Meehan Truck Sales, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 9, 1973

201 N.L.R.B. 780 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Meehan Truck Sales , Inc. and International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District
No. 63, AFL-CIO. Case 6-CA-5883
February 9, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
On September 11, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Sidney J. Barban issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.
We adopt the conclusion that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by its refusal to bargain
with the Charging Union when it knew that the
Union represented a majority of its employees. We
further find, in adopting the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision, that, after the Union showed its
card authorizations as proof of majority selection of
the Union to Respondent President Meehan, Re-
spondent Shop Manager Bollenbacher promised
employees benefits and threatened them with loss of
job benefits and jobs in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the
complaint allegation that Shop Manager Bollenbach-
er unlawfully interrogated employee Dionne about
the Union. Although the Administrative Law Judge
found that Bollenbacher had questioned Dionne
about his views on shop unionization and that such
interrogation "is a particularly unwarranted intru-
sion into employee rights," he concluded that this
action was not unlawful because there was no
evidence of like interrogation of other employees and
Bollenbacher had assured Dionne in the same
conversation of continued employment. The General
Counsel excepted to this conclusion on the ground
that the interrogation, when considered in context of
additional threatening statements made by Bollen-
bacher to Dionne and to the other employees,
constituted interference and coercion within the
I Member Kennedy would affirm the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision in all respects. He would hold that a finding of unlawful
meaning of Section 8(a)(1). We find merit in this
exception.
The record shows that on January 3, 1972, the day
after the employees' union organizing meeting,
Bollenbacher called Dionne into his office to talk
about the Union. He asked Dionne what he thought
about the Union coming in, said that if it did there
would be job classifications for which "some of the
lower men would not classify," that the Company
wanted to keep Dionne employed and would have a
job for him. As found by the Administrative Law
Judge, Bollenbacher questioned other employees as
to what they thought their job classifications should
be in the event of a union job classification system
and threatened job loss. We see the conversation
with Dionne in conjunction with the other threats of
loss of jobs and job privileges made by Bollenbacher.
In these circumstances we cannot view Bollenbach-
er's statements to Dionne about the latter's employ-
ment as reassuring.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Bollen-
bacher intended to convey the message that the
employees' jobs would be placed in jeopardy if they
persisted in bringing in the Union. In light of this
finding, and the other findings and conclusions
which we adopt, we further find that Bollenbacher
coercively interrogated employee Dionne in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Add this sentence as paragraph 6 to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law in his
Decision and Order. The Conclusions of Law
following thereafter are renumbered paragraphs 7
and 8.
6. Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union sympathies.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified herein, and orders that the Respondent,
Meehan Truck Sales, Inc., New Brighton, Pennsylva-
nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Administrative Law
Judge's recommended Order, as modified herein.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(d) and
reletter present 1(d) as 1(e).
"(d) Coercively interrogating its employees con-
cerning their union sympathies."
interrogation is not warranted by the single incident described by the
Administrative Law Judge
201 NLRB No. 107
MEEHAN TRUCK SALES, INC. 781
2. Substitute the attached Notice to Employees
for the Administrative La Judge's notice.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
You have the right under the law:
To organize, or form, or join unions
To bargain for your working conditions
through a representative freely chosen by a
majority of the service and parts employees
in an appropriate unit
To act together with fellow employees for
mutual aid or protection of your working
conditions
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce
you in your right to join or help International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, District No. 63, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, or in your right to have such labor
organization represent you in dealing with the
Company about your pay or other terms and
conditions of employment, if you want.
WE WILL NOT threaten or warn you that you
might lose your jobs or your benefits or that the
Company will harm you in any way if you join or
help a labor organization, or select a labor
organization to represent you in dealing with the
Company about your pay and working condi-
tions.
WE WILL NOT promise you benefits in order to
induce you not to join or help a labor organiza-
tion, or not to select a labor organization as your
representative in dealing with the Company.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees about their union sympathies.
WE WILL on request recognize and bargain with
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, District No. 63, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in a unit composed of "all
service department employees, including all auto-
motive mechanics, body and fender men, appren-
tices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners,
partsmen, parts truckdrivers, and car jockeys,
excluding all office clerical employees , salesmen,
watchmen and guards, professional employees
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, regarding their rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other terms or condi-
tions of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached , put that understanding into a signed
contract.
MEEHAN TRUCK SALES,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, 1536 Federal Building, 1000 Liberty
Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, Telephone
412-644-2977.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SIDNEY J. BARBAN , Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard at Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania , on July 20,
1972 (all dates herein in 1972). The complaint, issued on
March 30, based on a charge filed by the above-named
Charging Party (herein the Union) on February 9, alleges
that the above-named Respondent violated Section 8(aXI)
of the Act by threats, interrogations , and promises
addressed to its employees , and violated Section 8(aX5)
and (1) by refusing to bargain with the Union as the
bargaining representative of its employees in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit. Respondent's answer as amended at
the hearing denies the commission of any unfair labor
practices , but admits allegations of the complaint sufficient
to justify the assertion of jurisdiction under current
standards of the Board ($50,000 annual direct interstate
inflow), and to support a finding that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
Upon the entire record in this case , from observation of
the witnesses , and after due consideration of the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent , I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE FACTS
A. The Union's Majority Status
The complaint alleges, the amended answer admits, and
I find that the following unit of Respondent's employees
are appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of the Act:
All service department employees , including all auto-
motive mechanics , body and fender men, apprentices,
helpers , lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners , partsmen,
parts truckdrivers and car jockeys, excluding all office
clerical employees, salesmen , watchmen and guards,
782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
It is agreed that as of January 4, Respondent employed
12 employees in the unit just described. On January 3, the
Union held a meeting at a nearby hotel, which was
attended by nine employees in the appropriate unit. No
food was served, but some beer was provided at the
meeting, later paid for by the Union. The union organizer
present, Leonard M. Schloer, advised the employees that it
would be necessary that a majority of the employees
involved would have to sign authorization cards in favor of
the Union before the Union could go to their employer and
request that the Union be recognized as their bargaining
representative. Schloer distributed authorization cards to
all the employees present, and observed as each filled out a
card and returned it to Schloer signed. These authorization
cards provide that the employees signatory "hereby
authorize the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) to act as my collective-bargain-
ing agent with the Company for wages , hours and working
conditions. It is my understanding that I will be invited to
join the IAM." On the following day, January 4, a 10th
employee signed a similar card at the behest of an
employee solicitor and returned it to the solicitor.
On these facts, and on the entire record , it is found that
as of January 3, and thereafter, the Union held valid
authorizations from a majority of Respondent's employees
in the appropriate unit designating the Union as their
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining, and
that therefore the Union has been since that date the
exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri-
ate unit found above for the purpose of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
B. The Union's Request for Recognition;
Respondent's Refusal To Bargain
On January 4, Schloer, together with another representa-
tive of the Union, visited Thomas H. Meehan, president of
Respondent , in his office . It is agreed that Schloer advised
Meehan that the Union represented a majority of Respon-
dent's employees in its service and parts department, and
submitted the authorization cards in its possession to
Meehan . Meehan acknowledged that these constituted a
majority of the employees in that department. He exam-
ined each of the cards and was observed writing notations
on a pad in front of him as he looked at them. Schloer
asserts that Meehan was making notes of the names.
Meehan insists that he was in the midst of figuring a
projected truck sale, and that he continued in this endeavor
during the conversation. Though I do not consider the
resolution of this issue important , I do not credit Meehan's
explanation . There is a further dispute as to whether
Schloer specifically named each of the job classifications
set forth in the unit described above. Again the issue is not
significant , but I rather doubt that Schloer did so name the
jobs. However, it is clear that Meehan knew what
I G C Exh 2, apparently prepared by Respondent, lists the employees
and their classifications . Bailey, Hazuda , and Leist are listed as mechanic
employees Schloer was talking about , to the point of
admitting that a majority of them had signed cards
designating the Union as their bargaining agent . Further,
as set forth below , the Union soon advised the Respondent
in writing and in detail as to the unit which it represented.
Although in the course of this conversation Meehan told
Schloer that he did not care whether his shop was
organized or not, when requested to recognize the Union
as the employees ' representative , Meehan stated that he
would not agree to do so until he had contacted his
attorney.
On the following day, January 5, Schloer sent Meehan a
letter advising that the Union represented a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit (described substantially
as in the appropriate unit previously found), stating that
the Union was prepared to furnish proof of its claim, and
requesting recognition and a meeting to negotiate a
collective-bargaining contract. By a letter dated January 5,
Meehan wrote Schloer, advising that : "Since my earlier
discussion with you I have reviewed the situation and I am
convinced your union does not represent the majority of
my employees in the appropriate bargaining unit : there-
fore , we cannot recognize you as a bargaining agent."
Respondent suggests that inasmuch as the two letters bear
the same date they must have crossed in the mail.
However, as Respondent did not apparently otherwise
answer the Union 's letter, it is clear that Meehan has
adopted his letter as the answer to the Union request. In
any event, there is no dispute that within a week or two
after their first meeting, Schloer again visited Meehan and
again requested that Respondent recognize the Union as
the bargaining representative of Respondent 's employees
in the appropriate unit , and that Meehan again refused to
grant the request.
C. Alleged Acts of Interference With the
Employees' Union Activities
1. The talks in the shop manager 's office
Respondent 's shop manager, Curtis Bollenbacher, ad-
vised Respondent President Meehan in advance that the
employees were meeting on the evening of January 3. On
the next morning , Bollenbacher, an admitted supervisor,
began summoning service and parts employees in his
office , one at a time . Four of these employees , William D.
Bailey, Timothy E. Leist, Frederic H. Dionne, and
Leonard Hazuda , testified concerning their meetings with
Bollenbacher that morning . In essence, Bollenbacher told
the men that if the Union came into the shop, they would
have to be classified as either a journeyman , apprentice, or
helper ; and he asked each one at the outset what he
thought his classification would be . Bollenbacher asserted
that there were only two men in the shop qualified to be
called journeymen, and asked if the men thought they
should be classified as helpers or apprentices. These
inquiries caused some confusion and distress . Bailey
objected to the idea that he might be considered a helper,
since he had worked for Respondent for 3 years.'
Dionne testified that Bollenbacher gave him to under-
apprentices , and Dionne is listed as mechanic -lot boy. Three of the twelve
are designated journeymen . none of these testified.
MEEHAN TRUCK SALES, INC.
stand that the process of classifying the workers would
probably cause some of the present workers to lose their
jobs , because "some of the lower men would not classify."
Bollenbacher also told Leist that if the Union came in,
employees probably (or possibly) would be let go; that
"there were piles of applications from journeymen who
wished to work in union shops."
During these conversations , Bollenbacher also warned
the employees or some of them that the advent of the
Union would mean the loss of privileges which they
enjoyed . As testified by Bailey , Bollenbacher said, "You
know if the union does come in . . . you men are going to
be losing a lot of privileges ... you won't be allowed to
work on your cars here , in the shop , or lube them . . . you
won't be able to take coffeebreaks like you do . . . you
won't be able to do any curbstoning . . . by doing this .. .
you will be taking work from another shop ." 2 Bollenbach-
er told Leist that curbstoning wouldn't be allowed in a
union shop or under a union contract , and "that men
would be let go because of things like that."
Apparently these warnings that the men would lose
privileges if they brought the Union in was a matter of
discussion among the men. Thus , employee Walter Long
(who did not sign a union authorization so far as the record
shows) told Leist that if the employees brought the Union
in all their privileges would be taken away.3
In these office talks , Bollenbacher initiated his conversa-
tion with Dionne by asking him what he thought about the
Union coming in. Dionne answered that he would go along
with the majority of the employees. During the course of
this conversation, Bollenbacher also told Dionne that
Respondent desired to keep him employed . None of the
other witnesses reported similar questioning or statements
of approbation . Bollenbacher told Hazuda , in the words of
the latter, that he was "disappointed with the men, that
they went to the union to get a bargaining agent , rather
than to come to him for discrepancies or whatever it was in
the shop."
In the course of some of these conversations , Bollen-
bacher apparently told a number of the employees that he
had previously worked in a union shop , and advised some
that he had been a shop steward . Respondent argues that
Bollenbacher's comments to the employees with respect to
the consequences to the employees of bringing the Union
in were given as reasoned statements based on his
experience in union shops . However, that was not the sense
of the testimony of the employee witnesses (with the
possible exception of "curbstoning ," as discussed here-
inafter).4
2. Other statements of the shop manager
About a week after Bollenbacher 's talks with the
employees in his office on January 4, employee Bailey had
occasion to ask Bollenbacher if the men were going to
2 Curbstoning was described as the practice of the employees to work on
vehicles of private parties on the employees ' own time.
3 Respondent argues in its brief that the employees learned of the loss of
privileges from Long and not from Bollenbacher This is rejected . Neither
Bollenbacher nor Long testified , and the testimony of the employee
witnesses with respect to these talks was uncontradicted and is credited
4 Bailey, who testified principally concerning Bollenbacher 's statements
783
work until 6 p.m., that evening , to which Bollenbacher
replied that the men were only going to work until 5 p.m.
Employee Gary Hewitt asked Bollenbacher , "Where is all
this overtime we were supposed to be getting?", to which
Bollenbacher answered , "When you pruneheads make up
your minds which way you are going to go . . . then I will
get your overtime back for you." The employees had been
receiving overtime work previously , until the last of
December 1971. This conversation was overheard by
employee Leist.
On another occasion in mid-January 1972, when Bailey
was in Bollenbacher's office , the latter had Bailey close the
door, and stated to him that "this is a real slap in the face,
you men going out and bringing the union in.. . . I could
have got you all raises by going up and talking to Tom
[Meehan ].... you didn 't have to go behind our backs,
and bring the Union in." It appears that in the past,
employees in the service and parts department had secured
raises by requesting them of Bollenbacher.
II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Interference With Employee Rights
1. Bollenbacher's office talks
Shop Manager Bollenbacher was clearly engaged in a
campaign to induce the service and parts employees to
withdraw and desist from their efforts to secure union
representation . This began the morning following the
employees' first organizational meeting, at which a
majority had signed authorizations for union representa-
tion. During that morning , Bollenbacher began calling the
employees individually into his office to dissuade them
from the course upon which they had embarked. Though
this action in and of itself does not violate the prohibitions
of Section 8(a) of the Act , the Board has long held that the
act of calling employees , one by one , for this purpose, into
such a "locus of managerial authority ," puts impermissible
pressure upon employees and improperly interferes with
their freedom of choice . See, e .g., National Caterers of
Virginia, Inc., 125 NLRB 110, and cases cited ; see also
Spiegel, Inc., 61 LRRM 1030. During conversations with
the employees in his office concerning the harmful
consequences which would follow their choice of union
representation , Bollenbacher told them that bringing the
Union in would cause them to lose privileges which they
enjoyed , including the right to repair and lubricate their
own cars in Respondent 's shop , their coffeebreaks, and
their practice of working on private vehicles on their own
time (referred to as "curbstoning"). Contrary to Respon-
dent's argument, the record does not show that Bollen-
bacher asserted that this would happen because the Union
would insist upon it (with the exception of the "curbston-
ing"), or that the employees had any reason to believe that
this was the case . Thus there is no basis for inference that
that the employees would lose privileges if they brought the Union in was
questioned as follows:
Q [Respondent's counsel ] Isn't it true that all he did, was that he
explained to you the way that [the] union had worked when he was in
it. at Sanford Motors9
A [Batley ] No. it didn't sound that way to me, this may have been
the way he was explaining it. but it didn't sound like it to me though
784 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union would seek contract clauses which would deny
employees benefits like the right to use Respondent's shop
and materials to work on their own cars , or which would
require Respondent to take away the employees' coffee-
breaks . The manifest message was that Respondent would
take these benefits away in reprisal for the employees
bringing in the Union. This was apparently discussed in the
shop, to the point that it was stated that the employees
would lose "all privileges" if the Union came in. In
contrast to the above, it seems clear from the record that
Bollenbacher stated that the Union opposed "curbstoning"
and would seek contract clauses against it. Because
Bollenbacher did not testify, and there is no direct
evidence on the point, however, there is no way to
determine whether he had any basis for his claim as to
curbstoning, or whether this was a "scare tactic ," which he
adopted to his purpose.
It is further clear that , during these conversations in his
office, Bollenbacher told the employees that bringing the
Union in would cause some of them to lose their jobs. He
emphasized that only two of the employees were journey-
men (in fact there were three ), indicating that only
journeymen were secure in their employment , and stating
that there were "piles" of applications from journeymen on
the outside waiting for the jobs if the shop went union. In
connection with this , Bollenbacher acted in deprecation of
the job status of the employees to whom he was talking,
and said that some of them would not "classify" for jobs
with Respondent. This led employee Dionne to testify that
Bollenbacher asserted that "it would probably jeopardize
some of the lower jobs on account of the classifications,"
though it is clear that Bollenbacher did not use the word
"jeopardize" itself . The question remains, however, wheth-
er these threats to the employees' job security should be
considered mere predictions of consequences beyond
Respondent 's desire and control, or were additional
warnings of Respondent 's reaction to unwanted unioniza-
tion. In N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575,
618, the Supreme Court stated the applicable rule to be
applied as follows:
... [An] employer is free to communicate to his
employees any of his general views about unionism or
any of his specific views about a particular union, so
long as the communications do not contain a "threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit ." He may even
make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes
unionization will have on his company . In such a case,
however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on
the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's
belief as to demonstrably probable consequences
beyond his control or to convey a management
decision' already'made.... If there is any implication
that an employer may or may not take action solely on
his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to him , the statement is no
longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts
but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation
and coercion... .
5 Respondent points out that no mention of the Union was made in this
conversation However, in the context of this case , and in the absence of any
other explanation for the remarks , it is found that the reference was clearly
There is no question but that Bollenbacher intended to
convey to the employees the message that their jobs would
be placed in jeopardy if they persisted in bringing the
Union in, and it is clear that this was understood by the
employees . See Gissel, supra, 619. The record furnishes no
objective basis or necessity for the threat . The plain
implication of the testimony is that Respondent would take
such reprisal against the employees through some method
of reclassifying their status should the Union be brought
in.
Based on the above , and the entire record, it is found
that Respondent , by threatening employees with loss of
benefits and loss of employment because they joined or
assisted the Union , or sought to secure representation by
the Union for the purpose of collective bargaining, thereby
interfered with , restrained , and coerced its employees in
violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act.
During the course of these conversations in his office,
Bollenbacher also questioned employee Dionne as to his
views concerning unionization. Though Dionne had signed
a union authorization , he temporized in answer , replying
that he would do what the majority did. However, Dionne
admitted that, during the conversation , Bollenbacher
advised that Respondent intended to keep Dionne em-
ployed. While interrogation of employees with respect to
the exercise of their rights under the Act under the
circumstances shown here is a particularly unwarranted
intrusion into employee rights, in view of the fact that there
is no evidence that any other employee was interrogated,
and the individual assurances given Dionne, it will be
recommended that the allegation of the complaint that
Respondent violated the Act by interrogation of employees
be dismissed.
2. Other conduct of Bollenbacher
As has been noted , during the conversations in Bollen-
bacher's office , the latter told employee Hazuda that he
(Bollenbacher) was "disappointed with the men" for
seeking union representation , that they should have come
to Bollenbacher for rectification of "discrepancies" in the
shop. This continued to be a recurrent theme in Bollen-
bacher's dealings with the men . A week later, when
questioned as to the reason the men were not receiving
overtime, Bollenbacher replied, "When you pruneheads
make up your minds which way you are going to go .. .
then I will get your overtime back for you."5 About this
same time, Bollenbacher told employee Bailey that the
men had given him (Bollenbacher) a "real slap in the face"
by bringing the Union in, that he (Bollenbacher) "could
have got you all raises by going up and talking to
[Respondent President Meehan] . . . you didn't have to go
behind our backs and bring the Union in." Thus in a
context of constantly asserting that the employees had
caused him and Meehan personal injury by seeking union
representation, Bollenbacher told the men that if they had
not done so he would have secured wage raises for them as
well as adjusting other "discrepancies" in the shop which
were disturbing them, indicating quite clearly that they
to the employees' union activities , as the employees would reasonably
understand
MEEHAN TRUCK SALES, INC. 785
could expect this kind of favoritism if they ceased their
unwanted course of action and rejected the Union. This
was emphasized by his assurance that when they decided
to go in a more acceptable way Bollenbacher would "get
[their] overtime back for them."
On these facts, in the context of this record, it is found
that Respondent further threatened the employees with
reprisal if they continued to seek union representation and
promised them benefits if they discontinued that course of
conduct, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing
its employees in the exercise of rights under Section 7 of
the Act and thus violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
B. The Refusal To Bargain
The Union was the properly designated representative of
a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate
unit on each occasion when Respondent was requested to
recognize and bargain with the Union for the employees in
that unit. When first requested to recognize the Union,
Respondent President Meehan, after going through the
employees' authorization cards, acknowledged the Union's
majority status, but refused to accord it recognition until
he had contacted his attorney. Thereafter, after apparently
consulting his counsel, Meehan questioned the majority
designation of the Union. No objective basis for this
change appears, nor is any given in Meehan's letter to the
Union raising the issue. Respondent thereupon engaged in
a course of conduct designed to undermine the employees'
allegiance to the Union and destroy the Union's majority
status. Thus Respondent not only refused to accept the
employees' choice made through authorization cards, but
engaged in a course of conduct designed to prevent the
Board from conducting a free and fair election which
might have tested that choice.
