Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 1, 2007

04-CC-002463 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 1, 2007)

JD—24—07
Philadelphia, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS, SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF DELAWARE AND
EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA
and Case 4—CC—2463
ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES, INC.
and Case 4—CC—2482
PENN VALLEY CONSTRUCTORS, INC.
Donna D. Brown, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Stephen J. Holroyd, Esq., of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
Stephen J. Sundheim, Esq., of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for the Charging Parties.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
PAUL BUXBAUM, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on March 15, 2007. The charge in Case 4—CC—2463, was filed by Adams-
Bickel Associates, Inc. (Adams-Bickel) on May 5, 2006,1 and a complaint was issued on June
19. That complaint was amended on December 6. The charge in Case 4—CC—2482, was
filed by Penn Valley Constructors, Inc. (Penn Valley) on December 7, and a complaint was
issued on December 26. The Regional Director issued an order consolidating the cases on
January 29, 2007.
The first complaint alleges that the Union, through its agent, threatened a representative
of 421 Chestnut Partners LP (CPLP) that the Union would cause protests, work stoppages, and
problems with deliveries at the site of CPLP’s construction project. It further alleges that an
object of this conduct was to force CPLP to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of Adams-Bickel and to cease doing business with Adams-
Bickel. The complaint also alleges that another object of the Union’s conduct was to force or

1 All dates are in 2006, unless otherwise indicated.
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require Adams-Bickel to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of unspecified subcontractors deemed by the Union to be “unfair,” and to cease doing
business with those subcontractors. The Union’s conduct is alleged to violate Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The Union filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint.
The second complaint alleges that the Union, through its agent, threatened a
representative of Penn Valley by telling him that the Union would cause those of its members
who are employed by a subcontractor, P.A. Fly Contracting, Inc. (PA Fly), at the site of one of
Penn Valley’s projects to refuse to unload and install cabinetry manufactured by American
Millwork Cabinetry, Inc. (American Millwork) that was to be delivered to that site unless
American Millwork and the Union reached an agreement prior to the delivery. It is further
alleged that an object of the Union’s conduct was to force Penn Valley to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of American Millwork and to force
Penn Valley to cease doing business with American Millwork. It is also alleged that an object of
the Union was to force PA Fly to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of American Millwork and to force PA Fly to cease doing business with
American Millwork. Finally, it is alleged that an additional object of the Union was to force
American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of its
employees although the Union had not been certified as such representative under the
provisions of Section 9 of the Act. This conduct was alleged to violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the Act. The Union filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint.
In both complaints, the General Counsel served notice that it would be seeking the
imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order against the Union.2 The requested relief would
enjoin the Union from engaging in any form of conduct that would violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the Act where such conduct is directed at any person and is designed to force such person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
person or to cease doing business with any other person.
As described in detail in the decision that follows, I find that the Union, through its agent,
Bruce Jones, did threaten a representative of CPLP, Todd Strine, in the manner described by
the General Counsel and with the unlawful objectives alleged in the complaint. I further find that
the Union, also through its agent, Bruce Jones, threatened a representative of Penn Valley,
George McCardle, in the manner described by the General Counsel and with the unlawful
objectives alleged in that complaint. I conclude that, in both instances, the conduct was in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Finally, I determine that the totality of circumstances
demonstrates that the Union has a proclivity to violate the Act to the extent that an extraordinary
remedial measure is required. As a result, I concur in the General Counsel’s request for relief
and recommend imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order.
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and

2 The original complaint in the Adams-Bickel case did not contain this notification. It was
added by amendment on December 6. (GC Exh. 1(j).)
3 Counsel for the General Counsel has filed a motion to correct the transcript. This is
unopposed, and I grant it. In addition, I make the following corrections to the transcript. At page
8, lines 2—3, I asked counsel for the Union whether there is any contention that certain persons
“are not agents within the meaning of the Act.” At page 61, line 18, the witness reported that
Johnson “did not say anything of that nature.” At page 65, lines 24—25, counsel actually asked,
“I take it you threatened PA Fly with breach of contract if installation was not accomplished?” At
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after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Companies, and the Union, I make
the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Charging Party, Adams-Bickel, a Pennsylvania corporation, has been engaged as a
general contractor in the construction industry with an office and principal place of business in
Collegeville, Pennsylvania, where it annually provides services valued in excess of $50,000
outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Charging Party, Penn Valley, a Pennsylvania
corporation, has been engaged as a general contractor in the construction industry with an
office and principal place of business in Morrisville, Pennsylvania, where it annually purchases
and receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. The Union admits4 and I find that Adams-Bickel and Penn Valley are
employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts Involving Adams-Bickel
The General Counsel alleges that, on May 3, an agent of the Union, Bruce Jones,
threatened a representative of CPLP, Todd Strine, and that the threats were made with a
number of unlawful objectives.5 In support of this allegation, counsel for the General Counsel
presented the testimony of Strine. Strine, an attorney, has been a principal of CPLP since
2004, and has been involved in the Company’s development project at 421 Chestnut Street in
Philadelphia. He testified in a clear and persuasive manner and his testimony was corroborated
by notes that he took during the conversation that forms the heart of the allegation against the
Union. Most significantly, Strine’s testimony was uncontroverted since the Union did not call
Jones as a witness.6 I fully credit Strine’s account of the events under consideration.
Strine reported that the Chestnut Street project involves the conversion of an old bank
building. The upper floors are being developed as residential condominium units. CPLP
delivers “raw space” to the owners of the individual units. (Tr. 20.) Those owners may choose
any company they wish to perform the transformation of the raw space into living quarters.
CPLP hired two firms to perform the work on the infrastructure, Cyma Builders (Cyma) and Aloia
Construction (Aloia). Cyma was responsible for the major building systems such as electrical,
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page 82, lines 6—8, the transcription is garbled. The point of the discussion was that counsel
for the Companies did rest his case on behalf of each of his clients. Finally, at page 83, line 17,
I told counsel for the General Counsel that, “They have every right to put you to your proof.”
Any other transcription errors are not significant or material.
4 See the Union’s answers to both complaints as amplified by counsel during the trial. (GC
Exh. 1(e), pars. 2 and 3; GC Exh. 1(s), pars. 2 and 3; and Tr. 7.)
5 The Union concedes that Jones was acting as its agent. See the Union’s answer to the
complaint and the additional representations of counsel at trial. (GC Exh. 1(e), par. 4, and Tr.
8.)
6 Jones was present throughout the trial and sat at the counsel table with the Union’s
attorney. Furthermore, counsel for the Union concedes that, “[a]t the hearing, all parties had the
opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and present evidence.” (R. Br., at p. 2.)
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plumbing, elevators, and heating. Aloia did certain work on a stair tower and the fifth and sixth
floors. According to Strine, Cyma and Aloia employed “98 percent . . . union labor.” (Tr. 26.)
By 2006, development of the building had progressed to the point that individual
condominium owners were completing the work on their units. Adams-Bickel had been hired to
perform this work for two of those units. In late April, members of a union representing
employees involved in the field of elevator construction picketed the Chestnut Street jobsite. It
was within this general context that the crucial conversation between Jones and Strine took
place.
Strine testified that he had received several telephone messages from Jones. On May
3, he returned the calls. Strine asked the reason for the contact and Jones informed him that he
was an official of the Union and wished to discuss the Chestnut Street project. He began by
noting the presence of the elevator union’s pickets and the impact of the picketing on the ability
of Aloia to complete its work on the project. Jones then made an abrupt switch of topics,
stating, “What if[,] out of the blue, Adams-Bickel is going to be my [Jones’] problem
regardless[?]” (Tr. 23.) Strine asked why this would be a problem. Jones responded that the
reason was Adams-Bickel’s use of “unfair contractors” who did not pay “the prevailing wages.”
(Tr. 23.)
After some discussion about the concept of unfair wages, Jones told Strine that he had
formed the impression that Adams-Bickel was using unfair contractors and added, “If that’s the
way that it’s going to go[,] the building is going to have a problem.” (Tr. 24.) This caused Strine
to inquire as to the meaning of “problem.” Jones explained that this meant, “[p]rotests, work
stoppages and problems with deliveries.” (Tr. 24.) Strine asked what could be done to avoid
such problems. Jones appeared to sidestep a direct response, instead making reference to
other potential difficulties involving other labor unions.
At this point in their conversation, Strine opined that he did not understand why Jones
was discussing these issues with him. He noted that CPLP did not have any contractual
relationship with Adams-Bickel and suggested that Jones approach Gus Perea, a principal of
that firm. Jones advised that he had talked to Perea. As Strine put it, “[a]nd he added that he
wanted to talk to me because he didn’t have to be as careful about what he said, when he
talked to Gus Perea he had to watch what he said.”7 (Tr. 25.) The conversation then returned
to the situation involving Aloia and the elevator union.
Strine testified that Jones, “then turned the subject back to Adams-Bickel and the idea of
the unfair contractors.” (Tr. 26.) He warned Strine that, “[l]ook, if Adams-Bickel is in there and
there’s going to be a fight, its going to go one way and it’s not going to be a good way.” (Tr. 26.)
Strine expressed his puzzlement over this threat since he had no relationship with Adams-Bickel
and his own contractors employed union labor. He noted that he had no control over the
choices made by individual unit owners. Jones expressed some sympathy for this argument,
agreeing that, “[w]e know that initially you did the right thing.” (Tr. 26.) At this juncture, Jones
finally got to his point, explaining that, “we just want you to use some of your juice8 to convince

7 In my view, this comment by Jones reflects his consciousness that he was engaged in an
enterprise fraught with potential legal difficulties for the Union.
8 Webster defines this slang usage of the term “juice” as meaning, “[p]ower : clout.”
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary, The Riverside Publishing Co., 1984, at p. 657.
See also Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://m-w.com, showing the slang definition as
“influence, clout.”
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Adams-Bickel to use fair contractors.” (Tr. 26.)
Strine expressed surprise that the Union would make a “big deal” about the owners’
choices, given that the vast majority of the work on the project had been performed by union
labor and the remaining portion was just “small potatoes.” (Tr. 27.) Jones replied that, “this is
what I do. It’s all about upholding the wages in the [C]ity of Philadelphia, which we set . . . as
the standard.”9 (Tr. 27.) Expressing frustration, Strine asked Jones to get to the point. He
stated, “I don’t understand where we’re going with this conversation or what you want me to
do?” (Tr. 27.) Jones reiterated his earlier demand, “I want you to think about using your juice
and talking to Adams-Bickel. Why don’t you sleep on it[,] then we’ll talk further.”10 (Tr. 27.)
Strine promised to think it over and the conversation terminated. The men had no further
discussions. Two days later, Adams-Bickel filed the charge alleging that Jones’ statements to
Strine were unlawful.
B. The Facts Involving Penn Valley
Regarding Penn Valley, the General Counsel contends that, on December 5, the Union,
acting through its agent, Bruce Jones,11 threatened a field superintendent of Penn Valley,
George McCardle, and that those threats were made with unlawful objectives in mind. In
support of these allegations, counsel for the General Counsel presented the testimony of
McCardle and George Reitz. McCardle has been a superintendent with Penn Valley for 18
years and has been involved in the Company’s development project at Second and Chestnut
Streets in Philadelphia. Reitz is the owner of American Millwork, a nonunion firm that employs
26 persons. I found that both witnesses provided clear and persuasive testimony. In addition,
Reitz’ information provided useful background and corroboration for the more important
testimony given by McCardle. Finally, once again, I take note that the descriptions of the events
and statements provided by Reitz and McCardle were uncontroverted. Although Jones was
present throughout the trial, he was not called to the witness stand by the Union.12 For all these
reasons, I find the evidence presented by the General Counsel’s witnesses to be fully credible.

