Metta Electric

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 13, 2005

14-CA-028042 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 13, 2005)

JD(SF)–51–05
Saint Louis, MO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE

JHP & ASSOCIATES, LLC d/b/a
METTA ELECTRIC,

and Cases 14-CA-28042
14-CA-28179

LOCAL NO. 1, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, AFL-CIO

Paula B. Givens, Esq., of Saint Louis, Missouri,
for the General Counsel.

Christopher N. Grant, Esq., of Saint Louis, Missouri,
for the Charging Party.

Lawrence P. Kaplan, Esq., Saint Louis, Missouri,
for the Respondent.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This is an ongoing dispute in which the
Respondent has repeatedly refused to honor it obligations under the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §151, et seq. Following an initial Board decision,1 enforced by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 the Respondent has allegedly continued to engage practices
violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act (refusing to furnish requested information and refusing to
meet and bargain), which allegations were tried before me at Saint Louis, Missouri, on
May 25, 2005.

The Respondent generally denied the substantive allegations in the complaint, and
affirmatively contends that the Union never intended to reach an agreement but is trying to force
the Respondent out of business.

Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of the witness, briefs and
arguments of counsel, I hereby make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1 JHP & Associates, LLC d/b/a Metta Electric, 338 NLRB 1059 (2003).
2 JHP & Associates, LLC, d/b/a Metta Electric v. NLRB, 360 F3d 904 (8th Cir 2004).

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I. Jurisdiction

The Respondent is a Missouri limited liability company with an office and place of
business in St. Charles, Missouri, from which it has been engaged in the building and
construction industry as an electrical contractor. In the course and conduct of this business, it
annually receives directly from points outside the State of Missouri, goods products and
materials valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent admits, and I conclude, that it is an
employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(2), 2(6) and 2(7) of
the Act.

II. The Labor Organization Involved

The Charging Party, Local No. 1, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-
CIO (herein the Union) is admitted to be, and I find is, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.

III. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

A. The Facts in Brief.

On February 28, 2000, the Union was certified to represent a unit of the Respondent’s
electricians. The Respondent then made certain unilateral changes in employee working
conditions and on March 15, 2000, the unit employees went on strike. The Respondent hired
replacements and the strikers were subsequently hired by other employers whose employees
are represented by the Union. Thereafter, the Union made certain requests for information,
including the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all strike replacements. The
Respondent refused to submit the requested information, which along with the unilateral
changes in working conditions other activity alleged violative of the Act led to the initial round of
litigation. As noted above, these allegations were tried before an Administrative Law Judge,
whose findings were affirmed by the Board. The Eight Circuit granted enforcement (except for
the addresses of the strike replacements), following which the Union again requested certain
information and sought to bargain with the Respondent.

Counsel for the Respondent initially refused to bargain, stating in a letter dated May 27,
2004, to the Board’s Regional Office that “It is Metta’s position that Local 1 does not intend to
engage in ‘genuine bargaining’ as such Metta is refusing to bargain on the same grounds as
Local 1 has refused in those other instances.” When the General Counsel’s litigation division
was considering whether to seek contempt in the Eighth Circuit, Counsel again wrote, in part,
“The Employer has not furnished information concerning the identity of its employees, their
wage rates and other such information because it is the Employer’s well founded belief that the
Union does not wish to engage in ‘genuine bargaining’ and rather seeks the information only to
disrupt and destroy the Employer.”

Subsequent to the Board’s petition for contempt (which was ultimately denied), the
Respondent agreed to meet and did in fact furnish some but not all of the requested information.
The parties then had three negotiation sessions in February and March 2005. In sum, the
Union proposed its area agreement with National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA),
which the Respondent rejected on grounds that it did not want NECA as its bargaining agent.
The Respondent also rejected a proposed interim agreement, which Union negotiators stated
could run from 12 to 18 months, and, as Larry Palazzolo testified, would be “a bridge between
where they are now and the IBEW/NECA agreement”. And finally, the Respondent rejected

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the Union’s proposal which deleted NECA but which, according to Palazzolo, the Union’s
Director of Organizing, contained changes that made it more costly than the first proposal. He
testified “that many of these changes were substantially more than were in the first proposal”
because “if we were deleting NECA and the opportunities to bargain, we wanted something in
return. We feel that is (deleting NECA) is a very costly concession and we wanted something in
return.”

