Meier & Frank Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 4, 1950

89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

-In the Matter of MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. and RETAIL
DEPARTMENT & VARIETY STORE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL No. 1572,
A.F.L.
Case No. 36-CA-64.-Decided May 4, 1950
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On December 30, 1949, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding
that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain
unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also
found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices and recommended dismissal of those allegations of the
complaint. Thereafter, both the Respondent and the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
-rulings are hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the Interme-
,diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this
case and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with this
Decision and Order.
1. We unanimously agree with the Trial Examiner that the Re-
spondent's present no-solicitation rule is not reasonably related to the
prevention of disruptions in the Respondent's business and we find
therefore, that it is violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. How-
-ever, unlike the Trial Examiner, in so finding we rely exclusively on
' The Respondent contends that the complaint should be dismissed insofar as it alleges
interrogation by the Respondent of its employees regarding union activities and union
affiliation , upon the ground that the charge did not specifically include this allegation of
the complaint . We find no merit in this contention . There is ample authority to the effect
that the contents of the charge do not limit the scope of the complaint and the complaint
may properly be broader than the charge. A respondent is not prejudiced by the failure
of the charge to include unfair labor practices , so long as the respondent had ample notice
and opportunity to defend and the charges were actually litigated . In the instant case,
the Respondent does not contend that either element was lacking . Cathey Lumber Com-
pany, 86 NLRB 157; Columbia Pictures Corporation . Pt at.. 82 NLRB 568.
89 NLRB No. 114.
1016
METER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1017
the fact that the Respondent's no-solicitation rule as enunciated by
it in its Daily Bulletin of April 9, 1946, and as detailed in the record,
is too broad in its scope. It would prevent any solicitation of em-
ployees during nonworking hours away from the selling floors of
the store. The Board has previously decided that a department store
may prohibit union solicitation on its selling floors, even during
employees' off-duty time, because of the fact that department stores,
unlike industrial establishments, are frequented by customers of the
employer, and union solicitation on the selling floors is, therefore,
likely to be disruptive of the employer's business 2 However, a rule
like the Respondent's which apparently would prohibit union solicita-
tion off the selling floors outside of working time, such as before and
after work and during luncheon and rest periods, does not bear a rea-
sonable relationship to efficient operation of the Respondent's business
and therefore constitutes unwarranted interference with the em-
ployees' rights under the Act.3 We find that the Respondent's rule
is violative of the Act insofar as it prohibits union solicitation off the
selling floors during nonworking hours .4
But a majority of the Board 5 does not. agree with the Trial Exam-
iner that the Respondent's refusal to allow union organizers to make
engagements with employees on company time and property "without
more," was an unreasonable and discriminatory enforcement of its
no-solicitation rule. The record shows that on several occasions a
union organizer approached an employee on the selling floor and
invited the employee to meet the organizer for lunch, for the express
purpose of explaining the benefits of unionism. Apparently, on at
least one occasion, such a conversation was interrupted by a store de-
tective. The Trial Examiner apparently predicates his view that this
aspect of the no-solicitation rule is illegal upon the ground that all
employee could make a luncheon engagement with anyone other than
a union organizer and that under the method adopted here, the
organizer was merely effectuating the very results that the Respori-
ent desired to accomplish through its no-solicitation rule.
The Respondent, in its brief, contends that the Trial Examiner is
being unrealistic in adopting this approach to the problem. We be-
lieve there is merit in the Respondent's position. In the instances
2 Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 NLRB 1262: May Department Stores Company, 59 NLRB 976;
J. L. Hudson Company, 67 NLRB 1.403; Marshall Field & Company, 34 NLRB 1.
May Department Stores Company, footnote 2, supra.
• The Trial Examiner recommended that the Respondent be required to cease and desist
Prom enforcing any no-solicitation rule unless and until a new, definite, and explicit rule
against solicitation is first promulgated and published. In view of our above finding, we
do not adopt the Trial Examiner's recommendation, but shall order the Respondent to
rescind immediately its rule against solicitation insofar as it prohibits union solicitation
off the selling floors during nonworking hours.
Chairman Herzog and Members Reynolds and Murdock.
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
where union organizers attempted to make luncheon appointments
.with employees, it cannot reasonably be said that such engagements
were being arranged for "without more"; for on none of those occasions
were the discussions merely limited to arranging for lunch. On the
contrary, employees were requested to have lunch with union organ-
izers for the express purpose of discussing possible membership in the
union or the benefits of unionism. Contrary to our dissenting col-
leagues, we believe it unrealistic to assume that contacts between
organizers and employees would be limited to a simple invitation to
lunch and an acceptance or refusal, rather than broadening into
.extended discussions about the merits of the union which would neces-
sarily interfere with store operations. Under the circumstances, the
invitations to lunch, qualified as they were by the clear indication of
their purpose, were tantamount to a form of solicitation. The Board
has indicated that it will broadly construe the application of a no-
solicitation rule to cover all types of union solicitation on the selling
floor of a store, regardless of whether or not such solicitation takes
place during nonworking hours. Accordingly, we believe that the
no-solicitation rule was reasonably applicable to the form of solicita-.
tion presented here.6 Moreover, in our opinion, an employer has the
right to keep union organizers If the selling floors when, as here, .they
appear upon the premises in performance of their duties as representa-
tives. We find, therefore, that the Respondent's refusal to allow union
organizers to make luncheon engagements under these circumstances
was not violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the conduct of Detective
Lamberty in trailing an organizer and an employee of the Respondent
outside the Respondent's store was violative of Section 8 (a) (1).
2. We unanimously agree with the Trial Examiner that the Re-
spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thus
violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, as amended, by the following
statements and conduct :
(a) The Cooper-Walker-Halleck waste receptacle episode;
(b) Department Manager Anderson's interrogation of employees 7
with respect to their attendance at a union meeting and Anderson's
order that they report immediately to her if they were approached by
the Union or saw anyone they "thought was talking union"; 8
'The record supports the Trial Examiner 's statement that the Respondent permitted
drives in behalf of the Community Chest , the Red Cross, and the March of Dimes. It does
not support his further statement that the Respondent has permitted drives to be con-
ducted for any other organizations from which the Union was discriminatorily excepted.
Namely, Inez Elvira Slack , Gladys B . Annan , and Nora McNeil.
Premier Worsted Mills, 85 NLRB ' 985 ; Standard -Coosa-Thatcher Company , 85 NLRB
1358.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1019
(c) Department Manager Fuller's order to one of the employees
under her supervision that "if anyone talked to [her] about the union,
no matter what they said about it," the employee was to report to
Fuller immediately ;
(d) Detective Hamner's inquiry of employee Johnston as to
whether the organizers had been talking union to her and if they had
convinced her.;9
(e) Department Manager, Hamner's interrogation of employee
Maurer as to whether he had been giving names of employees to the
Union and otherwise assisting it; also, Hamner's statement to Maurer
that it might be a good policy "to keep his nose out of it";
(f) Department Manager Gil.baugh's interrogation of employee
Walker as to how she felt about the Union and Gilbaugh's statement
that the store management knew who had joined the Union and that
it "would be too bad" for those who had joined;
(g) The timing of Respondent's announcement on the change in
hours and wages."
3. We unanimously agree with the Trial Examiner that the sys-
tematic interrogations to which Respondent's employees were sub-
jected by the Respondent's supervisors, who based their inquiries on
matters contained in the questionnaires given to them by the Respond-
ent, and the subsequent interviews of employees by the Respondent's
superintendent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. In its brief,
the Respondent contends that the inquiry in the questionnaire as to
whether the particular employee has been solicited for membership in
a union does not constitute an invasion by the Respondent of the
employee's rights under the Act, because it is not an interrogation as
to the employee's union activities, affiliations, or sympathies. We find
no merit in this contention; for as the Trial Examiner points out,
being solicited for membership in a union constitutes one of the
original steps in an employee's union activities. It is as much an
interference with the employee's rights and a violation of the Act for
an employer to inquire about the first union activity of an employee
as it is to inquire about any other. Inquiries of this character have
an inherently restraining effect on employees, and we have consistently
held them to be per se violations of the Act "
In the Respondent's questionnaire, explanation of the employees'
rights was restricted exclusively to their right to refrain from joining
and assisting unions free from coercion and restraint by -unions, and
made no mention of their corresponding rights to join and assist
9 Elwood M. Jenks, 81 NLRB 707, 708.
10 See Minnesota Mining J Manufacturing Company, 81 NLRB 557.
11 Jacksonville Motors , Inc., and Redmond Company, Inc ., 88 NLRB 181; Standard-
'Coosa-Thatcher Company, footnote 8, supra.
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unions if they so desired. In the Trial Examiner's opinion, when an
employer thus assumes to explain to his employees their rights under
this Act, it is incumbent upon such employer to explain to the em-
ployees all their rights in a fair, complete, and unbiased manner. The
Trial Examiner believes that a failure or refusal to do so leads to the
conclusion that the employer is attempting to use certain portions of
the Act as a method of coercing its employees into refraining from
joining any union. We disagree. We have held that an employer is
not required to remain neutral by not indicating his preference with
respect to the unionization of his employees.12 As a corollary thereto,
we believe that an employer is privileged under Section 8 (c) to
advise his employees of some of their rights under this Act without
informing them as to all their rights, so long as the employer's
expressions contain no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit. We all
specifically reject, therefore, the Trial Exaniner's conclusion in this
matter.
4. We all find, as did the Trial Examiner, contrary to the conten-
tion of the General Counsel, that the speech of the Respondent's
president was privileged under Section 8 (c) of the Act, in that it
contained no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefits.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Meier & Frank
Company, Inc., and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union affiliations,
activities, or sympathies, including the question of their solicitation
for membership or any other aspect of their union activities;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join.or assist Retail Department & Variety
Store Employees' Union, Local No. 1572, A. F. L., or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain
from any and all such activities, excepting to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
12 See Chance Fought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, 85 NLRB 183;
Louisville Title Agency, 85 NLRB 1344.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1021
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Rescind immediately its rule against solicitation insofar as it
prohibits union solicitation off the selling floors during nonworking
hours, and immediately publish notice of such rescission in its Daily
Bulletin, and post notice of such rescission in conspicuous places
throughout its department store, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted ;
(b) Publish a copy of the notice attached hereto and marked
Appendix A in the Daily Bulletin and distribute it to the employees ;
(c) Post at its retail department store in Portland, Oregon, copies of
the notice annexed hereto marked Appendix A.13 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth
Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the Re-
spondent, be posted by said Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places throughout the store, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in
writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects the complaint here-
in be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBERS HOUSTON and STYLES, dissenting in part :
While we agree with our colleagues that the Respondent's no-
solicitation rule is too broad in scope and, therefore, violative of the
Act, we cannot concur in their further finding that the Respondent
did not discriminatorily enforce that rule when it refused to allow
Organizer Maine to invite employees to lunch in order tQ discuss the
Union.
The underlying purpose of legalizing reasonable ho-solicitation
rules, although they tend to circumscribe the rights of employees to
engage. in union activities guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, is to
prevent unnecessary disruptions in an employer's business. Insofar as
department stores are concerned, we have recognized that discus-
sions concerning the.advantages and disadvantages of unionism on the
selling floors, whether during working or nonworking hours of the
employees involved, may have such a disruptive effect. In the instant
case, however, we are not confronted with that situation. Here we
13 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words , "A DECISION AND ORDER" the
words, "A DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING."
r
1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have merely a routine conversation in the form of a luncheon invita-
tion. The vice of the situation, according to our colleagues, appears
to be that the conversation was had by a union organizer with an
employee. However, luncheon invitations to employees by identified
union organizers even when qualified by a "clear indication of their
purpose," are not likely to disrupt the Respondent's business operations
any more than would routine conversations between employees and
ether individuals. Indeed, it is unrealistic to conclude that the mere
:mention of the word "union" in the course of stating the purpose of a
luncheon invitation transforms that conversation into a discussion of
the advantages or disadvantages of unionism, and renders it tanta-
mount to solicitation.
The issue, therefore, is whether the Respondent may, under the
guise of a no-solicitation rule, prevent contacts between its employees
and union organizers, for the . purpose of making luncheon engage-
ments and, at the same time, permit contacts between employees and
other individuals for the same purpose. Such disparate treatment
bears no reasonable relation to the efficient operation of the Respond-
ent's business. Moreover, it is apparent that the only purpose, and the
necessary result, of all such action is to prevent contact by union or-
ganizers with employees solely because they are union organizers and
thereby to interfere unreasonably with the rights guaranteed to em-
ployees by Section 7 of the Act. For these reasons, as well as those
mentioned by the Trial Examiner, we would find, as did the Trial
Examiner, that the Respondent's refusal to allow union organizers to
:make luncheon engagements with employees on the selling floors con-
stituted a discriminatory application of the Respondent's no-solicita-
tion rule and therefore violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
:Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union
interest, sympathy, affiliation, or activities.
AVE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist RETAIL DEPARTMENT
& VARIETY STORE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL No. 1572, A. F. L ., or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
MEIER &. FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1023
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection , and to refrain from any and all such activities.
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree -
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment , as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
By -----------------------------
(Representative ) .(Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT.
Messrs. Patrick H. Walker and Hubert J. Merrick, for the General Counsel.
Mr. Herbert B. Galton, of Portland, Oreg., for the Union.
Mr. Abe Eugene Rosenberg, of Portland, Oreg., for the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on March 29, 1949, by Retail Department & Variety Store
Employees Union, Local No. 1572, A. F. L., herein called the Union, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein respectively called the,
General Counsel' and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth
Region (Seattle, Washington), issued a complaint dated August 17, 1949, against
Meier & Frank Company, Inc., herein called the Respondent, alleging that the.
Respondent had engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Labor Management Relations Act; 1947, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint and charge, together with notice of hearing thereon, were
duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint in substance alleged.
that the Respondent on and after February 7, 1949, interfered with, restrained,.
and coerced its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to-
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing by various enumerated activities of Respondent.
and its agents.
On August 26, 1949, the Respondent filed its answer wherein it admitted certain.
allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices. In addition, this answer set forth certain affirmative defenses which will'
be considered hereinafter. On the same date the Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the Board's complaint based upon an alleged variance between the
charge and the complaint and upon the fact that the charge allegedly was not
signed under oath.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from September 6 to September 15, 1949,.
inclusive, at Portland, Oregon, before the undersigned, the Trial Examiner duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Respondent,
and the Union were represented by counsel. All participated in the hearing and
' This term specifically includes the attorneys for the General Counsel at the hearing.
1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to introduce evidence pertaining to the issues. At the opening of the
hearing, counsel for the Respondent argued the motion to dismiss at length. The
motion was denied.' Counsel for the Respondent thereupon filed motions to re-
voke the Subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum previously served upon Aaron M.
Frank and J. D. Swenson, president and superintendent respectively of the Re-
spondent. These motions were denied. During the course of the hearing at the
request of counsel for the Respondent, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to Her-
bert B. Galton, who thereupon filed a petition to revoke said subpoena. The
undersigned allowed the petition and revoked the subpoena. At the close of the
hearing, the Respondent renewed its motion to dismiss the complaint which is
hereby denied. Extended oral argument was heard and thereafter briefs were
received from all parties except the Union.
Upon the entire record and from his observation of the witnesses, the under-
signed makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BTJSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Meier & Frank Company, Inc., a corporation duly organized under and existing
by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, operates a retail department store
at Portland, Oregon. At said department store the Respondent annually sells
merchandise valued in excess of $20,000,000, of which 50 percent has its origin in
localities outside the State of Oregon.
The Respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and the undersigned so finds.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Retail Department & Variety Store Employees Union, Local No. 1572, A. F. L.,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion
1. Chronology of events
The undersigned believes that a short chronology of events will be helpful to
a correct understanding of the issues raised in the complaint which will be dis-
cussed in greater detail subsequently. While the parties are in almost complete
agreement as to the facts herein, they are in equally complete disagreement as
to the conclusions which are to be drawn from these facts.
In the latter part of January or early February 1949, the Union began, or
renewed,' a campaign to organize the unorganized employees at the Respondent's
15-story retail department store covering a solid block in downtown Portland,
where approximately 3,000 employees are employed in the Respondent's retail
operations. Although the Respondent has a number of oral and written agree-
ments with unions representing employees engaged in various craft occupations
such as the printers, teamsters, warehousemen, painters, carpenters, elevator
operators, et cetera, its selling personnel and the large majority of its nonselling
2 See Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157 , 24 LRRM 1608 , and cases there cited.
3 From the testimony, it appears that the Union has been attempting for a number of
years to organize the employees of the Respondent.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1025
personnel remain unorganized despite the fact that the Union apparently has
made various and sundry attempts in the past to organize these employees.
From the early part of 1949, paid organizers, both outsiders and employees,
began soliciting the Respondent's employees to become members of the Union.
Such solicitation occurred both on the selling-floor in the store during working
hours and also away from the Respondent's premises during nonworking hours.
The Respondent soon became aware of this activity and of the identities of the
organizers. Store detectives commenced openly and notoriously to trail, or fol-
low, these organizers whenever and wherever seen in the store and to prohibit
or prevent all communication between these known organizers and employees in
the store. The Respondent justifies this conduct on the basis of a store rule
of long standing prohibiting any solicitation of store employees on store premises.
On March 2, 1949, the Union published and distributed to the Respondent's
employees, as they reported for work at the Alder Street entrance to the store,
a leaflet or dodger urging them to join the Union. On the morning of Friday,
March 4, the Union distributed a second organizational dodger entitled "First
Friday Surprise," a title suggested by the celebrated and highly advertised
"Friday Surprise Sales" conducted weekly by the Respondent. On this occa-
sion, Building Superintendent Sam Cooper placed a large waste receptacle just
inside the entrance to the store in which the union dodger could be deposited by
the employees.' Subsequently the Union distributed other dodgers to the em-
ployees outside the store without let or hindrance from the Respondent.
On March 12, 1949, the daily house organ distributed by the Respondent to
its employees entitled, the "Daily Bulletin," was distributed as usual to the em-
ployees. This particular issue contained the one large printed word, "Loyalty!"
surrounded by various types of script appearing to be excerpts from letters con-
taining laudatory comments regarding the store and Aaron Frank, its president,
and pledging the continued loyalty of the employees to both. This bulletin con-
cluded with the large printed words "Thank You" followed by the signature
"A. M. Frank."
Also, on March 12, a second issue of the Daily Bulletin announced to the
employees the institution on March 14, 1949, of the 5r/•_,-day workweek through-
out the year except for the period from Thanksgiving to Christmas, in lieu of
the Respondent's former practice of a 6-day workweek except during the months
of July and August when the store closed on Saturdays at 1 p. in. This con-
stituted a reduction of the employees' hours from 44 to 40 per week without any
similar reduction in wages. It conformed the Respondent's hours of employ-
ment to those of the other major Portland stores.
-Prior to the opening of the store on the morning of March 24, Aaron Frank
gave one of his rare speeches on the store premises to which all of the employees
of the store had been "invited." A few days thereafter, all those employees who
had been unable to accept this invitation were invited to hear a transcription
of Frank's speech in the store during store hours. According to Frank, this
speech was intended to answer "attacks" which had been made upon the Re-
spondent by "outsiders."
On March 29, 1949, the Union filed with the Board a charge that the Respondent
had engaged in unfair labor practices.
On or just before the middle of April 1949, the Respondent's department man-
agers were instructed by the Respondent to, and did, interview each and every
4 This episode, as all the others cited. herein, will be treated more comprehensively
hereinafter.
1026 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employee in the store during working hours for the purpose, according to the
Respondent, of informing the employees of their rights under the Act, of deter-
mining whether the employees had been solicited for membership in the Union
and if so, whether the Union had coerced or restrained the employees during that
solicitation. In addition to this mass interrogation, there had been other sporadic
instances of interrogation of individual employees by the supervisory and detec-
tive force.
2. The complaint filed herein
The complaint in this matter alleged that the Respondent had interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in their right to form, join, and assist labor
organizations of their own choosing by :
(1) Trailing organizers both in and outside the store and keeping under close
observation and surveillance contacts between the union representatives and the
employees; (2) interrogating employees regarding their union affiliations and
activities; (3) decreasing the number of work hours per week and increasing
the lunch hour; (4) a speech by Aaron Frank promising benefits.' These charges
will now be considered in detail in the order above listed.
3. Trailing organizers ; observing their contacts with employees ; the
"no solicitation" rule
It has long been recognized that, in the operation of a: retail merchandising
business such as that of the Respondent, it is necessary for efficient operation
that the employees must not be subjected to unnecessary interruptions and dis-
turbances which impede the employees in the discharge of their duty to sell
merchandise to customers promptly, efficiently, and courteously. Therefore,
department stores may promulgate and enforce reasonable rules prohibiting the
solicitation of their employees for any purpose during working hours on the
selling floor, provided that those rules are reasonably adapted to prevent the
evils indicated and are uniformly enforced without discrimination. This rule
is a compromise between the guarantee contained in the Act that the employees
may freely engage in union activities without fear or coercion from any source
and the right of the employer to conduct his business efficiently and profitably.
In his testimony, the union representative candidly acknowledged the necessity
for such a rule in the Respondent's business. Any such rule which purports to
prevent any solicitation of employees during nonworking hours away from the
selling floor of the store is not reasonably adapted to prevent disruptions in the
efficient operation of the business and therefore illegal.
Does the Respondent have such a "no solicitation" rule and, if so, what is the
rule? The answer to the first part of the question is easy. The Respondent had.
such a rule and it had been in effect for along time. The answer to the second
half of the question is not so easy. Admittedly, the rule has never been pub-
lished. Although the Respondent's training department is entrusted with the
duty of informing new employees of all store rules on the employee's first day of
employment, it was clear from the testimony of witnesses both for the General
Counsel and for the Respondent that many of the employees, as well as super-
visors, had never heard of any such rule. It was also obvious from the testimony
of the Respondent's president, its superintendent, various supervisors, and mem-
bers of its detective force who have the duty of enforcing the rule, that the rule
was so indefinite in its application as to subject, person, time, place, and manner
5 This allegation was added by amendment during the hearing and over the objection of
the Respondent.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1 027
that its enforcement depended upon the personal whim of the enforcing agent..
Aaron Frank's own explanation of the limitations of the rule was replete with
guesses and conjectures.
The most explicit enunciation of the rule appeared in the issue of the Daily
Bulletin of April 9, 1946, where it stated :
Our old established regulation of preventing solicitation of any kind
in our store is well founded and should be strictly adhered to. This regu-
lation is of vital importance to our customers and to our employees.
The last announcement of the rule appeared as the lead article in the Daily
Bulletin of March 3, 1949, the day following the distribution of the first
union circular to the employees, and read as follows :
BEWARE AND BE CAUTIOUS
It has been reported that solicitors have been in various departments
of the store, speaking to our co-workers, stating they have been sent by the
store management or some other authorized party to solicit our employees..
These statements are False-Untrue-Beware of them-their annoyance.
should be reported immediately to department managers or other
executives
Clearly, therefore, the rule was intended to apply to solicitation by the Union..
However, it was admitted that drives in behalf of the Community Chest,.
the Red Cross, the March of Dimes, and for any other organizations or causes.
which the store management saw fit to authorize were permitted in the store..
Respondent's management determined in each individual case who could solicit
its employees, where, when, and how.
The Union never requested permission of the Respondent to solicit the
employees to become members of the Union on store premises. Superintendent
Swenson's testimony at the hearing was unequivocal that such request, if
made by the Union, would have been denied.
Each of the Respondent's officials and enforcing agents gave individual and
conflicting interpretations as to whether the rule applied during an employee's
time off and rest periods, whether such employees could solicit others off duty,
whether the rule was restricted to the selling floor, whether the public sidewalk
used by Respondent as a loading depot was considered a part of the store,
whether the rule applied in the employees' restaurant and rest room. Some of
the interpretations were so broad as to exclude solicitation of one employee by
another employee during their off-duty time away from the selling floor. Such
a rule would be too broad a prohibition and therefore illegal under the Act.
The Respondentts "no solicitation" rule, therefore, is so indefinite and is
insufficiently explicit in its limitations as to subject, person, time, place, and
manner as not to be understandable to either management, employees, or or-
ganizations desiring to solicit. Because of these defects, the rule can obviously
be enforced by the Respondent in such a discriminatory manner as to nullify
the rights of the employees to engage in union activities guaranteed by the
laws of the United States. For the protection of all parties concerned, the
undersigned will, therefore, recommend that the Respondent be required, if
it desires in the future to enforce such a "no solicitation" rule, to promulgate
and publish a reasonable, definite, and explicit rule against such solicitation
O Interestingly enough, there appeared at the bottom of the same issue of the Daily
Bulletin , an announcement of the appointment of additional floor captains soliciting mem-
bership in the Red Cross.
889227-51-vol. 89-66
1028 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which will be reasonably adapted to prevent unnecessary disruptions in the
efficiency of its store operations reasonably to be anticipated from such solici-
tation. The present rule is too indefinite to be enforced fairly and impartially
depending as it does upon individual interpretations.
The Board and the courts have long held that, after a fair and reasonable
no-solicitation rule has been adopted by a retail merchant, that rule must be
enforced uniformly and in a nondiscriminatory manner so that the guarantees
of the Act that employees may freely engage in union activities may not be
nullified by discriminatory enforcement by the employer.
How was the Respondent's rule enforced in the instant case? As soon as
the union organizational drive began, organizers began soliciting the employees
during their working hours on the selling floor as well as during .their non-
working hours away from the store premises. The identities of the organizers
were soon known to the Respondent. As soon as a known organizer was seen
in the store, the detective force, composed of three women, followed or trailed
the organizer and crowded into any conversation the organizer might attempt
to hold with an employee, thus preventing any and all conversations by an
organizer with an employee. This trailing was open and, notorious and was
designed to, and did, prevent conversations between organizers and employees.
The detective force had orders from the superintendent to prevent any and all
solicitation for union memberships in the store. For some months the detec-
tive force was so busy following organizers around the store that they had
little, if any, time for their usual police activities.
In early February 1949, this game became so complicated that, on one
occasion, a union organizer was being tailed around the store by a store detec-
tive who, in her turn was being followed by the union business agent who, in
his turn, was being shadowed by the supervisor of the store detectives. This
adult game of "cops and robbers" finally ended when the business agent stopped
around one corner and there confronted the supervisor who then told the busi-
ness agent that the Respondent would not permit union organizers to contact
employees or to solicit membership for the Union in the store. Similar state-
ments were made by various store detectives to'other organizers.
In order to maintain efficient service and to prevent interruptions in serving
.customers, it is obviously a reasonable requirement that organizers should not
solicit memberships in the Union from employees on the selling floor of the store
with the usual concomitant explanations and arguments which frequently ensue
from such a solicitation. Such prohibition is reasonably adapted to prevent dis-
ruptions in efficient handling of sales and service to customers. Although there
is little direct evidence on the question in the instant matter, it appears that the
union organizers, no doubt, were actually interfering with the conduct of the
Respondent's business on the selling floor during some of their solicitations
and, therefore, despite the lack of an explicit, definite rule against solicitation,
the undersigned is not convinced that, under the circumstances present here, the
Respondent committed an unfair labor practice in tailing the organizers around
the store. This precaution may well have been necessitated by the actions of
the union organizers themselves.
However, on the other hand, in the case of Organizer Jeanie Maine, Detective
Lamberty attempted to prevent her from even speaking to an employee on the
selling floor in the store even though Lamberty herself testified, regarding the
only thin,,; she had ever heard Maine say in the store, as follows : "I heard her
say to [employees] that she wanted them to go to lunch with her and that she
wanted to tell them about the Union and they [she] would be able to explain
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1029
it to them if they would go with her to lunch." No doubt Lamberty justified
this type of interference on the Respondent's instruction that employees were not
to be "contacted in the store by organizers." However, it is apparent from
Lamberty's own testimony that Maine was engaged in making an engagement
for lunch and was not engaged in solicitation. The store has no rule preventing
its employees from making luncheon engagements with anyone-except organ-
izers-while they are on the selling floor during working hours.
A rule which prevents a union organizer, merely because he is an organizer,
from making an engagement with an employee on company time and property,
even though the purpose of that engagement may be to explain and solicit union
membership, is unreasonable and not designed to prevent the evils that no-
solicitation rule is supposed to eliminate especially where, as here, the employees
are permitted to make luncheon engagements, to receive personal mail and
phone calls at the store. The undersigned cannot conceive that the Respondent
would make any objection if a customer were to make a luncheon engagement
with an employee while that employee was at work. Furthermore, it appears
that the organizer in this instance was attempting to secure exactly the same
results which the Respondent desired through the no-solicitation rule by meeting
the employee away from his work and on his own time to explain to the
employee the benefits of unionism and to solicit his membership therein. Surely
an invitation to an employee to go to lunch, even by a union organizer for the
purpose of soliciting the membership of that employee, does not constitute the
type of activity which can reasonably be banned for the reason that such an
invitation will not interfere with or interrupt Respondent's business. The
enforcement of this rule in this manner proves that the rule was being enforced
by Respondent not for legitimate business purposes but, on the contrary, in an
effort to isolate the employees from union organizers solely because they were
union organizers.
The undersigned, therefore, finds that the Respondent's refusal to allow
union organizers to make engagements, without more, with employees on com-
pany time and property unduly restricts'the right of the employees to freely
form, join, and assist labor organizations as guaranteed by the Act, is unreason-
fable in that it bears no relationship to the business problems the "no solicitation"
rule is designed to eradicate and the enforcement of that rule in such fashion
against labor organizers, merely because they are organizers, discriminates
against the rights of the employees to engage in union activities. By such dis-
criminatory enforcement the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act.
Another matter must be mentioned here. This matter is one of the very few
-disputed facts in the present case. Two of Respondent's employees, then being
paid to help the Union in its organizing campaign, testified that on one occasion
Detective Lamberty trailed an organizer and an employee of the Respondent
outside the Respondent's store as the organizer and the employee walked together
on the public streets to lunch at a public restaurant outside the store. Although
Lamberty denied that she had ever tailed this particular organizer, or any other,
outside the store premises and although, in the opinion of the undersigned,
Lamberty was a witness worthy of credence, the undersigned credits the testi-
mony as stated above of the two organizer-employees who also appeared to be
very credible witnesses. The undersigned rejects Lamberty's denial for the
reason that the tailing of persons outside the Respondent's store was a daily
routine occurrence in the line of her regular duties and thus easily forgotten
1030 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
while, to the employee-organizers, the discovery of such surveillance was' both.
unique and novel and thus memorable.
Of course, such surveillance of union organizers and of employees beyond
store premises is a definite interference with the employees' guaranteed right to.
engage in union activity and organization and thus a violation of Section 8
(a) (1) of the Act. The undersigned so finds.
There is still one more partially disputed matter to be discussed under this-
topic. On March 4, 1949, the Union handed to the employees, as they entered the
store for work that morning, its second organizational leaflet entitled "First
Friday Surprise." In the morning all employees enter at one entrance to the
store consisting of some six separate outer doors and, after passing through a
second similar set of inner doors, walk a few steps to where they receive their
copy of the store's Daily Bulletin and then proceed to their individual assign-
ments throughout the building. On this particular Friday morning Building-
Superintendent Cooper, after knowledge of the Union's organizing attempt, placed
a large receptacle for waste in such a position that the employees had to walk
past it on their way to secure the Daily Bulletin and thence to their assignments.
For a considerable period of time Cooper stood by this receptacle urging the
employees to discard the Union's pamphlet in the receptacle. There was credible
testimony which the undersigned credits that Cooper urged the employees to,
throw "that trash" (referring to the leaflet) away and not to read it. Such!
statements only expressed Cooper's actions in words.
On the other hand Cooper testified that his only interest was in preventing-
the building from becoming littered up with discarded union leaflets thus causing
extra work for the janitors under his supervision. His testimony indicated that
he only spoke to those employees who were about to throw the union bulletin
on the floor to request them to discard the leaflet in the receptacle rather than
on the floor. However, after the years of daily training which the employees
had undergone in receiving the Daily Bulletin and discarding it elsewhere than,
upon the floor, the undersigned was not impressed with Cooper's explanation,,
especially as he was the only person who noted any undue amount of debris
upon the floor.
