Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 11, 1966

156 N.L.R.B. 1408 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

1408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Woonsocket , R.I.) and
Insurance Workers International Union , AFL-CIO. Case No.
1-CA-4038. February 11, 1966
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
On October 24, 1962, the National Labor Relations Board issued a
Decision and Direction of Election in Case No. 1-RC-7024,1 finding
appropriate a unit of insurance agents at Respondent Company's
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, district office. After an election duly
conducted on November 23, 1962, the Regional Director for Region 1,
on December 3, 1962, certified Insurance Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in
the appropriate unit. Contending that the Board's unit finding was
erroneous, and in order to test the validity of the certification, respond-
ent Company thereafter refused to bargain.
On March 7, 1963, Trial Examiner A. Norman Somers issued an
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled matter, finding that
Respondent had violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to bargain with the
Union. The Trial Examiner's findings were adopted by the Board on
May 7, 1963.2 Enforcement of the Board's order was denied by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The court declared, inter alia,
that in view of the "Board's failu e to articulate specific reasons for its
unit determination," it could only conclude from this and other deci-
sions of the Board that the Board "has indeed reverted to its pre-1944
policy of regarding the extent of union organization as controlling in
violation of § 9 (c) (5) of the Act." 3
On April 5, 1965, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals on the ground that it was unable to agree "that the
only possible conclusion here is that the Board has violated § 9(c) (5)"
and directed that the case be remanded to the Board because the
Board's action could not properly be reviewed "due to the Board's
lack of articulated reasons for the decisions in and distinctions among
the cases...." 4 On April 13, 1965, the court of appeals remanded
the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion.
On April 16, 1965, the Respondent filed a motion with the Board
asking the Board to: (1) vacate orders in a number of unfair labor
practice cases pending before the Board involving bargaining units for
the Respondent's insurance agents; (2) reopen the records in a number
I Not published in NLRB volumes.
S Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 142 NLRB 491.
' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. N .L.R.B., 327 F. 2d 906, 909 , 911 (C A. 1).
4 N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 380 U . S. 438, 442.
156 NLRB No. 113.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1409
of representation proceedings involving a unit issue similar to that in
the instant case; (3) stay all further proceedings in all these unfair
labor practice and representation cases; and (4) order a consolidated
hearing in the reopened representation cases to take testimony on
changes in the Respondent's organizational structure. The Union
filed a cross-motion on April 29, 1965, asking that the Board review
the record made in the original Woonsocket representation case and
"further articulate its basis for the decision therein," and deny the
relief sought in the Respondent's motion. On June 2, 1965, the Board
issued an order reopening the record in the instant proceeding and
directing that a further hearing be held before a Trial Examiner for
the purpose of obtaining evidence on the Respondent's alleged organi-
zational and operational changes. The Board indicated that after
this evidence was taken it would then be possible to provide for its
incorporation in the other cases, but denied the Respondent's motion
to reopen these cases.5
On October 14, 1965, Trial Examiner Harold X. Summers issued
his Supplemental Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding
that the organizational and operational changes in the Respondent's
structure which were made after the Board's unit determination did
not affect the earlier unit finding, and that the unit found appropriate
in the underlying representation proceeding, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision, is still appropriate.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Sup-
plemental Decision and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Supplemental Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
Respondent contends : (1) the Board's reopening of the unfair labor
practice case, rather than the representation case, is contrary to the
order and intention of the Supreme Court, is a denial of due process,
and is contrary to the Board's own Rules and Regulations, Series 8,
as amended, and to the Act; (2) contrary to the Trial Examiner's
conclusions, the changes in the Respondent's operations shown at the
reopened hearing require a holding that a single district office unit
is inappropriate for collective bargaining; (3) the smallest appro-
5 Thereafter , the Respondent moved the Board to reconsider the order of June 2, to
vacate all the unfair labor practice decisions , and to reopen the records in all the repre-
sentation proceedings . In the alternative the Respondent moved to amend the Board's
Order so as to reopen Case No. 1-RC-7024, the representation proceeding underlying Case
No. 1-CA-4038 . The Union also filed a motion similar to its earlier cross-motion of
April 29, 1965 . These motions were denied by the Board on July 1, 1965.
1410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
priate unit under the present company organization is the region;
and (4) the present representation decisions of the Board are totally
irreconcilable.
The.Supreme Court's opinion contains nothing even remotely sug-
gesting that the Board was required to reopen any case, either repre-
sentation or unfair labor practices The Supreme Court directed only
that the case be remanded to the Board because the lack of "articulated
reasons" for the Board's decisions in this and related cases made it
impossible for the Court properly to review these decisions.? These
reasons can be articulated in the unfair labor practice proceeding as
well as in the representation proceeding, and this could have been
done without the reopening of any record. That the Board did reopen
the record in the present case was due not to the Supreme Court's
opinion, but to the Respondent's claim that recent changes in its
organizational and operational structure made the Board's prior unit
determination no longer appropriate.
The Respondent also contends that by reopening only the unfair
labor practice case, the Board deprives it of the constitutionally guar-
anteed opportunity to obey the law. We do not agree. A representa-
tion proceeding is not a prerequisite to the validity of a bargaining
order." Such an order has prospective application only. In the instant
case the Respondent will have an opportunity to comply with our
order and the law by bargaining after the issuance of this Decision.
Moreover, no opprobrium attaches to an employer's refusal to bargain
where, as here, the refusal is based upon the employer's desire to test
the Board's unit findings in an underlying representation proceeding.
Respondent's additional arguments that the reopening of the unfair
labor practice case violates the Board's Rules and Regulations and the
Act are equally unpersuasive.
Respondent's remaining arguments are addressed to the approp-
priateness of the unit finding. They are considered hereinafter.
We have reexamined the original record and the record in the
reopened hearing as well as our unit determinations in this case and in
the other insurance cases in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion,
and we conclude that our earlier determinations were and are correct.
The Trial Examiner's attached Supplemental Decision contains an
accurate description of the Respondent's organizational structure both
6 Respondent ' s argument that the Court's opinion requires that all pending representa-
tion cases be reopened is equally without merit . The Supreme Court noted ( 380 U.S
438, 443 , footnote 6) :
Of course , the Board may articulate the basis of its order by reference to other
decisions or its general policies laid down in its rules and its annual reports, . . .
so long as the basis of the Board 's action, in whatever manner the Board chooses
to formulate it, meets the criteria for judicial review.
7 S. D. Warren Co. v. N L.R .B., 353 F . 2d 494 (C.A. 1).
8 Cf. United Mine Workers of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co, 351 U.S. 62.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1411
before and after the recent changes.9 Comparing the old and the new
organizational structure, the Trial Examiner found, and we hereby
adopt his finding, that:
... the function and role of the district office remain unchanged;
it still is the company's primary sales unit. The authority of the
district manager, to the extent it has changed, has been enhanced,
despite the creation of regions and the district manager's greater
accountability to his inmiediate superior.
. . . there had been no change in the status of district office
employees, vis-a-vis each other, the employees of other district
offices, or-except for closer supervision by Unit Managers-
representatives of management.
Nothing in the newly installed system of line management
relevantly alters the picture of the district office as a separate
administrative entity of the Company. If anything, the role of
the district office as a self-contained basic (sales) operating unit
has been more sharply defined.
The Trial Examiner concluded, and we agree, that these facts,
including the organizational and operational changes in the Respond-
ent's structure, do not alter our conclusion, hereinafter stated, that the
single office unit is appropriate for collective bargaining. Accord-
ingly, we proceed to set forth the reasons for the unit determinations
in this and related cases.
As Judge Madden has recently said : to
Of the many tasks entrusted by the Labor Relations Act to
the Board, the determination of the appropriate units may be the
most difficult. The Board's answer to the unit question is often
decisive as to whether or not there is to be collective bargaining,
just as the definition of the boundaries of a political election dis-
trict may determine which party will win such an election.
9 On August 16, 1965 , the Union moved the Board to incorporate the record made at
the supplemental hearing before Trial Examiner Summers into the records of 41 repre-
sentation cases and 32 unfair labor practice cases, action in which had been stayed by the
Board ' s Order of June 2, 1965 Respondent ' s reply, filed on September 1, 1965, opposed
the motion , contending instead that the Woonsocket representation case record should be
reopened . The General Counsel 's reply , filed on September 3, viewed the Union's motion
as premature , as the record made at the supplemental hearing was still being considered
by the Trial Examiner. We hereby grant the Union's motion and order that the record
made at the supplemental hearing herein be incorporated in the records of the cases
listed in the Union 's motion
io S. D. Warren Co. v. N .L.R.B., supra.