After the third meeting, Lawrence Kaplan, Counsel for the Respondent, suggested the
parties were at an impasse, but that if the Union wanted to negotiate further, he was available
by phone. The Union rejected phone negotiations.

B. Analysis and Concluding Findings.

The Respondent’s principal defense is Counsel’s assertion that the Union has no
intention of agreeing to anything other than its area contract with NECA. Given the “Favored
Nations” clause in the area agreement, for the Union to agree with the Respondent for terms
and conditions of employment lesser than those in the area agreement would allow all the other
employers to invoke those lesser terms. It therefore follows that the Union would not enter into
such an agreement with the Respondent. Counsel has a point and may even be correct;
however, other than his opinion, there is no evidence in the record on which to base a finding
that the Union does not in fact seek to negotiate an individual contract with the Respondent.
And, of course, the “Favored Nations” clause is subject to interpretation should in fact the Union
agree with the Respondent to something other than the terms of the area agreement. Counsel
made the same contention in the initial case, which was summarily rejected by Judge Clark on
grounds that Counsel there, as here, cited no case authority nor evidence to support his claim.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is not excused from its obligations under the Act to
bargain in good faith with the representative of its employees.

1. Refusal to Furnish Information.

In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint it is alleged that on various dates from
April 26, 2004, to February 3, 2005, the Respondent refused to furnish, or delayed in furnishing,
information concerning the names of bargaining unit employees and their respective wages and
other benefits. The first category of information requested by the Union on April 26, 2004 is: the
names of all bargaining unit employees from 2000 to the present, their dates of employment and
reasons for any terminations, current wage rates for all bargaining unit employees on prevailing
and non-prevailing wage jobs and all wage rates from 2000, all prevailing wage reports from
2000, copies of all employee benefit plans, copies of any vacation, holiday, sick days or cellular
phone plans and accumulated vacation, holiday, or sick days for each unit employee; and
copies of personal policies and employee handbooks in effect from 2000 to the present.
Excluded was all such information already submitted.

Additionally, by letter of February 3, 2005, the Union requested information relating to
current employees including for each: name, hire date, classification, wage rate, amount of PTO
accrued yearly and hourly cost to the Respondent, medical insurance paid by the Respondent,
any retirement premiums paid by the Respondent and the hourly cost and holiday pay costs.
The Union further requested information concerning each apprentice, including the particular
program and program standards, pay scale progression and hours needed for each progression
and the hours worked by each apprentice and the Respondent’s costs.

All this requested information relates to the wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of the Respondent’s employees. The information is therefore potentially helpful to the Union in

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forming bargaining proposals and determining whether to accept or reject proposals from the
Respondent. The information is necessary and material to the Union in its capacity as the
employees’ bargaining representative.

In NLRB vs. Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. 432 (1967), the Supreme Court affirmed the
Board’s general holding that a union is entitled to information necessary to perform its duty as
the bargaining representative, and specifically information which might tend to prove the viability
of grievances – that is information which is potentially relevant to issues being grieved.
Subsequently, the Board has applied the general holding of Acme to information requested by a
union for use in collective bargaining. E.g., Gorham House, Inc., 332 NLRB 1256 (2000).

The Respondent recognizes its general obligation to furnish material information on
request, but justifies its refusal to furnish the above information on grounds that “All of the
information requested from Metta concerning the names of current employees, individual wage
rates, their dates of employment, their status as journeyman or apprentice could have easily
been obtained from the employees directly if any attempt had been made to contact the
employees.” (Original emphasis.) It is well settled (and held by the Judge and Board in the
previous case) that the mere fact that requested information could be obtained elsewhere does
not excuse the employer from its obligations. Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 NLRB 1369
(1985). Since all the information requested by the Union set forth in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of
the complaint is clearly material and necessary for the Union to bargain, I conclude that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to furnish the information in a timely fashion. It
is noted that when the Respondent did finally agree to meet with the Union in February 2005, it
did submit some of the requested information, such as the names of employees; however, the
information was not in a form that was complete (no inclusive dates of employment, wage rates
or apprentice status) or very useful. Thus even submitting some information, I conclude that in
general, the Respondent ignored the information requests and delayed furnishing the
information. The Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of Act.

The Respondent further defends its refusal to furnish the requested information on
grounds that the Union engaged in surface bargaining, did not even attempt to contact the
replacement employees, attempted to force the Respondent to accept the association as its
bargaining agent and when the Respondent refused, made a proposal substantially more
onerous. On brief, Counsel for the Respondent concluded, “Since Local 1’s actions are in bad
faith, Metta is released from any obligation to supply the additional information requested by
Local 1.” I reject this defense. Although the Union’s tactics are in some respects questionable,
there is no allegation that it bargained in bad faith or had a mind set not to reach an agreement.
Further, the Respondent offered no evidence to prove its assertion that the Union’s request for
information was for the purpose of harming the Respondent. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems
Co., 332 NLRB 1257.

Finally, the Respondent does not contest the materiality of the requested information or
argue any kind of privilege (e.g. confidentially of employee personal files) which would relieve it
of the duty to furnish the information.

2. Bargaining

It is alleged in paragraph 9 of the complaint that by letters dated April 26 and May 10,
2004, the Union requested the Respondent meet with its representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining and that the Respondent refused to do so until February 1, 2005. It is also
alleged that the Respondent breached its bargaining obligations by “insisting on bargaining by
telephone rather than face-to-face,” failing to meet at reasonable times and “insisting the Union

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submit written concessions by mail prior to any further negotiations,” and by failing to meet since
April 7, 2005.

No doubt that following the Eight Circuit’s enforcement of the Board’s order in the first
case the Respondent refused to bargain. Counsel so stated in a letter to the Regional Office
and in a letter to litigation division. However, the parties did subsequently meet on three
occasions in 2005 and it is fair to say they were substantially apart on what would be an
acceptable agreement. The Respondent contends the parties were at impasse. Palazzolo
testified that everything was negotiable, notwithstanding that the Union’s latest proposal,
deleting NECA as the bargaining agent for the Respondent was substantially more onerous
than the area contract.

The parties last met on March 25, following which, by letter of March 29, Palazzolo
suggested to Kaplan that the parties meet on April 8 and any morning during the weeks of April
11 and 15. Kaplan replied on March 29, listing 27 ways in which the Union’s last proposal had
differed from the area contract and were more onerous. Palazzolo responded on March 30,
stating, “We are not going to bargain by letter. We have given you dates we would be available.
Please advise as to which date will work for Metta.” Kaplan wrote on March 30, in part,
“Because of time constraints and the cost of negotiations, Metta proposes that the parties
negotiate by telephone as is done in many negotiations. Please contact the undersigned with
available times and dates and I will arrange to have (the Respondent’s owner) available to
conference in.” By return letter, Palazzolo wrote, “The Union, respectfully, declines your request
to bargain by phone. * * * Local One’s last contract proposal was geared to Metta’s request for
their own agreement. The Union is ready to hear Metta’s counter-proposal and is prepared to
bargain.” Kaplan responded on April 1: “I am in receipt of your letter of this date. We have
offered to bargain by telephone. As per my letter of March 31, 2005. Please contact the
undersigned with your availability. This will be my last letter regarding the methods of
bargaining.” Palazzolo wrote back on April 6 that the Union “wants to meet face-to-face” and
that the Union was ready to consider any counter proposal by the Respondent. On April 7
Kaplan wrote that the Union’s proposal since 2000 had only been to increase the terms and
Respondent had nothing new to propose, but if the Union did, “please send it to the undersigned
and we will schedule a meeting to discuss it. If you don’t have something new to propose to
Metta, I must assume that the parties are at impasse.” In the final letter of this series, Palazzolo
said the parties were not at impasse and “We need, however, to meet in person to talk over a
contract and not bargain via telephone or by sending new proposals through the mail.”

From the beginning of this dispute, the Respondent’s approach to its obligations under
the Act has been one of delay, and outright refusal, particularly following the Eight Circuit’s
enforcement of the Board order to bargain in good faith. In fact, it is fair to conclude that the
Respondent finally agreed to meet only after the Board filed a petition for civil contempt. The
parties then had three meetings, then Counsel for the Respondent then suggested that they
bargain over the phone. The General Counsel argues that by this statement Kaplan was
refusing to negotiate further except by telephone. I disagree. In his letter a few days later, after
Palazzolo said the Union wanted to meet face-to-face, stated his willingness to “schedule a
meeting” to discuss any additional proposals by the Union.