As. Ruby Walker, an employee whom Cooper knew personally, although the
friendship between the two appeared a bit strained at least on Walker's part
at the time of the hearing, went past Cooper with a union pamphlet in,her hand,
Cooper said to her : "Drop them in here. They are all trash. Throw them away."
When Walker walked past the receptacle still retaining her union circular,
Cooper called after her : "So you won't do it, eh, Red?" ° About 3 p. in. that same
day Walker was called to Department Manager Halleck's office where Halleck,
her supervisor, for the first and only time in Walker's 4 years of employment,
criticized her work, her failure to be in store dress 8 and for visiting too much
with other employees. This incident in Halleck's office was too fortuitous to
have been accidental. It was an attempt to discourage Walker in her interesti
in the Union. Although Cooper never again appeared on the days the Union
distributed leaflets, the waste receptacle was generally present as a reminder
to the employees. The Respondent made no other attempt to interfere with the
Union's distribution of leaflets.
The undersigned believes, and therefore finds, that this whole Cooper-
Walker-Halleck waste receptacle episode was intended by the Respondent to,
T Cooper testified that he did not "recall " seeing Walker that day. "Red " was Walker's
usual nickname around the store.
8 Her failure was due to her doctor 's orders and was subsequently excused.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1031
interfere with the employees' rights to engage in union activities and to coerce
the employees into abandoning those rights in violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
4. Interrogation of employees
a. Isolated interrogations
Throughout this whole period of organizing by the Union there were a few
isolated instances of individual interrogation of employees by the Respondent's
supervisors and detectives.
Sometime early in February 1949, Department Manager Anderson' called
various employees working under her supervision for personal interviews. With
employee Slack, Anderson commenced by slating, as a fact, that Slack had at-
tended a union meeting the night before10 When Slack denied that fact, Anderson
inquired "are you sure?" and then stated that there were union organizers in
the store and that, if Slack were contacted, she was immediately to inform
Anderson. Anderson had very similar interviews with two other employees under
her supervision except for the fact that with one, Anderson asked if the employee
had attended the meeting and with the other, Anderson stated that she knew
the employee had not attended. These employees were then ordered to report
immediately to Anderson if they were approached by the Union or saw anyone
they "thought was talking union." 11 There was no limitation as to time or place
in this order.
In early April, Department Manager Fuller 12 also spoke to one of the employees
under her supervision in the stockroom and ordered that "if anyone talked to
[her] about the Union, no matter what they said about it," the employee was to
report to Fuller immediately. These interviews conducted by both Anderson
and Fuller invaded the employees' right of privacy by the inquiries regarding
the employees' union membership, sympathy, and activities, a subject matter
in which the Respondent had no legitimate interest, especially as the inquiries
were not restricted to activities occurring on the store premises, and were de-
signed to create among the employees a fear of even being solicited by the Union
and of engaging in conversations about the Union off the Respondent' s selling
floor, a definite violation of Section 7 of the Act.
On another occasion, Detective Hammer, while engaged in a telephone con-
versation, noticed two known organizers speaking to employee Johnston in the
Respondent's Book Department. As soon as Hamner had completed her tele-
phone conversation which occurred after the organizers had departed, Hamner
inquired of Johnston, who was selecting a book for her supervisor, if the
organizers had been talking Union to her and if they had convinced her. In
this instance, Hamner was inquiring about the employees' union membership
.and her interest in union organization, which is a definite violation of the
guarantees contained in the Act. '
.° Of the Children ' s and Infants ' Department.
10 As a matter of fact, Slack had been at the Union ' s office the previous evening with two
other employees. As they left the union office that evening, they noted the presence of
another of Respondent 's employees who, to them , appeared to be keeping the office building
under surveillance. However, the testimony at the hearing indicated that, while this
employee had been standing outside the building , she had been merely waiting for a street
car. No surveillance was proved in this instance.
11 These findings are made upon the credible testimony of the three employees involved
which remained largely undenied by Anderson , whose denial of knowledge of any such
union "meeting" was not impressive.
12 Of the Lower Level Girl 's Wear Department.
1032 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In early February 1949, Department Manager Hamner 13 asked employee Maurer
if he had been giving names of employees to the Union and otherwise assisting it..
When Maurer admitted his assistance to the Union, Hamner told him that it
might be good policy. "to keep his nose out of it." The interrogation in this
instance was directed to the employees' activities on behalf of a union. It was.
also intended to be coercive and prevent further union activities. On both
counts it is violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 14
Early in March, Department Manager Gilbaugh asked employee Walker how
she felt about the Union. After Walker answered that it did not matter to her,.
Gilbaugh informed Walker that the store management knew who had joined
the Union and that it "would be too bad" for those who had joined. The coercion
of this is too clear to require any discussion.16
Even with a legitimate, explicit "no solicitation" rule in effect, the inquiries
made of the employees by the Respondent's supervisors and detectives, in this
section of the report, cannot be justified. They are all in. violation of Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act. Even so, standing alone, the undersigned might be inclined
to dismiss these violations if they had been mere sporadic and isolated instances.
But they were not.
b. Systematic interrogations
The Union on March 20, 1949, filed its unfair labor practice charge against
the Respondent.
Thereafter and while the organizing campaign was still in- full swing, the
Respondent prepared and issued to each of its department managers the follow-
ing instruction sheet :
INSTRUCTIONS
[You are instructed to read to each of your employees Individually all of the
following, except the portions entitled, "Instructions"]
"The National Labor Relations Act is a federal law now in effect."
"Section 7 of said law provides : employees shall 'have the RIGHT TO RE-
FRAIN from' joining or assisting unions."
"Section 8 (b) of said Act provides: 'It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."'
"This Law as stated gives any employee the absolute right NOT to join a
union."
"Any threats or intimidation or coercion practiced upon an employee by
a union or its representatives is a violation of that right."
"In order to determine whether there has been any violation of your rights
I want to ask you a few questions."
"1. Have you been solicited for membership in a union, either personally,
by phone, or letter?"
13 Not to be confused with Detective Hamner.
14 At approximately this time Maurer began receiving $15 per week from the Union for
assisting it. There is no showing that Respondent knew this fact at the time of the above
episode. Even if it had such knowledge, it would not constitute a defense to the violation.
15 Respondent introduced evidence that Gilbaugh was on a buying trip at the time of the
hearing and thus unavailable as a witness. Respondent made no request to find means to
place Gilbaugh's testimony in the record. In view of this and of the undersigned's esti-
mate of Walker as a witness worthy of credence, the undersigned credits the testimony of
Walker as found above.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1033
[INSTRUCTION : If any employee answers, "No," make the following
statement.]
"If you should be so approached and there is any intimidation, restraint or
coercion practiced upon you by the union or its agents in any way whatso-
ever it is requested that you report the same to me immediately."
[INSTRUCTION : If any employee answers, "Yes," ask the following question.)
"2. Was any intimidation, restraint, or coercion practiced upon you in
any way by the union or its agent?"
"3. Did the union or its agents inform you-
"(a) That if you did not join NOW the union in the future would not take
your application for membership,
" (b) Or, that you would have to pay a higher initiation fee,
"(c) Or, that you could not get a job in some other store, or similar words
of like import and effect?"
[INSTRUCTION : if such statements have been made by the union or its agents
immediately report to Mr. Swenson the employee's name, together with
a brief statement as to what the employee said, signed by you.]
NOTE : Portion entitled, "Instruction" in boxes, not to be read-that's for
YOU only.
NOTE : Do not read question 2 or 3 if the answer to question 1 is "NO."
NOTE: Do not hand or deliver this to any employee. READ it as instructed
only.
NOTE: Return this to me with your comments after you have carried out
the instructions.
c
Division Head 16
Thereafter, each Department Manager interviewed each of the employees under
his supervision in accordance with the above instructions.l7
The Respondent contends vigorously that it was within its rights in sub-
jecting the individual employees to this interview and interrogation. The under-
signed cannot agree.
