides embodiments with specific examples of
travel-to points as store entrances (see, e.g., Fig. 5 and Spec. 15:10–21), the
claims do not require any specific travel-to point. A particular embodiment
appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the
claim language is broader than the embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, we
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agree that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims read on a
travel-to point being a parking lot, and providing guidance to that parking lot
using the extended routing data 260. Ans. 3–4 (citing Finn, col. 5, l. 5–11
and 17–21; see also col. 8, l. 54–col. 9, l. 4); Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1369.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues Finn’s disclosure of a multi-part,
core database that includes a basic portion and an extended portion does not
disclose “a first attribute identifier” and “a second attribute identifier.”
Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant further contends “Finn does not provide any
teaching or suggestion regarding a single data record that quickly and
efficiently identifies both (a) the addressed link and (b) the routing link
corresponding to an address.” Id. at 5.
These arguments are not entitled to consideration because they were
not presented for the first time in the opening brief, and Appellant has not
shown good cause why they should be considered, as required by our
procedural rule. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.4l(b)(2) (2012); accord Ex parte
Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1473–74 (BPAI 2010) (informative opinion)
(absent a showing of good cause, the Board is not required to address an
argument newly presented in the reply brief that could have been presented
in the principal brief on appeal); see also Optivus Technology, Inc. v. Ion
Beam Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (argument
raised for the first time in the reply brief that could have been raised in the
opening brief is waived).
Nonetheless, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments in the
Reply Brief that the Examiner erred. Appellant’s Specification describes a
single geographic database 200 that comprises a point address record 202
having addressed link 202(3) and routing link 202(4). Fig. 3 and Spec.
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12:10–16. Similarly, as cited by Appellant, Finn discloses a core geographic
database 220 that is configured to have the various portions (basic data 250,
extended data 260, etc.) linked as a single database. See Reply Br. 4 (citing
Finn, col. 3, l. 28–36, 41–55; see also col. 3, l. 37–40). Thus, we agree with
the Examiner that Finn discloses a single database record 220 having a first
identifier attribute (i.e., a link to basic data 250) and a second identifier
attribute (i.e., a link to extended data 260). Ans. 3–4, 20.
Appellant’s argument that Finn does not disclose a single data record
that quickly and efficiently identifies the address link and routing link is not
persuasive, because it is attorney argument not supported by the
Specification. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). The Specification discloses
increased accuracy in representing an address (see Spec. 3:21–23), but
Appellant has not identified, and we cannot find, any support for the single
data record quickly and efficiently identifying the address link and routing
link.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 under
pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Finn.
Independent Claim 15
As discussed above with respect to the § 101 rejection, claim 15 is a
method claim that recites conditional language to provide “at least one of a
map display using the display point data and route guidance using the
routing point data.” Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.) (emphasis added);
Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847. Although claim 15 requires only one
request or the other (i.e., routing or map display) under Schulhauser, for
completeness, we address the obviousness rejection of both requests.
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When the request provides route guidance using the routing point
data, the scope of the claim is similar to independent claim 1, and we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection for the same reasons as discussed with respect to
claim 1. When the request provides a map display using the display point
data, which is address information different than the routing point, we agree
with the Examiner that Finn discloses displaying an actual street address
point on a map (Finn, Fig. 3, address on road network 250), which is
different than the routing point (parking lot 260) used for navigational
guidance. Ans. 7–8 (citing Finn, col. 3, l. 56–col. 4, l. 55).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15, 16,
19, and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Finn.

The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 11–14, 17, and 18 over Finn and Natesan
Appellant argues Natesan fails to correct the alleged deficiencies of
Finn. Appeal Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant contends Natesan does not
teach representing an address with two links, i.e., an addressed link and a
routing link different therefrom, and does not teach representing an address
with two points, i.e., a display point and a routing point. Id. As discussed
above with respect to independent claims 1 and 15, we agree with the
Examiner that Finn discloses these disputed limitations. Thus, for those
same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 11–
14, 17, and 18 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the
combination of Finn and Natesan.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is AFFIRMED.
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The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Finn is AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 11–14, 17, and 18 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Finn in view of Natesan is
AFFIRMED.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–20 101 Non-statutory
subject matter
1–9, 11–20
1–9, 15,
16, 19, 20
102(b) Finn 1–9, 15,
16, 19, 20

11–14,
17, 18
103(a) Finn, Natesan 11–14,
17, 18

Overall
Outcome
1–9, 11–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED