Melvin M. Hayashida, Complainant, Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 16, 2000
01970075 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 16, 2000)

01970075

02-16-2000

Melvin M. Hayashida, Complainant, Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.


Melvin M. Hayashida v. Department of Transportation

01970075

February 16, 2000

Melvin M. Hayashida, )

Complainant, )

)

) Appeal No. 01970075

) Agency No. 94-0140

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation )

(Federal Aviation Administration), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision of the agency concerning his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Accordingly, the appeal accepted

in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE(S) PRESENTED

Whether complainant has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that agency officials discriminated against him on the bases of race

(Japanese-American), national origin (Asian/Pacific Islander), and

reprisal (for writing to Hawaii's congressional delegation) when, (1)

his request for Leave Without Pay (LWOP) was denied until he had used all

of his annual leave; (2) there were different procedures established for

the approval of his request for leave; (3) his request for his annual

leave balance was denied; (4) his sick leave was monitored; and (5)

he was counseled on the use of sick leave.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals complainant filed an EEO complaint with the agency on

October 20, 1993, alleging discrimination as alleged above. The agency

originally dismissed this complaint on the grounds that complainant had

previously filed a grievance on the same matter. However, on appeal,

the Commission found that this complaint had been improperly dismissed

and reversed and remanded the complaint for further processing.

On remand, the agency accepted the complaint and conducted

an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the

agency notified complainant of his right to a hearing before an EEOC

administrative judge (AJ) or a final agency decision (FAD) on the record.

Complainant requested a FAD. On June 2, 1995, the agency issued a

FAD finding no discrimination. In its FAD, the agency concluded that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on the bases of alleged because he failed to present evidence that he

was treated differently than similarly-situated individuals not in his

protected class under similar circumstances. The FAD also concluded

that the agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions. It is from this decision that complainant now appeals.

Allegation (1): Complainant's request for Leave Without Pay (LWOP)

was denied until he used all annual leave.

Complainant is an FAA Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS), GS-2152-12,

at the Honolulu Flight Service Station located in Diamond Head Crater,

Hawaii. Complainant has approximately twenty-eight years of government

service. In March 1992, complainant provided Responsible Management

Official No. 1 (RMO1) (Caucasian), the Air Traffic Manager, with a

written series of hypothetical situations concerning annual leave,

sick leave, and LWOP usage during pay periods eight through twenty-six

of 1992, for his comments. The hypothetical scenarios contained two

sets of questions. The first set pertained to leave balances, loss of

compensatory time, and benefits. The second set pertained to whether all

annual leave would have to be exhausted before LWOP would be granted,

the mechanics of requesting LWOP, the parameters with regard to LWOP,

and leave earned while on LWOP. RMO1 responded to complainant's inquiry

in writing. The RMO1 responded that "based on LWOP usage as described

in your scenario, I would not require you to use all your annual leave

before considering LWOP requests." The response continued as follows:

You would request LWOP from an Area Supervisor on an APPLICATION FOR

LEAVE SF171 form. Parameters would be as follows: 1. LWOP will not

take priority over annual leave. 2. Approval of LWOP will be at the

discretion of the Area Supervisor on watch based on staffing and workload.

3. Overtime will not be used to cover LWOP.

Complainant then began to request and to be granted LWOP. On November

24, 1992, while complainant was assigned as the Controller-in-Charge<1>

for the evening shift, he approved his own leave for November 25 and 27,

1992. Complainant then requested that his approved leave be converted

to LWOP. However, on November 25, 1992, RMO1 disapproved complainant's

leave. RMO1 stated that it was inappropriate for complainant to approve

his own leave because a CIC is only authorized to approve leave requests

for the current and following day. Therefore, only the leave request for

November 25, 1992, was proper. The agency argued that there was an Area

Supervisor on duty who could have considered complainant's leave request.

Complainant argues that there was none. Nevertheless, RMO1 alleged that

he reconsidered his decision to disapprove complainant's leave in light

of the conflicting directions in the guidelines. Therefore, on December

10, 1992, RMO1 approved complainant's leave and request to convert the

leave to LWOP. Concurrently, he issued a memorandum to complainant

regarding his pattern of requesting annual leave and allegedly expecting

the approved annual leave to be converted to LWOP. RMO1 stated that this

pattern was unfair to the other employees. The RMO1 further stated that

the possibilities of doing this had not been a part of the March 1992

hypothetical posed to him about LWOP. In conclusion, RMO1 stated in the

memorandum that effective December 13, 1992, all LWOP requests would be

considered "in accordance with the provisions of 3600.4, Absence and Leave

Handbook, Chapter 5, Absence Without Pay." RMO1 stated that to preclude

further misunderstandings concerning the procedure for processing LWOP

requests on the part of the workforce, the facility was notified of Order

3600.4 via a memorandum that was placed in the "Read and Initial" binder.

RMO1 stated in his affidavit that "[m]y decision that all future LWOP

requests would be handled in accordance with . . . 3600.4 was based on

[complainant's] non-compliance with the previously agreed upon procedures

and the potential unfair impact on the rest of the workforce. . .."

RMO1 stated, "[the complainant was] correct in his perception that the

LWOP agreement was between he and I, his absence from duty due to LWOP

and subsequent actions outside the agreement affected all employees."

The RMO1 failed to specifically state to what he was referring when he

stated complainant performed "subsequent actions" outside of his alleged

agreement with complainant.

Order 3600.4, reads in pertinent part:

Leave Without Pay (LWOP) is temporary nonpay status and absence from duty,

granted upon the employee's request, or is a temporary nonpay status and

absence from duty as a result of administrative discretion of authorized

agency officials. .

GRANTING LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (LWOP). Normally, employees must exhaust all

annual leave before LWOP is granted. Exceptions may be authorized in

individual cases of a meritorious nature. a. Administrative Discretion.

The authorization of LWOP is a matter of administrative discretion.

An employee cannot demand that he/she be granted LWOP as a matter of

right, except in cases of (1) Disabled Veterans . . . [and] Reservists

and National Guardsman. . . .

Thereafter, interpretation of the phrase " . . . of a meritorious nature"

became an issue between the parties. Complainant asked Responsible

Management Official No. 2 (RMO2)(Caucasian), Area Supervisor, to define

"meritorious" and cites examples of such. RMO2's definition followed:

". . . unless the applicant has a �meritorious' situation, which I

[interpret] to be one being significantly out of the norm, all annual

leave must be exhausted prior to granting of LWOP." The RMO2 referenced

one employee who's son was born with a cleft palate, and she herself went

through extensive treatment to fight cancer. Both conditions drained

her leave balances; however, she requested and was granted LWOP.

Complainant stated in his affidavit that ". . . I had borrowed all the

leave that I would have accrued through the end of the leave year and

complied with [RMO2's] requirement. [RMO2] also required a reason for

requesting LWOP and I complied. . .." As a reason for requesting LWOP

complainant wrote, " . . . because I have personal matters that need my

attention . . . if the above reason is not good enough, please advise what

type of reason would you need to grant LWOP." At the bottom of the page,

RMO2 wrote, "BONAFIED [sic] & VERIFIABLE EMERGENCY TO BE APPROVED." The

RMO2 stated in the Counselor's Report that, "[t]he region had given an

interpretation . . . that granting of LWOP would be based on �meritorious

performance or a bonefide [sic] and verifiable emergency." The RMO2

stated that the regional interpretation was verbal.

On appeal, complainant argues that the EEO Counselor's statement that:

"miscommunication appeared to have been a problem" and that "in fact,

management had two criteria. This information/interpretation was not

relayed to [complainant] until after depleting his annual leave," assessed

his entire situation. Complaint argues that he was deliberately misled

by RMO1 and RMO2 into believing that once he had exhausted his annual

leave that LWOP would be granted.

Allegation (2) There were different procedures established for the

approval of complainant's request for leave.

The following facts are revealed in chronological order. The record

reflects that on February 12, 1993, complainant requested leave for

February 17, 1993. February 13-14, 1993, complainant was on regularly

scheduled leave. RMO2 denied this request on February 13, 1993, based

on operational staffing on that date. The original leave request

was allegedly placed in the supervisor's in-basket in order to inform

complainant when he returned to duty on February 14, 1993. RMO1 issued a

grievance decision finding that "[s]ometime during the period 2/13-15/93,

[complainant's] leave request was removed from the supervisor's in-basket

to the clerical assistant's in-basket. Why this was done and by whom

could not be determined. This whole incident revolves around a simple

administrative oversight which could have been prevented had [complainant]

simply handed [his] leave request to the supervisor for action before

his watch ended."

Also in February 1993, complainant submitted two leave requests for

November and December 1993. In the grievance decision dated July

29, 1993, RMO1 stated that the watch schedule had not been posted.

Complainant submitted three leave requests for leave in August, September,

and October. Apparently, the watch schedules for those periods were not

posted until July 14, 1993. Two requests were submitted in April 1993

for leave in November and December 1993. Similarly, the RMO1 stated

because the watch schedule had not been posted it would not have been

practical for RMO2 to process complainant's leave requests.

On March 11, 1993, RMO1 issued another grievance decision finding that

after being denied unscheduled annual leave for that day, complainant

requested a copy of the Personnel Log. The decision found that complainant

had not cited a reason for wanting a copy of the log; therefore, the

agency denied this request citing employees' privacy. Complainant argued

that the log was displayed for public viewing and that it is casually

viewed by employees on a daily basis. The grievance decision denied this

request stating that viewing and copying were two different things.

Complainant stated that he was subjected to continued acts of reprisal

because he wrote to his congressperson, in an undated letter, about

discrimination. As an example, complainant stated in an attachment

to the Counselor's Report that, " . . . special procedures have been

specifically set up in my case, i.e., an Oriental Supervisor is supposedly

in charge of leave, however, in my case, it was transferred to a Caucasian

Supervisor." He further stated in his affidavit, "I was informed by

Supervisor A (retired supervisor of Japanese descent like myself) that

[RMO2] had volunteered to 'handle' me . . .."

On March 30, 1993, a congressional inquiry was made to the agency, on

behalf of complainant. In response, the agency reported that it was

policy to rotate supervisors within a two-three year period. However, no

evidence of this purported policy was provided. During this particular

rotation, the agency responded to the congressional inquiry by reporting

that new supervisor-employee assignments were made by having a union

member pull the names out of a hat for each supervisor.

On May 4, 1993, Supervisor A (Japanese) had a discussion with complainant

about his 1992 annual rating and he told complainant that he was using his

annual leave quickly. Complainant was informed that if he expected to

use LWOP when his leave was depleted, there was no promise or guarantee

that LWOP would be authorized. He also reminded complainant that LWOP

requests would be reviewed according to the Order. Supervisor A stated

that complainant responded by stating he would get his annual leave back

when he won his cases.

Also, in May 1993, complainant submitted to RMO2 a request for LWOP for

June 3 and 11, 1993, and a memorandum stating that he had used all the

annual leave he would have accrued through 1993. Complainant specified

that the LWOP request was for personal reasons and if his reason was

insufficient to be granted LWOP, then he wanted to know what type of

reason was necessary. On June 2, 1993, RMO2 denied complainant's request

and in a memorandum stated that a bona fide and verifiable emergency would

be the type of reason acceptable for approving his request for LWOP.

In December 1993, Supervisor A retired. In his post-retirement affidavit,

Supervisor A stated that he had been aware of an agreement between

complainant and RMO1 regarding the use of LWOP. However, he was not aware

that the agreement expired at the end 1992. Supervisor A stated that as

a result of granting one of complainant's leave requests for LWOP that

RMO1 lowered his (Supervisor A's) performance evaluation. Supervisor A

stated that during the previous supervisory rotation, he was assigned as

complainant's rating supervisor based on the assumption that he was the

only one who could handle complainant. Supervisor A stated that management

felt complainant was a troublemaker and that RMO1, RMO2, and Supervisor B

(Chinese) would not got as many grievances if he remained his supervisor.

During the next supervisory rotation in April or May 1993, however, RMO2

was assigned as complainant's rating supervisor. Supervisor A stated

that after informing RMO2 about complainant's LWOP requests that RMO2

responded that he would "handle him." Supervisor A stated that he was

told by RMO2 that he was not afraid of complainant; that complainant's

performance ratings and other evaluations would be lowered; he would

handle any of complainant's LWOP requests by denying them; and he would

and could stop any grievances that complainant might file.

Supervisor A further stated that RMO1 had the mind set that no matter what

complainant did it was not good enough; therefore, RMO1 felt complainant

could not be trusted. Supervisor A felt RMO1 showed prejudice towards

complainant. As an example of his prejudice, RMO1 told Supervisor A that

complainant's 1992 performance appraisal of "Exceptional" was undeserved

and was given just to pacify complainant. However, Supervisor A affirmed

that complainant's performance appraisal was deserved and added that

RMO2 had similarly given complainant an "Exceptional" rating during an

earlier rotation of supervisors.

Supervisor A also stated that complainant declared that he was filing

so many grievances in the hopes that RMO1 would be so busy responding

to them that he would unable to operate effectively. Complainant also

hoped that RMO1 would be removed. RMO1 and RMO2 stated that management

had been lenient regarding granting leave to complainant until such

time that he began to violate the leave agreement. They further stated

that complainant told management that he would bury them in a barrage

of grievances and other types of complaints.

On appeal, complainant added that when he was denied leave he was never

given a reason as required on the leave form. Complainant stated that

when he asked for an explanation he was repeatedly told by RMO1 and RMO2

he needed a "bonafide and verifiable emergency." However, complainant

argues, the words "bonafide and verifiable emergency" are no where to

be found in Order 3600.4.

Allegation (3) Complainant's request for his annual leave balance was

denied.

Complainant alleged that at the beginning of May 1993, he made a

written request to his supervisor for his annual leave balance which was

refused. In July 1993, complainant found a letter in his mail drawer from

RMO2 along with copies of disapproved annual leave forms. The letter

was dated July 8, 1993, and referred to a conversation between RMO2 and

complainant concerning complainant's lack of available leave. However,

complainant claims this conversation never took place, and that he was

not working on the day referred to in the letter, and that he never

received the information he requested. After an informal discussion

with a union representative, RMO2 admitted the date he referred to in

the letter was incorrect and he alleged that he never received a request

for information from complainant.

However, the record reveals that RMO2 stated in a grievance decision

that he found complainant's request for his leave status for May through

June, 1993 in his distribution box on May 29, 1993. Even though the

leave balances are routinely provided to employees on the bi-weekly

Statement of Earnings and Leave form, RMO2 stated he researched and

verbally provided this information to complainant on June 2, 1993.

On June 3, 1993, complainant filed a union grievance claiming that

RMO2 failed to respond to his request for his annual leave balance.

On July 29, 1993, RMO1 denied complainant's grievance based on the fact

RMO2 already provided the information to complainant.

Allegations (4) and (5) Complainant's sick leave was monitored; and

complainant was counseled on the same.

Complainant alleged disparate treatment in the ". . . monitoring [of]

my sick leave usage in conjunction with my days off, without tracking

the sick leave usage of others in the facility." In the FAD, RMO2 stated

that in reviewing the attendance records, complainant's record showed a

pattern in which sick leave was used on five occasions in conjunction

with his days off for the period July 1 through September 1, 1993.

RMO2 asked complainant whether he had a recurring medical condition

to which complainant responded in the negative. On October 1, 1993,

RMO2 stated that he counseled complainant in the presence of a union

representative and issued a memorandum to him stating that his sick leave

usage would be monitored and medical documentation would be required if

his sick leave usage did not improve significantly. RMO2 stated that

complainant was counseled according to the guidelines of the Order,

and that following the counseling, complainant's sick leave pattern

disappeared and all references to this action were expunged from his

record. However, in the EEO Counselor's Report, RMO2 stated that since

May 27, 1993, complainant had exhibited a pattern of sick leave abuse.

On appeal, complainant alleges that May 27, 1993, was the day that his

facility contacted the regional office upon learning that complainant had

written to his congressional representative. Complainant alleges that

his facility sought regional interpretation of the Order with regard to

the LWOP policy. In RMO2's affidavit he cites complainant's sick leave

abuse from July 1, 1992 to September 1, 1992. However, in a letter to

complainant dated October 1, 1993, RMO2 refers to sick leave usage from

the same month and day but in 1993. Complainant argues that RMO2 cited

May 27, 1993, as the date he exhibited a pattern of sick leave abuse, not

September through October or when a pattern could have been established.

It should be noted that in June 1994, this particular agency facility

changed the LWOP policy stating the following: " . . . we are eliminating

the requirement that employee's annual leave must be exhausted prior to

approval of request for LWOP. We encourage supervisors to approve requests

for LWOP when operational requirements permit and when additional costs

. . . would not result."

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Allegations of disparate treatment are analyzed under the tripartite

scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under

that analytical framework, complainant must present sufficient evidence

to raise an inference of discrimination, i.e., a prima facie case of

discrimination. At that point, the agency must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions to rebut the inference of

discrimination. Complainant then must show, by preponderant evidence, that

the agency's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. Complainant

has the ultimate burden of showing that discrimination occurred. Texas

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

As noted above, the FAD found that complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case on any of the bases alleged because he was unable to

show that he was treated differently from similarly-situated individuals

not in his protected class. However, it is well established that while

comparative evidence is usually used to establish disparate treatment,

complainant need only set forth some evidence or facts from which, if

otherwise unexplained, an inference of discrimination can be drawn. See

Scura v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 01965021 (October 8,

1998) (citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576

(1978)). Thus, the failure to establish a specific element of a prima

facie case may be overcome if complainant sets forth some evidence of

agency actions from which, if otherwise unexplained, an inference of

discrimination can be drawn.

In the instant case, we find that complainant has established the

required inference of discrimination based, inter alia, on Supervisor

A's post-retirement affidavit, as well as the numerous inconsistencies

with which the leave policies were applied to complainant. For example,

Supervisor A's (Japanese) affidavit stated that he felt RMO1 (Caucasian)

harbored prejudice against the complainant. We find most compelling,

however, Supervisor A's statement that RMO2 (Caucasian) lowered his

(Supervisor A's) performance appraisal because he gave complainant an

"Exceptional" rating. Supervisor A also stated in his affidavit that

RMO2 told him that he was not afraid of complainant; that complainant's

performance ratings and other evaluations would be lowered; he would

handle any of complainant's LWOP requests by denying them; and he would

and could stop any grievances that complainant might file. In this

regard, the record reflects that all of complainant's grievances against

RMO1 and RMO2 were self-investigated and dismissed by these two same

officials. We also note that the EEO Counselor stated in her report

that information with regard to the interpretation of the policy on

LWOP was not relayed to complainant until after he had depleted his

annual leave. We also find it interesting that the LWOP policy was

reverted back to the original 1992 policy after a congressional inquiry

concerning the policy was made on complainant's behalf. In June 1994,

this particular agency facility changed the LWOP policy stating: "

. . . we are eliminating the requirement that employee's annual leave

must be exhausted prior to approval of request for LWOP. We encourage

supervisors to approve request for LWOP when operational requirements

permit and when additional costs . . . would not result." In light of

the above, we find that the record, evaluated as a whole, supports an

inference of discrimination in this case.

In considering whether the agency's proffered reason was a pretext for

discrimination, we note that with regard to allegation (1), the agency

stated that complainant's request for LWOP was denied until he had used

all of his annual leave because of a facility-wide procedural change

in policy. The policy indicated that normally employees must exhaust

all annual leave before LWOP is granted. With regard to allegation (2),

the agency stated that based on the process of rotating supervisors within

a two-three year period, complainant's assignment to RMO2 was determined

by a union member drawing his name out of a hat. Therefore, in essence,

complainant was required to follow different procedures established by

his new supervisor for the approval of leave. With regard to allegation

(3), the agency stated that complainant's request for his annual leave

balance was not denied. RMO2 found complainant's request on May 29,

1993, and after researching the records, verbally provided the requested

information to complainant on June 2, 1993. With regard to allegations

(4) and (5), the RMO2 stated complainant's sick leave was monitored and

he was counseled on the same only after a pattern of sick leave abuse

became apparent.

However, the record demonstrates striking inconsistencies in the responses

to the agency stated reasons for its actions. The most salient example

of this is the RMO2's consistent interchanging of the year from 1992 to

1993 on the documentation of record. As previously noted, the RMO2's

affidavit cited complainant's sick leave abuse from July 1, 1992 to

September 1, 1992. However, in a letter to complainant dated October

1, 1993, RMO2 refers to sick leave usage from the same month and day

but in 1993. However, the record is devoid of any sick leave requests

establishing this alleged sick leave abuse during either of the years in

question.<2> Then, in the EEO Counselor's report, the RMO2 states that

complainant's sick leave abuse began in May 27, 1993, not during the time

when a pattern could have been established; but, conspicuously enough

after a congressional inquiry had been made on complainant's behalf.

Therefore, based on the above, including factors not specifically

mentioned herein, the Commission finds that the record supports a finding

that complainant was a victim of discrimination as alleged. The Commission

finds that based on the entire record, particularly the inconsistent

documentation and statements provided by the RMOs in support of their

employment decisions, as well as Supervisor A's post-retirement affidavit,

that the agency's stated reason for its actions were pretextual. Thus,

we find that complainant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of alleged.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we REVERSE the agency's finding of no discrimination and

REMAND this matter to the agency to comply with the order below.

ORDER (D1092)

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

1. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the complainant will notify the agency in writing of his intention

to pay back to the agency all of the annual leave he was required to

exhaust in 1993, prior to having his LWOP requests considered, in order

to avoid double recovery. Complainant has already been paid for the

annual leave utilized during this period in question. Therefore, once

complainant has paid back all of the annual leave he has already been

paid, the agency shall take the necessary steps to convert that annual

leave to LWOP for 1993; otherwise, complainant would be paid twice for

the annual leave. The agency must attach all documentation utilized in

determining the exact of amount of annual leave complainant exhausted

as result of unlawful discrimination. The agency will also provide

complainant with a copy of the report and ensure that he is provided all

forms concerning his absences during this period. Should complainant

choose not to pay back to the agency any of the annual leave in order

to have it converted to LWOP, complainant will state so in writing and

provide the appropriate agency officials, as well this office, with

his statement. Complainant's failure to timely notify the agency of his

intention will be deemed a decision not to pay back his annual leave.

2. The agency will take corrective, curative and preventive action to

ensure that discrimination does not recur, including but not limited to

providing training to the responsible official(s) at the Federal Aviation

Administration, Honolulu Flight Service Station located in Diamond Head

Crater, Hawaii, in the law against employment discrimination. Within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date the training is completed, the

agency shall submit to the compliance officer appropriate documentation

evidencing completion of such training.

3. The issues of compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs

are REMANDED to the agency. The agency shall conduct a supplemental

investigation of the compensatory damages issue. Complainant, through

counsel, shall submit a request for attorney's fees and costs in

accordance with the Attorney's Fees paragraph set forth below. No later

than sixty (60) days after the agency's receipt of the attorney's fees

statement and supporting affidavit, the agency shall issue a final

agency decision addressing the issues of attorney's fees, costs, and

compensatory damages. The agency shall submit a copy of the final

decision to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

4. The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report will include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of benefits due complainant, including evidence

that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at the Federal Aviation Administration,

Honolulu Flight Service Station located in Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii,

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by

the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to insure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The

original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. ��1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g).<3> Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R1199)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Feb. 16, 2000

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that

a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.

The Federal Aviation Administration, Honolulu Flight Service Station,

Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii, supports and will comply with such Federal

law and will not take action against individuals because they have

exercised their rights under law.

The Federal Aviation Administration, Honolulu Flight Service Station,

Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii has been found to have discriminated on

the bases of race, national origin, and reprisal with regard to leave

policies. The Federal Aviation Administration, Honolulu Flight Service

Station, Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii, has been ordered to give complainant

an opportunity to repay the annual leave taken in lieu of LWOP and have

the agency adjust its leave records accordingly. The Federal Aviation

Administration, Honolulu Flight Service Station, Diamond Head Crater,

Hawaii will also take corrective action in the form of training for the

responsible official(s). The Federal Aviation Administration, Honolulu

Flight Service Station, Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii will ensure that

officials responsible for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of

employment will abide by the requirements of all federal equal employment

opportunity laws.

The Federal Aviation Administration, Honolulu Flight Service Station,

Diamond Head Crater, Hawaii will not in any manner restrain, interfere,

coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her

right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in

proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment opportunity law.

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 16141 The agency contends that the Controller-in-Charge

(CIC) position did not meet the criteria for an Absence and Leave

Approval Official. However, CICs did have the authority to approve

leave for the current and following day.

2 We note that the only leave requests of record with regard to the

year 1992 denote requests for LWOP on 11/25/92 and 11/27/92. In 1993,

the record contains one request for annual on 2/17/93, which was denied

by RMO2 stating operational needs, and two requests for LWOP on 7/3/93

and 7/11/93, both of which were denied by RMO2.

3 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.