First, the Respondent argues that, in the first half of the interview at least,
it was merely informing the employees of their rights under the Act. The under-
signed cannot agree. The Respondent restricted its explanation of the "em-
ployees' rights" exclusively to their right to refrain from joining and assisting
unions free from coercion and restraint by unions. The Respondent omitted
to make any mention of the right of the employees to form, join, and assist
labor organizations of their own choosing free from any interference, restraint,
and coercion by the employer, a right which, even since 1947, has been numerically,
at least, more important than the right which the Respondent stressed. When an
employer, voluntarily and for purposes of his own, assumes to explain to his
16 Emphasis as in the original.
27 Those employees who were already represented by a union In collective bargaining with
the Respondent were not subjected to this inquiry.
1034 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees "their rights" under this Act, it is incumbent upon such employer
to explain to the employees all their rights, even those against the employer, in a
fair, complete, and unbiased manner. A failure, or refusal, to do so leads to the
conclusion that the employer is attempting to use the negative and the 8 (b)
portions of the Act, setting forth the unfair labor practices by unions, as a means
or method of interfering with the correlative right of the employees to form, join,
and assist labor organizations without interference from the employer himself
and as a method of coercing its employees into refraining from joining any union.
Especially is this so where, as in the instant case, the employer attempts to set
himself up in the eyes of his employees as the guardian of their freedom and
rights. In the present case the employer explained the reason for interrogating
the employees by stating that he was asking those questions "in order to
determine whether there has been any violation of your [the employee's] rights."
There is nothing in the Act nor in its legislative history which indicates that
Congress intended, by adding the sections dealing with unfair labor practices
by unions, to make the employer the guardian of the rights of the employees
nor to give him a weapon with which to coerce his employees into refraining
from union activities. As to the bona fides of the Respondent's pretext for asking
these questions of the employees, it is significant that the Respondent also forgot
to inform the employees of their own individual right to file charges with the
Board in order to protect themselves from coercion by the union-or from co-
ercion by the Respondent.
The Respondent next argues that, in the second half of the interview, it was
merely attempting to ascertain whether or not the Union had actually com-
mitted unfair labor practices so that, if it had, the Respondent could file charges
against the Union. No doubt that is partially true. No such charges, in fact,
were filed by the Respondent. As indicated above there is nothing in the Act
nor its legislative history indicating any intention that employers were to be-
n
come the guardians of their employees' rights under the Act. Such unfair labor
practices by the Union, even if proved, would constitute no defense to the unfair
labor practices charged against this Respondent. Even in labor relations two
wrongs do not make a right.
The crux of the second part of the interview appears in question No. 1 asked
of each employee individually by his supervisor : "Have you been solicited for
membership in a union, either personally, by phone or by letter?" 18
Although the Respondent candidly admits that it would have been an unfair
labor practice for it to have inquired of its employees if they had become mem-
bers of the Union, it contends that it did not violate this rule because it only
required if the employee had been solicited for membership and further argues
that, by this question concerning solicitation, it was not inquiring about the union
activity of the employee because only the solicitor is engaged in union activity
at the time of the solicitation and not the person solicited. The undersigned
cannot agree with this hyper-technical argument. Being solicited for member-
ship in a union is one of the original steps of an employee in union activities
and is, therefore, protected by the right of privacy created by the Act preventing
inquiry in that field by the employer. It is as much an interference with the
employees' right of privacy and a violation of the Act for an employer to inquire
about the first union activity of an employee as it is to inquire about any other.
The activities and sympathies of an employee in the field of labor organization
is none of the employer's business.
18 It is to be noted that this question has no limitation as to time or place
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC . 1035
Although the case does not involve the exact question asked here, the Board
in the recent case of Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company, 85 NLRB 1358, set forth
the law and rationale applicable in interrogation cases as follows :
. . . We again affirm the position the Board has consistently taken that
Section S (a) (1) of the Act is violated when an employer interrogates his
employees concerning any aspect of union activity. . . .
The express purpose of the Act is to protect the "exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of represent-
atives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual. aid or protection." Con-
sonant with this objective, Section 7 of the Act declares that employees have
the "right" to engage in organization and association, and Section 8 (a) (1)
makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce" employees in the exercise of that right.
The language and the legislative history of Section 8 (a) (1) shows that
Congress intended the terms "interfere," "restrain," and "coerce" to have
separate and distinct meanings. In banning "interference" Congress clearly
meant to proscribe any employer activity which would tend to limit em-
ployees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Inherent in the very
nature of the rights protected by Section 7 is the concomitant right of pri-
vacy in their enjoyment-"full freedom" from employer intermeddling, in-
trusion, or even knowledge.
Like the Trial Examiner, we believe that interrogation of employees as to
union matters constitutes, at the very least, interference with the rights
protected by Section 7. Whenever an employer directly or indirectly at-
tempts to secure information concerning the manner in which or the extent
to which his employees have chosen to engage in union organization or other
concerted activity, he invades an area guaranteed to be exclusively the
business and concern of his employees.
This Board, with the approval of the courts, has long recognized this right
to privacy in condemning as unlawful interference such indirect attempts by
an employer to secure information about the union activities of employees
as resort to espionage or surveillance. When espionage is successfully con-
cealed, "restraint" and "coercion" may perhaps be absent, but the con-
duct is nevertheless vulnerable on the ground of "interference," if on no
other. So it is in the case of interrogation. The employer may not legally
seek information on those subjects which the statute makes the sole concern
of his employees.
Interrogation by an employer not only invades the employee's privacy
and thus constitutes interference with his enjoyment of the rights guar-
anteed to him by the Act. Its effect on the questioned employee, like that
of open surveillance of union activity, is to "restrain" or to "coerce" the
employee in the exercise of those rights. The employee who is interrogated
concerning matters which are his sole concern is reasonably led to believe
that his employer not only wants information on the nature and extent of
his union interests and activities but also contemplates some form of re-
prisal once the information is obtained. The finger which espionage might
merely direct to him is actually pointed at him by the inquiry from his em-
ployer. He fears that a refusal to answer or a truthful answer may cost
him his job. He is also in effect warned that any contemplated union ac-
tivity must be abandoned, or he will risk loss of his job. Weighing these
1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"subtle imponderables," the Board early characterized direct interrogation
as "a particularly flagrant form of intimidation of individual employees."
Our experience demonstrates that the fear of subsequent discrimination
which interrogation instills in the minds of employees is reasonable and well-.
founded. The cases in which interrogated employees have been discharged
or otherwise discriminated against on the basis of information obtained
through interrogation are numerous. These cases demonstrate conclusively
-that, by and large, employers who engage in this practice are not motivated
by idle curiosity, but rather by a desire to rid themselves of union adherents.
In prohibiting interrogation, therefore, we are not only preserving the em-
ployees' right to privacy in their union affairs; we are not only removing
.a subtle but effective psychological restraint on employees' concerted activ-
ities ; but we are also seeking to prevent the commission of the further unfair
labor practice of discrimination by condemning one of the first steps leading
to such discrimination.
* * * * * * *
Finally, we again reject the contention that interrogation is protected by
Section S (c) of the amended Act. Interrogation cannot be considered an
expression of "views, arguments, or opinion," within the meaning of that
provision. Moreover, the purpose of that section is to permit an employer
to express his. views, not to license him to extract those of his employees.
The employer is explicitly accorded a right to "influence" his employees
by verbal appeals to reason, but not to fear.19
Through the question asked in the instant case of the employees individually 20
the Respondent learned about one aspect of the employee's union activity, it
learned the extent of the Union's organizing effort, it further learned the extent to
which its employees were choosing to engage in organizational activities, and it
learned the identity of many of its employees who had joined or were interested
in joining the Union. The question as framed in the instruction sheet is in
violation of the Act.
During the argument the Respondent made much of the fact that its super-
visors, according to the evidence, carefully restricted themselves to the instruc-
tion sheet and asked no questions beyond those contained on the sheet. The
undersigned cannot agree. The instruction sheet was designed to secure more
informtion that a mere "yes" or "no" answer to the questions posed. It is note-
worthy that in two places in the instructions the supervisor is requested : First,
to report to the management the name of the employee solicited "together with a
brief statement as to what the employee said," and second, to return the ques-
tionnaire to management "with your comments" after completion of the inquiry.
The obvious intention of the questionnaire, therefore, was to determine more
facts than the were answers to the questions propounded. It is also noteworthy.
that nowhere on the questionnaire is the employee instructed that he or she may
answer the questions in the affirmative or in the negative only.
Anderson was the only supervisor who had conducted the inquiries examined
at the hearing. Her examination was most revealing. She reported the names
of three of her employees but could only definitely remember the answers of one
of such employees. However, she could well remember the attitude of the
employees during the interview. Therefore, she reported three individuals who
19 The copious citations of authority are omitted.
10 The Respondent' s emphasis , not the undersigned's.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1037
:answered the questions in an "antagonistic or slurring fashion." One of these
employees gave her the "antagonistic" answer that she knew all about the Union
and had worked for it previously. Another was reported, even though Anderson
could not recall her answers to the questions, because, in Anderson's own words,
"you could always tell in the attitude of a person's voice, the way they answer
and little Jeanie has a very definite expression that we all know when she is
antagonized and I could tell from her answer that she had."
Even assuming that the supervisors had restrained their natural curiosity and
restricted themselves to the answer given, the evidence proves that Superintendent
'Swenson did not. He sent for the girls reported by Anderson following the inter-
rogation and, in his interview, attempted to expand upon the matters reported by
the supervisor and to reduce them to affidavit form. One employee interrogated
by Swenson asked if she had to answer his questions. His answer was "No,
- it is a free country." He then proceeded to determine the name of the
organizer involved by the clever method of having the employee deny that the
organizer was various individuals whom Swenson named until he arrived at the
correct individual person. In all, Swenson admitted interviewing 10 or 12
employees as a result of the mass interrogation.
From the "comments" etc. requested in the questionnaire and from Swenson's
.subsequent interview with those employees reported to him by the supervisors,
it is clear that the object was to provide the Respondent with as much informa-
tion regarding the activities of the Union and of the individual employees engaged
therein, as well as the extent of the organization and the interest of the individual
employees, as it could secure. The calling of individuals to Swenson's office for
subsequent interviews after the original interrogation is of itself coercion in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
By means of these systematic interviews and interrogations on the mass scale
by the supervisors and by the Respondent's superintendent, as well as by the spo-
radic individual interrogations found previously herein, the Respondent inter-
fered with and restrained its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
to them in Section 7 of the Act and coerced said employees into refraining from
the exercise of those rights in violation of Section S (a) (1) of the Act.
5. Decrease in working hours
Prior to 1947 the employees of all the major Portland stores including the
.Respondent worked a 0-day week. In that year these stores agreed upon and
placed in effect a plan whereby the stores closed at 1 p. m. on Saturdays during
the months of July and August thus granting the employees a 51 -day workweek
during the summer months.
After further consultations in 1948 the stores could not agree. The Respondent
retained the 1947 plan. announcing its decision so to do on May 19, 1948. Two
days later all the other major stores announced that they had installed a 51/2-day
workweek throughout the year with the exception of the period between Thanks-
giving and Christmas but would remain open on Saturday afternoons during the
summer. No reduction in pay was made.
Soon after the May 21 announcement a number of the Respondent's employees
urged that the Respondent adopt the same plan as the employees preferred the
shorter workweek and as they did not like losing the Saturday afternoon sales
during the summer to the other stores. While these requests continued through-
out the period, they increased in volume, according to Frank, after 1949 began.
However, Superintendent Swenson determined by September or October that
Respondent was going to be forced for business reasons to follow the plan of the
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
other stores as Respondent could not afford to lose the summer Saturday after-
noon sales. He desired to make such a determination and announcement by
January 1 but apparently could not interest the other executives as no decision
or announcement was made.
Then the Union's organizing drive began in earnest with the usual cry for
higher wages and shorter hours. 0
"Very, very shortly," according to the testimony, before March 12, 1949, the
Respondent decided to adopt the year around 51/2-day workweek in conformity
with the plan adopted by the other major stores some 9 months previously.
Through the medium of the Daily Bulletin the Respondent announced this deci-
sion to its employees on March 12, 1949. The change meant a reduction from
44 to 40 hours per week for the employees and, as there was no corresponding
reduction in take-home pay, a consequent hourly wage increase. This announce-
ment over Frank's name concluded with the following statement :
Over the years it has been gratifying to have the confidence of so many
employees who have personally spoken to me and made known matters
pertaining to the store and the employees' welfare. I have always endeav-
ored to carry out the ideals of the founders to make this store the best place
in which to work as well as to shop, and I pledge to you my continuing best.
efforts, asking only your loyalty and cooperation. [Emphasis supplied.]
The regular issue of the Daily Bulletin for that same day was unique. In its;
usual format the space generally reserved for news items on this occasion con-
sisted of the one large printed word "Loyalty !" in the center surrounded by
numerous pledges of loyalty to, and laudatory comments regarding, Frank and,
the store printed in varying types of script appearing to be excerpts from
original letters received from employees. At the bottom margin appeared in
large type the words "Thank you" and the facsimile signature "A. M. Frank."
The above changes in hours did not apply to those employees engaged in.
craft occupations working under either an oral or written labor agreement be-
tween the Respondent and the employees' union. In those cases the Respond-
ent chose to honor the agreement according to its letter and spirit. The dis-
parity of Respondent's treatment between the organized and unorganized
groups is apparent. In fact Frank himself referred to it inferentially in his
speech when he assured the employees: "I would never force you to join a
union. Nor will we ever grant any advantages to members of the union that
are not given to non-members."
In his speech of March 24, 1949, while commenting at length upon the benefits
which the Respondent had conferred upon its employees with a concluding:
remark after each such as "Will an outsider do that for you?" Frank took
occasion again to refer to the shortened hours as follows : "When we ascertained
for various reasons a substantial number of employees preferred a short day out
of six, we met that too." The rhetorical question posed after describing this
benefit was "Is this important?"
Respondent argues that this change in hours was forced upon the Respondent
so that it could compete with the other stores on Saturday afternoons. This
argument fails to conform to the facts. Swenson had been unable to create any
interest in the problem with his fellow executives on its purely business angles.
Interest in the problem arose only after the union organizing campaign became
intensified with the usual union arguments of higher wages and shorter hours.
Very, very shortly thereafter the Respondent made this unilateral grant of
shorter hours and higher wages. The suppositions reasonable employees reading
the last paragraph of the hour announcement, the "Loyalty" Daily Bulletin to-
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1039
gether with Frank's comments, would reach the reasonable conclusion that the
Respondent had granted the shorter hours to the unorganized employees as a
reward for their having remained unorganized and as proof that the employees
would be economically better off by placing their "confidence and trust in the
Respondent and Frank" than by "placing their future in the hands of paid
organizers." "
Although the undersigned realizes that the Respondent would ultimately have
had to put itself in a competitive position, he is convinced and, therefore, finds
that the decision and announcement on hours and wages were made at the par-
ticular time as part of Respondent's effort to prevent the unionization of its
employees and to interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed them by the Act and in violation of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
6. Frank's speech of March 24
A few days before March 24, Frank decided that it was of sufficient importance
for him to "answer" the "attacks" being made upon "us" by "outsiders" for
him to make one of his infrequent addresses to the assembled "store family."
When this "coy" language, as it was referred to by counsel during the hearing,
is translated it means that Frank considered it to be of sufficient importance
for him to answer the arguments being advanced to the employees by the Union
for him to address the store employees. These speeches are reserved for only the
most important matters, according to Frank.
After the speech had been prepared for delivery by Frank in consultation with
his advisers, the superintendent's office instructed the control switchboard
operator to notify each supervisor that Frank would speak to the assembled
employees the following morning at 9 a. in. and for the supervisors to so advise
the employees. This instruction was obeyed and the employees informed.
Frank spoke to the assembled employees in the store from approximately
9 a. in, to shortly after the store opened at 9: 35 a. in. The invitees were present
on their own time and were not paid for the time they were in attendance.
A few days thereafter, those employees who were unable, or had failed, to hear
the speech on March 24 were notified that a recording of the speech would be
played in the store the following day before work. Most, if not all, of the
employees heard either the original speech or its replay. No employee received
pay for his attendance.
In his speech, Frank first identified himself and the employees as a "store
family" and then stated : "Now, there have been some attacks made upon this
family in recent days, and I consider it my duty as head of this family to have
a heart to heart talk with you so that we can understand whether these attacks
are justified or not." After keynoting his speech with the statement that the
Respondent's success could be summed up in the one word, "loyalty," Frank pro-
ceeded to enumerate the benefits resulting to the employees from that loyalty.
He cited the "record" of what the Respondent had done in employee advance-
ment, employee security, employee conveniences, employee welfare funds, em-
ployee good fellowship, store hours,' employee wages, and community loyalty,
21 Paraphrased from Frank's speech of March 24.
22 On the question of reduction of hours, Frank had the following to say : "Store hours-
hours, over the years, have gradually been reduced to meet the changing need of the times.
Meier & Frank Company met this need and desire responsively as it arose. We pioneered
for Saturday closing two years ago in the summer months, and you will remember , practi-
cally went on it alone last year. When we ascertained for various reasons a substantial
number of employees preferred a short day out of six , we met that too."
1040 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ending this citation of the record in each instance with a rhetorical question
such as "Will an outsider do that for you?" Frank then stated: "We have in
the past, and will continue to do everything possible because what is good for-
you is good for us, and there are no two ways about that. Our success is your
success and vice versa. They say to you, `United we stand.' :3 You know that
and we know that. We have been united for almost 100 years. Their object is
to divide us." Frank then expounded upon his claim that the Union was.
interested in "creating a barrier, a spirit of antagonism, a spirit of distrust
between you and me." Then Frank came to the crux of his plea when he
stated: "I will. never shirk my responsibilities to you. That is why I am before
you today. To put it directly-bluntly, that is exactly what I am asking, a vote of
confidence. The decision is yours, if you please. (Applause) You must make
up your minds as to whether you want to place your future in the hands of paid
organizers-[who]. then treat you not as Meier & Frank Company have done
but as a regimented group-a dues-paying number on the books of the Union,
not as individuals." Frank turned his attention to what he called the "standard
arguments" " which he assumed the Union had used "to shove" the employees into,
membership and proceeded to state what he referred to as "the true facts, the real
facts and the honest facts" to demonstrate the Union's arguments to be either
illegal or untrue. Frank really ended with this solicitation : "And I want also-
and this is a selfish point-I want to feel that I have your confidence and your
trust. I want your expressions of confidence in me, and I want you to feel that
all I have said indicates beyond any doubt that Meier & Frank Company is not
only the type of store in which you like to work,'but that your management is-
the type of management that you want. So, if you don't want the Union, don't
be embarrassed to say, `No' when you are asked to sign a card. No one can.
compel you to sign."
In short, Frank expressed his opinion as the head of the store family that
the employees should remain individuals loyal to the store and himself asp
members of the store family and should not become a regimented number in the
Union. He became a protagonist for the antiunion forces in the campaign to.
decide whether the employees should or should not become members of the Union.
He solicited the employees not to join the Union. This solicitation was on store-
property.
Section 8 (c) of the Act permits the expressing of any views, arguments, or
opinion if such expressions contain "no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit." Although the whole theme and tenor of the speech was that the
employees would do better to place their faith and reliance in him than to,
put their future into the hands of paid organizers, the undersigned finds no,
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefits expressed in the speech. There-
fore, the speech is protected under the above-mentioned section of the Act.
The General Counsel contends, however, that irrespective of the contents of
the speech, the fact that the employees were compelled by the employer to listen
to a speech on union matters on their own time and on the Respondent's property-
is of itself an unfair labor practice.
The General Counsel admits that the Board has ruled against his contention,
when employees are compelled to listen on company time'but contends that the
rule is different when employees are compelled to listen on their own time. The
23 A reference to a union leaflet.
24 So far as the record shows these "standard arguments" were the figment of the-
Respondent's imagination. Subsequently each employee of the store was asked if the-
Union bad used these arguments upon him.
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1041
undersigned finds it unnecessary to decide that legal question on the facts,
presented here.
Were the employees here "compelled" to attend Frank's speech? The Re-
spondent refers to the notification regarding the speech to the employees as an
"invitation." The General Counsel appears to consider that notification in the
nature of a command performance, a requirement or an order coming from the
employer. The undersigned is of the opinion that whether this notification
was an invitation implying a freedom of choice to accept or reject on the part
of the invitee or as an order or command performance without such freedom
of choice is a question of fact to be proved by evidence unless the undersigned
may infer or presume a force or compulsion preventing a choice from the fact
that the notification came from an employer. Today, especially in view of the
obvious congressional intent expressed in the amendment to the Policy Section
of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act deleting the phrase regarding
the "inequality of bargaining power between employees-and employers," the
undersigned feels that such an inference or presumption against an employer
because he is an employer would not be justified and that the matter is subject
to proof in each individual case.
The testimony in the instant case on that phase is meager. One supervisor,,
in telling an employee of the speech, stated : "Everybody goes to Mr. Frank's
speeches." Perhaps everybody goes because of Mr. Frank's forensic ability,.
his wit, his personality, or some other reason not related to compulsion.
Another supervisor changed an employee's half-day off, contrary to the.
employee's wishes, so that she would be sure to hear the transcription. Although
this definitely indicates a command performance type of invitation, it is the
only such evidence in the record. In a store with 3,000 employees, the under-
signed would not feel justified in finding compulsion on that evidence alone.
Perhaps all but one attended voluntarily.
The undersigned, therefore, finds that the Respondent committed no unfair
labor practice in the method of giving the speech of March 24, 1949, or in the
contents thereof.
Iv. THE EFFECT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in.
connection with the operations of the Respondent's business described in See-
tion 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,,
and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes.
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent's rule against solicitation is so
indefinite as to subject , person, time , place, and manner as to be unworkable
and fraught with the possibility of discriminatory treatment between various
organizations engaged in solicitation, the undersigned will recommend that, if
the Respondent desires to enforce a "no solicitation" rule in the future, it
promulgate and publish a clear, definite,.and explicit rule so that the Respondent,
the employees, and the various organizations may clearly and definitely know
their rights thereunder. This iule is to be reasonably adapted to prevent.
1042 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interruptions or disturbances affecting the efficient operations of the Respondent's
store.
It having also been found that the Respondent has enforced this "no solicita-
tion" rule in a discriminatory fashion in the past so as to interfere with the
union activities of the employees, the undersigned will recommend that the
Respondent cease and desist therefrom and, in the future, enforce any new
rule against solicitation in.a uniform and nondiscriminatory fashion.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Retail Department & Variety Store Employees Union, Local No. 1572, A. F. L.
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
,commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices by trailing union
organizers throughout its store.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
recommended that the Respondent, Meier & Frank Company, Inc., Portland,
Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating the employees concerning their union affiliation, activities,
or sympathies including the question of their solicitation for membership or any
other aspect of their union activities ;
(b) Enforcing any "no solicitation" rule unless and until a new, definite, and
explicit nondiscriminatory rule against solicitation reasonably adapted to pre-
vent unnecessary interruptions and disruptions of the store's efficiency on the
selling floor is first promulgated and published ;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, or to join or assist Retail Department & Variety Store Employees Union,
Local No. 1572, A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will- effectuate the
policies of the Act :
(a) Publish the notice to all employees attached hereto, and marked Appendix
A, in the Daily Bulletin and distribute to the employees ;
(b) Post at its retail department store in Portland, Oregon, copies of the
notice attached hereto marked Appendix A. Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for.the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being
signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in-
i 1EIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC. 1043
eluding all places where notices to employees are customarily 'posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in writing, within
twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Intermediate Report, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that the complaint herein be dismissed' insofar as
it alleges that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices by trailing union
organizers inside the store and by an address by Aaron Frank promising benefits.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, any party may, within twenty (20) days from the date
of service of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section
203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C.,
an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions
to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (in-
cluding rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with
the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party may
within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in support of
the Intermediate Report. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of
exceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon
each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate
by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly
printed or mimeographed, and if mimeographed shall be double spaced. Proof
of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly
made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section 203.46
should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request
therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the
date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 30th day of December 1949.
TIIoMAS S. WILSON,
Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union interest,
sympathy, affiliation, or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist RETAIL DEPARTMENT & VARIETY STORE EM-
PLOYEES UNION, LOCAL No. 1572, A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
889227-51-vol. 89-67
1044 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
other mutual aid or protection . All our employees are free to become or
remain members of this union , or any other labor organization.
METER & FRANK COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated ---------------------------- By ------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain .posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.