Although demanding that the parties negotiate by phone is at odds with Section 8(d) and
is unlawful, Alle Arecibo Corp., 264 NLRB 1267 (1982), the mere suggestion that they do so is
not. That is, the parties can mutually agree to negotiate by phone, or, indeed, agree to any
other nonmandatory subject of bargaining. On balance, I cannot conclude that Kaplan made
more than a suggestion and such is not an unfair labor practice.

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In the same letter in which Kaplan said he would schedule a meeting, he also wrote that
if the Union had anything new to propose “please send it to the undersigned. . . .” This is
alleged to have been violative of Section 8(a)(5) as a demand to bargain to bargain by mail,
Beverly Farm Foundation, 323 NLRB 787 (1997). It would not seem unreasonable or unlawful
for one party to collective bargaining to suggest to the other that a proposal be mailed in
advance of meeting, particularly since collective bargaining agreements are complex and
require some time to study. Thus, I believe, the issue here is whether Kaplan’s suggestion was
really an unlawful demand that the parties negotiate by mail, or whether is was suggestion to
expedite the process when the parties should meet. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s actions
in refusing to bargain, I do not conclude that Kaplan made an unlawful demand to bargain by
mail.

I conclude that the Respondent unlawfully delayed in meeting with the Union and since
the final meeting on March 25, has refused to meet and bargain with the Union. Counsel for the
Respondent suggested to the Union and argues here that the parties are at impasse, which
presumably excuses his refusal to meet with Union representatives. Although the Respondent
rejected the Union’s last proposal (and indeed many of the provisions therein are more onerous
than previous proposals) such does not imply impasse. The Respondent did not suggest any
particular issue on which the parties were in adamant disagreement, and the Union has stood
willing to bargain on all issues. And they only had three meetings. On these facts it can
scarcely be concluded that there was an impasse excusing the Respondent from meeting at
reasonable times. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475 (1967). Beyond the lack of
impasse, there was no justification for the Respondent’s nine month period of adamant refusal
to begin meeting.

It is well settled that neither party to collective bargaining negotiations must agree to any
particular proposal. The Act requires only that they bargain in good faith which means, among
other things, that they have a good faith intent to reach an agreement. However, collective
bargaining is not a technical exercise. Rather, it is the process by which parties can mutually
agree to the wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The duty to bargain
includes the duty for an employer to furnish, on request, all information necessary and material
for the union’s use in representing employees. The duty further includes meeting at reasonable
times and places. Here, following the initial unfair labor practice litigation, the Respondent
stated that it would not bargain with the Union. And it is clear from the sequence of events that
the Respondent would never have done so absent the Board’s petition for contempt in the Eight
Circuit. The fact that the Eight Circuit denied the petition for a contempt citation does vindicate
the Respondent’s stated refusal to bargain for some nine months. Nor does it justify the
Respondent’s refusal to furnish necessary and material information. In short, by its actions the
Respondent has demonstrated a distain for its obligations under the Act and has again raised
the defense that the Union does not really seek a contract, a defense which was summarily
rejected in the first litigation.

IV. Remedy

Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, including its
refusal to meet and bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees and its refusal
to furnish in a timely manner complete information requested by the Union which I find was
necessary and material to the Union’s representation, I shall recommend that the Respondent
be ordered to meet on request and bargain with the Union and if an agreement is reached,
embody same in a written executed contract. I shall also recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to furnish all information requested by Union that has not previously been furnished and
to update such information as it did furnish.

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In addition to the above traditional remedy, the General Counsel argues that the remedy
should include litigation costs, including attorney’s fees, for the Board and the Union; that the
highest ranking official (or an agent of the Board) read the attached Notice to employees; a
broad cease and desist order and a 12-month extension of the Union’s certification year.

Although the Board has generally held with the American Rule that litigation costs should
not be awarded where the defenses are “debatable” (usually turning on credibility), where the
defenses are “frivolous” then such an award is justified. Alwin Manufacturing Co., Inc., 326
NLRB 646 (1998). Thus the issue is whether the Respondent’s defense to this litigation –
specifically that the Union does not intend to bargain a separate contract – is “debatable.” I
conclude it is, notwithstanding that the essentially same defense was raised, and rejected, in the
first case. I note that in the previous litigation, the issues primarily involved Sections 8(a)(1) and
(3), with the only Section 8(a)(5) issue being the Respondent’s refusal to furnish the names and
addresses (and other data) of its replacement employees.

It was after the Eight Circuit’s decision that the Respondent stated its intent not to
bargain and why. When the parties did meet, the Union presented its proposal, which was the
area agreement. In this, the Union sought to have the Respondent designate the association as
its bargaining agent (a clearly nonmandatory subject of bargaining). The area agreement also
contained a “Favored Nations” clause, from which the Respondent could at least debatably
conclude that the Union would not agree to more favorable terms for the Respondent regardless
of the Respondent’s particular circumstances. These factors do not excuse the Respondent’s
unlawful activity found above. They do, however, make the Respondent’s defense “debatable.”
Therefore, an award of costs is not appropriate.

The Board has held that and award of litigation expenses is also appropriate where the
unfair labor practice is “flagrant, aggravated, persistent and pervasive.” Cogburn Healthcare
Center, 335 NLRB 1397 (2001). The Respondent’s refusal to bargain with the Union following
the decision of the Eight Circuit, and its delay and refusal to furnish necessary information, are
flagrant, but I conclude not sufficiently outside the mainstream of refusal to bargain violations to
justify the imposition of costs.

Where the violations of the Act are numerous and serious, the Board has held that the
Respondent be ordered to read the Notice to employees (or at its option, have an agent of
Board do so). Charlotte Amphitheatre Corp., d/b/a Blockbuster Pavillion, 331 NLRB 1274
(2000). Again, I do not find the violations sufficiently extraordinary to warrant this extraordinary
remedy.

A broad cease and desist order is standard where the respondent has shown a proclivity
to violate the Act. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). Since this is the second case
against the Respondent such a broad order is appropriate.

Finally, the General Counsel argues that the Union’s certification be extended another
year, citing Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962). Although the Union’s strength has
probably been dissipated as a result of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices and the strike,
the Union nevertheless should be given a reasonable opportunity to bargain for the current
employees. Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 300 NLRB 278 (1990), enfd. 939 F.2d 402 (6th
Cir. 1991). The Board has therefore held that the remedy for an employer’s refusal to bargain
unfair labor practices “to assure at least a year of good-faith bargaining include an extension of
the certification year.” Northwest Graphics, Inc., 342 NLRB No. 127, slip op 2 (2004). The
Board recognized that the length of such an extension depends on a number of factors, such as

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the bargaining history. Here there is no significant bargaining history. Thus an extension of 12
months is appropriate.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I make the following
recommended:

ORDER3

The Respondent, JHP & Associates, LLC d/b/a Metta Electric, its officers, agents,
successors and assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

a. Refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union concerning
wages, hours and others terms and conditions of employment.
b. Refusing to furnish the Union information necessary and material to collective
bargaining.
c. In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

a. Upon request, bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of all employees in the below described bargaining unit
concerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment and if
an agreement is reached, embody that agreement in a signed contract, the Union
certification to be extended one year from the date the Respondent complies with
this Order. The appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act is:
All journeymen and apprentice electricians employed by the Respondent from
its St. Charles, Missouri facility, EXCLUDING all office clerical and
professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
b. Provide the Union with information it requests that is necessary for it to bargain
collectively as the representative of the employees in the above-described unit,
including the information requested in letters dated April 26, 2004, May 10, 2004,
January 12, 2005, February 3, 2005 and February 28, 2005.

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

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c. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its each of its facilities copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facilities involved in these proceedings, the Respondent
shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
and former employees of the Respondent at any time since March 15, 2000.
d. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, San Francisco, California, July 13, 2005.

_______________________
James L. Rose
Administrative Law Judge

4If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in
the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered that we
post this notice and comply with its terms.

Federal Law gives you the right to:

Form, join or assist a union,
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf,
To act together with other employees for your benefit and protection,
Choose not to engage in any such protected activity.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union concerning wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment for employees in the bargaining unit found appropriate.

WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish the Union information necessary and material to collective bargaining.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL bargain in good faith with the Union and if an agreement is reached, put it in an executed
contract.

WE WILL furnish information requested by the Union which is necessary for the Union to bargain on behalf
of our employees.

JHP & ASSOCIATES, LLC d/b/a
METTA ELECTRIC
(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Resident Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.

1222 Spruce St., Room 8302
Saint Louis, MO 63103-2829
(314) 539-7770, Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. (CDT)
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE

THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE
DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (602) 640-2146.