Merideth C.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Dec 18, 2018

0120171601 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 18, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Merideth C.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Capital Metro Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120171601

Agency No. 4K-280-0136-16

DECISION

On March 31, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
March 15, 2017, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the
Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Agency discriminated against Complainant, and subjected her to a hostile work
environment, based on her disability, race, and in reprisal for protected EEO activity.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Rural Carrier
Associate (RCA) at the Agency’s W.T. Harris Station in Charlotte, North Carolina. On July 26,
2016, Complainant stated that she contacted her first line supervisor (S1) (Caucasian) to request
assistance while delivering mail, and no one came to assist her.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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On July 29, 2016, Complainant stated that S1 contacted her about working that day. She stated
that when she informed S1 that she was not scheduled to work that day, S1 conceded that
Complainant was not on the schedule, but wanted her to come in to work anyway. Complainant
stated that when she responded that she would not come in, S1 stated that Complainant was a “no
show.” Report of Investigation (ROI) at pgs. 156,159.

On July 30, 2016, after Complainant returned from delivering the mail, S1 stated that she needed
to go back out to assist another carrier. Complainant informed S1 that she needed to leave, and
could not go back out. S1 stated that she would “make a note of this.” On August 1, 2016,
Complainant stated that when she and S1 were discussing her schedule, S1 became furious and
yelled at her. ROI at pgs. 161-162.

On August 6, 2016, S1 requested to speak with Complainant, who then requested a union steward
or another manager present during the conversation. S1 responded that they did not need anyone
else. Complainant stated that S1 informed her that she received an email from a customer who
witnessed Complainant texting and driving. Complainant stated that S1 threatened her by stating
that if Complainant did not resign, she would never be eligible for employment with the Agency.
Complainant signed the resignation paperwork. ROI at pgs. 165-166.

On August 8, 2016, Complainant’s second line supervisor (S2) (African American) called
Complainant stating that the Union Steward (US) called him with concerns about Complainant’s
resignation. US coordinated an investigative interview with Complainant and S1.2 Complainant
was reinstated on August 8, 2016. Complainant stated that S1 shared her employment status with
others at the station by announcing that Complainant had resigned. ROI at pgs. 167,171. On or
about August 9, 2016, Complainant received calls, texts, and voicemails from someone at the Steel
Creek Post Office asking if Complainant would be available to work after her son’s allergy
appointment. Complainant believed that it was the Customer Service Supervisor (CSS) who
contacted her. ROI at pg. 172.

On August 19, 2016, Complainant’s physician provided a note excusing her from work from
August 19-22, 2016. On August 27, 2016, Complainant stated that S1 informed her that she had
unsatisfactory attendance, and gave her a copy of the Agency’s Attendance Policy. ROI at pg. 174.

On September 2, 2016, Complainant stated that S2 informed her that she was not needed at work
that day because they had someone else to deliver the express mail. ROI at pgs. 176-177. On
September 6, 2016, Complainant saw S1 walking around offering assistance to the other RCAs,
but S1 did not offer her assistance to Complainant. ROI at pg. 179. Also on September 6, 2016,
Complainant stated that she experienced a panic attack while at work. Complainant called S1 over
to explain her situation, and stated that she was not able to work her route that day. Complainant
claimed that S1 called over another supervisor (S3) (Black), and both snickered at her.
Complainant stated that they ran to catch the Postmaster (PM) (Black), who was visiting that day.

2 The EEO investigator noted that he attempted to obtain an affidavit from US for the instant
complaint, but she did not reply to his messages. ROI at pg. 116.
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PM stated that since Complainant could not drive a postal vehicle, she should not drive herself
home. Complainant’s husband came to pick her up. ROI at pgs. 182-183.

Complainant’s doctor ordered her to not work until September 12, 2016. Complainant’s husband
provided her medical note to S1, who responded that the note was not detailed enough. From
September 12-15, 2016, Complainant stated that she contacted S1, S2, and S3, to ask about her
employment status and schedule, and she did not receive a response. On September 16, 2016,
Complainant stated that she spoke with S2, who stated that he terminated her because she
abandoned her job. ROI at pgs. 88,183,186-187.

On November 21, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), disability (Anxiety/Panic
Attacks), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when:

1. on July 26, 2016, her request for assistance on her route was denied;

2. on July 29, 2016, S1 contacted her, and stated that Complainant failed to report as
scheduled, and was considered a “no show”;

3. on July 30, 2016, after Complainant declined to go back out and assist another
carrier, S1 stated, “I will make a note of this”;

4. on August 1, 2016, and other dates, she was spoken to in a loud and/or demeaning
manner;

5. on August 6, 2016, she was informed that she had the option of resigning, prior to
being terminated;

6. on August 8, 2016, she was subjected to an investigative interview;

7. on August 8, 2016, she became aware that S1 shared her employment status with
coworkers;

8. on or about August 9, 2016, she became aware that S1 shared family medical
information with CSS of the Steel Creek Post Office;

9. on August 27, 2016, she was informed of her unsatisfactory attendance;

10. on September 2, 2016, and other dates, after being scheduled to work, she was
contacted and informed that her services would not be needed;

11. on September 6, 2016, S1 did not ask her if she needed assistance in delivering her
route;

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12. on September 6, 2016, she was questioned about her anxiety health issues;

13. from September 12-15, 2016, she failed to receive a response when she inquired
about her job status;

14. on September 16, 2016, she became aware that she was not paid for two previous
pay periods that she worked; and

15. on September 16, 2016, she became aware that she was terminated for
unsatisfactory work performance and abandonment of her position.

Complainant also included a claim alleging that she was discriminated against when her request
to see a union steward was denied. On December 5, 2016, the Agency dismissed this claim stating
that the proper forum for actions associated with a grievance procedure is through that forum. The
Agency determined that the claim was a collateral attack, and an employee may not use the EEO
complaint process to lodge a collateral attack on another forum’s proceedings. ROI at pgs. 105-
111.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report
of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge
(AJ). In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to
29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the
Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

In its decision, the Agency endorsed the dismissal of Complainant’s claim that she was
discriminated against when her request to see a union steward was denied for failure to state a
claim because it lodged a collateral attack on the proceedings on another forum.

The Agency determined that incidents 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15, were discrete acts and
analyzed them as independent claims of discrimination, in addition to incidents as part of her
overall claim of harassment. The Agency found that Complainant had not established a prima facie
case of discrimination based on disability, race, or in reprisal for prior EEO activity. However, the
Agency assumed for the sake of argument that Complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination, and found that the management officials articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for their actions.

For claim 1, S1 stated that by the time Complainant called for assistance, there was no one
available to send out. She stated that new carriers are required to call by 3:00 p.m. if they need
assistance, and Complainant did not call in a timely manner. Regarding claim 2, S1 stated that the
posted schedule showed that Complainant was scheduled to work on July 29, 2016, and she did
not report to work. S1 confirmed that she called Complainant, and informed her that she was a “no
show.”

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With regards to claim 5, S1 stated that she informed Complainant that she was going to be
terminated because she was observed texting while driving a postal vehicle, which was a safety
violation. S1 added that she would let Complainant resign so that she could possibly be hired again
in the future. S1 stated that she gave Complainant a resignation form, which she completed and
signed, with an effective resignation date of August 6, 2016. For claim 6, S1 stated that she
conducted an investigative interview with Complainant to discuss her performance and attendance
issues. S1 stated that her notes from the interview were stolen from her desk, but recalled that
Complainant denied having performance or attendance issues.

Regarding claim 9, S1 stated that when she was handing out the attendance guides, she informed
Complainant that her attendance needed to improve because there were several instances when
Complainant did not answer her phone and was not available to work. For claim 10, S2 stated that
he was responsible for scheduling the employees, which was subject to change because the RCAs
were temporary and supplemented the full-time employees, as needed. With regards to claim 13,
S1 stated that she saw a missed call from Complainant, and would have spoken with her. S3 stated
that she responded to Complainant that she did not know anything about Complainant’s schedule,
and informed her to contact her supervisor. S2 stated that he spoke with Complainant, and
informed her that her employment was terminated.

For claim 14, S1 stated that Complainant did not speak to her about missing pay, and she did not
know anything about this issue. S2 stated that Complainant did not properly record the time she
had worked; and that Complainant did not provide any details, and simply stated that she did not
get paid. He added that when issues are raised, they are taken care of immediately. For claim 15,
S2 stated that he terminated Complainant because her work performance was unsatisfactory, and
she was not available to work. He added that Complainant did not meet the expectations for the
position, despite having extra training.

The Agency then found that Complainant did not show that these reasons were pretext for
discrimination because she did not offer any direct evidence, corroborating testimony from another
witness, or documentation to show that the management’s actions were discriminatory.

For claim 8, CSS stated that he did not recognize Complainant’s name, and that no one shared any
information about her or her family. Regarding Complainant’s harassment allegation, the Agency
found that Complainant did not establish that the managers’ conduct occurred as described, much
less that it was based on her protected status. The Agency also determined that the conduct was
not severe or pervasive when judged by a reasonable person’s standard. The Agency concluded
that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that Complainant was subjected to
discrimination as alleged.

Complainant filed the instant appeal, and submitted a brief in support of her appeal on May 8,
2017. The Agency did not respond to Complainant’s appeal.

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CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant argues that she was discriminated against, and harassed, based on her
race, disability, and in reprisal for her EEO activity. In support of her claim that she was subjected
to racial discrimination, Complainant states that S1 “discussed racist comments” made by a
customer. Complainant also claims that a “female Caucasian” was provided assistance on her
route, while she was not (claim 1). Complainant asserts that no Caucasian, or non-African
American, employee was treated the same, with regards to claims 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9. She further
argues that “Josh” was repeatedly tardy and granted his requested days off, but was not given a
copy of the Agency’s attendance policy.

For Complainant’s disability discrimination claim, she states that S1 was aware of her disability
in August, and that she provided medical documentation excusing her from work for August 19-
22, 2016. Complainant also alleges that on August 1, 2016, S1 subjected her to intense scrutiny
and yelled at her. Complainant asserts that S1 shared confidential medical information about her
son with someone at the Steel Creek Post Office, and that she did not share other non-disabled
employees’ medical information. Complainant alleges that S1 accused her of unsatisfactory
attendance; and gave her a copy of the attendance policy, despite having a physician’s note
excusing her from work.

On September 6, 2016, Complainant states that after she suffered a panic attack, S1 “viciously”
attacked Complainant, and that S3 and PM questioned her disability. She alleges that they all
followed her out of the building, and stated that Complainant should not be driving her own car, if
she cannot drive an Agency vehicle. Complainant argues that her requests for leave were ignored,
and she was terminated.

Regarding Complainant’s claim of reprisal discrimination, she stated that following an incident
that occurred on August 1, 2016, S1 tried to “intimidate” her with an investigative interview based
on false allegations. Complainant alleges that S1 was aware of her intention to file a grievance,
and purposefully intimidated her to prevent her from filing a complaint. Complainant also argues
that S1 and S2 purposefully refused to place her on the schedule; and that they assigned her an
unfamiliar route on the day after a major holiday to make her work more difficult because the mail
volume was twice that of a normal route. Complainant asserts that she contacted S3 on September
12, and 13; S2 on September 14; and S1 on September 15, and they refused to answer her.
Complainant argues that she was terminated, and then not paid for two previous pay periods.

Complainant also claims that she provided S1 numerous examples of harassment, who denied the
allegations, and continued the “tirade” against Complainant.

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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b),
the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the
Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision
based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

As an initial matter, we affirm the Agency’s dismissal of Complainant’s allegation that she was
discriminated against when S1 did not allow her a union representative. We note that Complainant
has not challenged the Agency’s dismissal on appeal, and accordingly, we will leave the Agency’s
decision on this matter undisturbed.

Disparate Treatment

Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for
Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e.,
that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Once complainant
has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981). If the agency is successful, the burden reverts back to complainant to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s reason(s) for its action was a pretext for
discrimination. At all times, complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is her obligation
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the cgency acted on the basis of a prohibited
reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983).

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on
her disability, race, and in reprisal for protected EEO activity, we find that the management
officials articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions for claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9,
10, 13, 14, and 15, as discussed above.

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Complainant has not shown that the reasons are pretext for discrimination. Complainant can
establish pretext in two ways: “(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not
believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the
employer.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. On appeal,
Complainant argues that S1 “discussed racist comments made by a customer.” Complainant stated
that a customer alleged that a carrier did not properly deliver his mail because of his race, and that
S1 informed Complainant and the carrier about the comments to advise them to “handle the
customer with caution.” ROI at pg. 153. We do not find that this shows that S1 was motivated by
a discriminatory intent, but that she was relaying a customer’s concerns to ensure that the carriers
acted appropriately.

Additionally, Complainant repeatedly claims that Caucasian and non-African American
employees were treated differently. However, we find that Complainant has only made bare
assertions that the unnamed female employee and “Josh” were treated more favorably,3 and has
not shown any evidence supporting her assertion.

For claim 2, we find that the record does not show conclusively if Complainant was on the schedule
for July 29, 2016. While we note that S1 wrote a note that she called Complainant at 9:38 a.m., it
is unclear if Complainant was scheduled to work that day. ROI at pg. 299. With regards to claim
6, Complainant argues that she was subjected to an investigative interview based on “false
allegations.” However, Complainant has not specified which allegations are false, nor has she
provided any proof showing that they are false.

Regarding claim 10, Complainant states that S1 and S2 refused to place her on the schedule, on
September 2, 2016, and other dates. However, in her formal complaint, Complainant wrote that
she worked on September 3, 5, and 6, which contradicts her claim that her managers refused to
schedule her for work. ROI at pgs. 17-18.

We also find that Complainant has not provided evidence showing that the reasons for her removal
are pretext for discrimination. S2 stated that he removed Complainant for performance and
attendance issues. The record contains evidence supporting S2’s stated reasons for terminating
Complainant. S1 conducted a pre-disciplinary interview with Complainant to discuss her
performance and attendance issues on August 8, 2016, and informed her that she needed to
improve her attendance on or about August 27, 2016. ROI at pgs. 221, 226. The record shows that
Complainant requested leave and/or her time was recorded as LWOP on July 13-17, and August
4, 11, 18-22, 2016. ROI at pgs. 306-311. While Complainant asserts that she was on medical leave,
the record only contains a medical note for her absences on August 19-22, 2016.

3 The record shows that there was no employee named “Josh” at this station. The managers
assumed that Complainant was referring to certain employees, and provided information about the
unnamed female employee and “Josh.”

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Additionally, S3 noted that on September 6, 2016, they found that Complainant had “cut” tubs of
mail without authorization, and had hidden mail. The record also contains a copy of the customer
email alerting the Agency to Complainant’s texting while driving. ROI at pgs. 89,304.

To the extent that Complainant argues that the management officials are not worthy of belief, we
note that Complainant did not request for a hearing before an EEOC AJ, and, as a result we do not
have the benefit of an AJ’s credibility determinations of the witnesses in this case. Complainant
bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged discriminatory acts
occurred. When the evidence is at best equipoise, Complainant fails to meet that burden. See Lore
v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120113283 (Sept. 13, 2013) (complainant
failed to establish that witnesses made false statements where he withdrew his request for a hearing
and credibility determinations were unable to be made): Brand v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120102187 (Aug. 23, 2012) (complainant failed to establish that his coworker made
offensive comments in a “he said, she said” situation where complainant requested a final decision
and an Administrative Judge did not make credibility determinations). Complainant only provides
her own statements in support of her allegations, which are insufficient to prove pretext for
discrimination. Therefore, Complainant has not shown that the Agency discriminated against her
based on disability, race, or in reprisal for protected EEO activity.

Disclosure of medical information

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires employers to treat as confidential
medical records all information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of an
employee. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(B), (4)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1). Such information
includes any medical information voluntarily disclosed by an employee. See EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), No. 915.002, General Principles section in Background
discussion (July 27, 2000). Improper Agency disclosure of such medical information constitutes a
per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Vale v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960585
(Sept. 5, 1997). This is true even if the complainant does not have a disability. Young v. U.S.
Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120112626 (Oct. 3, 2011).

In this case, we find that the record does not support Complainant’s allegation that S1 improperly
disclosed her son’s medical information to CSS. He stated that he did not have any conversation
with a supervisor from the Harris Station regarding Complainant. Moreover, CSS stated that he
did not know who Complainant was, and did not recall her name. ROI at pg. 285. Accordingly, we
find that Complainant was not discriminated against because no improper disclosure was made.

Harassment

Harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of
the conditions of the Complainant’s employment. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement
Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., at 3 (Mar. 8, 1994).

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To establish a claim of harassment a Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily
protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the
protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4)
the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance
and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for
imputing liability to the employer. See Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998).

We find that Complainant has not shown that any of the complained of conduct was due to her
disability, race, or in reprisal for her protected EEO activity, and that most of the incidents occurred
during the normal course of business, as noted above. Additionally, for incident 3, S1 stated that
carriers are expected to go back out again if other carriers need assistance. She stated that the other
carriers who had returned were already scheduled to go back out, or were working on other matters.
ROI at pg. 217. Regarding incident 7, S1 denied saying anything about Complainant’s employment
status to anyone. ROI at pg. 244. For incident 11, S1 stated that supervisors do not ask the carriers
if they need assistance, and it is the responsibility of the carriers to request assistance when they
need it. ROI at pg. 230. In response to incident 12, S1 and S3 denied questioning Complainant
about her health issues, and stated that Complainant disclosed her condition on her own. ROI at
pgs. 232,262.

Even assuming that S1 repeatedly yelled at Complainant, we note that Title VII is not a civility
code. Rather, it forbids “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
Additionally, when considering all the events together, we find that they are not severe or pervasive
rising to the level of an unlawful hostile work environment. As such, we find that Complainant has
not shown that the Agency subjected her to harassment based on her disability, race, or in reprisal
for protected EEO activity.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding that Complainant
has not shown that she was discriminated against, or subjected to a hostile work environment,
based on her disability, race, or in reprisal for protected EEO activity.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

December 18, 2018
Date