Michael K.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 25, 2018
0120170485 (E.E.O.C. May. 25, 2018)

0120170485

05-25-2018

Michael K.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Michael K.,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120170485

Hearing No. 480-2014-00239X

Agency No. 4F900017713

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's November 4, 2016, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was a former career employee of the Agency. He was a flat sorting machine operator, and he resigned from his position in 1997.

On August 24, 2013, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Asian), national origin (Korean), age (53), and reprisal when: (1) on or about May 8, 2013, Complainant was denied reinstatement as a career employee; and (2) since on or about May 22, 2013, Complainant was not offered a non-career position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's/Complainant's June 3, 2014, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency on September 28, 2016.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Complainant, on appeal, states that the Human Resources (HR) office did not take his requests seriously, and he feels they violated the Agency's handbook.

For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in his favor. Therefore, we find that the AJ properly issued a decision here by summary judgment.

A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep't. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The record indicates Complainant submitted requests for reinstatement to a career position to the HR office in the Los Angeles District. DM, who worked in the HR office informed Complainant that the Los Angeles District had not hired any career employees since 2007 or 2008 and did not have any career employee spaces available. Complainant states that KR, who also worked in the HR office, denied his reinstatement request. However, KR stated that she is not involved in the day to day hiring of employees and was not involved in denying Complainant's request.

As to claim 2, Complainant asserted that he talked to KR in May 2013, and she said she would contact him in a few weeks, but did not contact him until September 2013. Complainant asserted he should have been given a non-career position earlier that others because of his "high seniority." Complainant was eventually given a non-career position that started in November 2013. Complainant did not offer any evidence that any similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than he.

We now turn to Complainant to establish that these explanations were a pretext masking discrimination. Complainant stated that another person, RV, was reinstated as a career employee after early retirement. 2 However, the AJ noted that RV never separated from the Agency. As found by the AJ, Complainant offered no evidence that would raise an inference of discrimination based on race or national origin. As to his age claim, the AJ similarly found that there was no evidence that gave rise to an inference of age discrimination. As such, we cannot find that Complainant has established that he was subjected to discrimination based on his race, national origin or age.

Regarding his retaliation claim, even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case of reprisal, for the same reasons we find he did not prove race, national origin, and age discrimination, we conclude that the weight of the evidence does not establish that retaliatory animus played any role in the failure to hire Complainant for a career position, or the delay in offering him a non-career position.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision to AFFIRM the Agency's final order, because the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 25, 2018

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

2 Complainant states that the AJ and the Agency looked at the records of the wrong RV. However, according to the investigative summary, the Los Angeles District did not have any record of a RV (as spelled by Complainant) working for the district. Complainant was informed of the discrepancy and stated that RV (as spelled in the record) might be the same person he named as a comparator. In his appeal, Complainant does not state where his RV worked, nor does he provide a statement from him.

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