Met Food

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 20, 2001

337 N.L.R.B. 109 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

MET FOOD 109
256 Food Corporation d/b/a Met Food; and its
Golden State successor, Bafter Food Corpora­
tion and United Food & Commercial Workers
Local 1500, AFL–CIO. Cases 2–CA–30788, 2–
CA–30862, 2–CA–30905, 2–CA–30986, 2–CA–
31025, and 2–CA–31170.
December 20, 2001
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On February 16, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Ste­
ven Davis issued the attached supplemental decision.1
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the Ge neral Counsel filed a cross-exception2 and an
answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions3 and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find­
ings,4 and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.5
1 On March 10, 2000, the judge issued an erratum correcting his in-
advertent omission of the attorneys’ appearances in this case.
2 The General Counsel contends in his cross-exception that the judge
failed to include discriminatee Aleida Torres and the amount of back-
pay due her in his recommended Order. In this regard, the General
Counsel contends that the compliance specification and notice of hear­
ing included Torres and computed the backpay due her for the period of
September 13, 1997, through September 29, 1997, as $240 plus inter­
est. The General Counsel further contends that the Respondent con-
ceded in its posthearing brief that Torres is due this amount of backpay.
In its answer, the Respondent admitted that Torres was due backpay
for the period referred to above in the amount of $220. However, the
Respondent subsequently conceded in the appendix attached to its
posthearing brief that the amount of Torres’s backpay is $240. In light
of the Respondent’s answer and posthearing brief, we grant the General
Counsel’s cross-exception and find that Torres is due backpay in the
amount of $240. We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order
accordingly.
3 No exceptions were filed with respect to the judge’s findings (1)
regarding discriminatees Domingo Almonte, Pascual Alonzo, Miguel
Ayala, Wandy Cepeda, Marisol Chavez Frias, Jose Frometa, and Fran­
cisco Urena; and (2) regarding the method chosen to calculate gross
backpay.
4 In adopting the judge’s finding that discriminatee Juan Lopez’
backpay should not be tolled, Chairman Hurtgen finds that the circum­
stances of Lopez’ job search, and his decision to remain in a part-time
job, are distinguishable from Acme Bus Corp., 326 NLRB 1447 (1998),
wherein he dissented. In Acme Bus, the employee had the opportunity,
and declined, to work two part -time jobs, the functional equivalent of a
full-time job. In Lopez’ case, there is no showing that he was offered
full-time work (or 2 part -time jobs). Therefore, there was no willful
declination. Further, the Respondent has not shown that there were
full-time jobs available for Lopez.
5 As stated above, we have modified the judge’s recommended Or­
der to include discriminatee Torres and the backpay due her. We have
also modified the recommended Order to include the total amount of
backpay. Finally, we have modified the recommended Order to reflect
In adopting the judge’s finding that discriminatee Jose
de la Cruz’ job at Key Food was not substantially equiva­
lent to his job at Met Food before he was unlawfully dis­
charged on September 13, we note that the judge found
that de la Cruz earned $6.50 per hour and $325 per week
at Met Food in his predischarge job (on the basis of a 50-
hour workweek).
By contrast, the judge found that de la Cruz was paid
$5.50 per hour at Key Food and worked there for about
1-1/2 weeks. The General Counsel contends that the
judge’s finding that de la Cruz earned $460 at Key Food
is erroneous, and asserts that de la Cruz actually earned
$324.50. The record reflects that de la Cruz’ earnings at
Key Food were, in fact, $324.50. As the General Coun­
sel asserts, this is essentially consistent with de la Cruz’
credited testimony that he worked at Key Food for about
a week and a half: at $5.50 an hour, de la Cruz would
have had to work 59 hours to have earned $324.50 at
Key Food.
Thus, absent evidence that de la Cruz did not work a
40-hour workweek at Key Food, we shall assume that he
worked 40 hours per week. At $5.50 per hour, de la
Cruz earned approximately $220 per week at Key Food.
This amounts to just 68 percent of what de la Cruz
earned per week at Met Food, and demonstrates—along
with the $1 per hour disparity in his hourly wages at Met
Food compared to Key Food—that his job at Key Food
was not substantially equivalent to his job at Met Food.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec­
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and orders that the Respondent, 256 Food Cor­
poration d/b/a Met Food, Bronx, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall, jointly and sever-
ally, with its successor, Bafter Food Corporation, Bronx,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
make whole the employees named below by paying them
the amounts set forth opposite their names, plus interest
as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987), minus tax withholdings required by
Federal and State laws.
Domingo Almonte $3,276.22
Pascual Alonzo 4,342.55
Miguel Ayala 9,004.73
Wandy Cepeda 8,648.53
Jose de la Cruz 12,979.96
Marisol Chavez Frias 7,127.00
Jose Frometa 892.92
that Met Food and its Golden State successor Bafter Food Corp. are
jointly and severally liable for the backpay remedy. See, e.g., AC Elec­
tric, 333 NLRB 987 (2001).
337 NLRB No. 14
110 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Juan Lopez 13,233.36
Aleida Torres 240.00
Francisco Urena 6,110.68
TOTAL BACKPAY: $65,855.95
Burt Pearlstone, Esq., for the General Counsel.

John Diviney, Esq., Portnoy, Messinger, Perl & Associates,

Syosset, NY, for the Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: On March 1,
1999, the National Labor Relations Board issued its Decision
and Order approving a Settlement Stipulation reached by the
parties, directing 256 Food Corporation d/b/a Met Food to rein-
state and make whole its employees Domingo Almonte, Pas­
cual Alonzo, Miguel Ayala, Wandy Joel Cepeda, Jose de la
Cruz, Marisol Frias, Jose Formeta, Juan Lopez, Aleida Torres
and Francisco Urena, for losses resulting from Met Food’s
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act. On April 23, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit issued its Judgment enforcing the
Board’s Order in full.
A controversy having arisen over the amount of backpay due
the discriminatees, on May 27, 1999, the Regional Director for
Region 2 issued a Compliance Specification and Notice of
Hearing. At the hearing, the Specification was amended. Re­
spondent timely filed an answer to the Specification.1
A hearing was held before me on October 4 and 5, 1999 in
Manhattan. Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the fol­
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
Legal Principles
The employees involved herein were the subject of a mass
discharge which occurred on September 13, 1997, and were
later reinstated on September 29, 1997.
The Board’s “objective in compliance proceedings is to re-
store, to the extent feasible, the status quo ante by restructuring
the circumstances that would have existed had there been no
unfair labor practices.” Alaska Pulp Corp., 326 NLRB 522, 523
(1998). “Any formula which approximates what discriminatees
would have earned had they not been discriminated against is
acceptable if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary in the circum­
stances. The formula should be representative of the
discriminatee’s employment history and take into account
intermittency of employment. The backpay claimant should
receive the benefit of any doubt rather than the Respondent, the
wrongdoer responsible for the existence of any uncertainty and
against whom any uncertainty must be resolved.” La Favorita,
1 At the hearing, Respondent admitted the Specification’s allegation
that Bafter Food is a Golden State successor to Met Food and is liable
to remedy the unfair labor practices of Met Food, including the obliga­
tion to make whole the discriminatees. Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). That allegation had been previously de­
nied.
whom any uncertainty must be resolved.” La Favorita, Inc.,
313 NLRB 902, 903 (1994). The Board’s discretion is broad in
its selection of a backpay formula that is reasonably designed to
produce approximations of backpay due. Regional Import &
Export Trucking Co., 318 NLRB 816, 821 (1995).
Board compliance officer Esther Morales testified that she
computed the gross backpay of the discriminatees based upon
their weekly salary at the time of their discharge on September
13, 1997. Such figures were obtained by interviewing each of
the discriminatees. Each was paid in cash and they received no
pay stub or other written record of their earnings.
Morales asked each employee how many hours he or she
worked, and whether the amount of money received was the
same each week. Most replied that they received the same
amount most of the time, but when they worked fewer hours
they received less pay.
The payroll records of Respondent Met Food were not pro­
duced although they had been requested by the compliance
officer.
I accordingly find and conclude that the method chosen to
calculate gross backpay was a reasonable one. In the absence of
payroll records or of written documentation given to the em­
ployees, their recollection of their earnings during their em­
ployment is the most reliable, and the only reliable method of
determining what they earned while employed. The compliance
officer reasonably assumed that their earnings during the back-
pay period would have been the same as their earnings prior to
their discharge. Bridgeway Oldsmobile, 294 NLRB 858, 860
(1989). Thus, the weekly earnings of the discriminatees during
their employment with Respondent constitutes a reasonable
approximation of what the discriminatees would have earned
had they continued to work for Respondent during the backpay
period. The amount of earnings prior to the start of the backpay
period is an appropriate, accepted measure of determining gross
earnings during the backpay period. A-1 Schmidlin Plumbing
Co., 312 NLRB 191 (1993).
Once the General Counsel has shown the gross backpay due
in the Specification, the employer bears the burden of establish­
ing affirmative defenses which would mitigate its liability,
including willful loss of earnings and interim earnings to be
deducted from any backpay award. La Favorita, supra. A dis­
criminatee must make reasonable efforts to secure interim em­
ployment in order to be entitled to backpay. The burden is on
the Respondent to establish that the employee failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in searching for work. “The Board empha­
sized that the standard is that of reasonable diligence, not the
highest diligence, [and] that the sufficiency of a discriminatee’s
efforts to mitigate backpay are determined with respect to the
backpay period as a whole and not based on isolated portions of
the backpay period.” Basin Frozen Foods, 320 NLRB 1072,
1074 (1996).
Employees testified concerning their interim earnings. In
most cases, those earnings were supported by pay stubs pro­
vided to General Counsel prior to the hearing, who has consid­
ered them in preparing the amended Specification which was
MET FOOD 111
issued on September 29, 1999. Complete backpay calculations
are contained in the Appendix. 2
Domingo Almonte
Prior to September 13, Almonte earned $325 per week for a
72 hour work week. Upon his reinstatement in late September,
he earned $5.15 per hour, and worked 36 to 38 hours per week
until his second discharge in late December, 1997. The parties
stipulated that Almonte’s interim earnings at Respondent dur­
ing the fourth quarter of 1997 were $2,288.26.
Following that discharge, in December Almonte obtained
part time work at Key Food where he worked 28 to 29 hours
per week at a rate of $6.00 per hour where he is still employed.
In about June, 1998 he received a salary increase to $7.15 per
hour.
In May, 1998, while working at Key Food, Almonte ob­
tained a second job, at Field Marketing, where his starting wage
was $7.00 per hour. He continued to work at both jobs through
the end of the back pay period, March 4, 1999.
Pascual Alonzo
Alonzo testified that he worked at Respondent Met Food for
nearly 1 year before his discharge on September 13, 1997. He
earned $185 per week for a 38 hour week.3 He made the same
amount each week and always worked the same number of
hours with the same schedule. Although he stated that his
wages varied occasionally if he worked fewer hours, he did not
earn less than $185 per week.
Following his reinstatement on September 29, Alonzo earned
wages of $145 per week although he worked the same number
of hours as he had prior to September 13. The parties stipulated
that Alonzo earned $1413.61 in the fourth quarter of 1997.
On March 4, 1999, the store was purchased by Fernando Ba­
tista who operated the facility as Respondent Bafter. Alonzo
continued to receive the same wage until July 1, 1999 when he
received a raise to $350 per week, and promotion to dairy man­
ager.
Batista testified that Alonzo worked only part-time after
school for about 4 or 5 hours per day. Batista further stated that
in early April, 1999, he paid Alonzo about $40 in cash each
week in addition to his regular wages. Batista could not recall
the exact amount of the extra payment, and also had no records
of paying those sums to Alonzo until early July when he began
paying him a salary of $350 per week. Alonzo denied receiving
any additional wages in addition to the $145 he received from
September 29, 1997 through June 30, 1999. I credit Alonzo’s
denial of receipt of any more than $145 per week. Batista’s
testimony is not supported by any documentation, which would
be expected from a business operation. In addition, he was not
certain as to the exact amount of those payments. Accordingly,
I find that it was only when Alonzo was promoted to manager
in July 1999 that he received the raise in pay.
2 The backpay computations set forth in the Appendix were made
based upon the amended Specification and the hearing record.
3 All the wages set forth herein are gross wages unless otherwise
stated.
Respondent argues that Alonzo must have received a raise in
pay in March, 1999 because his co-worker, Francisco Urena
received a raise at that time. Although the 2 workers are simi­
larly situated in that they both were continuously employed
following their reinstatement on September 29, that does not
prove that both received a raise. Respondent argues that it
would make no sense for it to increase the wage of Urena but
not Alonzo. That may be true, but there is no credible evidence
to support a finding that Alonzo received such a raise in pay.
The Specification, which issued in May, 1999, states that
Alonzo’s backpay would continue to accrue until his weekly
salary was “properly adjusted.” Inasmuch as he received a sal­
ary of $350 on July 1, 1999 and has continued to earn that sal­
ary which is more than his weekly earnings at Respondent Met
Food, his backpay terminates with the beginning of the third
quarter of 1999.
Miguel Ayala
Ayala earned $300 per week at Respondent Met Food prior
to his discharge on September 13. He worked 10 to 12 hours
per day, 6 days per week.
Following his reinstatement in late September, he worked for
about 1 month, and then, on October 20, was given a letter by
Respondent asking that he bring, within 72 hours, his “docu­
mentation or legal working permit” from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Ayala stated that prior to this
occasion he had never been asked by Respondent during his 3-
year tenure with the company to provide such information.
Ayala was discharged on October 22. It was stipulated that his
earnings in the fourth quarter of 1997 were $545.27.
Ayala stated that from October, 1997 through the time of the
hearing he was not legally authorized to work in the United
States. When he was asked by Respondent on October 20 to
provide legal documentation concerning his ability to work in
this country he was not able to do so.
Ayala testified that following his discharge on October 22 he
looked for work by reading advertisements in El Diario news-
paper, and he called his friends and others and asked if they
knew of businesses that were seeking employees. Although he
lived in Manhattan he traveled to Queens and the Bronx search­
ing for work. He visited supermarkets including Associated,
Bravo, C-Town, Super Extra and supermarkets located at 200th
Street, and at 185th Street. He also visited the Sam Miguel Gro­
cery. He limited his search to supermarkets, which was his
expertise. During these visits, Ayala asked for work. He was
never offered an application, but he was asked to leave his
phone number. He did so, but was not called for work.
Ayala found a job in early February, 1998 at the Associated
Supermarket on Ogden Avenue. He earned $250 per week and
worked until March 4, 1999 when he was offered reinstatement
by Respondent.
Respondent argues that Ayala was offered reinstatement in
September, 1997, and at that time was asked to present proof of
citizenship. However, as set forth below, the September 29
offer of reinstatement was found to be an improper offer inas­
much as it unlawfully required Ayala to present INS documen­
tation.
112 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent’s main argument is that Ayala was an illegal
alien who possessed no legal authority to work in the United
States. Respondent contends that it properly requested his proof
of citizenship and when it was not produced had no further
obligation to retain him in its employ. Accordingly, Respondent
requests that backpay be limited to the period from September
13, the date of discharge, to mid October, when after a reason-
able time after his first reinstatement it was clear that he was an
undocumented alien and unable to produce records supporting
his legal ability to work in the United States.
General Counsel argues that Respondent’s contentions are ir­
relevant considering the Settlement Stipulation executed by it.
By the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent withdrew its an­
swers to the consolidated amended complaint which alleged,
inter alia, that on September 13, Respondent unlawfully dis­
charged Ayala, that on September 29, it unlawfully failed to
properly reinstate Ayala by requiring him to present INS docu­
mentation, and that on October 22, it unlawfully discharged
Ayala.4
It is thus apparent that Respondent has admitted to violating
the Act on September 29 by requiring Ayala to present docu­
mentation of his lawful immigration status. In addition, there
has been no showing that Respondent made a valid offer of
reinstatement prior to March 4, 1999 when backpay was tolled
since Ayala refused that offer.
Undocumented aliens are employees under Section 2(3) of
the Act and are entitled to the protections and remedies of the
Act. County Window Cleaning Co., 328 NLRB 190 fn. 2 (1999)
In A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 NLRB 408, 416
(1995), the Board held that backpay to an illegal alien would be
tolled either as of the date the discriminatee is reinstated subject
to compliance with the employer’s obligations under the Immi­
gration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) or when, after
a reasonable period of time, he fails to produce the documents
required by IRCA.
Where an employer hires an employee with knowledge that
he is not legally entitled to work in the Untied States, it cannot
assert that it would have terminated the employee on the basis
of his immigration status. A.P.R.A., supra, at 416; County, su­
pra.
However, the Board has held that where an employer can
prove that it would not have offered an employee initial em­
ployment had it known of his unauthorized immigration status,
backpay terminates when the employer first learned that the
employee was not legally authorized to work in the United
States. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 NLRB 1060,
1062 (1998). In such a case, the employer must show that it had
a “policy of compliance with IRCA” and further that it did not
knowingly hire any employee in violation of IRCA. The em­
ployer in Hoffman made such a showing through evidence that
(a) the employee there fraudulently presented another person’s
birth certificate upon hire in order to prove his legal status (b)
the employee’s employment application asked questions con­
cerning his immigration status and (c) there was no evidence
4 T he Stipulation contains a nonadmissions clause which excepts any
admissions in Respondent’s answer. Inasmuch as the answers have
been withdrawn the entire amended complaint stands as admitted.
that the employer knowingly hired any employee in violation of
IRCA.
Respondent here did not make such a showing. Ayala testi­
fied that he was never asked for immigration papers upon his
hire or at any time during his employment. At the hearing there
was testimony that beginning in October, 1997 he was ad-
dressed as Miguel Leyva by Respondent. Ayala stated that
Leyva was a friend of his who worked at the store in 1996 and
1997. However, there was no evidence that Ayala held himself
out as Leyva in order to falsify his immigration status. Accord­
ingly, Respondent was not lawfully concerned about Ayala’s
immigration status when it hired him or at any time during his
employment. As set forth above, Respondent’s attempts to
ascertain Ayala’s immigration status on September 29 and Oc­
tober the Board were found to be unlawful.
I therefore find that backpay continued until March 4, 1999
when an offer of reinstatement was made to Ayala.
Wandy “Joel” Cepeda
Cepeda testified that he earned $280 per week for a 70 to 71
hour, 6 day workweek, and was paid the minimum hourly
wage. Following his reinstatement in late September, he was
again discharged in late December, 1997. It was stipulated that
he earned $2,111.47 in the fourth quarter of 1997. Cepeda testi­
fied that in December, 1997, he worked at an Associated Su­
permarket for 2 days for which he was paid a total of $60. That
sum must be added to the stipulated amount of $2111.47, for a
total of $2171.47 which represents the amount of fourth quarter
1997 interim earnings. Upon his discharge from Respondent
Met in December, he sought work at the Associated store but
no work was available.
Cepeda searched for work by visiting stores where he was
told work was available. He sought work at supermarkets such
as Associated, Key Food, Waldbaum’s, and also at hotels in­
cluding the Marriott in Manhattan, restaurants, bakeries, a bagel
store in Brooklyn, Mirage in Manhattan and LaMaya in the
Bronx. He visited all such businesses and also searched the
classified advertisements in the newspaper and asked his
friends if they knew where he could obtain a job.
Cepeda found work on February 23, 1998 as a replacement
for his friend at an Associated Supermarket on Webster Avenue
in the Bronx. He worked for 4 weeks earning $300 per week or
a total of $1200.
Cepeda was unemployed during the second quarter of 1998.
Cepeda next worked at an Associated Supermarket on Ogden
Avenue. He worked for 1 month in July,1998, earning $150 to
$200. Cepeda worked part time there, whenever he was called
to work. His average weekly earnings would therefore be $175
times 4 weeks or $700. While working there, Cepeda visited
other businesses in an attempt to find full time work. He went
to the Marriott Hotel in Manhattan, LaMaya and Three Way
restaurants, and Associated, Bravo, C-Town, and Pioneer su­
permarkets. He stated that he visited about 20 locations in one
week and then did not have enough money for subway fare to
continue searching. He visited all the supermarkets that were
within walking distance, visiting each one 2 or 3 times.
In August, 1998 Cepeda found work in an Associated Su­
permarket on Webster Avenue where he worked for about 8 or
MET FOOD 113
9 months, to February or March, 1999. He earned $300 per
week. For the months of August and September, which oc­
curred in the third quarter of 1998, the interim earnings compu­
tation is $300 per week times 8 weeks or $2400. That sum plus
$700 received in July totals $3100 for the third quarter of 1998.
Cepeda continued to work at Associated through February,
1999 at a rate of $300 per week,. Thus, during the fourth quar­
ter of 1998, Cepeda earned $3900. In the 9 weeks constituting
the first quarter of 1999 prior to his offer of reinstatement he
earned $2700, not the $2400 set forth in the Specification. Ce­
peda’s interim earnings for the fourth quarter of 1998 and the
first quarter of 1999 exceeded his gross backpay, and no back-
pay is due.
Respondent argues that Cepeda’s job search was “deficient,”
stating that he only approached and applied for a couple of
supermarket jobs and did not follow through on any of his in­
terviews. According to Respondent, Cepeda looked for jobs
outside his area of expertise, the supermarket industry.
I do not agree. In addition to the businesses set forth above,
where he sought employment, his job search, as noted in his
written search for employment form, indicated that from Janu­
ary to April, 1998, Cepeda also visited 2 laundromats, Bravo
and C-Town supermarkets, 2 grocery stores, a cleaning estab­
lishment and a travel agency. I find, based upon the above, that
Cepeda’s search for employment was substantial and that he
exercised more than reasonable diligence. In addition to look­
ing for jobs in the supermarket industry he expanded his search
to include businesses he had not worked in before. From his
work in the supermarket, it would appear that Cepeda had gen­
eralized skills that could readily transfer to numerous working
environments. Associated Grocers, 295 NLRB 806, 811 (1989).
In addition, he also sought work in the supermarket industry.
Jose de la Cruz
Jose de la Cruz testified that prior to his September 13 dis­
charge he earned $325 per week for a 48-hour week. He did not
obtain employment in the 2-week period that he was unem­
ployed between that discharge and his reinstatement in late
September. It was stipulated that he earned $995.93 from Re­
spondent in the fourth quarter of 1997. In addition, he earned
additional sums from Key Food Pick Quick that quarter. Ac­
cordingly, his fourth quarter, 1997 interim earnings are
$1360.54, as set forth in the Amended Specification.
De la Cruz was discharged again in early November, 1997.
He stated that he looked for work following that discharge. His
efforts included speaking to Union representatives about avail-
able work, looking in newspapers, inquiring at stores and ask­
ing workers who were employed at supermarkets whether their
employers were hiring.
In December, 1997, a Union representative took de la Cruz
to Key Food Pick Quick Foods, Inc., supermarket, a Union job,
and recommended him. De la Cruz obtained a job in the frozen
food department, identical to the job at Respondent Met Food.
This was a job which offered Union benefits.
De la Cruz worked there about 1 ½ weeks earning a total of
$460 during that time. He stated that he left that job because he
should have been paid $7.50 per hour but his first check stated
that he earned $5.50. He testified that he could have remained
employed at $5.50 per hour but did not do so because he was
not paid the amount of money the employer agreed to pay. He
told the manager that if he would not pay the amount he was
told, he would leave. The manager said that he could do so. De
la Cruz quit but denied that he did so voluntarily saying he was
compelled to leave because the employer breached its agree­
ment concerning the amount of his pay. He did not have an-
other job when he quit.
De la Cruz then searched for work. He visited Domino’s
Pizza, two Key Food supermarkets, Pioneer Supermarket, a
discount store in the Bronx and Waldbaum’s Supermarket at
which he was told to return. He did so but no job was offered.
He also looked in newspapers for job opportunities and called
some advertisers. He had a telephone interview with the United
Parcel Service, and he filled out an application for a mainte­
nance position with Columbia University. He also visited many
other stores, most being supermarkets. At some of the above
businesses, de la Cruz completed applications when he was
given them.
In about March, 1998, de la Cruz found a job at the Associ­
ated Supermarket on Valentine Avenue in the Bronx where he
worked more than 2 months. He was paid $250 per week. The
W-2 form for that employer stated that he earned total wages of
$3914 during his employment there. He left that job because
the owner sold the store and discharged most of the workers.
He stated that he was asked to leave because the new owner
wanted a “change of personnel.” The owner was satisfied with
his job performance. He was dismissed in about July, 1998.
In about June, de la Cruz worked at the New York Road
Runners Club for 2 weeks where he dispensed water to mara­
thon runners. He earned total wages of $487.50.
Thereafter, de la Cruz worked for about 2 weeks in about
August, 1998 for Shop Smart earning $280 per week or $560
for the 2 weeks off the books.5 He stated that he was asked to
leave. He apparently asked that his employment be on the
books but the employer refused. He left in about September.
De la Cruz’ next job was at the Alamar grocery store where
he worked for 2 months in late October and early November,
1998. He earned $125 per week, or a total of about $1000.
Thus, the total interim earnings for the first 3 quarters of
1998 are, respectively, $3914, $1047.50 (comprised of $487.50
and $560), and $1,000.
On November 16, de la Cruz began work at Telebeam
Communications, where he is still employed. He earns $350 to
$365 per week, but is paid by the hour depending upon how
many hours he works. At the start of that employment he was in
training for 2 months during which time he earned $6.00 per
hour. His W-2 form for 1998 listed total wages as $1473.
Respondent asserts that de la Cruz’s backpay should be
tolled when he quit the job at Key Food Pick Quick. Respon­
dent argues that his salary at Key Food was substantially simi­
lar to that at Respondent Met Food and accordingly he could
not have been dissatisfied with the $5.50 hourly wage received
at Key Food. Respondent is incorrect in claiming that de la
5 General Counsel erroneously asserts that de la Cruz earned a total
of $280 for both weeks. De la Cruz testified several times that he
earned $280 per week and I accept that testimony.
114 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cruz testified that the hourly wage promised was $7.00. In fact,
it was $7.50. Respondent calculates his hourly wage at Met
Food at $6.25. That calculation was done by dividing his
weekly wage of $325 by 52 hours per week. However, de la
Cruz stated that the most hours he worked was 52, and the least
he worked was 48. Accordingly, the appropriate average
weekly hours is 50. His weekly wage of $325 divided by 50 is
$6.50 per hour. Thus, de la Cruz earned $6.50 per hour at Re­
spondent Met Food. His claim is that he earned only $5.50 per
hour at Key Food, which is a $1.00 reduction from his wages at
Met and $2.00 less than he had been promised at Key Food.
Respondent asserts that de la Cruz should have realized that
he would be eligible for a raise in pay pursuant to the Union
contract and stayed at that job. However, there was no proof
that he was eligible for a raise, that he would have received a
raise, or that the Union told him of such eligibility.
It is somewhat disingenuous for Respondent to argue that de
la Cruz should have remained in lower paying employment
when he left because he was not being paid a higher amount.
By leaving this job he sought higher paying work which would
have benefited Respondent by increasing his interim earnings.
Of course, in hindsight, we see that de la Cruz was not success­
ful in finding other employment for 2 or 3 months, but his rea­
son for leaving that job, for higher pay, did not constitute a
willful loss of earnings.
Respondent asks why de la Cruz left a Union job paying Un­
ion wages. That question has not been satisfactorily answered
and it is Respondent’s burden to prove a willful loss of earn­
ings, which it has not done.
The Board has held that “a discriminatee who, without good
cause, quits a comparable job with an interim employer has
thereby incurred a willful loss of earnings warranting a reduc­
tion in backpay. A discriminatee, however is under no obliga­
tion to retain nonequivalent employment.” Glover Bottled Gas
Corp., 313 NLRB 43 (1993). I find, accordingly, that the job at
Key Food was not equivalent to that he held at Respondent
Met. The wages were $1.00 less per hour at Key Food, and de
la Cruz was under no obligation to retain such employment.
Respondent also asserts that his quit at Shop Smart after
working only 2 weeks because he was not happy at being paid
off the books constitutes a willful loss of earnings. Respondent
argues that since de la Cruz worked off the books at Respon­
dent Met Foods he should have accepted similar terms at Shop
Smart. No explanation was given as to why de la Cruz was not
satisfied with being paid off the books. One can only speculate
that his reason was that he wanted his employment to be made
a matter of record so that the proper taxes were deducted from
his pay for the payment of government benefits.
There was testimony that de la Cruz may have been dis­
charged from his interim employment at Associated Supermar­
ket on Valentine Avenue, and at Shop Smart. A discharge from
interim employment, without more, does not constitute a willful
loss of employment. As set forth in Ryder System , 302 NLRB
608, 610 (1991):
A respondent must show deliberate or gross misconduct on
the part of the discharged employee in order to establish a
willful loss of employment. Here we find that the Respon­
dents failed to show that Larry Elmore’s conduct fell within
that standard. Elmore may have missed several scheduled de-
liveries, but he committed no offense involving moral turpi­
tude and his conduct was not otherwise so outrageous as to
suggest deliberate courting of discharge. Without such proof,
Elmore’s discharge from ATS will not serve as a basis for
tolling his backpay.
The Board has found that discharges for the following rea­
sons did not toll backpay: (a) failure to call in or appear for
work (b) refusing to work on Sundays (c) discharge for incar­
ceration (d) unsatisfactory performance (e) argument with su­
pervisor over working conditions. La Favorita, Inc., 313 NLRB
902, 903–904. (1994).
I accordingly find that even if de la Cruz was discharged
from his employment at Associated Supermarket and at Shop
Smart, the reasons for his discharge did not constitute such
conduct as would toll his backpay. Ryder, supra.
Marisol Chavez Frias
Frias worked as a cashier at Met Food. She first testified that
prior to September 13 she earned $220 to $230, or an average
of $210 per week at $5.15 per hour working 7 hours per day, 6
days per week. Based upon the above, the amended Specifica­
tion alleged that Frias’ gross backpay was $216.30 per week
(42 hours per week times $5.15 per hour).
However, Frias also stated that when work was slow she
went home early and did not work a full week. She further testi­
fied that she often worked different hours during the week, and
averaged perhaps 35 hours per week for which she earned
about $172. Frias identified her timecards for the weeks of
September 6 and 13.6 The card for September 6 indicated that
she worked 42 hours at an hourly rate of $5.15, receiving
weekly pay of $216.30. The card for September 16 indicated
that she worked 33 ½ hours and received pay of $172.52.
Respondent asserts that inasmuch as Frias stated that she
earned $172 per week, her gross backpay must be based upon
that amount, and not on $216.30 as set forth in the Specifica­
tion.
The only uncontroverted, documentary evidence in the re-
cord concerning this matter are the 2 timecards. I cannot accept
General Counsel’s gross backpay figure of $216.30 as Frias’
average weekly earnings because she stated that her hours of
work were 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., which is confirmed by the 2
timecards. Thus, she stated specifically that she worked those 7
hours 6 days per week. Accordingly, 42 hours per week appears
to be her regular hours, and also the maximum hours that she
would have worked. Based upon Frias’ testimony that occa­
sionally she worked fewer hours (which is supported by the
time card for September 16 – 33 ½ hours) I cannot find that she
always worked 42 hours per week as set forth in the Specifica­
tion. Nor can I find, as argued by Respondent, that her weekly
pay should be calculated at $172 (which would be approxi­
mately 33 ½ hours) since it has been established that she
worked 42 hours.
6 A third timecard which was undated has not been considered as it
is unreliable.
MET FOOD 115
Therefore, I believe that a proper calculation would be the
average of $172.52, the amount she earned during the week of
September 16 and $216.30, the amount she earned during the
week of September 6. Thus, the average of those weeks is
$194.41. Accordingly, gross weekly backpay of $194.41 will
be substituted for $216.30 for the entire backpay period.
It was stipulated that Frias earned $1364.98 in the fourth
quarter of 1997.
Following her second discharge in late November, 1997,
Frias found work in the middle of December as a cashier at the
Associated Supermarket on Ogden Avenue. She worked there
less than 5 days. She was released because the person she re-
placed returned to work or because someone told the manager
that he saw her and another employee “associating.” Frias did
not recall how much money she earned in that job.
Thereafter, Frias was out of work for about 3 months. During
that time she visited stores such as C-Town and Aim supermar­
kets near her home. She also visited a department store and a
clothing store. She conceded that she did not go to too many
stores and limited her search to the Bronx, claiming that she
had no money for transportation to search for work. She also
stated that she did not visit various supermarkets nearby Re­
spondent Met Food because she “did not want to go around
there” and did not want to visit places “far away” where she
had to use public transportation.
Respondent argues that Frias unreasonably limited her job
search citing Continental Insurance Co., 289 NLRB 579
(1988). That case is inapposite. The employee refused an offer
of similar employment because it was too far to travel. The
Board, in denying the claimant backpay, framed the issue as a
refusal to accept an offer of similar employment and not in
terms of the reasonableness of limiting her job search. Here, in
contrast, Frias was not offered a similar job while she was out
of work. I cannot find that Frias unreasonably limited her job
search. Although it is true that she later found work in a super-
market far from her home, I cannot find that she did not engage
in a reasonably diligent search for work. Thus, she visited 2
supermarkets, a department store and a clothing store. When
her search for work is looked at as a whole it is clear that she
engaged in a proper search for work.
In March, 1998, Frias found work at C-Town supermarket.
She stated that that job was not close to her home—in fact it
was “pretty far away.” She worked there during May and June,
1998, earning the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour. Frias
worked part time, 5 to 6 hours per day, 5 to 6 days per week.
The first quarter 1998 calculation for such employment is 25 ½
hours per week times $5.15 per hour equaling $141.62 times 8
weeks or $1132.96, and not the $659.20 set forth in the
amended Specification. She stated that she left because she “did
not want to work there no more. No reason. I did not want to
stay that long in a supermarket” and “did not want to be there.”
Frias stated that another reason for her leaving C-Town was
that it was too far from her home.
Frias was out of work only a few days when she began work
at Rockbottom Stores, where she was employed about 2
months, from July 26 to late September. That store was located
far from her home. She worked part time, earning $5.15 per
hour. She enjoyed her job at Rockbottom more than at C-Town
because she did not work on Sunday. The calculations for that
employment, as set forth in the paystubs for Rockbottom and
Duane Reade reflect third quarter 1998 earnings of $1,340 and
not $649.16, the amount set forth in the amended Specification.
Frias left Rockbottom and immediately began work, on Oc­
tober 5, 1998 at the Archdiocese of New York where she con­
tinued to be employed through the end of her backpay period,
March, 1999. She began as an assistant bookkeeper trainee
earning $8.00 per hour, working from 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.,
Monday through Thursday.
Respondent argues that Frias’ voluntary quitting of the C-
Town job constitutes a willful loss of earnings, contending that
had she remained at C-Town she would not be entitled to back
pay thereafter because her weekly wage was more than she
earned at Respondent. However, she earned more at Respon­
dent where she worked full time, than at C-Town where she
was part time working fewer hours at the same rate of pay.
The issue is thus whether Frias quit a comparable job with-
out good cause. Glover, supra. First, in agreement with Re­
spondent, I find that Frias quit the C-Town job without good
cause. She could give no valid reason for quitting. She did not
say that she sought to improve her salary or type of work.
However, although the nature of the work performed at C-
Town was similar to that which she performed at Respondent, I
cannot find that the C-Town job was a “comparable” job. Her
wages at C-Town were far less than she received at Respon­
dent. She earned $216.30 per week at Respondent and only
$141.62 at C-Town. Thus, I cannot find that her job at C-Town
was equivalent to her job with Respondent which precluded her
from quitting without cause. Moreover, it should be noted that
after she quit the C-Town job, she secured employment within
a few days with Rockbottom and then upon leaving that job
immediately obtained a far better paying job with the Archdio­
cese. Glover , supra.
Jose Frometa
Frometa’s testimony concerning his pre-strike earnings was
far from clear. He testified that prior to his discharge on Sep­
tember 13, he always earned $359 per week, but then stated that
he was never paid $359 per week. Then he conceded that $359
was the maximum amount he earned, and when he worked
fewer hours he earned less, the least amount earned being $270
to $280 per week. Then he stated that that latter range was his
wage during that time period.
Frometa also testified that he worked for Pioneer Supermar­
kets at which he earned $359 per week, for some period of time
before the strike. Then he was transferred to Respondent Met
Food and worked there for only 1 or 2 weeks before the Sep­
tember 13 strike.
General Counsel argues that inasmuch as Pioneer was owned
by the same person who owned Respondent Met Food, Nelson
Diaz, and since Frometa was transferred to Met in an effort to
“pack the unit” at Met, Frometa’s pre-strike wage should be
calculated at $359 per week because but for the strike he would
still have been employed at Pioneer.
However, such a proposition is not supported by the evi­
dence. The Settlement Stipulation did not name Pioneer as a
party, does not mention Pioneer, and there is no reference to an
116 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
alleged attempt to pack the Met Foods unit with Pioneer em­
ployees. It is General Counsel’s burden to prove gross backpay.
Basin Frozen Foods, 320 NLRB 1072, 1074 (1996). I do not
believe that General Counsel has proven that Frometa earned or
would have earned $359 per week while employed at Met Food
prior to his September 13 discharge.
The most that can be discerned from Frometa’s testimony is
that he earned $359 per week at Pioneer, and then upon his
transfer to Met prior to the September 13 discharge he earned
$270 to $280 per week at Met Food. I accordingly find that
Frometa earned $275 per week while employed at Met prior to
the September 13 discharge, and I shall amend the backpay
calculations to state that Frometa’s gross backpay was $275 for
the 10 weeks set forth in the Specification.
Frometa was not questioned concerning his search for work
during the 2-week period from his discharge to his reinstate­
ment in late September. However, the Specification sets forth
that his interim earnings during that period was $334 and I
accept that figure.
It was stipulated that Frometa received $1,523.08 during the
fourth quarter of 1997. General Counsel asserts in his brief that
Frometa voluntarily quit Respondent’s employ on about No­
vember 28, 1997. Accordingly, Frometa is not entitled to back-
pay following the fourth quarter of 1997.
Juan Lopez
Lopez testified that at the time of his discharge on September
13, he earned $290 per week for a 69 to 72 hour week. He was
employed for 5 years before his termination. Upon his rein-
statement in late September, 1997, his hours were reduced to 4
per day or 28 per week, and he earned about $136 to $150 per
week. The parties stipulated that during the fourth quarter of
1997, Lopez earned $1468.34.
Lopez was again discharged on December 14. He stated that
following his firing, he looked for work in the area in which he
lived. He went to Pathmark and National supermarkets in the
Bronx and a discount store in Manhattan. He could not recall
other places he visited. He stated that he did not look for work
at any businesses other than those three and did nothing else to
look for work.
Lopez became employed in early February, 1998 at an Asso­
ciated Supermarket on Ogden Avenue in the Bronx where he is
still employed. He earns $5.15 per hour for a 5 hour workday.
He works 5 days per week which is the amount he earned from
the start of his employment until the hearing. Accordingly,
beginning with the second quarter of 1998, his weekly interim
earnings have been $128.75 or $1673.75 per quarter. Lopez did
not seek to work any extra hours at Associated. He stated that
he received no other income during the backpay period, al­
though even after he obtained that job he searched for work,
including at a supermarket in Manhattan. However, he was not
offered any other positions.
It was stipulated that the backpay period ends on March 4,
1999.
Respondent argues that Lopez should be disqualified for
backpay as he intentionally incurred a willful loss of earnings
by not seeking full time work following his employment in a
part time position at Associated in February, 1998. Lopez testi­
fied, however, that he sought work at a Manhattan supermarket
after obtaining this position. Respondent contends that he en-
gaged in no “meaningful search” for work, maintaining that
following his full time employment with Respondent he had an
obligation to find a similar position with the same number of
hours he was employed at Respondent.
McCann Steel Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 652, 655 (6th Cir.
1978) is cited by Respondent on the issue of willful loss of
earnings. In that case, the court overruled the Board’s decision.
First, I am bound by Board decisions and not those of circuit
courts. Hillhaven Rehabilitation Center, 325 NLRB 202 fn. 3
(1997). Second, in McCann, the court found that at the em­
ployee’s interim employer “overtime was readily available …
[but the employee] did not always choose to take advantage of
it.” The court found that inasmuch as the employee worked
overtime at the respondent’s business but did not work avail-
able overtime at the interim employer, he engaged in a willful
loss of earnings, finding that he “refused to work the same
number of hours at his interim employer as he had worked at
McCann.”
McCann is readily distinguishable. There was no evidence
that there were additional hours available to be worked at As­
sociated. One other discriminatee, Miguel Ayala, testified that
he began work at that store at the same time as Lopez. Ayala
earned $250 per week, or about double the amount earned by
Lopez. The record contains no explanation for the difference.
Unlike McCann, there was no proof here that additional hours
were available for Lopez and that he refused to work more
hours. In addition, it is Respondent’s burden to prove that he
could have worked more hours at Associated. Acme Bus Co.,
326 NLRB 1447 (1998); United States Can Co., 328 NLRB
334, (1999), or that he could have obtained a full-time job had
he continued looking, or that he was offered but refused to
accept full-time employment. Under these circumstances, Lo­
pez should not be penalized for failing to continue looking for
full-time employment after obtaining the part-time job. United
States Can, supra.
Although Lopez searched for work at only 3 stores, he was
out of work for only 1 ½ months, and I find that he exercised
reasonable diligence in searching for work. Respondent has not
met its burden of proving that Lopez failed to exercise reason-
able diligence in searching for work.
Francisco Urena
Urena testified that prior to his discharge on September 13,
he earned $260 per week for which he worked 10 to 13 hours
per day, 6 days per week.
Urena was not asked and did not testify about a search for
work or the receipt of interim earnings from September 13
through September 29 when he was reinstated. Inasmuch as it is
Respondent’s burden to show deductions from gross pay, I find
that it has not established that any deductions from gross back-
pay should be made for that 2-week period.
Urena testified that upon his reinstatement on September 29,
his gross pay was about $208 to $210 per week. However, the
parties stipulated that Urena’s earnings in the fourth quarter of
1997 totaled $2,394.34. Inasmuch as there were 13 weeks that
quarter, Urena’s weekly earnings would be $184.18. He earned
MET FOOD 117
the same amount until early March, 1999, when Respondent
Bafter became the owner, and Urena then received $265 per
week.
For the first quarter of 1999, Urena earned $184.18 weekly
from January 1, 1999 through the first week of March, 1999
(March 5) and then earned $265 for the remainder of March.
General Counsel argues that Urena is entitled to receive
backpay for the entire month of March notwithstanding that his
wage rate increased to $265 in early March. Respondent argues
that Urena’s backpay must end in early March because at that
time his wages exceeded his pre-backpay weekly earnings of
$260.
I agree with General Counsel. Backpay computations are
made on a quarterly basis and not a weekly basis. Thus, the
entire first quarter of 1999 is considered in making backpay
calculations. Woodline Motor Freight, 305 NLRB 6, 9 (1991);
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289, 293 (1950).
Accordingly, Urena’s interim earnings were $184.18 per
week or $2394.34 for each of the quarters from the fourth quar­
ter of 1997 through the fourth quarter of 1998.
The first quarter of 1999 must be separated into 2 parts since
Urena earned 2 different salaries during that quarter. In the 9-
week period from January 1 through March 5, Urena earned
$184.18 per week or $1657.62 for the 9 weeks. In the remain­
ing 4 weeks of March, Urena’s salary increased to $265 per
week or $1060 for the 4 weeks. The total of those 2 sums, first
quarter interim earnings is $2717.62.
Urena is not entitled to backpay for the period beginning the
second quarter of 1999 and thereafter inasmuch as his weekly
salary of $265 or quarterly earnings of $3445 exceeded his
gross backpay of $3380.
ORDER
The Respondents, 256 Food Corporation d/b/a/ Met Food,
and its Golden State Successor, Bafter Food Corporation, their
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make the em­
ployees named in the attached Appendix whole by paying to
them the sums set forth in the column entitled Total Net Back-
pay for each of the employees, with interest on such amounts to
be computed in accordance with New Horizons for the Re­
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), minus tax withholdings re­
quired by Federal and State laws.
Year Quarter Weeks Weekly Wages Net Backpay
1997 3d 2 $325.00 $650.00.
4th 13 325.00 1936.74
1998 1st 13 325.00 689.48
2d 13 325.00 0
3d 13 325.00 0
4th 13 325.00 0
1999 1st 9 325.00 0
Total Net Backpay $ 3276.22
Year Quarter Weeks Weekly Wages Net Backpay
1997 3d 2 $185.00 $370.00
4th 13 185.00 991.39
1998 1st 13 185.00 496.86
2d 13 185.00 496.86
3d 13 185.00 496.86
4th 13 185.00 496.86
1999 1st 13 185.00 496.86
2d 13 185.00 496.86
3d 13 185.00 0
Total Net Backpay $ 4342.55
Year Quarter Weeks Weekly Wages Net Backpay
1997 3d 2 $300.00 $600.00
4th 13 300.00 3354.73
1998 1st 13 300.00 2650.00
APPENDIX
Domingo Almonte
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings
$650.00 $0
4225.00 2288.26
4225.00 3535.52
4225.00 5643.56
4225.00 5643.56
4225.00 5643.56
2925.00 3884.58
Pascual Alonzo
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings
$370.00 $0
2405.00 1413.61
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 1908.14
2405.00 4550.00
Miguel Ayala
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings
$600.00 $0
3900.00 545.27
3900.00 250.00
118
2d 13
3d 13
4th 13
1999 1st 9
Year Quarter Weeks
1997 3d 2
4th 13
1998 1st 13
2d 13
3d 13
4th 13
1999 1st 9
Year Quarter Weeks
1997 3d 2
4th 3
1998 1st 13
2d 13
3d 13
4th 13
1999 1st 9
Year Quarter Weeks
1997 3d 2
4th 13
1998 1st 13
2d 13
3d 13
4th 13
1999 1st 9
Year Quarter Weeks
1997 3d 2
4th 8
Year Quarter Weeks
1997 3d 2
4th 13
1998 1st 13
2d 13
3d 13
4th 13
1999 1st 9
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
300.00