Nor is it to be expected that traditional Board remedies
would erase this unlawful conduct within any reasonable
time, to the point that an election could be conducted that
would better express the employees' desires than the cards
they have already executed. It must be kept in mind that
the unit here involved is relatively small, and the
relationship of the employees to the shop manager is fairly
close.6 The shop manager's good will is important to these
employees, for his ability to aid or injure them in their
working conditions is only too obvious. Immediately upon
their resort to the Union, he began a campaign to impress
them with his opposition to their conduct, advising them
that he considered what they had done a personal injury to
him and telling them one by one that their action would
cause them to lose employment benefits and threatened
their jobs. On the other hand, it was made plain that, if
they would give up their wrongheaded pursuit of union
representation, the shop manager could secure raises for
them, get their overtime back, and adjust other shop
problems. The campaign against the Union was given
especial impact by the swiftness with which it followed
upon the employees' initial organizational efforts, the
dissemination of the original threats on a one-to-one basis
in the shop manager's office, its repetition in more pointed
6 The Board has previously instructed us to give close attention to the
size of the unit and the extensiveness of the employer 's conduct within that
form shortly thereafter, and its apparent widespread
diffusion among the employees.
The Board's conclusions in Solvay Baking Company, 180
NLRB 418 , appear particularly apt to the present case:
The foregoing unlawful conduct not only precluded the
holding of a fair election ... but, in our judgment, was
of a sufficiently pervasive and extensive character,
considering the small size of the unit , to have likely
served its intended purpose of undermining the Union's
preexisting majority . In these circumstances , we believe
that restoration of the status quo ante is required in
order to vindicate employee rights and prevent the
Respondent from profiting from its own unfair labor
practices . We are further of the opinion that the
lingering effect of the Respondent's past coercive
conduct renders uncertain the possibility that tradition-
al remedies can ensure a fair election . We therefore
conclude , on balance , that Respondent 's majority card
designations obtained before the unfair labor practices
occurred provide a more reliable test of employee
representation desires , and better protect employee
right than would [a future] election.
I find this particularly true in the instant case where the
Union secured authorizations from 10 out of 12 employees
in the unit, and there is no evidence that this was other
than the free and voluntary act of the employees
concerned.
Accordingly, it is found that by refusing to recognize and
bargain with the Union , on the basis of the record in this
case , the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the
Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All service department employees, including all
automotive mechanics, body and fender men, apprentices,
helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen,
parts truckdrivers and car jockeys, excluding all office
clerical employees , salesmen , watchmen and guards,
professional employees and supervisors as described in the
Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. At all times since January 3, 1972, the Union has
been the exclusive bargaining representative of Respon-
dent's employees in the appropriate unit set forth above
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By threatening reprisals and promising benefits to
induce its employees to refrain from joining , assisting, or
designating the Union their bargaining representative,
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By refusing to recognize and bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
unit. See Solvay Baking Company , 176 NLRB 673; 180 NLRB 418.
786 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of its employees in the appropriate unit set forth above, on
and after January 4, 1972 , Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the
Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(axl) and (5)
of the Act , it will be recommended that the Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I issue the following recommended: T
ORDER
Meehan Truck Sales , Inc., New Brighton , Pennsylvania,
the Respondent herein , its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dis-
trict No. 63, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of its employees in an appropriate unit
composed of "all service department employees , including
all automotive mechanics , body and fender men, appren-
tices , helpers , lubricators , lot boys , reconditioners, parts-
men, parts truckdrivers and car jockeys , excluding all
office clerical employees , salesmen , watchmen and guards,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the
Act."
(b) Threatening employees with loss of employment, loss
7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
" In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals . the words in the notice reading "Posted by
of benefits , or other reprisals if they join or assist a labor
organization , or select a representative for collective
bargaining.
(c) Promising benefits to induce the employees not to
join or assist a labor organization or not to select a
representative for collective bargaining.
(d) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request , recognize and bargain collectively with
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers , District No . 63, AFL-CIO, the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in the aforesaid unit
with respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understanding into
a signed contract.
(b) Post at its operation at New Brighton , Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." s Copies
of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places , includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered
by any material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision , what steps
have been taken to comply herewith .9
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it
hereby is dismissed as to any alleged violations of the Act
not found hereinabove in this Decision.
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
9 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."