MEDLINE INDUSTRIES, INCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 4, 20202019003182 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/872,906 04/29/2013 Mahmoud N. Hamdan BPMDL0001MHC1 (10021U C1) 1786 27939 7590 08/04/2020 Philip H. Burrus, IV Burrus Intellectual Property Law Group LLC 222 12th Street NE Suite 1803 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER CERIONI, DANIEL LEE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3791 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/04/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): kberry@burrusiplaw.com pburrus@burrusiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte MAHMOUD N. HAMDAN1 ________________ Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 Technology Center 3700 ________________ Before ERIC B. GRIMES, JOHN G. NEW, and DEVON ZASTROW NEWMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. NEW, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.142. Appellant states that the real party-in-interest is Medline Industries, Inc. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 2 SUMMARY Appellant files this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–20. Specifically, claims 1, 3– 8, 11–13, and 16–20 stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Jaques et al. (US 2002/0067273 A1, June 6, 2002) (“Jaques”), Smith et al. (US 7,378,975 B1, May 27, 2008) (“Smith”) and Ranney (US 2007/0069560 A1, March 29, 2007) (“Ranney”). Claims 2, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Jaques, Smith, Ranney, and Clute (US 5,357,642, October 25, 1994) (“Clute”). Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Jaques, Smith, Ranney, and Vrzalik et al. (US 2007/0261548 A1, November 15, 2007) (“Vrzalik”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant’s invention is directed to a unitary patient monitoring system, including an alarm, such as a loudspeaker, and a weight sensitive switch. Each component is encapsulated in a cover member, which can be configured as a T-shape. Abstract. REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is representative of the claims on appeal and recites: 1. A unitary patient monitoring system, comprising: Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 3 a loudspeaker; a weight sensitive switch to actuate the loudspeaker; and a unitary cover member encapsulating and surrounding both the loudspeaker and the weight sensitive switch within the unitary cover member; the unitary cover member comprising a first portion and a second portion extending from the first portion so as to form a trunk from the first portion with length and width dimensions of the first portion different than the second portion, the weight sensitive switch disposed in the first portion and the loudspeaker disposed in the second portion. App. Br. 20. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS We adopt the Examiner’s reasoning, findings of fact, and conclusions that the appealed claims are obvious over the cited prior art. We address the arguments raised by Appellant below. Issue 1 Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the combined cited prior art neither teaches nor suggests a loudspeaker surrounded by a unitary cover, as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 11. Analysis The Examiner finds that Jaques teaches a weight-sensitive switch to actuate a loudspeaker and a unitary cover member encapsulating and Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 4 surrounding both the loudspeaker and the switch within the unitary cover. Non-Final Act. 3–4 (citing Jaques, Figs. 10, 12, ¶¶ 56–61). Appellant disagrees, pointing to the Board’s Prior Decision on appeal with respect to this application, mailed March 23, 2018 (the “Prior Decision”). App. Br. 11. According to Appellant, the Board has already determined that the combination of Jaques, Smith, and Ranney fails to teach or suggest this limitation, finding that “Jaques teaches that the speaker of the alarm is “exposed.” Id. (quoting Prior Dec. 6). Appellant reasons that an object cannot be both surrounded and exposed at the same time: the terms are antithetical and mutually exclusive. Id. Appellant contends that the Examiner relies upon Figures 10 and 12 of Jaques, which depicts a control unit 164 and a pressure sensor 166 both disposed in the same case 168. App. Br. 12 (also citing Jaques ¶ 57). Appellant asserts that the Examiner finds, in these embodiments, that “Jaques discloses ... a unitary cover member encapsulating and surrounding both the loudspeaker and the weight sensitive switch within the unitary cover.” Id. (quoting Non-Final Act. 4). Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s findings. Appellant asserts that Jaques does not teach a cover member surrounding the loudspeaker, but, rather, expressly teaches an exposed loudspeaker. App. Br. 12. Appellant acknowledges that Jaques teaches that the control unit and pressure sensor are located in the cover, but Appellant also contends that Jaques states that at least a portion of the control unit is exposed. Id. (citing, e.g., Jaques ¶ 56 (“The control unit 164 is located in a pocket within the case 168 so that a control surface is exposed and available for setting”). Appellant also points to paragraph [0057] of Jaques, which teaches that “[t]he enclosing case 168 Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 5 is sealed around the control unit 164 leaving a control face 170 exposed to permit adjustment of the amount of pressure necessary to cause an alarm to be given by the pressure sensing pad 160.” Id. Appellant next points to paragraph [0061], which details the portions of this control unit that are exposed in Figures 9 and 10, stating that “[i]n FIG. 12, there is shown a fragmentary perspective view of the control unit 164 within the case 168, with the case 168 sealed to the control face 170 leaving exposed the lamp 188 (not shown in FIG. 12), the speaker of the alarm 186, the bias adjustment manual dial 190 and the on/off switch 182.” App. Br. 12. In other words, Appellant argues, Jaques expressly teaches that four elements are left exposed in this embodiment: (1) the lamp; (2) the speaker of the alarm; (3) the bias adjustment manual dial; and (4) the on/off switch. Id. at 12–13. Appellant therefore asserts that Jaques fails to teach a cover member “surrounding” an alarm loudspeaker, as recited in claim 1. Id. at 13. Appellant next turns to Smith, arguing that its patient detection switch is disposed in a first housing 380, whereas loudspeaker 395 is disposed in a second housing 50 and is exposed. App. Br. 13. Therefore, argues Appellant, Smith, like Jaques, neither teaches nor suggests a cover member surrounding a loudspeaker as set forth in claim 1. Finally, Appellant argues that Ranney does not teach a loudspeaker. App. Br. 13. Appellant therefore asserts that none of the cited prior art references, taken alone or in combination, teach a unitary cover surrounding a loudspeaker and weight sensitive switch, as recited in independent claims 17. Id. Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 6 Appellant notes that, in its Prior Decision, the Board found that “despite what is shown in FIG. 12, paragraph 61 of Jaques teaches that the speaker of the alarm is ‘exposed.’” App. Br. 14 (quoting Prior Decision 6). Nevertheless, Appellant argues, the Board interpreted the term “encapsulate” as meaning “to enclose as if in a capsule,” relying upon the online version of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary for its construction. Id. (quoting Prior Dec. 5). Appellant alleges that, although Appellant’s loudspeaker is shown completely surrounded by the cover member in FIGS. 5–6, the Board held: “But even if an opening in the cover exposes a small portion of the loudspeaker, that does not mean the speaker is not ‘enclosed’ within the cover itself, as long as the speaker is entirely contained within the borders of the cover,” and “no portion of the speaker extends or protruded beyond the envelope of the enclosing cover,” then Jaques speaker was “encapsulated” by the cover member. Id. (quoting Prior Dec. 6). In response to the Board’s affirmance of the Examiner’s rejection of the claims, Appellant amended independent claims 1 and 17 to recite, inter alia, “a unitary cover member encapsulating and surrounding […] the loudspeaker.” App. Br. 14. Appellant contends that the claim term “surrounds,” when read in light of Appellant’s Specification, means “completely surrounds” as depicted in Figures 5 and 6 of the Specification, in which no part of the loudspeaker is exposed. Id. Appellant also points to the definition of “surround” provided by the same source employed by the Board in its Prior Decision, as meaning “to enclose on all sides.” App. Br. 14 (quoting https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/surround (last visited by Appellant on October 18, 2018). Therefore, argues Appellant, even using Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 7 the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term “surrounding,” claims 1 and 17 each recite a cover member that encloses, on all sides, a loudspeaker. Id. We are not persuaded. Appellant’s Specification provides no express definition of the claim term “surrounding” other than a description of one embodiment of the invention, disclosing, in relevant part, that “[t]he cover member 101 encapsulates and surrounds the internal components of the unitary patient monitoring system 100, which can include a loudspeaker, an energy source, weight sensitive switches, and so forth.” Spec., ¶ 30. Absent an express definition of the claim term, we employ the broadest reasonable definition of the claim term consistent with the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Appellant has supplied us with a definition of “surround” taken from the same dictionary source we employed in defining the claim term “encapsulate” viz., “to enclose on all sides.” See App. Br. 14. However, even if we accept Appellant’s definition, we nevertheless arrive at the same conclusion as we did previously. In the Prior Decision, we found that: As is evident from Figure 12 of Jaques, as well as from the corresponding passage of paragraph [0061] quoted by Appellant supra, Jaques teaches that the speaker of the alarm 186 (i.e., Appellant’s “loudspeaker”) is contained entirely within the envelope of the unitary cover 168 that covers the rest of the unit. See also Jaques FIG. 10. Figure 12 shows that no portion of the speaker of the alarm extends or protrudes outside of the envelope of the cover, as is indicated by the dashed line indicating the entire profile of the speaker. See id. ¶ 61 (describing control unit Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 8 164, which is indicated in dashed lines in Figure 12, as being “within the case 168”). Prior Dec. 5–6. We concluded that: Even if an opening in the cover exposes a small portion of the loudspeaker, that does not mean that the speaker is not “enclosed” within the cover itself, as long as the speaker is contained entirely within the borders of the cover because, as we have explained, no portion of the speaker extends or protrudes beyond the envelope of the enclosing cover. We therefore agree with the Examiner’s finding that Jaques teaches the disputed limitation. Id. at 6. Our reasoning remains the same with respect to the claims presently before us. If the claim term “surrounding” is construed to mean “enclosing on all sides,” just as “encapsulating” was previously construed to mean “to enclose in or as if in a capsule” (see Prior Dec. 5), then we find, once again, that the speaker is enclosed within the cover “as long as the speaker is contained entirely within the borders of the cover because, as we have explained, no portion of the speaker extends or protrudes beyond the envelope of the enclosing cover.” Id. at 6. We are therefore not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments with respect to this issue. Issue 2 Appellant argues that neither Clute nor Vrzalik cures the alleged deficiencies of Jaques, Smith, and Ranney. However, and for the reasons we have explained supra, we find that the combined cited prior art references teach the limitation reciting “a unitary cover member encapsulating and Appeal 2019-003182 Application 13/872,906 9 surrounding […] the loudspeaker,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 17 and therefore incorporated into dependent claims 1–16 and 18–20. We consequently affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–8, 11– 13, 16–20 103(a) Jaques, Smith Ranney 1, 3–8, 11–13, 16–20 2, 14, 15 103(a) Jaques, Smith Ranney, Clute 2, 14, 15 9, 10 103(a) Jaques, Smith Ranney, Vrzalik 9, 10 Overall Outcome 1–20 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation