0120122780
12-07-2012
Michael J. Hillion, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.
Michael J. Hillion,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120122780
Agency No. 4F-920-0138-08
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the Agency dated August 1, 2012, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Complainant was assigned to the position of Postmaster at the Agency's Post Office facility in Fawnskin, California.
Prior to this event, believing that the Agency subjected him to unlawful discrimination, Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint process. On August 10, 2009, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement to resolve his pending EEO complaints. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
THIRD: [The Agency] agrees to reassign Complainant on a non-competitive basis into the position of Postmaster, Fawnskin Post Office (EAS 13, Occupational Code 23016113) at a salary of $52,526.00 per year.
(d) Complainant understands that his retention of the Postmaster position at Fawnskin Postal Office depends on operational needs, as well as his job performance. He understands that this Agreement is not intended to grant any additional rights or privileges with respect to such Postmaster position and that he is expected to comply with all postal policies, rules, and regulations.
By letter to the Agency dated June 7, 2012, Complainant alleged that the Agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that the Agency specifically implement its terms. Specifically, Complainant indicated that he received a letter dated May 30, 2012, stating that, based on the Agency's new strategy plan regarding rural offices, his office will become a remotely managed post office or a part-time post office. As a result, there would be a decrease in the operating hours of his office effective September 30, 2014. The letter from the Manager of Organizational Effectiveness Employee Resource Management (Manager) in San Diego, California, noted that he will remain in his current position title, occupation code and grade until that time, unless he chooses to pursue another career choice prior to September 30, 2014. The Manager provided Complainant with additional options such as applying for other postmaster vacancies and voluntary early retirement. Complainant asserted that when he signed the settlement agreement settling three EEO complaints, he expected the Agency to keep its end of the agreement. He requested that the Agency continue its compliance with the settlement agreement.
In its August 1, 2012 FAD, the Agency concluded that it did not breach the settlement agreement. The Agency noted that Complainant was reassigned to the Postmaster position as provided in the settlement agreement and would remain in the position. However, the Agency noted that, due to the drop in mail volume, the Agency had to identify offices for reduced work hours. As such, the Fawnskin Post Office was one of the offices identified as a six-hour per day office. The Agency also noted that the settlement agreement did not provide for a specific length of time during which the Agency is obligated to retain Complainant in the Postmaster position. Further, due to the change in the Agency's circumstances, Complainant's position will be changed effective September 30, 2014. Accoridngly, the Agency found no breach of the settlement agreement.
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
Complainant asserted on appeal that the settlement agreement must remain in force and that the Agency should continue to comply with the settlement agreement. However, the Commission has held that where an individual bargains for a position without any specific terms as to the length of service, it would be improper to interpret the reasonable intentions of the parties to include employment in that exact position forever. See Papac v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05910808 (Dec. 12, 1991); Parker v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05910576 (Aug. 30, 1991); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997) (Agency agreed in a settlement to promote the complainant to a specific position, and did so. She was reassigned almost four years later because of a reorganization. Applying Papac and Parker, the Commission found no breach). Applying these cases, we find that the Agency did not breach the settlement agreement.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
December 7, 2012
__________________
Date
2
0120122780
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120122780