9 Strine indicated that Jones engaged in a “long pause” before completing the sentence with
the phrase “as the standard.” (Tr. 27.)
10 Strine’s contemporaneous notes describe Jones as telling Strine, “I mean think about it.
You can use some juice.” (GC Exh. 2, p. 2.)
11 Once again, the Union admits that Jones was its agent. See the Union’s answer to the
complaint and the representations of counsel at trial. (GC Exh. 1(s), par. 4 and Tr. 8.)
12 In his brief, counsel for the Union repeatedly argues that Jones’ failure to testify somehow
undermines the General Counsel’s case. (R. Br. at 15 and 18.) In my view, this turns the
matter upside down. It is true that the Board authorizes factfinders to draw adverse inferences
from the failure to produce testimony. See Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622 (2001), enf. 56 Fed.
Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adverse inference drawn against employer who failed to produce
testimony from the only management official present at a key meeting) and NLRB v. Iron
Workers, 124 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1997) (Board’s “well established” use of adverse
inference for failure to produce testimony was properly applied to a respondent labor
organization). However, the key to such a finding is the conclusion that the missing testimony
would reasonably be assumed to favor the party who chose not to call the witness. Applying
this test, it is evident that one would have expected Jones to testify about his conversations in a
manner favorable to the Union’s cause. Indeed, at the outset of the trial, counsel for the Union
reported that Jones would be testifying. (Tr. 8.) Any inference to be drawn from his
unexplained failure to do so would have to be that his account would have been adverse to the
Union’s position in this litigation.
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The testimony revealed that Penn Valley’s Chestnut Street worksite consisted of a four-
level brick building that was being converted into a micro-brewery and residential condominium
units. Although Penn Valley was the general contractor, all the work was being performed by
subcontractors. The subcontractors that were working at the actual site employed union labor.
However, Penn Valley contracted with a nonunion firm, American Millwork, to manufacture
cabinetry, bar tops and fronts, and wall panels for the brewery. While American Millwork made
the woodwork, it hired a subcontractor to perform the delivery and installation. That
subcontractor was PA Fly, a company that employed union labor.
Reitz presented testimony that serves as background and context for the conversation
between Jones and McCardle that is the subject matter of this complaint allegation. He
reported that he was first approached by a representative of the Union, Chris Johnson, in late
2005. Johnson’s purpose was to propose that American Millwork enter into a relationship with
the Union. Reitz declined to make any such commitment, explaining that the Company’s
finances had been adversely affected by a plant fire and other factors.
Approximately one year later, Reitz received a telephone call from another person acting
on behalf of the Union, Ed Coryell, Jr. Coryell asked if American Millwork was doing work on
the condos at the Chestnut Street project. Reitz explained that the Company was not involved
in that work, it was only providing woodwork to the micro-brewery. Coryell asked if Reitz had a
labor agreement and was told that he did not. He then asked who would be performing the
installation at Chestnut Street. Reitz explained that he was considering a couple of potential
subcontractors, both of whom employed union labor.
Reitz was again contacted by the Union on December 5. This time, the telephone call
was made by Jones. Jones told Reitz that he had an agreement with the owner of the micro-
brewery that employees on the project would be paid “fair wages.” (Tr. 54.) Reitz opined that
he did pay his employees fair wages. Reitz reported that,
[t]here was also further conversation that basically if—
since we were an open shop[,] he was going to instruct
his carpenters not to unload the custom case work from
our truck and he repeated that statement again[,] saying
that if it wasn’t made union it was not going to be
unloaded.
(Tr. 54.) Reitz testified that Jones ended their conversation by asserting that, “if the cabinets
were not union made[,] the[y] would not be unloaded.” (Tr. 55.) Under cross-examination, he
reiterated that Jones warned him that, “no millwork was going to be unloaded unless it was from
a union shop.” (Tr. 59.)
I asked Reitz to amplify his explanation of what Jones was telling him in this
conversation. He explained that Jones had told him that, “[t]here was going to be a picket line,
that cabinets would not be—he was going to instruct his—the Carpenters, meaning I guess
under his jurisdiction, that they were not going to unload any millwork from American Millwork.”
(Tr. 63.) Reitz concluded that this would be an effective threat because he inferred that the
union members employed by his delivery and installation subcontractor, PA Fly, would refuse to
cross such a picket line.
Later that same day, Reitz received another telephone call made jointly by Jones and
Johnson. The purpose was to discuss, “unionizing my shop.” (Tr. 55.) Reitz explained that,
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due to the fire and other factors, he was not ready to make any commitments. Jones responded
that, “this phone conversation’s not going in the right direction.” (Tr. 55.) With that, Jones’
participation in the call terminated.
On the same day that Reitz reported he had the conversations with Jones, McCardle
also indicated that Jones approached him. They spoke at the brewery worksite. Jones told
McCardle that Reitz was “jerking them around.” (Tr. 69.) McCardle asked what he meant and
Jones explained:
Let me put it this way, . . . I just want to give you a heads
up, . . . and frankly I shouldn’t even be saying this to you13
but if an agreement isn’t worked out between American
Millwork and the Union[,] the truck’s not getting unloaded
. . . Let me put it this way, if—my men are not going to
unload that truck if something’s not worked out between
American Millwork and the Union.
(Tr. 69—70.) McCardle testified that Jones went on to “ask me to call George Reitz and see if
there was something I could do about it.” (Tr. 70.) McCardle reported that he did make such a
call to Reitz.
On the next day, Johnson again phoned Reitz to discuss unionizing American Millwork.
Reitz “laid out a three-point plan” to address the topic and said he would get back to Johnson in
a couple of weeks. (Tr. 61.) One day later, Penn Valley filed the charge in this case.
In order to complete the picture surrounding these events, Reitz and McCardle testified
that the millwork was to have been delivered on December 11. This was postponed until early
January. McCardle reported that the delay was,
[b]ecause of the threats of a picket line. We didn’t want a
picket line because everybody was on—union and if there’s
a picket line every—we lose everybody. . . . They won’t cross
the picket line, all the other trades.
(Tr. 70.) In addition, McCardle testified that he knew that PA Fly would not unload American
Millwork’s product because the subcontractor’s owner, “didn’t want to jeopardize his standing
with the Union.” (Tr. 78.)
On December 26, the Regional Director filed the complaint, alleging that Jones’
conversation with McCardle on December 5 constituted unlawful secondary activity. The Union
filed its answer to the complaint on December 29.
Five days later, PA Fly attempted to make the delivery of American Millwork’s products
to the micro-brewery. McCardle testified that on that day, January 3, 2007, he was waiting for
the delivery truck outside the jobsite early in the morning. After the truck arrived, two men
stationed themselves in front of the door to the brewery with picket signs stating that, “American
Millwork is unfair to local . . . Carpenters Council.”14 (Tr. 71.) All of the employees of the other

13 I interpret this remark to mean that Jones knew that what he was saying was in violation
of the Act.
14 Counsel for the Union argues that the “MRC representatives picketed the truck,” not the
Continued
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subcontractors on the site refused to cross this picket line. As a result, McCardle sent the
delivery truck away. Reitz and McCardle reported that the delivery was accomplished several
days later, after Reitz had threatened PA Fly with a breach of contract action. There were no
pickets at the site on the day of the successful delivery.
C. Legal Analysis
The General Counsel contends that the Union has twice violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the Act through statements made by its agent to Strine and McCardle, representatives of CPLP
and Penn Valley, respectively. That portion of the statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . . . to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is . . . forcing or
requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing
business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of
Section 9.15
This language forms a portion of an overall legislative plan designed,
with the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right
of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending
employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures in controversies not
their own.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Another
administrative law judge has observed that,
[t]he two prerequisites for the finding of an 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation
are: (1) that a labor organization threaten, coerce or restrain any
person; and (2) that an object of this conduct be to force one person
to cease doing business with another person.” [Internal quotation
marks and citations omitted.]
Local 27, Sheet Metal Workers, 321 NLRB 540, 547 (1996). Another of my colleagues has
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brewery building. (R. Br., at p. 8.) It is true that the precise situs of the picketing was largely left
implicit in the testimony. On the other hand, McCardle did observe that one person employed at
the brewery project “had to go to the bathroom so they [the pickets] let him go to the bathroom
but he had—he came back out.” (Tr. 72.) I seriously doubt that this employee was attempting
to go to the bathroom inside the delivery truck. Based on all of the circumstances, I find that the
situs of the picketing was at the entrance to the brewery project.
15 The Act contains various provisos that are not cited above.
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noted that the definition of coercion under the statute is “broad” and “pragmatic” and the Board
“has not hesitated to include varied forms of economic pressure within the conceptual ambit.”
[Internal quotation marks omitted.] Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335 NLRB
814, 827—828 (2001), enf. 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002).
Long ago, the Board pointed out that, “in any of these secondary boycott situations the
ultimate determination depends upon the Union’s objective. Often ‘the line is fine,’ and
circumstances of the particular case must supply the answer to which way the chips are to fall.”
[Italics in the original. Footnote omitted.] Electrical Workers, Local Union 11 (L.G. Electric
Contractors), 154 NLRB 766, 767 (1965).
Finally, in laying the foundation for analysis of the issues in this case, it is worth citing
the summary provided in a recent treatise on the Act’s secondary boycott provisions, where it
was concluded that,
[m]ost common in this area are threats to picket, shutdown
or strike. The Board has routinely held that unqualified threats16
of this nature directed at a secondary or neutral party violate
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Failure to carry through the threat does
not provide a defense to the assertion that the threat, itself,
rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) . . . . The Board has also
held that threats of economic pressure against neutral persons
constitute section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. In this regard, even
unspecified threats of “trouble” have been found to be violative.
Again, as in other areas of Board law, subjective interpretations
of the listener are irrelevant to the analysis; instead, the focal
point for consideration is the specific language used. The Board
assesses those words on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the entire nature of the conversation at issue. [Footnotes
omitted.]
Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. Pa. Lab. & Emp. L. 905, 932, Summer 2005.
With these principles as background, I will now assess the Union’s conduct at issue. On
May 3, the Union’s agent, Jones, told a representative of a neutral employer, Strine, that the
employment of Adams-Bickel by condominium owners was unfair because that firm did not pay
prevailing wages. Jones warned that, as a consequence, “the building is going to have a
problem.” (Tr. 24.) When asked to be more specific, Jones explained that the problem would
be “[p]rotests, work stoppages and problems with deliveries.” (Tr. 24.) After some digressions
in their conversation, Jones was pressed to explain what he desired Strine to do. Jones’
response was that, “we just want you to use some of your juice to convince Adams-Bickel to use
fair contractors.” (Tr. 26.)

16 By noting the “unqualified” nature of the threats found to be unlawful, the commentator
recognized that the Board prohibits those predictions of picketing activity that fail to include
“assurance that the picketing would comply with the Moore Dry Dock requirements and be
restricted to, and directed only at, the primary [employer].” Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF
Services), 342 NLRB 740, 749 (2004), citing Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.),
92 NLRB 547, 549 (1950). In this case, Jones’ threats to picket did not contain any of the
necessary assurances.
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The case law is replete with interesting discussions of whether vague threats about
future “problems” or “troubles” violate the Act. See, for example, Lafayette Building &
Construction Trades Council (Southern Construction Corp.), 132 NLRB 673 (1961) (“trouble”);
Carpenters (Apollo Dry Wall), 211 NLRB 291 (1974) (“trouble” and “problems”); United Mine
Workers, District 12 (Old Ben Coal Co.), 239 NLRB 800 (1978) (“problems”); Laborers, Local
1030 (Exxon Chemical Co.), 308 NLRB 706 (1992) (“problems”); and Carpenters (Society Hill
Towers Owners’ Assn.), supra (“trouble” and “problems”). Fortunately, I do not need to
determine where the Board’s proverbial chips would fall regarding Jones’ prediction of a
problem in this case. Not being content with such a vague formulation of his intentions, Jones
provided a crystal clear warning that what he was predicting and threatening were protests,
work stoppages, and interruptions of deliveries.
In response to an inquiry from a circuit court, the Board explained that when a union’s
promise to refrain from future picketing,
is conditioned upon some action to be taken by the neutral
general or prime contractor, such conduct constitutes a
deliberate entanglement of a neutral person in a dispute
not his own and is violative of the secondary boycott
provision of the Act.
Local No. 441, Electrical Workers, 222 NLRB 99, 101 (1976), affd. 569 F.2d 160 (DC Cir. 1977).
Thus, Jones’ warning of protests and delivery interruptions, coupled with his demand that Strine
use his influence against the offending contractor hired by the condominium owners, constituted
a blatant example of restraint and coercion of a neutral party in a labor dispute. While the Union
did not execute the threat by engaging in picketing or other tactics to fulfill its prediction of
problems at the worksite, this does not insulate it from responsibility for making the threat. The
Board has noted that it is “settled” law that “a threat to picket alone may be coercive, whether or
not picketing actually ensues.” [Citation omitted.] Amalgamated Packinghouse, 218 NLRB 853
(1975). Furthermore, it is apparent from the words chosen that Jones’ objective was to force
CPLP to apply pressure to the condominium owners to cease using Adams-Bickel or other
“unfair” contractors to perform construction work on the Chestnut Street project.17 This
constitutes an illegal objective rendering the conduct unlawful under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act.
In his brief, counsel for the Union attempts to place a different import on Jones’
statements. For example, he notes that Jones conceded that the great majority of the work had
been performed by union members. He also observes that Jones never specifically demanded
that the remaining portion of the work be similarly assigned. Indeed, he contends that when
Jones threatened protests, work stoppages, and disruption of deliveries, he was not speaking
for his own union, but instead, “on behalf of the Electricians, Steamfitters, Plumbers and Sheet
Metal Workers.” (R. Br., at p. 14.) Apart from the fact that Jones never testified in support of

