Medallion Cabinetry, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 13, 2009

25-CA-030623 (N.L.R.B. May. 13, 2009)

JD–19-09
Culver, IN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
MEDALLION CABINETRY, INC.
and Cases 25–CA–30623
25–CA–30658
25–CA–30659
CARPENTERS INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL,
a/w UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
AND JOINERS OF AMERICA
Raifael Williams, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James B. Sherman and Christina Lopez-Nutzman, Esqs.,
(Wessels Sherman, PC.), of Minneapolis, Minnesota,
and Chicago, Illinois, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN T. CLARK, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Rochester, Indiana, on
October 7–8 and November 18, 2008. The original charge in Case 25–CA–30623 was filed by
the Carpenters Industrial Council, a/w United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(the Union or the Charging Party), on March 5, 2008, against Medallion Cabinetry, Inc. (the
Respondent). That charge was amended on June 11, 2008. The charges in Cases 25–CA–30658
and 25–CA–30659 were filed by the Union on April 14, 2008. On July 31, 2008, the Regional
Director for Region 25 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), issued an order
consolidating cases, consolidated complaint, and notice of hearing.
The consolidated complaint alleges that the Respondent’s supervisors and agents, at all
material times, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by: maintaining and enforcing a rule that would reasonably tend to chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights; and by issuing written warnings to two
employees because they engaged in union and protected concerted activities.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
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FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, a corporation, with an office and place of business in Culver, Indiana,
has been engaged in the business of manufacturing cabinets primarily for residential markets.
During the 12-month period ending July 31, 2008, the Respondent in conducting its business
operations, purchased and received at its Culver, Indiana facility goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Indiana. The Respondent admits, and I find,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent’s Culver, Indiana facility is one of six Medallion facilities located
throughout Minnesota, Oregon, and Illinois. The Respondent is owned by Elkay Cabinetry
Division. Pam Michelson is the human resources manager for the six Medallion facilities.
Michelson reports to Phyllis Roth, the vice president of Elkay Cabinetry Division. Dick Reil is
the operations manager at the Culver facility. At the time of the hearing, the facility employed
approximately 250 employees. Donna Louk is the human resources supervisor at the facility.
She reports directly to Reil, and has some reporting responsibility to Michelson.
The Culver facility opened in late 2005. The employee handbook that was in effect when
it opened was revised by Michelson in February 2007. The employee handbook contains a part
entitled “performance improvement plan, disciplinary, action and termination of employment”
(GC Exh. 4 at 1–16). The statement below is contained in that part: (id. at 1–16, 1–17).
Following is a list of actions which will result in serious disciplinary action, including
termination of employment. These actions include but are not limited to:
Disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior
including, but not limited to unwelcome solicitations, persistent and unwelcome talking,
distracting actions or non-work activities, etc.
The complaint alleges that the maintenance and the enforcement of this rule violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Wright’s March 3, 2008 Warning
Employee Julie Wright has been employed by the Respondent since January 2006 as a
dual process specialist. In February 2008, Wright contacted the Union regarding organizing the
Respondent’s work force. To that end, also in February, the Union began conducting meetings
in Monterey and Culver, Indiana. Wright signed a union authorization card on about February 9
and she solicited other employees to sign cards. Wright was the chairperson for the Union’s in-
house organizing committee. The Respondent does not dispute that Wright was a known active
and vocal supporter of the Union. The Respondent also admits that it was aware of the union
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organizing campaign in February 2008. Louk testified that she saw union and antiunion buttons
and literature in the facility on a daily basis. She also testified that she was aware that the
employees had attempted an organizing campaign in February 2007.
On February 26, 2008, Wright was on her morning break in the employee break room.
Wright sat at the same table every day during her break and distributed union buttons and
literature, and solicited employees to sign union authorization cards. Shortly after 8:30 a.m.,
Wright noticed an antiunion flyer on a table. The first sentence on the flyer indicated that “what
the Union doesn’t want you to know is that you can say ‘no’ to the Union.” (Tr. 81.) Wright
took issue with that sentence. Because there were approximately 25 employees in the break
room, Wright testified that she raised her voice to be heard. Wright announced, “What they
don’t want you to know on this piece of paper, is that you are allowed to say ‘yes,’ too.” An
employee asked what Wright thought about the flyer. Wright replied, “I don’t think much of it,”
and mimicked wiping her behind with the flyer. Wright denied threatening anyone, using
profanity, or any inappropriate language. Sometime after this incident employees Lisa Stacy and
Katherine Brandenburg complained to Louk about this incident and later still they provided Louk
with written statements.
On February 28 at approximately 11:25 a.m. Wright, who was on break, stationed herself
near the front door to the facility. After the first buzzer sounded, the employees began reentering
the building. Wright asked them if they wanted to sign a union authorization card as they walked
pass. Wright noticed Louk leaving through the door that the employees were entering.
Louk is uncertain as to whether the date was February 27 or 28. Louk states that Stacy
told her that employee Dawn Sibo complained to Stacy about Wright screaming “don’t forget to
sign your union card.” This reminded Louk of “something that I had witnessed going to lunch.”
Stacy, in her written statement, claims that the Sibo incident occurred on February 27.
Based on Stacy’s reminder, Louk added that on “2/28/08 [Wright] was again shouting as
employees were returning from lunch” to the written warning that was given to Wright on March
3, 2008. (GC Exh. 6.) Louk also testified that she contacted Michelson, Roth, and the
Respondent’s labor attorney and the group decided that Wright should be issued the warning.
The warning is signed by Riel, the operations manager, Ian Brandt the production manager,
James Elder, the production supervisor, and Louk. Louk admitted that she was the only
decisionmaker to sign the warning. Louk testified that the decision to reprimand Wright was
made “right after I did my investigation, I am thinking it was probably a couple of days after the
last incident.” The warning is dated February 28, 2008, which is the date it was signed by Louk
and Riel. Brandt and Elder signed the reprimand on March 3. After counsel for the General
Counsel reminded Louk that the last incident occurred on February 28, 2008, Louk replied: “It
was actually issued to her . . . on March third.” Thus, based on Louk’s testimony it appears that
she and Riel signed the warning before the decision was made to issue it.
The warning has “performance improvement plan” written in bold print at the top form.
The forms are called performance improvement plan (PIP) notifications. They are part of the
Respondent’s progressive discipline system. In essence, they are written disciplinary warning
and are referred to as such throughout the decision. The warning states that there were numerous
complaints from employees regarding Wright’s screaming and yelling in the break room on
February 26. The reprimand alleges that employees reported that they were uncomfortable with
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Wright’s intimidating behavior. Additionally, Wright’s shouting at the front entrance on
February 28, 2008, “was unwelcomed by a number of employees.” The warning concludes “[a]s
stated in the Employee Handbook, disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or
otherwise offensive behavior will result in serious disciplinary action, including termination of
employment.” (GC Exh. 6.)
During the afternoon of March 3,Wright was summoned to the office by Brandt and
Elder and they gave her the reprimand. After Wright refused to sign it, Brant commended
Wright “for holding in your anger.” Thereafter he and Elder signed the reprimand, gave it to
Wright, and she left the office.
Discussion
I find Wright to generally be a credible witness. I do not accept her statement she was
not angry because “angry is when you have to go out and [physically] beat something down.”
(Tr. 105.) Not only is the statement ludicrous but there is no record evidence Wright was ever
arrested or disciplined for any physical assault. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the testimony
of other witnesses who attested to Wright’s reputation for anger. Indeed, as noted Wright
testified that after Brant gave her the reprimand he commended her for not exhibiting anger.
Wright’s voice when testifying was louder than that of most people, it appeared to be her normal
speaking voice. No doubt the volume of her voice was greatly increased when speaking in the
break room and when soliciting at the front entrance.
Employee Dino McCay testified on behalf of counsel for the General Counsel regarding
the break room incident. Although McCay left the break room before Wright gestured, he did
observe that she appeared to be angered by what she read on the flyer. McCay acknowledged
that Wright had a reputation for being loud and aggressive but denied that she was yelling.
Employee Loyal Bailey also testified on behalf of the General Counsel. He was present
throughout the incident. He stated that Wright was complaining about what she had read on the
paper, and that she was telling the employees that they had the right to vote for or against the
Union, and to discuss, or not, the reason for their position. Although Bailey had difficulty
distinguishing between speaking in a loud voice and yelling, he testified, “[t]hat’s just the way
she speaks [she] is a loud person.” (Tr. 320.)
I find that McCay and Bailey are credible witnesses neither of whom appeared to have
any apparent bias. I am unable to make the same finding regarding the credibility of
Brandenburg and Stacy. I find that Brandenburg’s claims regarding Wright’s conduct are
nothing more than generalized exaggerations. Thus, according to Brandenburg the first sound
she heard from Wright was screaming “in the loudest voice I’ve ever heard inside.” She could
not “even put a name to it because it was so loud it was—you could feel her voice. I almost want
to call it a blood curdling scream.” Brandenburg claims that Wright’s “arms were flailing. Her
head was just going all over the place. She was pacing. Her body language was very
aggressive.” When asked to explain what she meant by aggressive body language, Brandenburg
stated, “I was waiting for furniture to move because being she was going to push it.” After being
asked for further clarification, Brandenburg admitted that Wright never attempted to “push” any
furniture, but that was Brandenburg’s “feeling.” (Tr. 278–280.) I find that Brandenburg’s
testimony concerning Wright’s conduct is exaggerated and that she is biased in favor of the
Respondent. Her bias is established by her admission that she is a personal friend of Louk’s, that
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she was in the break room to collect signatures for an antiunion petition, and that it was she who
had distributed the proemployer flyer.