217-919-66-vol. 15 6-9 0
1412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The sole affirmative guide as to what constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit is contained in Section 9(b) of the Act, which reads:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof: ...
Under this broad delegation of authority, the Board, in determining
whether the unit petitioned for in a particular case is appropriate,
has traditionally looked to such factors as the community of interest
among the employees sought to be represented; whether they comprise
a homogeneous, identifiable, and distinct group; whether they are
interchanged with other employees; the extent of common supervision;
the previous history of bargaining; and the geographic proximity of
various parts of the employer's operation." Moreover, it is well
settled that there may be more than one way in which employees of
a given employer may appropriately be grouped for purposes of col-
lective bargaining.12
11 As the Board earlier stated:
In attempting to ascertain the groups among which there is that mutual interest
in the objects of collective bargaining which must exist in an appropriate unit, the
Board takes into consideration the facts and circumstances existing in each case.
The nature of the work done by the employees involved, their training and the extent
of their responsibilities , and the organization of the employer's business are all en-
titled to weight. In evaluating these factors , the Board must also consider the his-
tory of collective bargaining , whether successful or otherwise , among the employees
involved as well as among other employees in the same Industry or in similar in-
dustries . Finally the Board must evaluate various other factors which tend to show
the presence or absence of a mutual interest in collective bargaining between various
groups of employees
The precise weight to be given to any of the relevant factors cannot be mathemati-
cally stated.
Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, p 157 . See also
Twenty-eighth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, pp. 50-53; May
Department Stores, d/b/a Famous -Barr Company v. N L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376, 380.
'- In a recent survey of national labor policy , a distinguished panel of labor relations
experts, headed by Clark Kerr , said the following about unit determination:
Decisions on appropriate units are bound to be somewhat arbitrary and, beyond
establishing broad guidelines , it is difficult to do other than proceed on a case-by-case
basis .... One of the most difficult structural issues for collective bargaining is
that the problems to which bargaining Is addressed vary widely in scope. For some,
a large unit Is appropriate and, for others , the only sensible approach is in terms of
the small group of people immediately involved . This need for a varying and
sophisticated bargaining structure means, in our view, that the parties should be
left free to use election units for building blocks, as their arrangements for collective
bargaining are designed to deal with questions that are large as well as those that are
small in scope.
The Public Interest in National Labor Policy , Committee for Economic Development, New
York, 1961 , pp. 73-74.
See also General Instrument Corporation v. N.L R.B., 319 F. 2d 420, 422-423 (C A. 4),
cert. denied 375 U.S. 966 ; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. N L.R B , 310
F. 2d 478, 480 (C.A. 10) ; N.L.R.B. v Charles Smythe, et al., d/b /a E. W. Saybolt & Co,
212 F. 2d 664 , 667-668 ( C.A. 5) ; Harris Langenberg Hat Company v. N.LR.B., 216 F.
2d 146, 148 ( C.A. 8) ; Mueller Brass Company v. N.L R B., 180 F. 2d 402, 405 (C.A.D.C.).
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1413
The broad delegation of authority in Section 9(b) is limited by
9(c) (5), which provides:
In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purpose
specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have
organized shall not be controlling.
At the time this section was considered by Congress, Senator Taft
explained its effect, as follows :
Section 9(c) (5) : This amendment ... overrules the "extent of
organization" theory sometimes used by the Board in determining
appropriate units. Opponents of the bill have stated that it pre-
vents the establishment of small operational units and effectively
prevents organization of public utilities, insurance companies and
other businesses whose operations are widespread. It is sufficient
answer to say that the Board has evolved numerous tests to deter-
mine appropriate units, such as community of interest of
employees involved, extent of common supervision, interchange of
employees, geographical considerations, etc., any one of which may
justify the finding of a small unit. The extent-of-organization
theory has been used where all valid tests fail to give the
union what it desires and represents a surrender by the Board of
its duty to determine appropriate units. [Emphasis supplied.] 13
As the Supreme Court pointed out in N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., supra, 441-442, "both the language and legislative his-
tory of § 9(c) (5) demonstrate that the provision was not intended
to prohibit the Board from considering the extent of organization as
one factor, though not the controlling factor, in its unit determina-
tion." Stated otherwise, that provision was merely intended to pre-
clude the Board from basing its unit determination solely on the
extent of organization in the absence of other criteria of appropriate-
ness. It was not intended to prohibit the Board from considering
extent of organization as one factor in its determination, or to invali-
date units which qualified under the other established tests for appro-
priateness irrespective of extent of organization.
Applying the above-described principles here, the uncontradicted
evidence shows that each of the Respondent's district offices, including
the Woonsocket, Rhode Island, office involved in this case, functions
as a distinct entity in the Respondent's operations. As more fully set
forth in the Supplemental Decision, each office covers a defined geo-
graphic area, and is, to a significant degree, a self-contained unit,
is 93 Cong. Rec. 6860. See also Texas Pipeline Company v. N.L.R.B., 296 F. 2d 208
(C.A. 5) ; S. D. Warren Co . v. N.L.R.B., supra
1414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
autonomous in its day-to-day workings. The agency managers 14 in
each office exercise immediate control and supervision over the agents
in their office. The agents in each office enjoy common working con-
ditions and benefits, and provide service primarily to clients within
their designated territories. Almost no transfer or interchange of
employees takes place among the offices. Finally, while it appears
that the new regional manager has a greater familiarity with the
operations of his district offices than did the former superintendent
of agencies, most of the regional manager's contact in the district
office is with the district manager, and then primarily with respect
to sales program development. The district manager is still the prin-
cipal representative of company authority and policy as far as indi-
vidual agents are concerned. And, it is the agency manager, working
in the district office, who transmits and explains company. policy to the
agents during the periodic group meetings and individual confer-
ences, and who reviews each agent's performance with him.
These factors justify our prior conclusion, which we here reaffirm,
that each of "the [Company's] indlvichlal district office is . . . a sepa-
rate administrative entity through which the Employer conducts its
business operations, and therefore is inherently appropriate for pur-
poses of collective bargaining." 15 In short, the district office is the
insurance industry's analogue of the single manufacturing plant,", or
the single store of a retail chain."' Accordingly, if petitioned for, we
14 As found by the Trial Examiner, the top official of Respondent's field management
division is the senior vice president in charge of field management. Reporting to him
are 10 agency vice presidents, stationed in the home or head offices, each of whom is
responsible for a territory in the United States or Canada. The average territory is
comprised of approximately 4 regions with a total of about 92 district offices. Each
region is headed by a regional manager who works out of an office in his region, and
who is responsible for the operations of (on the average) 21 district offices, which he
regularly visits (Under Respondent's past structure, the superintendent of agencies,
headquartered at the home or head offices, was on the next level of supervision above the
district manager.) The district manager, now, as in the past, has direct supervision over
the district office. He supervises one or more agency managers (called assistant managers
under the past structure), who are also known as metropolitan insurance consultant man-
agers, or, collectively, as unit managers. The agency managers, located in each district
office, are Respondent 's lowest level of supervision.
15 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 565, 567.
1e Since the plant is the basic component of a manufacturing enterprise and Section
9(b) of the Act specifically recognizes the validity of such a unit, the Board has long held
that a unit confined to a single plant of a particular employer is presumptively an ap-
propriate unit. See, e g., Beaumont Forging Company, 110 NLRB 2200, 2201-2202;
Fredrickson Motor Express Corporation, 121 NLRB 32, 33; Hygrade Food Products Cor-
poration, 85 NLRB 841, 848 (concurring opinion).
171n Sav-On Drugs, Inc, 138 NLRB 1032, 1033, the Board reconsidered its prior
policy that the appropriate unit for retail chainstore operations should embrace employees
of all stores within an employer's administrative division or geographic area. In Sav-0n,
where the Board found a single store to be an appropriate unit, the Board concluded that
the above-stated policy, "has overemphasized the administrative grouping of merchandis-
ing outlets at the expense of factors such as geographic separation of the several outlets
and the local managerial autonomy of the separate outlets ; . . See also Primrose
Super Market of Salem, Inc., 148 NLRB 610, enfd. 58 LRRM 2863 (C A. 1), cert. denied
382 U.S. 830, rehearing denied 353 F. 2d 675 (CA. 1) ; The J. L. Hudson Company, 155
NLRB 1345; J. W. Mays, Inc., 147 NLRB 968; Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc, 147
NLRB 551.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1415
will ordinarily find a single district office to be an appropriate bargain-
ing unit for insurance agents, and will direct an election in that unit,
just as we normally do for a manufacturing plant or a retail store.
However, a unit composed of two or more district offices may also
be appropriate if there is a reasonable degree of. geographic coherence
among the offices. If the offices are not too distant and their territories
are either adjacent or in reasonable proximity to one another, then,
in the absence of strong countervailing considerations, the conven-
tional and well accepted criteria set forth above would justify such a
grouping.18 Thus, the employees in the several offices are doing the
same work, for the same employer, with the same working conditions
in an area that is clearly defined and sufficiently compact so that a
single bargaining unit will permit the employees to exercise their
collective-bargaining rights under the Act. In such cases-where
either the district office or a combination of offices might be "appro-
priate" on the basis of factors other than the extent of organization-
the Board will take the Union's request into account in deciding in
which unit an election should be conducted. For, there is little justifi-
cation for requiring that adjacent offices, organized by the same union,
be in different bargaining units where a combination would also be ap-
propriate. On the other hand, although other rational groupings of
offices may be possible, there is no reason to compel a labor organization
to seek representation in a larger unit than the one requested unless the
smaller requested unit is itself mappropriate.1°
Nor does Section 9(c) (5) of the Act preclude the Board from thus
giving weight to the Union's request. As shown, that section merely
prohibits the establishment of a bargaining unit which would not be
appropriate under traditional criteria apart from extent of organiza-
tion. Since either a single district office or a grouping of such offices
where they are geographically related would be appropriate apart
from extent of organization, Section 9(c) (5) does not bar the Board
fronn taking that factor into account in selecting among those units 2°
Since 1961, the Board's unit determinations for insurance agents
have followed these principles. The first of these cases was Quaker
City Life Insurance Company, 134 NLRB 960, enfd. 319 F. 2d 690
1s \lultiplant and multistore units which include employees in all the plants or stores
in a defined area are commonplace and have proved workable. See, for instance, Weis
Markets, Inc., 142 NLRB 708; Barr's Jewelers, 131 NLRB 235; The Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 128 NLRB 342, Orchard Industries, Incorporated, 118 NLRB
798; B. G. Wholesale, Incorporated, et al. , 114 NLRB 1429
19 See Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 NLRB 629, 631 ; P. Ballantine & Sons, 141 NLRB
1103, 1107; Bagdad Copper Company, 144 NLRB 1496; Gordon Mills, Inc, 145 NLRB
771, 773-774 ; cf. Bernard %lint, et al., d/b/a Ny-Lint Tool & Manufacturing Co., 77
NLRB 642.
20 As set forth above, the fact that the union, in petitioning for a particular unit, may
have been motivated by the extent to which it had organized is immaterial so long as the
Board in making its determination of the appropriate unit does not give controlling weight
to that fact. Allied Stores of New York, Inc., d/b/a, Stern's, Paramus, 150 NLRB 799
1416 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(C.A. 4), where, as here, a petition had been filed for a unit of
employees in a single district office. The Board noted that prior
insurance unit cases had been controlled by the rule enunciated in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 56 NLRB 1635, 1640, where
the Board had decided to deny units of insurance agents less than
statewide in scope. In this early insurance unit decision rendered in
1944, 17 years before Quaker City, the Board said:
Thus, the rapid growth of union organization among insurance
agents makes it clearly appear that provisional units less than
State-wide in scope are, under ordinary circumstances, unneces-
sary to make collective bargaining reasonably possible for them
if they desire it. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that, in the
absences of unusual circumstances, the practice of setting up units
for insurance agents smaller than State-wide in scope should be
avoided. In the instant case, since the Federation, the Independ-
ent, and the C.I.O. are all actively engaged in a broad organiza-
tional program in Ohio, and since it may reasonably be antici-
pated that one of these organizations may in the near future
extend its membership to State-wide proportions, we are of the
opinion that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act to set up
city-wide units for employees of the Company in Ohio at this
time 21
At the time Quaker City was decided, it was apparent to the Board
that the expectation of companywide or statewide organization had
not materialized, and that the effect of the special rules enunciated
in Metropolitan was to frustrate organization and to deny to insurance
company employees the same rights enjoyed by employees in other
industries. Accordingly, the Board decided in Quaker City that
henceforward it would only apply the same unit rules to the insurance
industry which it had been applying to other industries.
Thus, where, as here, a single district office has been petitioned
for, the Board has found that to be an appropriate unit and has
directed an election therein22 The Board has also found appropriate
21 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company , supra. 1640.
23 Quaker City Life Insurance Co., supra ( district office in Alexandria, Virginia) ; The
Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 538 ( single district offices in
McKeesport and Wilkinsburg , Pennsylvania ) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 147
NLRB 69 ( single district office in Meriden, Connecticut , and a single district office in New
London , Connecticut , the latter together with its detached office at Westerly , Rhode Is-
land) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 734 ( single district office In
Sioux City , Iowa, together with its detached offices in Fargo , North Dakota , and Sioux
Falls , South Dakota ) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 147 NLRB 688 ( single dis-
trict office in Holyoke , Massachusetts ) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 148 NLRB
1471 ( single district office in Chicago Heights , Illinois). A detached office is administered
as part of the district office ( see 138 NLRB at 736 ) ; hence it is appropriately included
with its parent district office, even though the two offices may be some distance apart, as in
the Sioux Falls case
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1417
single units of two or more district offices 23 In each of these instances
the combination met the test that the grouping exhibit a reasonable
degree of geographic coherence. Thus, in Equitable Life Insurance
Co'impany, 138 NLRB 529, the unit consisted of the company's only
two offices in Cleveland, together with a detached office in Lorain,
Ohio, which was not a separate entity. In Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company, 138 NLRB 565, the unit combined the two district
offices in Wilmington, Delaware; the only other district office in the
State was 46 miles away, in Dover. The unit in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 146 NLRB 967, combined all the district offices in the
Toledo area, together with detached offices. And, in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 146 NLRB 1557, the unit combined all the district
offices in the Greater Detroit area.
The units certified in the Metropolitan Life cases in Cleveland 24
and in Chicago 25 do not deviate from the foregoing standards. In
the Cleveland case, the Board found appropriate a unit which com-
bined six district offices in the city of Cleveland together with three
suburban offices 8 or 9 miles from the center of the city. The next
closest district office that was excluded was at Akron, 30 miles from
the center of Cleveland and 21 miles from the closest office petitioned
for. In the Chicago case, the Board found appropriate a unit of 33
offices within the Chicago city limits, excluding 14 offices located in
the Chicago metropolitan area, but outside the city limits, in the coun-
ties of Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, and Kane. (Respondent's primary
position in that case was that a statewide grouping was the smallest
appropriate unit.)
In deciding on groupings based on geographical considerations, the
problem is where to draw the line. A city, a metropolitan area, a
State, cover well-defined geographical areas. Each of these areas
represents a possible appropriate area grouping for bargaining pur-
poses. No one of these areas, in the absence of bargaining history or
other cogent considerations, is exclusively appropriate 26 The city of
Cleveland and its suburbs obviously cover a smaller area than the
Metropolitan Chicago area, and include only 9 district offices, as against
the 47 district offices in the Chicago metropolitan area, of which 33
za Equitable Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 529 ; Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 138 NLRB 565 and 146 NLRB 1577.
u Metropolitan Ltife Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 512.
25 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 144 NLRB 149
21 Morand Brothers Beverage Co , 91 NLRB 409, 418, enfd. In part 190 F. 2d 576
(C.A. 7) ; J. W. Mays, Inc., 147 NLRB 968.
1418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
are in the city of Chicago proper.27 It is therefore reasonable to
define a unit in one case in terms of a metropolitan area, and in the
other in terms of a city area.
In each case the Board has found that the employees in all Respond-
ent's district offices within the stated area-one a metroplitan area,
the other defiled by the city limits of a much larger city-constitute
an appropriate unit. In making its determination, the Board applied
the usual tests to measure the community of interest of the employees
involved : common working conditions, a clearly defined geographical
area sufficiently inclusive and compact to make collective bargaining
in a single unit feasible, and the absence of any substantial interchange
with employees or offices outside the stated areas. As the units are
thus appropriate under traditional criteria, the fact that we give effect
to the Union's request certainly does not mean that our decision is
controlled by the extent of the Union's organization, which would be
contrary to the mandate of Section 9 (c) (5).
For these reasons, we find that the units established for insurance
agents in all of the foregoing cases are valid and proper, and we
accordingly reaffirm our decisions in those cases. We reach the same
conclusion in the instant case. The unit sought here involves the debit
insurance agents at Respondent's district office at Woonsocket, Rhode
Island. We are convinced that the single district office is the basic
appropriate unit for insurance agents, and we have consistently di-
rected elections in that unit where it has been petitioned for (see cases
cited in footnote 22, supra).28 We therefore reaffirm our earlier find-
ing that the debit insurance agents at Respondent's district office at
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, constitute an appropriate bargaining unit
for purposes of the Act 29
271n the Cleveland case , the three suburban offices included are situated 8 or 9 miles
from the center of the city (138 NLRB at 514). In the Chicago case, by contrast, to
include all of the offices in the Chicago metropolitan area would have iequired including
district offices as far away as 39 miles from the center of the city Some of the offices,
such as the one at Joliet , are almost as far from the center of Chicago as they are from
the nearest district office not in the Metropolitan Chicago area Among the suburban
offices around the perimeter of the city not included in the unit requested and found ap-
propriate , some of -the offices ( Waukegan and Joliet ) are as much as 60 miles from each
other. In contrast , the unit found appropriate in the Chicago case covering the 33
offices within the city limits produced a relatively compact grouping , with all offices
within 14 miles of the center of the city.
28 Moreover , we note that there is no recent history of collective bargaining involving
the agents at the Woonsocket office and no union is seeking to represent these agents as
part of a larger unit We do not regard it as material that the Union here was ap-
parently unsuccessful in organizing the insurance agents in Rhode Island on a broader
basis ; as shown ( footnote 20, supra ), the union ' s motive for seeking a particular unit
is irrelevant for purposes of Section 9 (c) (5) of the Act.
25 The Respondent contends that the smallest appropriate unit should follow the lines
of its regions The Providence region includes 8 district offices and 2 detached offices in
the State of Rhode Island , and 16 offices in the southern half of Massachusetts . To require
that union organization follow the Respondent ' s administrative setup would , in effect,
give to the Respondent the power to define the scope of the appropriate unit , contrary to
the Act which entrusts such responsibility to the Board . It might also make the orga-
nization of employees a practical impossibility . S. D. Wai reu Co. v. N L . R.B., 342 F.
2d 814 (C.A. 1)
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1419
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
Respondent, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Woonsocket,
Rhode Island, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Insurance Workers Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO, as the duly certified exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the following unit:
All debit insurance agents, including all canvassing, regular, and
office account agents of the Respondent selling industrial life insurance
and other forms of insurance sold by the Respondent at its district
office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island; but excluding independent agents,
retired agents, Metropolitan Insurance consultants, district managers,
agency managers, clerical employees, secretaries, professional employ-
ees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Interfering with the efforts of the Insurance Workers Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO, to negotiate for or represent the employ-
ees in the said appropriate unit as the exclusive bargaining agent.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the said certified Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described
above, with respect to grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of work, and, if an agree-
ment is reached, embody it in a signed contract.
(b) Post at its district office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 30 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, shall, after
being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.
MEMBER JENKINS took no part in the consideration of the above
Supplemental Decision and Order.
30 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order, the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
1420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Insurance
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described below concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of work, and,
if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All debit insurance agents, including all canvassing, reg-
ular, and office account agents selling industrial life insurance
and other forms of insurance sold by us at our district office
in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, but excluding independent
agents, retired agents, Metropolitan Insurance consultants,
district managers, agency managers, cashiers, clerical em-
ployees, secretaries , professional employees, guards, watch-
men, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts of Insurance Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, to negotiate for or represent the
employees in the said appropriate unit as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, Boston Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street,
Boston, Massachusetts, Telephone No. 223-3358, if they have any
questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
This case was heard pursuant to an order of the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board , issued on June 2, 1965 , as reaffirmed , with modifications,
on July 1, 1965. The Board order , as amended , directed that the record in the
above-entitled case, first heard on March 6, 1963, be reopened for the purpose of
receiving evidence regarding certain changes in the organizational and operating
structure of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, herein called Respondent or,
simply, the Company, which, allegedly, affects the composition of the collective-
bargaining unit theretofore found appropriate by the Board 1 for bargaining purposes,
i Originally , in its Decision and Direction of Election in Case No . 1-RC-7024 issued
October 24 , 1962 ( unpublished ) ; and subsequently , in the instant case, on May 7, 1963
(142 NLRB 491).
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1421
and that a further hearing be held before a Trial Examiner for the purpose of obtain-
ing any such evidence proffered by the Company, the General Counsel of the Board,
and the Charging Party, Insurance Woikers International Union, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Insurance Workers or the Union. Pursuant to notice,2 the further hearing
was held before Trial Examiner Harold X. Summers at New York, New York, on
July 14 and 15, 1965, at or in connection with which all parties were afforded full
opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to submit
briefs. Briefs filed by Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Insurance Workers
have been fully considered.
In order to place the instant stage of this proceeding in its proper focus, I here set
forth certain background circumstances.
The Union's petition in Case No. 1-RC-7024 for a unit of employees located at
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, was one of a number of representation petitions filed in
Regional Offices of the Board by the Insurance Workers, requesting certification as
bargaining representative of one or another bargaining unit of the Company's
employees at various locations throughout the United States. The different repre-
sentation cases went their respective ways: some have proceeded to terminal points;
others are pending. As for the Woonsocket representation case-the one serving
as the foundation for the instant proceeding-an election was held among the
employees in the bargaining unit therein found appropriate by the Board, in which
the Insurance Workers received a majority of the valid votes cast and as a result of
which it was certified as the representative for the employees in such unit. In order
to test the Board's unit finding therein, Respondent declined to honor the certifica-
tion, an act which led to the filing of the instant charge on January 4, 1963. A com-
plaint issued on February 18, alleging violations of Section 8(a) (5) and, derivatively,
8(a) (1); a hearing was held on March 6 of that year; a Trial Examiner found the
violation as alleged and recommended the entry of an order requiring Respondent
to bargain; and on May 7, the Board, in a split decision,3 adopted the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
On February 17, 1964, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 4 denied enforce-
ment of and set aside this Board Order, concluding, in the light of what it considered
to be the failure of the Board to articulate the bases of its decision and what appeared
to it to be inconsistent Board Decisions on the point, that the Board majority, in its
unit determination, had given controlling weight to the extent of the Union's
organization, in violation of Section 9(c)(5) of the Act.5 On April 5, 1965, the
United States Supreme Court, in N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,"
expressed its disagreement with the circuit court's conclusion and vacated the judg-
ment of that court; because, however, it believed that the Board's lack of articulated
reasons for the decisions in and distinctions among this and related cases did not
permit a proper review,7 it remanded the case to the court of appeals with instruc-
tions to remand to the Board for appropriate action.8 The remand to the Board
was effectuated on April 13.
'The Board order above referred to remanded the proceeding to the Regional Director
for Region 1 for the purpose of arranging for and issuing notice of the further hearing.
Although the notice of further hearing was Issued prior to the Board's modification of
this order, all parties have waived any defect which may have resulted from a failure
to issue a new notice of hearing upon issuance of the amended order.
3 As noted above, reported at 142 NLRB 491. The dissenting members would have
found the unit inappropriate, citing their dissents in Quaker City Life Insurance Co , 134
NLRB 960; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 512, and Equitable Life
Insurance Company, 138 NLRB 529. In ,the first of these cases , the dissenters had ex-
pressed disagreement with the majority ' s decision to abandon a policy ( epitomized by
the Board 's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 56 NLRB 1635 ) of finding
inappropriate less -than-statewide or less -than-companywide units of insurance agents ; in
the latter two cases, in addition, they had expressed the opinion that the majorities'
decisions were based upon the unions' extent of organization among the affected employees.
* Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. N.L I?.B., 327 F. 2d 906.
5 "In determining whether a unit is appropriate for [bargaining purposes ] the extent
to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling "
9 380 U.S. 438.
7 Justice Douglas dissenting.
8 Three weeks later, the Supreme Court, for the same reason, took similar action with
respect to two other cases involving Respondent, in which the Board orders had been
enforced by circuit courts. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v. N L R.B , 380 U S. 523,
vacating and remanding 328 F 2d 820 (C A 3), and 380 U S. 525, vacating and remand-
ing Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 330 F. 2d 62 (C A. 6).
1422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ten days after the Supreme Court's decision , Respondent moved the Board to
vacate this and other pending bargaining orders against the Company and to reopen
the related representation proceedings to receive evidence of changes in its orga-
nizational and operating structure . Upon consideration of this motion and the
Union's opposition thereto, the Board issued its order of June 2, 1965, above
referred to, reopening the record in the instant case. Respondent having moved the
Board to reconsider and to make certain changes in its order and the Union having
moved the Board to rescind its order completely , the Board , on July 1, 1965, made
certain amendments to its order of June 2. As indicated, the Board's order, as
amended, directed that a Trial Examiner , at a further hearing, take testimony as to
the Company 's organizational and operational changes; in addition , it directed the
Trial Examiner, at the conclusion of said further hearing , to prepare and serve upon
the parties a Supplemental Decision as to the effect of these changes on the Board's
prior unit determination.
The Company , in arguments made at the further hearing and in its brief, assailed
the propriety of the further hearing on a number of grounds. It argued, for example,
that the Board 's reopening of the instant case rather than the related representation
case was contrary to the order and intention of the Supreme Court 9 was a denial
of due process 10 and violated the Board 's own Rules and Regulations , Series 8, as
amended.1' Finally, the Company vigorously argued that the Board's unit determina-
tion in this and other cases are reconcilable only on the basis that controlling weight
was given to the extent of organization by the respective unions involved.
Likewise , the Insurance Workers argued at the further hearing-but not in its
brief-that the reopening of the record in the instant case for the purpose stated
constituted an abuse by the Board of its power and discretion ; the Supreme Court's
criticism , it contended , should and could be met by the Board 's making specific
findings on the record as it existed prior to the opening of this further hearing. It
also argued-both at the further hearing and in its brief-that the Company had
"waived" any right to introduce testimony on organizational and structural changes
made during the past 3 years because it had not sought to introduce the testimony
at earlier stages of this or other proceedings.
I indicated at the further hearing , and I here reaffirm , that these arguments-both
the Company's and the Union's-have no place in this phase of this proceeding
because they were necessarily disposed of by the Board when it ordered the further
hearing.
Upon the entire record 12 in the case , including my evaluation of the reliability of
the sole witness based upon the evidence and my observation of his demeanor, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE ISSUE PRESENTED
In its Decision and Order herein dated May 7, 1963,13 the Board, adopting the
findings, conclusions , and recommendations of a Trial Examiner , found that Respond-
0 This argument was bottomed on the asserted belief that the court 's language criticiz-
ing the B oard ' s decisions-In this and in other cases involving the Company-clearly
applied to the unit findings in the respective representation cases.
10 The argument , as I understand it, is that the failure to afford the Company the
opportunity to comply with or to refuse to comply with a representation case unit deter-
mination in which the Board "has disclosed the basis " of its unit determination deprives
it of a substantial right.
II In support of this argument , Respondent, after pointing out the sections of the
Act and of the Board 's Rules and its practices relating to the handling of representation
questions , contended that (1) the Act, under which the Rules and the practices have been
promulgated , requires the Board , where a representation question exists, to "provide for
an appropriate hearing" and to "direct an election . . and certify the results thereof,"
(2) the investigative and nonadversary character of a representation proceeding renders
it the only satisfactory one for gathering the facts necessary in making unit determina-
tions and developing unit concepts , and (3 ) even if the Board ' s prior unit determination
were a correct one, the passage of time and the turnover of employees in that unit calls
for a current expression of employees ' desires In an election).
11 The further hearing was closed with provision for the receipt , within 9 days after
such close , of a map to be narked as Respondent ' s Exhibit No. F-7 . Such map having
been timely submitted , it is hereby received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit No F-7.
On October 1, 1965, I issued an order to show cause why the transcript should not be
corrected in a number of respects No good cause to the contrary having been shown,
the corrections indicated in the order to show cause , which is received in evidence as
Trial Examiner ' s Exhibit No. F-1, are hereby made.
13 142 NLRB 491.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1423
ent had, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and, derivatively, Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, refused to bargain collectively for a unit composed of: All debit insurance
agents, including all canvassing regular and office account agents of (Respondent)
selling industrial life insurance and other forms of insurance sold by (Respondent)
at its district office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, but excluding independent agents,
retired agents, Metropolitan Insurance consultants, managers, assistant managers,
cashiers, clerical employees, secretaries, professional employees, guards, watchmen,
and all supervisors as defined in the Act, which unit had been found appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining, within Section 9(b) of the Act, in the Board's
Decision and Direction of Election issued in the related representation' case on
October 24, 1962.14
In this stage of the proceeding, the Company-without waiving any of its con-
tentions respecting alleged defects in the Board's prior unit determination arising out
of reliance on the Union's extent of organization-contends that structural changes
occurring since the date of the hearing leading up to the Board's Decision and Direc-
tion of Election clearly renders inappropriate the above-described unit; specifically,
it argues that the Company's present structure calls for a determination that any
unit narrower in scope than companywide, teriitorywide, regionwide, or statewide is
inappropriate for bargaining purposes. The Union, on the other hand, argues, inter
alia,1a that the evidence here educed with respect to the alleged changes should have
no effect upon the Board's prior unit determination.'
Because it is not within the scope of the remand to me, I do not here treat with
the questions of the weight given or to be given to the Union's extent of organization
or of the propriety of the inclusions or exclusions of various job classifications. 17
For purposes of this Decision, I assume the legal correctness of the bargaining unit
as and when previously determined by the Board, and, in, accordance with my
mandate, I reexamine the appropriateness of that unit in the light of the evidence of
changed circumstances.
It. THE PAST STRUCTURE IS
The Board's prior unit determination herein was based upon evidence with respect
to Respondent's organizational and operational structure as it existed on the date of
the representation case hearing, August 13, 1962.
At that time, the direction of the sales and service activities of the Company's
entire force-the responsibility for the procurement of new business of all kinds,
except for group insurance, and for the conservation and servicing of old business-
lay in the Company's field management division headed by the vice president in
charge of field management, who reported directly to Respondent's president and to
the chairman of the board of directors. With the assistance of five second vice presi-
dents and one third vice president, each of whom headed a unit engaged in a
specific staff function and each of whom, in addition, performed assigned adminis-
trative and research activities, the vice president in charge of field management
exercised general supervision over all employees of the division.
For administrative purposes, the geographical area covered by the field manage-
ment division was divided into 16 territories, 14 in the United States and 2 in Canada.
Each of these territories was headed by a so-called superintendent of agencies. Sub-
ject to the control of the vice president in charge of field management (or of one
of the staff officers previously mentioned when and to the extent specific respon-
sibilities were delegated to that officer), the superintendent of agencies was the effec-
tive supervisor over the personnel in the-on the average-60 district offices in his
territory. All operations of his district offices were his direct concern- the produc-
tion of new business, the servicing and conservation of old business, and sales promo-
tion in general; the operating effectiveness of district offices and district employees,
all district personnel actions; and the training of new district employees. Moreover,
he was in charge of the creation, abolishment, and changes in the boundaries of
district offices within his territory; and he directed, the negotiations of leases covering
14 Unpublished.
15 Subsidiary contentions of both the Company and the Union are noted and dealt with
at appropriate places below.
16 Ruling on a union motion to this effect made late in the further hearing was reserved
it is disposed of in accordance with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations ap-
pearing in this Decision.
17 None of the parties attacked the inclusions or exclusions, even though, it was pointed
out, they do not accord with the inclusions and exclusions in many other units sought or
found appropriate in other cases involving the Company For example, so-called Metro-
politan Insurance consultants, excluded here, have been included in other bargaining units.
18 The findings herein are based on the original representation case record
1424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
district office quarters. This supervision he exercised with the assistance of five
to eight territorial supervisors attached to him and field supervisors attached to staff
units (e.g., in field auditing) who sent copies of reports to him.
The superintendents of agencies, along with their respective territorial supervisors,
were headquartered either at Respondent's home office in New York City (12 of
them) or at head offices in San Francisco (2) and in Ottawa, Canada (2). Yet,
personal contact with district personnel was considered essential . This being the
case, the exercise of supervisory authority over district offices necessitated a sub-
stantial amount of travel both by the superintendent of agencies and by his territorial
supervisors. Each district office was usually visited by its superintendent of agencies
at least once every other year and, on the average, 12 times a year by him, by one
or another of his territorial supervisors, or by representatives of the (staff) field
training division. In addition to district office visits, the superintendent of agencies,
along with territorial supervisors, conducted several meetings a year with all his
district managers to review personnel and training programs and sales accomplish-
ments, to announce future plans, new policies, or other items of importance, and to
recognize past accomplishments. In addition, he or one of his supervisors would
meet a number of times a year with groups of his district managers, divided into
"Associations" based upon geographical clusterings, to plan sales and business-
conservation programs, to review and discuss common district management problems,
and to exchange management ideas and methods.
In the performance of their duties, the superintendents of agencies devoted a
majority of their time, and their territorial supervisors an even greater proportion of
their time, in the field. In addition, when in the home (or head) office, they were
in constant communication with district managers by telephone and through corre-
spondence, on matters concerning every aspect of field management. And, with the
aid of detailed reports and records on each employee in their respective territories,
they made and implemented decisions on every phase of the operations of the district
offices.
The Company, as of the time in question, had established nationwide sales stand-
ards. Recognition for achievement in excess of standards took the form of agents'
membership in one of several achievement "clubs," which, generally speaking, were
administered on a territorial basis.
The front-line rank-and-file employees of the Company, its "agents" and its Metro-
politan Insurance consultants (both described infra), as well as the necessary clerical
employees, were attached to one or another of the district offices, the Company's
basic working administrative units. The district offices were assigned definite
geographical areas (subject to changes as proposed by the superintendent of agencies
and confirmed by officers on the staff of the vice president in charge of field admin-
istration), and, within their respective areas, all business generated by employees was
transacted through these offices.1° There was virtually no interchange or transfer
of agents among the various district offices and there was no business or social con-
tact among agents except on a district office level.
Each district office was under the direct supervision of a district manager, appointed
by the vice president in charge of field management upon the recommendation of the
superintendent of agencies for such district and subject to confirmation by the com-
pany president. Himself directly responsible to the superintendent of agencies of
his territory, the district manager caused company policy to be put into effect at the
district level. His chief function was to stimulate the sales of new and the conserva-
tion of old insurance in his district. In the course of the performance of this function,
he would conduct "educational" meetings of all agents in the district office at least
weekly (usually on Friday morning ) arid, when indicated, would summon and meet
with individual agents 20 to discuss their work performance, the accuracy of their
records, and their diligence in conserving business and servicing existing policies.
to In many cases, a district covered such a large geographical area that it was desirable
to establish one or more "detached offices" at cities within the district other than the
district office city. A detached office , to which the appropriate superintendent of agen-
cies would assign a definite portion of a district , was under the general supervision of
the district manager-see infra-who , with the approval of the superintendent of
agencies , usually assigned an assistant manager-see snfra-to exercise immediate super-
vision. In this Decision, there will be no further separate treatment of detached offices.
20 Except for required attendance at the Friday meetings and, for ashort period on
Tuesday mornings in connection with recordkeeping , agents normally fixed their own hours
of work.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1425
In addition , he delegated supervisory tasks to assistant managers (whose selections
were frequently made on the basis of his recommendation to the superintendent of
agencies ), and his was the general responsibility for seeing that the clerical work
of the district office was satisfactorily performed by the clerks working directly under
the office supervisor-although the size of the clerical staff and their compensation
was determined by the home office.
The remainder of the district manager's job description at the time in question is
distinguished by its emphasis on the negative . District managers were not authorized
to accept , postpone , reject, or withhold from the home office applications for insur-
ance; 21 they might not vary the terms or conditions of an insurance policy, which
terms and conditions were set by the home office ; they could not approve or dis-
approve a request for a loan on a policy ; and, although they might make advances
on settlements on a very limited basis , they had no authority to pay a claim. They
could not make a change in the bank used for the district offices ' financial transac-
tions. With respect to the office's physical plant , only the home office decided upon
the location , furniture , equipment , and supplies . The district office manager might,
and usually did, make recommendations with respect to the continuation or abolish-
ment of an "agency" ( an area covered by an agent , formerly called a "debit," the
term employed in the unit-description involved herein ) becoming "open" by virtue,
for example , of a termination of employment , but the actual decision would be made
by the superintendent of agencies as reviewed by an officer assisting the vice presi-
dent in charge of field management . In connection with the hiring of an agent, the
district manager, who was charged with maintaining an active recruiting program,
after screening out obviously unsatisfactory applicants , would order a prehire investi-
gation and a medical examination of the applicant and would see that employment
tests were given him , in addition to which he conducted an initial interview and, on
the basis thereof, made a recommendation to the home office; but the results of the
investigation and medical examination went directly to the home office never to be
seen by him , the employment tests were scored and reviewed at the home office level,
and his recommendation was followed ( by the superintendent of agencies, in whom
the appointing authority resided ) in no more than three out of four instances. Once
an agent came on board, his preliminary training was administered by the home
office at one of several training centers, and his early on-the-job training in the dis-
trict was given by an assistant (district ) manager. Approximately one out of every
four Friday meetings alluded to earlier was conducted in accoidance with specific
instructions from the home office, on which Fridays, therefore , all district managers
would follow identical programs . The district manager was forbidden to authorize
changes in his agents ' report forms as prescribed by the home office. Although he
might, if he wished, maintain copies of personnel records, the main responsibility
for the accuracy of district office personnel records, was the superintendent of
agencies ', not his. He was never delegated the authority to terminate an agent's
appointment-this was reserved to the superintendent of agencies with the concur-
rence of one or more executive officers; where he initiated a recommendation to
terminate , an independent investigation was made, and , " in a significant number" of
cases, his recommendation was not followed . Under limited , clearly enunciated
conditions , he could serve a notice of suspension upon an agent , but except for this
and for giving immediate notice thereof to the home office, he might take no further
action except by direction of his superiors ; on the other hand , under specified condi-
tions, he was required to suspend an agent, regardless of extenuating circumstances.
Agents' resignations-greatly outnumbering terminations-were customarily tendered
to the district manager, which he then forwarded , with a recommendation, to the
home office for disposition action. All leaves of absence for district personnel had
to be approved by the home office. Nor did the district manager have any authority
to make adjustments or determinations in the matter of deficiencies in agents' accounts.
Although his was the signature on district employees ' paychecks , payrolls were com-
puted at the home office , and the district manager was not authorized to pay an
agent a rate of compensation or a fee or to confer upon him a working benefit
differing from that uniformly fixed by the home office ; to make any pay adjustments,
all questions of commissions due being settled by the home office ; or to pay an agent
for expenses incurred except as uniformly authorized by the home office. If he
wished to supplement the companywide sales competitions with competitions within
21 They were expected to review the applications to make sure that company pre-
requisites were met , but, in view of the number of applications, the reviews were "cursory."
1426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his office, he could do so but only at his personal expense. With respect to labor
relations generally, the district manager was excluded from any committees nego-
tiating with a union on behalf of the Company; as to agents' complaints about his
conduct, he could involve himself at the first and lowest level, but, if the complaint
was not satisfactorily adjusted there, the matter was out of his hands; finally, with
respect to all other types of grievances, he played no role at any stage.
Respondent's lowest level of supervision was that of assistant manager,22 of
whom there were from three to five in each district office. Their duties (as of
August 1962) can be gleaned from the above descriptions: briefly, they performed
supervisory duties as assigned by their district manager and, on a regular basis, they
engaged in the initial and continued training of agents.
The agents attached to a district (or detached) office were divided into regular
agents and, in lesser numbers, office account agents. (As of December 29, 1961, there
were 20,750 agents. At the end of 1963 the average district office had 20 agents.)
Both categories sold and serviced all policies issued by the Company, the sole
difference being that each regular agent had an agency or geographical area in
which he performed his work, including the collection of premiums from policy-
holders at their homes or places of business.23 With respect to openings of agencies
occurring within a district, all bidding for the vacancies was limited to the agents
of the district office involved.
Finally, Respondent had field representatives attached to district offices known as
Metropolitan Insurance consultants. These representatives were authorized to sell
all forms of insurance sold by the Company except "account" business the premiums
for which were payable monthly and weekly premium industrial insurance.
Without relevant deviation, the Woonsocket district office, in August 1962, oper-
ated within the system described above. Twelve miles away from Pawtucket, the
nearest district office, it was one of eight district offices (plus two detached offices)
in the State of Rhode Island, which, along with Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
and Massachusetts, constituted the New England territory of Respondent.
III. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE
After a number of years of study, an experimental change in the structure of
Respondent was made on September 1, 1961. Three regional managers were
appointed within one of the two territories encompassing the southeastern United
States. In May 1962, Respondent's board of directors, by resolution couched in
general terms, authorized the conversion of the field management division into what
eventually culminated in the structure described below. Beginning late in 1962 or
early in 1963, the experiment of September 1961 was extended by the appointment
of additional regional managers throughout the area served by the Company. By
early 1964, a new set of territories had replaced the old-see infra-and, by May
1964, the entire country and Canada was divided into regions-see infra. Mean-
while, the "conversion" of district offices from the "old" to the "new" plan was
taking place; by July 15, 1965, the second day of the instant hearing, one-half to
three-fourths of them had been converted. As of this date except for the ultimate
conversion of the remaining district offices-the division had installed what it has
labeled "line management"; and the following is a description of that structure.
The top official of the field management division is the senior vice president in
charge of field management. His duties and responsibilities do not appreciably
differ from those devolving upon the vice president in charge of field management
under the old structure.24 The sole difference- Whereas, before, 16 superintendents
of agencies reported directly to him, now (as will be seen) 10 agency vice presidents
report to him.
(Also reporting directly to the senior vice president in charge of field management
are a number of staff vice presidents-formerly second and third vice presidents.
22 The parties agreed that both district managers and assistant managers were super-
visors within the meaning of the Act.
23 But selling activities were not confined to that agency An agent was permitted to
sell insurance anywhere policies were issued, if he possessed an insurance agents ' license
in the State of the sale.
24 In point of fact, the same individual, Alexander Hutchinson, filled the old and now
fills the new position.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1427
Their areas of activity have been redistributed to some extent, but this is without
relevance to the instant issue. They, or their subordinates, still furnish staff services
to line officials.) 25
The 16 territories have been reduced to 10, 8 in the United States and 2 in Canada
Four of the new territories have boundaries identical to those existing prior to line
management; the remaining 6, obviously, are considerably larger in area, on the
average, than the 12 they replace.
Each of the 10 territories is headed by an agency vice president, a newly created
position. Subject to the control of the senior vice president to whom they are
responsible, the agency vice presidents, working out of the home office (seven of
them), the San Francisco head office (one), or the Ottawa head office (two), exercise
general supervision over the district offices in their respective territories through the
newly created regional managers, discussed infra. (In this function, they have the
assistance of equivalents to the old territorial supervisors, working out of the home
office.) Except for changes in the reach of their areas of responsibility-the average
present territory is larger than the old, and contains just over four regions and 92
district offices _b-their duties and responsibilities substantially resemble those of the
former superintendents of agencies, except that, a new layer of supervision having
been interposed between them and the district managers, each of them has from 2
to 7 subordinates reporting directly to him rather than, as was the case with each
superintendent of agencies, 60.
(The 10 agency vice presidents all were superintendents of agencies under the old
setup. Of the remaining six formerly superintendents of agencies, two have become
staff officers, three have become regional managers-infra-and one has retired.)
A new administrative unit, the region, has been created. There are 43 regions in
the United States and Canada, each headed by a regional manager.
The responsibilities and authority of the regional manager vis-a-vis the district
office operations are essentially the same as those of the former superintendent of
agencies In contrast, however, the regional manager lives and works out of an
office in the region which he supervises and controls rather than in the home or a
head office; he is responsible for the operations of (on the average 21-plus district
offices 2instead of 60; and a portion of his income is based on the performance of
his region, whereas the superintendent of agencies had received a straight salary.
He, like the old superintendent of agencies, spends a substantial portion of his time
in the district offices, except that, because of the proximity and the smaller number
of offices within his scope, he is able to spend at least two-thirds of his time there.
In the district offices, he usually meets with the district manager and not with the
entire staff, but he does meet with the staff once each year. He holds group meetings
of all his district managers three or four times a year, and he occasionally meets
with smaller groups of his district managers, including training chnics.28 Because
of the elimination of travel time and the decreased number of subordinates directly
beneath him, he cannot help but have, and I find he does have, a greater familiarity
with his district office operations and personnel than did the superintendent of
agencies. And, since the regions are substantially smaller than the old territories,
regional managers can, more easily than could the old superintendent of agencies,
direct and supervise the development of sales programs for their district offices in the
context of a logically comprehensive and attainable goal for the areas for which
they are respectively responsible. In this 'connection, companywide achievement
"clubs" are now operated on a regional, rather than a territorial, basis.
25 The witness attempted to explain a "difference ": formerly , he said, staff officers "had
responsibilities and authority, in the operation of the Field Management organization"
now, he testified, they had no direct responsibility for the supervision or direction of the
line organization , merely providing assistance to the senior vice president and, through
him, to his subordinates . (Later in his testimony , he said that "what went on before"
was that the advice rendered by the staff officers, given to the vice president and passed
down by him, was accepted or rejected at the upper levels and that staff officers had no
direct supervision even as to their staff functions, over district office employees!) If
there be a difference, I find it to be without relevant distinction At any rate, Respond-
ent does not regard changes, if any, in the staff 'organization as part' of its case
26 Actually, the deviation from the average is substantial. One territory contains, 7
regions and 148 district-'offices while another contains 2 regions and 39 district offices.
27 The actual range: between 14 and 26 'i '
28 There are no longer "Associations" 'of district managers except, perhaps, on an
informal basis outside Respondent's structure.
217-919-66-vol. 156-91
1428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(As to the identities of the 43 regional managers, 3 were superintendents of agencies
under the prior structure; the rest were selected from among the most promising
district managers.
(To the extent that it has any relevance, I here make certain findings as to the
relative importance-from the standpoint of compensation, prestige, and other factors
considered in the construction of a ladder of promotions-of various levels of super-
vision in existence under both the past or present organizations. In decreasing order
of importance, they are senior vice president in charge of field management, vice
president in charge of field management, agency vice president, superintendent of
agencies, regional manager, district manager, and unit manager-infra )
The number of Respondent's district offices now approximates 920 (as compared
with 960 to 970 in 1962), each headed, as formerly, by a district manager.29
The instant record is replete with testimony as to the present status of the district
manager. Upon a consideration of the whole, I find 30 that, generally speaking, his
responsibilities and authority have remained unchanged under line management, but
that, to the extent they have changed, they have increased: e.g., subject to specified
restrictions, he may now appoint agents and Metropolitan Insurance consultants from
among applicants; and -he may now resolve compensation disputes between agents
in his district, subject to appeal to the regional manager. The only other change-
whereas, formerl}, the larger part of his salary was based on the business in force
in his district, now it is largely based on new business.
The assistant managers, under a new name, have additional responsibilities. Now
known as agency managers or as Metropolitan Insurance consultant managers (or,
collectively, as unit managers) they each furnish day-to-day supervisors o%er a unit
of approximately five to eight agents or Metropolitan Insurance consultants, respec-
tively. The unit managers, who are responsible to the district manager, meet with
their units as a whole once per week (a substitute for the former Friday meetings)
and individually at least once more each week.
The status of agents and Metropolitan Insurance consultants has remained
unchanged with the advent of line management. (As indicated, they are, however,
more directly under the supervision of the unit managers than in the old setup )
At the end of March 1965, there were 21.5 agents-the term does not embrace
Metropolitan Insurance consultants-in the average district office, and the number
is expected to increase.
There are still eight district offices, including Woonsocket, and two detached offices
in the State of Rhode Island. All are "converted" to line management and operate
within the system described above. All, I find, are located in the Providence, Rhode
Island, metropolitan area, as the term is used by the United States Census Bureau
and by the Department of Commerce. The Providence region, in which these offices
lie, also includes 16 district offices in the southern half of Massachusetts, and the
region is a part of what is now the northeastern territory, consisting of Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York
State above Westchester County.
IV DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Before analyzing the structural changes with which this further hearing was con-
cerned, and their effect upon the Board's prior unit determination, it is necessary to
dispose of a number of threshold issues.
At the hearing (but not in its brief), the Insurance Workers broadly insinuated, if
it did not strongly urge, that the changes about which testimony was being submitted
were intended at least in part to accommodate the facts to the Company's unit posi-
3 Earlier, there was a reference to "unconverted" offices-from one-fourth to one-half
of them. By this, it is meant that alterations such as changes in the office's physical layout
have not yet been made. But even in an "unconverted" office, the district manager, in the
performance of his duties, Is accountable to a regional manager
ao
This finding is based upon concessions by Respondent, as well as the oral testimony
and documentary evidence. At the hearing, it became apparent (and was conceded) that
the direct testimony of the sole witness called by Respondent, A. Rogers Maynard, com-
pany vice president, which direct testimony was read into the record by agreement of
the parties, had been prepared by counsel in consultation with the witness and others
To the extent there were deviations between this direct testimony and the same witness'
cross-examination, I have credited the latter ; to the extent there were deviations between
his testimony as a whole and documentary evidence, I have credited the latter
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1429
tion, hence were not "bona fide." 31 The short answer is that the credited testimony
establishes, and I find, that Respondent's motivation (for making the changes, such as
they were) was its desire, by "tightening up" on supervision at all points,32 to capture
"its fair share" of the rapidly growing middle and upper income groups as customers
and of the growing suburban market.
Secondly, the Union (in its brief) argued that the failure of Respondent to support,
by evidence at this further hearing, the four factual contentions which, in its motion
of April 15, 1965-the motion which broke the ground for this further hearing-it
was urging upon the Board as the basis for redetermining the prior unit finding,
clearly demonstrated that the motion itself was a dilatory tactic. It is true that, both
with respect to facts and legal significance, the original motion and the eventual
hearing were marked by substantial differences in company evidence offered and
company positions taken. But my mandate did not include any obligation to probe
Respondent's motivation in filing the motion; it was limited to taking evidence as to
structural changes. Moreover, I did not and do not regard the motion of April 15 as
a limiting bill of particulars; rather, I deem myself as having been directed to take
any evidence offered with respect to the alleged changes. Signifiantly, the Union
made no attempt to exclude any testimony on the ground that it consituted a variance
from the "offer of proof" implicit in the motion. And, finally, all matters about which
testimony was offered were fully litigated. The argument of the Insurance Workers
is rejected.
Finally, we come to the changes themselves.
I find that the new structure provides additional supervision at all levels above
that of district manager . I further find, as urged by the Company, that the new struc-
ture differs basically from the old in that (1) there has been the addition of a level
of supervision, a circumstance which,,for all management representatives above the
level of district manager, (a), has cut down the number of subordinates reporting to
each superior, (b) has enabled each superior, the better to familiarize himself with
the problems of his area of responsibility, and (c) has increased the degree of
accountability of each of each supervisory level to the next higher; and (2) the
immediate supervisors (the regional managers) of the district managers are quartered
near their district offices rather than in a distant home or head office.
These factors do tend to support assertions that companywide, territorywide, and
regionwide units are or could be appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. But
the question here is-do the changes render a districtwide unit inappropriate9
Under the new stiucture, I find, the function and role of the district office remain
unchanged; it still is the company's primary sales unit. The authority of the district
manager, to the extent it has changed, has been enhanced,33 despite the creation of
regions and the district manager's greater accountability to his immediate superior.
Even the assignment of unit managers to supervise units of agents and Metropolitan
Insurance consultants has, in the words of the company president, freed the district
manager to provide attention to planning and to "selective management," and to
adapt his district office program to local conditions.
And, finally, I find, there had been no change in the status of district office employ-
ees, vis-a-vis each other, the employees of other district offices, or-except for closer
supervision by unit managers-representatives of management.
31 Counsel for the, General Counsel disassociated himself from this contention No
amended charge attacking the Company's installation of the new structure had been, filed,
and no amendment to the original complaint had been issued. As far as the General
Counsel was concerned, the thrust of the case was as it always had been-an attempt on
the part of Respondent to test the unit determination by refusing to bargain as to this
unit
38 Other steps in the same direction , simultaneously taken: the acceleration of the
Metropolitan Insurance consultant program ; the introduction of, new , types of policies ;
changes related to management 's compensation and cost controls ; and the introduction
of "more comprehensive" planning and a "more accurate " measure of results.
33 Not only by virtue of the additional responsibilities above-described but also because,
in contrast with higher level supervisors , he has more people to supervise than before.
The number of district managers has fallen from 960-odd to 920; the number of agents
per office has increased from 20 to 21 5 and is expected to increase further, and, al-
though the record contains no specific figures as to consultants , the acceleration of the
consultant program is one of the steps which has been taken in connection, with ,the Com-
pany's drive to build and rebuild its operating base.
1430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The basis for the Board's prior unit determination herein is found at footnote 2
of the aforementioned Decision and Direction of Election of October 24, 1962 34
After noting that the Woonsocket district office, the only office in Woonsocket, was
12 miles from the next nearest district office, it referred to its prior finding,35 on
what was essentially the same record, that each of Respondent's district offices was
in effect a separate administrative entity and, therefore, was inherently appropriate for
collective bargaining.36 And the Board also cited Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
138 NLRB 734, in which, the Board having arrived at the same conclusion for the
same reasons, found appropriate a unit consisting of the Sioux City, Iowa, district
office and its two detached offices, even though the latter were not in Iowa and were
farther away from Sioux City than another (excluded) district office in Iowa.
Nothing in the newly installed system of line management relevantly alters the
picture of the district office as a separate administrative entity of the Company. If
anything, the role of the district office as a self-contained basic ( sales ) operating
unit has been more sharply defined. Upon the entire record and on what I am
convinced is a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, I conclude and find that
the organizational and operational changes in the Company's structure which
were made since the Board's. prior unit determination have no effect upon said
determination 37
Upon the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, I come to the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The bargaining unit heretofore found appropriate in this matter for the purposes
of collective bargaining is unaffected by changes in Respondent's organizational and
operational structure installed since August 13, 1963, the date of the hearing on the
basis of which the said unit determination was made.
2. All debit insurance agents, including all canvassing, regular, and office account
agents of the Company selling industrial life insurance and other forms of insurance
sold by the Company at its district office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, but excluding
independent agents, retired agents, Metropolitan Insurance consultants, managers,
assistant managers, cashiers, clerical employees, secretaries, professional employees,
guards, watchmen, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constituted and still
constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to the order of the Board issued herein on June 2, 1965, as amended on
July 1, and based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
are themselves based upon the entire record of this further hearing, I recommend
the following:
1. The changes in the organizational and operational structure of the Company
which have been installed since August 13, 1962, have no effect upon, i.e., do not
call for any revision of, the Board's prior unit determination herein.
311 am well aware that the Supreme Court concluded that the Board failed to articulate
reasons for the decisions in and distinctions among the several cases involving Respond-
ent, and, of course , I accept this as the law of the case. But, in context, I believe that
the lack of articulation lay in the area of the degree of reliance placed on the Union's
extent of organization, with which I am not concerned As will, be seen, the Board did
speak with respect to the general appropriateness of a bargaining unit confined to a
single district office.
36 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 138 NLRB 565, 567. As has been noted, this
case, after enforcement of a related bargaining order, Is on remand from the Supreme
Court on the issue of extent of organization. ,
36 In the same case , the Board went on to say that this conclusion did 'not preclude it
grouping of district offices on the basis of cogent geographical considerations, and It com-
bined the two district offices In the Wilmington, Delaware; metropolitan area. This
would seem to be authority for sustaining an alternative contention put forth by Respond-
ent In the instant case-that all district offices In the Providence metropolitan area might
be considered an appropriate bargaining unit; but here again, It must be noted, the ques-
tion at hand Is not whether other units might be appropriate, but whether a district office
unit is appropriate.
37 At the further hearing, I asked the parties to comment in their briefs upon' the legal
effect of a substantial unit change upon a bargaining order predating the change. Upon
reconsideration, I conclude that this is not for me to decide ; in directing this further
hearing, the Board, In effect, displayed an Intention to take appropriate action If the
Company's structural changes did in fact affect the prior unit determination Moreover,
in view of my conclusion herein, the question becomes immaterial
DIXIE COLOR PRINTING CORP. 1431
2. To the extent that any present action depends upon such changes, the Board
reaffirm its Decision and Order of May 7, 1963 (142 NLRB 491).
NOTE.-Under the terms of the order directing the further hearing herein, the
parties shall have the right to file exceptions to this Decision in accordance with the
procedure outlined in Sections 102.45-102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended.
Dixie Color Printing Corp. and International Typographical
Union. Case No. 10-CA-5942. February 14, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 22, 1965, Trial Examiner Alba B. Martin issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with sup-
porting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel. [Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the record establishes
that Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union was not motivated by
a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status. Respondent's con-
sistent pattern of unlawful conduct after it became aware of the union
adherence of most of its employees clearly indicates that by its refusal
to recognize or bargain with the employees' majority representative,
Respondent rejected the collective-bargaining principle and sought
only to gain time within which to undermine the Union and dissipate
its majority.'
'Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd . 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied
341 U.S. 914 . In agreeing with the Trial Examiner 's findings that supervisor Horton's
interrogations and promises of benefits to seven employees on the night of November 20-
21 violated Section 8(a) (1), we place no reliance on the Trial Examiner's determination
that Plant Manager Clinton was informed in advance of the employees' union activities.
Even if Clinton was not so informed, the record amply reveals that soon after Horton
began his questioning, he became well aware of the employees' union affiliation but never-
theless persisted in unlawfully attempting to persuade them to abandon the exercise of
their Section 7 rights.
156 NLRB No. 120.