17 I recognize that one of Jones’ objectives was the preservation of area wage standards.
As the Board has explained, “picketing for a lawful objective, such as to preserve area
standards, may be unlawful if there is additionally an unlawful objective as revealed by
contemporaneous statements of union agents or other pertinent evidence.” Electrical Workers,
Local No. 441, supra at 101. Recently, the Board reiterated that, to violate the Act, “the
secondary object need only be ‘an object’—not the sole object” of the union’s activities. Local 7,
Sheet Metal Workers, 345 NLRB No. 119, slip op. at p. 2 (2005).
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this unusual theory, it simply strains credulity. While Jones did refer to these other labor
organizations, in doing so he stated that, “the problems went beyond problems with the
Carpenters Union,” because those other unions were also unhappy with Adams-Bickel. (Tr. 24.)
This statement clearly demonstrates that Jones was addressing the “problems” of his own
union. He was not merely acting as an unsolicited and unpaid advocate for other labor
organizations. Such a strained interpretation cannot withstand application of the Board’s
requirement that I examine, “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the union’s
conduct demonstrates an unlawful purpose.” United Mine Workers District 29 (New Beckley
Mining Corp.), 304 NLRB 71, 73 (1991), enf. 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992). [Internal quotation
marks and citation omitted.]
Turning now to the allegation of misconduct directed against Penn Valley, the
uncontroverted evidence showed that Jones told the Company’s superintendent at the Chestnut
Street worksite that, “if an agreement isn’t worked out between American Millwork and the
Union[,] the truck’s not getting unloaded . . . my men are not going to unload that truck.” (Tr.
69—70.) After posing this as the dilemma facing Penn Valley, Jones went on to propose a
course of action for McCardle, telling him to call American Millwork’s owner and see if there was
something he “could do about it.” (Tr. 70.) Thus, the evidence clearly establishes that the
Union’s agent threatened to prevent the delivery of millwork to Penn Valley’s project and
demanded that Penn Valley intercede with its subcontractor to resolve the Carpenter’s Union’s
issues.
The General Counsel presented significant additional evidence regarding the context in
which Jones’ conversation with McCardle occurred. Reitz testified that, earlier on the same
day,18 Jones warned him that, if he did not come to terms with the Union’s demand for a
bargaining relationship, “there was going to be a picket line” at the Chestnut Street site, and
“that they were not going to unload any millwork from American Millwork.”19 (Tr. 63.)
Subsequently, the Union carried out its threat by posting pickets at the entrance to the Chestnut
Street worksite. Union employees of Penn Valley’s subcontractors refused to cross that line.
As a result, delivery of materials to Penn Valley’s construction project was delayed.
The Board’s precedents reveal that a union’s attempt to attain a bargaining relationship
with a primary employer by applying pressure to a secondary target in order to enlist that firm’s
assistance in achieving the desired objective constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). As
the administrative law judge put it in Operating Engineers Union No. 3, 340 NLRB 1053, 1056
(2003), “the Act makes clear, a threat to shut down a general contractor’s job in order to

18 I infer that the conversation took place before Jones’ discussion with McCardle because
Jones told McCardle that Reitz was “jerking them around.” (Tr. 69.)
19 For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, the General Counsel did not allege that
Jones’ unqualified threats to Reitz constituted an additional unfair labor practice. The Board’s
policy is that an improper threat communicated directly to a union’s primary target without the
presence of the secondary employer is still unlawful. As the Board put it in Tri-State Building
Trades Council (Backmon Sheet Metal), 272 NLRB 8, fn. 1 (1984), affd. 781 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.
1986), “the absence of a direct communication of the threat to the neutral . . . is not critical to the
finding of unlawful secondary conduct.” See also The Wackenhut Corp., 287 NLRB 374, 382
(1987), and Operating Engineers Union No. 3, 340 NLRB 1053, fn. 1 (2003). The General
Counsel’s reticence may stem from reservations about this policy expressed by Member
Liebman. See, for example, Local 247, Teamsters (Rymco, Inc.), 332 NLRB 1230, fn. 2 (2000),
and Elevator Constructors (Otis Elevator Co.), 345 NLRB No. 68, slip op. at fn. 4 (2005). As
any relief would be cumulative, I will not address this further.
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pressure a subcontractor to sign an agreement with a union covering the uncertified employees
of the subcontractor is improper secondary conduct prohibited by the Act.” See also Sheet
Metal Workers Local 104 (Losli International), 297 NLRB 1078, 1083 (1990) (union’s threat that
it “would not allow equipment to go in” and that the primary “would have no cooperation from the
other trades” at the worksite violated the Act).20
It is clear to me that Jones was threatening McCardle that if he did not either dispense
with American Millwork as his subcontractor or apply pressure to Reitz to reach agreement with
the Union, the Union would picket Penn Valley’s jobsite and that one of the consequences of
this activity would be to cause those members of various other unions employed at that jobsite
to withhold their services to their respective employers. While Jones may not have spelled out
his intent in exactly these terms, I conclude from consideration of the entire context that this was
his plain meaning.21
As the Board has noted, “[v]ague or guarded threats” must be given meaning by the
“surrounding conduct and events.” Laborers, Local 1030 (Exxon Chemical Co.), 308 NLRB 706,
708 (1992). That the objectives of the threat were unlawful was demonstrated by the Union’s
subsequent activity that disrupted work activity at the secondary employer’s worksite.22 I find
that Jones’ statements to McCardle constituted threats directed against Penn Valley with the
objectives of forcing Penn Valley and PA Fly to cease doing business with American Millwork,
and of forcing Penn Valley to require American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union
despite the Union’s lack of certification as representative of American Millwork’s labor force.
This conduct violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
The essence of this matter may be highlighted by noting that counsel for the Union
correctly observed that the “principle evil Congress sought to avoid in enacting [Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)] is the entanglement of a neutral or secondary employer in a dispute between a
union and some other employer.” (R. Br., at p. 10.) When Jones made his threats while, at the
same time, demanding that Strine use his “juice” with Adams-Bickel and importuning McCardle
to “call George Reitz and see if there was something [he] could do,” he was engaged in
precisely the types of activity proscribed by the Act. (Tr. 26 and 70.)
Conclusions of Law
1. By threatening to cause protests, work stoppages, and delivery problems for CPLP

20 Very recently, another administrative law judge has provided a useful compendium of
Board precedents on this issue. See Rocket Hill, Inc., 2006 WL 2827110 (Div. of Judges,
September 29, 2006).
21 Once again, counsel for the Union proffers a strained parsing of Jones’ language in
support of the Union’s defense. He asserts that, “there is no statement from Jones that he (or
the MRC) would cause employees it represents to refuse to perform work.” (R. Br., at p. 17.)
[Italics in the original. Internal quotation marks omitted.] Counsel omits any acknowledgement
that Jones warned McCardle that, “[l]et me put it this way, if—my men are not going to unload
that truck if something’s not worked out between American Millwork and the Union.” (Tr. 70.)
[Italics supplied.] Furthermore, this warning followed on the heels of his similar statement to
Reitz that, “he was going to instruct his—the Carpenters, meaning I guess under his jurisdiction,
that they were not to unload any millwork from American Millwork.” (Tr. 63.)
22 I recognize that the General Counsel does not allege that the picketing violated the
standards set forth in Moore Dry Dock, supra. Nevertheless, the fact that the Union carried out
Jones’ threats to Reitz and McCardle sheds light on its intentions and objectives.
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with the objective of forcing CPLP to pressure other persons with whom it had contractual
relationships to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel, the Union has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. By threatening to cause employees that it represents at Penn Valley’s worksite to
refuse to unload and install products manufactured by American Millwork with the objectives of
forcing Penn Valley and PA Fly to cease doing business with American Millwork and to force
Penn Valley to pressure American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union despite the
Union’s lack of certification as representative of American Millwork’s labor force, the Union has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. The appropriate relief includes the imposition of a cease-and-
desist order and the requirement for the posting of a notice.
In each of the complaints filed in this case, the General Counsel served notice that he
would be seeking a broad order requiring the Union to,
cease and desist from any conduct prohibited by
Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act where an object is to force
or require any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other person, or to cease doing business with any other
person.
(GC Exhs. 1(j) and (o).) Because it both broadens the types of misconduct enjoined and the
scope of coverage to include all potential secondary parties, this proposed remedy goes beyond
the relief that is typically granted.
The Board’s power to impose a remedy for unfair labor practices stems from the
language of Section 10(c) of the Act, which provides that, upon a finding that a respondent has
committed an unfair labor practice, it shall issue “an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of this Act.” The Supreme Court has observed that this is a Congressional grant of
authority that is broad and yet rather vague. The Court held that, “at a minimum it
encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it
is intended to redress.” Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984). Put another way, the
Court has instructed that the validity of any remedial measure imposed by the Board must be
“examined in light of the appropriateness in the circumstances of th[e] case.” NLRB v. District
50, Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958).
The Supreme Court has also addressed the standards for imposition of the precise type
of relief being sought in this proceeding. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437
(1941), it held that the justification for a broad order must be that its provisions “bear some
resemblance to that which the [respondent] has committed or that danger of their commission in
the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past.”
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Applying the Court’s teachings, the Board has developed a test for gauging the
appropriateness of any request for a broad order. In Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979),
the Board held that a broad order:
is warranted only when a respondent is shown to have a proclivity to
violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread
misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for . . .
fundamental statutory rights. Accordingly, each case will be analyzed
to determine the nature and extent of the violations committed by a
respondent so that the Board may tailor an appropriate order.
[Footnote omitted.]
242 NLRB at 1357. It concisely summarized its test by noting that “repeat offenders and
egregious violators” would be subject to imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. 242
NLRB at 1357. Very recently, the Board has provided an additional commentary on its Hickmott
Foods standard. In Five Star Mfg., 348 NLRB No. 94, slip op. at 1 (2006), it noted that, while
considering imposition of a broad order under Hickmott, “the totality of circumstances” must be
examined to determine whether the respondent’s behavior manifests, “an attitude of opposition
to the purposes of the Act . . . which would provide an objective basis for enjoining a reasonably
anticipated future threat.” [Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.] 23
In her opening statement, counsel for the General Counsel explained that the request for
a broad order was premised on the Union’s “demonstrated proclivity to violate Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, its general disregard for the right of [neutral] employe[r]s and blatant
disrespect for the Board and its processes.” (Tr. 14.) In order to evaluate the appropriateness
of this request for relief, the starting point must be an examination of the Union’s history of
similar or related misconduct. Unfortunately, that history is a rather lengthy one.24
The earliest instances of unlawful activity cited by the General Counsel occurred during
the summer of 1999. This involved secondary activity at the Society Hill Towers Owners’
Association construction project designed to force Society Hill to cease doing business with the

23 The preceding general discussion is taken from my recent decision involving a similar
remedial issue. See Electrical Workers Local 98 (Tri-M Group, LLC), 2007 WL 1101502 (April
10, 2007). Counsel for the Union also incorporated elements of my background discussion into
his brief. See R. Br. at pp. 19—21.
24 In reciting the pertinent history, in addition to reported decisions, I rely on records
submitted into evidence by the General Counsel. In each instance, these include complaints
filed against the Union and accompanying formal settlements and orders of the Board and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforcing the settlements. Each of the
settlements included language providing that, in any future proceeding involving the
determination of the scope of an order to be entered against the Union, the conduct alleged in
the complaints would be given the same force and effect as a litigated adjudication against the
Union. A provision containing such language renders the conduct underlying the settlement
agreement cognizable when considering the question of a proclivity to violate the Act. See
Electrical Workers Local 98 (The Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999), Carpenters
Local 1622, 262 NLRB 1211 (1982), enf. 786 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1986), and Teamsters Local 70,
261 NLRB 496, 503 (1982). Put another way, counsel for the Union has recognized that, for
purposes of this analysis, the Union’s entry into the formal settlements resulted in the Union
having been found “guilty” of the unfair labor practices alleged in those complaints. (R. Br., at p.
22.)
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Smucker Company. The specific form of misconduct involved the use of a sound amplification
system at excessive volume levels to coerce compliance with the Union’s unlawful objective.
During approximately the same period in the summer of 1999, the Union engaged in
similar unlawful secondary activity directed at the Carlisle Construction Company and
Rittenhouse Regency Affiliates, joint owners of The Versailles, an apartment building. The
Union’s objective was to cause these companies to cease doing business with Nytech, a firm
performing window replacement work on the premises. The Union’s campaign began with a
telephone call from one of its agents to the property manager of the apartment building. The
agent warned that, “if we didn’t use his men there, that he would have 100 of his men show up
at the job and there might be trouble.” Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335
NLRB 814, 820 (2001), enf. 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002). Subsequently, the Union
embarked on another pattern of employment of a sound amplification system to produce what a
United States District Court characterized as “vastly excessive noise levels.” 335 NLRB at 820.
On September 14, 1999, the General Counsel issued the complaint in the case arising
from the Union’s conduct at Society Hill Towers and The Versailles. On March 17, 2000, an
administrative law judge found that the Union’s conduct at each worksite had violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. He recommended imposition of a cease-and-desist order. 335 NLRB at
829.
While the Society Hill Towers litigation was continuing before the Board, the Union
engaged in unlawful secondary activity directed at one of the charging parties in the case
currently before me. In January 2001, it began picketing at a Commerce Bank jobsite where
Adams-Bickel was engaged as a general contractor. The object of the Union’s picketing was to
force Adams-Bickel to cease doing business with one of its subcontractors, Hi-Tech Interiors,
LLC. (Complaint in Case 4—CC—2308, GC Exh. 3.)
On August 27, 2001, the Board issued its decision in Carpenters (Society Hill Towers
Owners’ Assn.), supra. It adopted the judge’s findings, conclusions and recommendations in
pertinent respects and issued a cease-and-desist order.
Barely more than two months later, on November 2, 2001, an agent of the Union
threatened a general contractor, Cutler Associates, Inc., that it would picket the company’s
jobsite with the objective of forcing Cutler to cease doing business with one of its
subcontractors, Vision Contract Flooring, Inc. On the three days immediately following this
conversation, the Union did picket at the jobsite with the purpose of threatening, coercing, and
restraining Cutler, R & S Electric Company, and Adams-Bickel. (Complaint in Case 4—CC—
2341-2, GC Exh. 3.) Once again, it is noteworthy that the Union’s unlawful secondary activity
was directed against a charging party in the case before me, Adams-Bickel.
The complaint involving the Union’s conduct at the Cutler jobsite was issued on
November 21, 2001. Just over 6 weeks later, on January 7, 2002, the Union engaged in
restraint and coercion of employees of Charles A. Higgins & Sons, Inc., and Mustang
Expeditors, at a jobsite in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. This activity was in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.25 (Complaint in Case 4—CB—8807, GC Exh. 3.)