As a point of clarification, I specifically find that Wright never used profanity and
specifically never verbally interpreted her gesture, i.e., she never said, “I’ll show you what this
[paper] is good for. It’s only good to wipe my . . . [ass] with,” as Louk testified. (Tr. 220.)
Louk claimed that Brandenburg told her that was said by Wright as she gestured. Wright
credibly denied ever swearing, neither Brandenburg nor anyone else testified that Wright swore,
and it is not contained in Brandenburg’s written statement. That statement was what Louk said
reflected what she was told by Brandenburg on February 26. Accordingly, I discredit Louk’s
testimony on this matter and I credit Wright’s emphatic denial.
Stacy testified that she and Wanda Fox were laughing at Wright when Wright started
speaking. The laughter stopped, according to Stacy, when Wright started “yelling at someone
telling them to ‘Sit Down and Shut Up!”’ Stacy claims that Wright was “loud, rude, and
disrespectful to everyone in the break room.” (R. Exh. 4.) I discredit Stacy’s written and oral
statements that Wright made that statement. (Tr. 297–298; R. Exh. 4.) Stacy’s statements are
contradicted by Wright’s credited testimony that she did not direct any comments or threats to
any individual. Wright’s testimony is corroborated by McCay and Bailey, both of whom
testified that they did not hear Wright make any threats. Brandenburg did not mention this
incident in her testimony. Nor was Wanda Fox, the employee who was sitting next to Stacy
during this incident, called to corroborated Stacy’s testimony. I find that her discredited
testimony is evidence of a personal bias against Wright and her announced bias for the
Respondent. In Stacy’s undated written statement, she admits that she is “tired of [Wright’s]
tactics.” She then volunteers that the Respondent is a fair and generous employer that provides
more benefits that other employers. This non sequitur is followed by Stacy’s assurance that she
and “quite a few” other employees “are proud to be a members of [the Respondent].” (R. Exh.
4.)
Based on the complaint allegations, counsel for the General Counsel argues that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when it disciplined Wright for engaging
in union and protected concerted activities. Furthermore, argues counsel for the General
Counsel, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing a rule
that reasonable tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
The Respondent argues that the challenged language in the rule does not explicitly
restrict Section 7 activity, nor would employees reasonably construe the language to prohibit
Section 7 activity. The Respondent also argues that Wright was not engaged in protected
concerted activity, and even if her conduct in the break room was protected concerted activity, it
was so opprobrious that she lost the protection of the Act.
a. The incident in the break room
There is no question that Wright was engaged in union and protected concerted activity
when she began her harangue in the break room. The record also establishes that the Respondent
was aware of that fact before it reprimanded Wright. Thus, Brandenburg wrote that Wright was
speaking about “the company” (quotes in the original) being in the wrong, the office people
being in “volition” (sic), and “how the company was in the wrong and the office people don’t
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have the right to do this and she [Wright] has the proof,” implying that the proof was written in
the paper she was waving about. Stacy testified that Wright was addressing chargeable and non-
chargeable offenses because of the antiunion paper in the break room. Brandenburg and Stacy
each adopted their statements. Louk testified that the statements are representative of what the
women said when they first came to her office.
I also note that had the Respondent conducted even a minimal investigation, as opposed
to merely accepting statements from two biased employees, and relying on hearsay statements
from other employees, it could have easily established the union and protected nature of
Wright’s comments and actions. For example McCay testified that he observed that Wright
appeared to be angered by what was written on the antiunion flyer. He heard Wright say
something regarding the Union. Bailey recalled that Wright was complaining about what written
on the antiunion flyer, and that she was telling the employees that they had a right to vote for or
against the Union, and to discuss, or not, the reason for their position. Moreover, in a situation
such as this—with an ongoing union organizing drive, and aggressive pro and antiunion
partisans, I would be loath to permit the Respondent to claim lack of knowledge of the context of
Wright’s actions and thereby take advantage of its own pathetic investigation. An investigation
that did not even give the subject of the investigation an opportunity to address the accusations
made against her. See generally Alstyle Apparel, 351 NLRB 1287, 1288 (2007) (where the
Board adopted the judge’s finding that the employer did not discharge the employees based on a
reasonable belief of misconduct because it conducted only a limited investigation, deciding to
discharge the employees before giving them an opportunity to explain the allegations against
them).