300.00

300.00

300.00

Total Net Backpay

Weekly Wages
$280.00

280.00

280.00

280.00

280.00

280.00

280.00

Total Net Backpay

Weekly Wages
$325.00

325.00

325.00

325.00

325.00

325.00

325.00

Total Net Backpay

Weekly Wages
$194.41
194.41
194.41
194.41
194.41
194.41
194.41
Total Net Backpay
Weekly Wages
$275.00

275.00

Total Net Backpay

Weekly Wages
$290.00
290.00
290.00
290.00
290.00
290.00
290.00
3900.00 3250.00 650.00
3900.00 3250.00 650.00
3900.00 3250.00 650.00
2700.00 2250.00 450.00
$9004.73
Wandy Cepeda
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
$560.00 $0 $560.00
3640.00 2171.47 1468.53
3640.00 1200.00 2440.00
3640.00 0 3640.00
3640.00 3100.00 540.00
3640.00 3900.00 0
2520.00 2700.00 0
$ 8648.53
Jose de la Cruz
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
$650.00 $0 $650.00
4225.00 1360.54 2864.46
4225.00 3914.00 311.00
4225.00 1047.50 3177.50
4225.00 1000.00 3225.00
4225.00 1473.00 2752.00
2925.00 4006.80 0
$12979.96
Marisol Chavez Frias
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
$388.82 $0 $388.82
2527.33 1364.98 1162.35
2527.33 1132.96 1394.37
2527.33 0 2527.33
2527.33 1340.00 1187.33
2527.33 2226.22 301.11
1749.69 1584.00 165.69
$ 7127.00
Jose Frometa
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
$550.00 $334.00 $216.00
2200.00 1523.08 676.92
$892.92
Juan Lopez
Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
$580.00 $ 0 $580.00
3770.00 1468.34 2301.66
3770.00 1158.30 2611.70
3770.00 1673.75 2096.25
3770.00 1673.75 2096.25
3770.00 1673.75 2096.25
2610.00 1158.75 1451.25
MET FOOD 119
Total Net Backpay $13233.36
Francisco Urena
Year Quarter Weeks Weekly Wages Gross Backpay Interim Earnings Net Backpay
1997 3d 2 $260.00 $520.00 $0 $520.00
4th 13 260.00
1998 1st 13 260.00
2d 13 260.00
3d 13 260.00
4th 13 260.00
1999 1st 13 260.00
2d 13 260.00
Total Net Backpay
3380.00 2394.34 985.66
3380.00 2394.34 985.66
3380.00 2394.34 985.66
3380.00 2394.34 985.66
3380.00 2394.34 985.66
3380.00 2717.62 662.38
3380.00 3445.00 0
$6110.68