25 Counsel for the Union asserts that the Union’s conduct in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act is “of no value to the discussion here.” (R. Br., at fn. 21.) I do not agree. While the
Board has held that, “[i]n general,” proclivity must be determined from prior findings of “similar
unlawful conduct in the past,” it has also very recently instructed that “the totality of
Continued
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Just a month after these events, on February 8 and 11, 2002, the Union engaged in
secondary picketing at a jobsite involving the renovation of a United States Army Reserve
Center with objectives of forcing Harkins & Harkins Mechanical Services, Inc., to cease doing
business with USA Environmental Management, Inc., and forcing USA Environmental to cease
doing business with Boncouer Construction Company. A complaint alleging this misconduct
was issued February 27, 2002. (Complaint in Cases 4—CC—2350-1 and 2350-2, GC Exh. 3.)
A week after the issuance of this complaint, on March 7, 2002, the Union engaged in
unlawful secondary picketing at a Burger King restaurant with the objective of forcing the Burger
King Corporation to cease doing business with A.E. Manning, Inc. (Complaint in Case 4—CC—
2357, GC Exh. 3.)
The General Counsel issued complaints against the Union on March 14 and May 17,
2002. These concerned the unlawful activities just described. (Complaints in Cases 4—CB—
8807 and 4—CC—2357, GC Exh. 3.) Little more than 6 weeks later, on July 2 and 3, 2002, the
Union engaged in unlawful picketing at a building renovation project located at Tenth and Berks
Street, blocking ingress to that site. An object of this secondary activity was to force Roosevelt,
Inc., d/b/a Philadelphia Management to cease doing business with Diamond Contract Flooring.
(Complaint in Cases 4—CB—8886 and 4—CC—2366, GC Exh. 3.)
The flurry of litigation spawned by the Union’s course of illegal conduct was resolved as
follows. On August 20, 2002, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation designed to
resolve the allegations in Cases 4—CC—2308, 4—CC—2341-2, 4—CB—8807, 4—CC—2357,
4—CB—8886, and 4—CB—2366. This provided for issuance of narrow cease-and-desist
orders and the posting of notices. (Settlement Stipulation, GC Exh. 3.) On April 8, 2004, the
Settlement Stipulation was approved by the Board and an appropriate order was issued.
(Decision and Order, GC Exh. 3.) Finally, on September 30, 2004, the Third Circuit entered a
judgment enforcing the Board’s Order.26 (Judgment, GC Exh. 3.)
From July 2002 through September 2004, the Union was not found to have engaged in
similar or related unlawful activities. However, commencing on October 1, 2004, in what
appears to me to be a particularly troubling series of events, the Union engaged in
“confrontational conduct” at the Springside School, a school for girls in grades kindergarten
through 12. This conduct included the massing of demonstrators, amplification of loud music,
and aggressive handbilling. The purpose of this secondary activity was to force the Springside
School to cease doing business with E. Allen Reeves, Inc. (Complaint in Case 4—CC—2429,
GC Exh. 4.) The complaint in this case was filed March 7, 2005. The parties resolved the case
by Formal Settlement Stipulation on July 5, 2005. The settlement provided for the entry of a
narrow cease-and-desist order and the posting of a notice. (Formal Settlement Stipulation, GC
Exh. 4.) The Board issued a Decision and Order effectuating the parties’ settlement on June 9,
2006. This was enforced by judgment of the Third Circuit on October 31, 2006.
_________________________
circumstances” must be considered in analyzing this remedial issue. Teamsters Local 166
(Shank/Balfour Beatty), 327 NLRB 449, 455 (1999) and Five Star Mfg, 348 NLRB No. 94, slip
op., at p. 1 (2006). I have cited the Union’s conduct because it forms a material part of the
context that I must consider in recommending an appropriate remedy.
26 The Third Circuit had earlier enforced the Board’s order in the Society Hill Towers case.
See Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Court found that the record was “replete with evidence supporting” the Board’s findings. 50
Fed. Appx., at 91.
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Approximately six months after entering into the Formal Settlement Stipulation discussed
above, the Union resumed its illegal secondary activities. On January 17 and 20, 2006, the
Union engaged in picketing at a jobsite on Kimball Street in Philadelphia and at an office in
Sicklerville, New Jersey. Among the objectives of this activity were to force East Coast
Construction Services Corporation to cease doing business with Keniko Construction, Inc.; to
force D Construction to cease doing business with Ray Marasheski, Jr., t/a Marasheski
Contractors; and to force Marasheski to cease doing business with East Coast Construction
Services. (Complaint in Case 4—CC—2450, GC Exh. 5.) A complaint containing these
allegations was filed February 16, 2006. The parties resolved the case by entering into a
Formal Settlement Stipulation on May 11, 2006. This provided for a narrow cease-and-desist
order and the posting of a notice. (Formal Settlement Stipulation, GC Exh. 5.) The Board
approved the settlement by Decision and Order dated August 1, 2006. It was enforced by
judgment of the Third Circuit on October 31, 2006.
I certainly realize that this long and melancholy recitation of dates and documents must
cause even an interested reader’s eyes to glaze over. Thus, it is particularly important that I
urge that reader to take heed of the temporal relationship between this past history and the
events of the current case. It will be recalled that the Regional Director filed the complaint in
Case 4—CC—2450 on February 16, 2006. While this was pending, Jones unlawfully
threatened Strine on May 3. Little more than a week later, the parties’ settlement of the earlier
case was signed by the Regional Director. Only slightly more than a month after that, on June
19, the Regional Director issued the charge in this case arising from Jones’ threats to Strine.
On October 31, 2006, the Third Circuit entered not one, but two, separate judgments enforcing
Board orders against the Union. (GC Exhs. 4 and 5.) Yet, shortly thereafter, on December 5,
Jones threatened McCardle that if he did not take action regarding American Millwork, the Union
would picket the brewery jobsite with the result that construction activities would be disrupted.
On the next day, the Regional Director amended her complaint in the Adams-Bickel case
to notify the Union that she was seeking imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. (GC
Exh. 1(j).) On the day after that, Penn Valley filed its charge against the Union. (GC Exh. 1(l).)
On December 26, the Regional Director filed a complaint based on that charge. (GC Exh. 1(o).)
The Union filed its answer to that complaint on December 29. (GC Exh. 1(s).) Amazingly (to
me, at least), 5 days later, the Union chose to carry out the precise unlawful threat that it had
issued to Penn Valley and that had resulted in the filing of the latest complaint against it. It did
so by picketing the brewery jobsite with the result that the delivery of cabinetry was disrupted.
In evaluating the propriety of the General Counsel’s request for broad relief, I have
placed great weight on several factors that have supported the issuance of broad orders in prior
cases. First and foremost, the extensive scope and nature of the Union’s pattern of secondary
activity strongly suggests that an order tailored to protect the statutory rights of all employers in
the Philadelphia metropolitan area is a necessary remedial measure. In this regard, the Union’s
history of unlawful secondary activity shows that its misconduct has affected a total of 30
employers in the Philadelphia area, both primary and secondary, since 1999.27 By way of

27 Those employers were: Society Hill Towers Owners’ Association; Smucker Company;
Carlisle Construction Company; Rittenhouse Regency Affiliates; Nytech; Adams-Bickel; Hi-Tech
Interiors; Cutler Associates; Vision Contract Flooring, Inc.; R & S Electric Company; Charles A.
Higgins & Sons, Inc.; Mustang Expeditors; Harkins & Harkins Mechanical Services, Inc.; USA
Environmental Management, Inc.; Boncouer Construction Company; Burger King Corporation;
A.E. Manning, Inc.; Roosevelt, Inc.; Diamond Contract Flooring; Springside School; E. Allen
Continued
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comparison, I note that the Board adopted an administrative law judge’s recommendation of a
broad cease-and-desist order enjoining unlawful secondary activity by a union that had been
found to have committed misconduct against 10 neutral employers at six locations in the
Philadelphia area. While that union’s misconduct occurred during a more concentrated period
of time, the extent of the impact on the rights of neutral employers and the effect on the regional
economy is comparable to that caused by this Respondent’s pattern of behavior. See Electrical
Workers, Local 98 (The Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999). Furthermore, the extent
of the Union’s past misconduct is a strong predictor of the need for broad remedial measures.
See Carpenters Local 690 (R.L. (Bob) Moore Construction Co.). 190 NLRB 609, at fn. 2 (1971),
and Service Employees Union, Local 77, 264 NLRB 628, 629 (1982).
In addition to the extent of the Union’s unlawful activities, I note that it has repeatedly
targeted one of the specific charging parties in this case, Adams-Bickel. In 2001, it picketed a
jobsite where that company was engaged as a general contractor. The object was to force
Adams-Bickel to cease doing business with one of its subcontractors. (Complaint in Case 4—
CC—2308, GC Exh. 3.) Later that year, the Union picketed a jobsite of Cutler Associates with
an objective of threatening, restraining, and coercing Cutler, R & S Electric, and Adams-Bickel.
(Complaint in Case 4—CC—2341-2, GC Exh. 3.) I have now found that the Union has again
targeted unlawful secondary activity against Adams-Bickel by threatening CPLP with protests,
work stoppages, and disruption of deliveries in order to force CPLP to apply pressure against
Adams-Bickel and persons who had contractual relationships with Adams-Bickel. In Painters
Local 558 (Carroll Day Glass), 317 NLRB 254 (1995), the Board issued a broad order against a
union premised on “record evidence of previous unfair labor practice proceedings finding that
the Respondent engaged in similar unlawful conduct against [the same] Charging Party.” The
Board characterized this pattern of misconduct as demonstrating a proclivity to violate the Act
within the meaning of Hickmott Foods, supra. The same reasoning applies with equal force
here.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I am mindful that the ultimate purpose of any
remedial measure is that it be reasonably tailored to be effective at deterring future misconduct
while avoiding undue impact on the respondent labor organization. Here, the only lesser form of
remedy would be a narrow cease-and-desist order such as those the Board has previously
issued against this Union as part of formal settlement proceedings. Although these narrow
orders have been enforced by judgments of the Court of Appeals, they have not proven to be
effective in protecting the rights of neutral employers generally and Adams-Bickel specifically.
In Postal Service, 345 NLRB No. 25, slip op. at p. 2 (2005), enf. of pertinent part denied 477
F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007), the Board ordered broad relief, observing that “the violations in this
case took place after the Board issued an uncontested narrow cease-and-desist order in the
prior case, suggesting the inadequacy of this order to deter future violations.” Once again, the
same reasoning applies with equal validity in the circumstances of this case.
In approving the Board’s issuance of a broad order, the Supreme Court in Electrical
Workers v. NLRB, 341 US 694, 706 (1951), cited a rather colorful metaphor from one of its
antitrust decisions, noting that, “[w]hen the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear
violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and
that only the worn one be closed.”28 The record in this case convinces me that the appropriate
_________________________
Reeves, Inc.; East Coast Construction Services Corporation; Keniko Construction, Inc.; D
Construction; Ray Marasheski, Jr., t/a Marasheski Contractors; CPLP; Penn Valley; PA Fly; and
American Millwork.
28 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 US 392, 400 (1947).
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remedial recommendation is for the Board to close all of the possible avenues for application of
unlawful secondary pressure against neutral parties that may otherwise be chosen as this
Union’s route to the achievement of its unlawful objectives.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended29
ORDER
The Respondent, Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Southeastern
Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening representatives of 421 Chestnut Partners LP, or any other neutral
employer, that the Union will cause protests, work stoppages, or problems with
deliveries, where an object of such threats is to force or require that employer to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Adams-
Bickel Associates, Inc., and to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc.,
or to force or require Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., to cease using selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of unspecified “unfair” subcontractors,
and to cease doing business with those subcontractors.
(b) Threatening representatives of Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., or any other
neutral employer, that the Union will cause employees that it represents to refuse to
unload and install products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., where an object of such
threats is to force or require Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., PA Fly Contracting, Inc., or
any other neutral employer, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to cease doing business
with American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to force or require American Millwork
Cabinetry, Inc., to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of
American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc.’s employees although the Union has not been certified
as the representative of those employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.
(c) In any other manner engage in conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act that is directed at neutral employers with the objective of forcing or requiring neutral
employers to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of other employers, or to force or require neutral employers to cease doing
business with other employers, or to force or require an employer to recognize and
bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees although the Union has
not been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of
Section 9 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

29 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union office in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”30 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting
by Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., and Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., if willing, at all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 1, 2007
____________________
Paul Buxbaum
Administrative Law Judge

30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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Philadelphia, PA
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT threaten representatives of 421 Chestnut Partners LP, or any other neutral
employer, that the Union will cause protests, work stoppages, or problems with deliveries,
where an object of such threats is to force or require that employer to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc.,
and to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., or to force or require Adams-
Bickel Associates, Inc., to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of unspecified “unfair” subcontractors, and to cease doing business with those
subcontractors.
WE WILL NOT threaten representatives of Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., or any other neutral
employer, that the Union will cause employees that it represents to refuse to unload and install
products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., where an object of such threats is to force or
require Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., PA Fly Contracting, Inc., or any other neutral employer,
to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of American
Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to cease doing business with American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to
force or require American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., to recognize and bargain with the Union as
the representative of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc.’s employees although the Union has not
been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, engage in prohibited activities directed at persons
engaged in commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce, with the objective of forcing or
requiring such persons to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of other employers, or to force or require such persons to cease doing business
with other employers, or to force or require an employer to recognize and bargain with the Union
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Philadelphia, PA
as the representative of its employees although the Union has not been certified as the
representative of those employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS, SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF DELAWARE AND
EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, One Independence Mall, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-4404
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
215-597-7601.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 215-597-7643.