The Respondent also contends that “the subject of the discussion was [Wright’s] dislike
toward Brandenburg’s presence. I reject this contention. The only contact Wright had with
Brandenburg was after she had finished her speech. That fact is acknowledged by the question
posed to Wright by the Respondent’s counsel—“Do you recall after your speech . . . was over
and before you left, . . . going over to [] Brandenburg’s table and speaking with her?” Wright
credibly denied that Brandenburg was the cause, or the object, of Wright’s displeasure, and I
reject the Respondent’s contention to the contrary. (Tr. 113–115.)
I find, in agreement with counsel for the General Counsel, that Wright was disciplined for
engaging in union and protected concerted activity. The Board has held, and the parties do not
contend otherwise, that where the conduct for which an employee is disciplined is intertwined
with protected concerted activity, the analysis set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), is inapplicable. Thus, the
only issue is whether Wright’s conduct lost the protection of the Act. Phoenix Transit System,
337 NLRB 510, 510 (2002), enfd. mem. 63 Fed.Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (and cited cases).
Where, as here, it is clear that the employee was disciplined for an outburst that occurred
while engaging in union and protected concerted activity, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
outburst was so opprobrious as to remove the employee from the protection of the Act. Nor-Cal
Beverage Co., 330 NLRB 610 (2000). The test to determine the outcome of the inquiry is set
forth in Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979). In that case, the Board enumerated the factors
to be balanced in determining whether an employee’s protected concerted activity loses the
protection of the Act due to opprobrious conduct, or otherwise crosses the line between protected
and unprotected conduct. The factors for consideration are: (1) the place of the discussion; (2)
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the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the outburst; and (4) whether the outburst
was provoked by unfair labor practices. Atlantic Steel, supra at 816.
Applying the factors to the facts, I find that the first factor weighs in favor of retaining
the protection of the Act. The incident happened in the employees’ break room, a location that
would not interfere with the Respondent’s workflow. It was in a nonworking area on
nonworking time. There is no evidence that any nonemployees were present. It was an area
where partisan activity was permitted. Thus, Wright was asking employees to sign union
authorization cards and Brandenburg was asking them to sign an antiunion petition. See
generally Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 NLRB 669, 670 (2007).
Addressing the second factor, I find that the subject matter of Wright’s harangue also
weighs in favor of protection. Wright was clearly advocating that the employees reject the
information contained in the antiunion flyer and, alternatively, informing them that they had a
right to vote “yes” for the Union and to discuss, or not discuss, the reasons for their decision
among themselves. In finding this factor favors the Act’s protection I also note that I have
previously rejected the Respondent’s contention that the subject matter of the discussion had
anything to do with Brandenburg’s presence in the break room.
The third factor, the nature of the conduct weighs in favor of protection of Wright’s
conduct as well. There is no question but that Wright was loud. Wright speaks in a voice that is
louder than that of most people. She was also attempting to speak over, and get the attention of,
the other 20 plus people in the break room. Lastly she was angered by the contents of the
antiunion flyer. Wright is an ardent union adherent. She was the employee that initial contacted
the Union and she is the chairperson for the Union’s organizing committee. Although her
impassioned voice was loud, she was not profane. See Farah Mfg. Co., 202 NLRB 666 (1973)
(refusal to lower voice while engaged in protected concerted activity was found to be protected
and not insubordinate). Her ire was neither directed at an individual, nor was she “in anyone’s
face.” Undeniably her gesture was crass, but it was also a succinct, vivid depiction of her
opinion of the antiunion flyer. I accept Brandenburg’s testimony that the entire incident lasted
approximately 4 minutes. Based on the foregoing, and being mindful that, “the Board has
allowed a degree of latitude in circumstances where employees are engaged in allegedly
inappropriate, yet protected activities.” See, e.g., Noble Metal Processing, Inc., 346 NLRB 795,
799–801 (2006) (footnote omitted) (and cited cases), I find that this factor weighs in favor of the
protection of the Act.
As to the fourth factor, I find that Wright’s conduct was not provoked by the Respondent.
In making this finding, I note that there is no evidence that the Respondent was in any way
responsible for, or involved in, the creation or distribution of the antiunion flyer. I conclude that
this factor weighs against Wright’s retaining the Act’s protection.
Having carefully balanced the four factors articulated in Atlantic Steel, supra, I find that
the fourth factor is clearly outweighed by the initial factors. Accordingly, I find that Wright’s
conduct on February 26, 2008, did not removed her from the protection of the Act. Additionally,
given the nexus between Wright’s union and protected concerted activity, the Respondent cannot
rely on independent motive to legitimate Wright’s discipline. Thus, the comparator evidence
offered by the Respondent is of no relevance.
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Having found that Wright’s conduct in the break room on February 26, 2008, was
protected, it follows that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act when, on
March 3, 2008, it disciplined Wright for engaging in union and protected concerted activity and I
so find. See St. Joseph’s Hospital, 337 NLRB 94, 95 (2001), enfd. 55 Fed. Appx. 902 (11th Cir.
2002); Nor-Cal Beverage Co., 330 NLRB 610, 611–612 (2000).
b. The incident near the front door to the facility
This part of the March 3, 2008 reprimand is allegedly based on “something that I [Louk]
had witnessed going to lunch is when [Wright]was screaming ‘don’t forget to sign your union
card.’” Louk testified that this incident occurred on either the day after the break room incident,
February 27, or the following day, February 28. Louk expressed no such reservation when she
drafted Wright’s reprimand on February 28, and wrote “2/28/08.” Thus, Louk is writing about
the February 28 incident on the day it happened. Louk never explains why she had doubts about
the date. Regrettably this is not the only problem with Louk’s testimony.
When asked by the Respondent’s counsel what she did immediately after receiving the
written statements Louk emphatically responded, “Well, I read them and re-read them and I
thought, oh boy.” (Tr. 169.) Even when confronted by the fact that Brandenburg’s statement is
dated March 6, 2008, 3 days after Wright was given the reprimand, Louk attempts to obfuscate.
She never offers any satisfactory explanation for this obvious inconsistency. Had Louk’s
testimony not been so emphatic and specific it could be attributed to an unreliable memory. This
is not the case. I find that Louk’s testimony was an attempt to mislead, possibly in hopes of
making the Respondent’s disciplinary process appear more deliberative.
Another example of Louk’s mendacity is her fallacious explanation of how she decides
who she will interview before issuing discipline. Louk claims that “where if two employees
were going at it, he said/she said, and it involves two individuals, at times, I would get both
[sides] of the story. If it is an alleged harassment claim, I would definitely do interviews, per
se.” (Tr. 66.) Notwithstanding how incredible that answer appears, it does, conveniently
accomplish its purpose of fitting the facts of this case. I also find that it further diminishes
Louk’s credibility.
Some misstatements are such blatant falsehoods that it is reasonable to believe the very
opposite of what the witnesses says, and to disbelieve the witness totally. NLRB v. Walton Mfg.
Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Louk’s testimony regarding Wright’s solicitations on February
28 fits that category.
I find, in accordance Wright’s testimony, and the date Louk wrote on Wright’s
reprimand, that the incident occurred on February 28, 2008. Louk testified that although she
observed Wright “screaming” at the employees, she not only failed to confront Wright, but
totally forget about the incident until she was reminder by Stacy. I find that her testimony is
patently false. Louk is the human resources supervisor, and Wright is not just another employee.
Wright is the employee that was the subject of consultations between Louk, the Company’s labor
attorney, the Company’s human resources manager, and the vice president of Elkay Cabinetry
Division. Wright is the employee for whom she would draft a disciplinary warning when she
returned from lunch. Wright is not an employee that Louk would or could forget.
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A more likely scenario is that Wright was doing nothing that would cause Louk to stop
and confront Wright or to take disciplinary action against her. Wright was soliciting union
authorizations cards in a nonworking area on nonworking time. Most assuredly she was loud,
her normal speaking voice was louder than most people. Additionally, she presumably wanted to
be heard, and to get the attention of the employees as they passed by. This would have caused
her to speak even louder that usual. Even so, Louk clearly saw no need to stop. Louk’s failure
to act belies her testimony. She saw no reason to discipline Wright, at least not until Stacy
presented Louk with her written statement.
Stacy, perhaps because of her bias, appears to be overly enthusiastic about building a case
against Wright. Although Louk told Stacy and Brandenburg to memorialize the verbal statement
that they had to her, Stacy went the extra yard and provided additional information that had
nothing to do with the events in the break room. (R. Exh. 4.) Wright credibly testified that it
was 11:25 a.m. when Louk walked pass her. Louk testified that she was on her way to lunch.
Presumably Stacy gave Louk her written statement that afternoon. Stacy was not a witness to the
event that is alleged to have occurred on February 27. Stacy merely added what was reported to
her by two employees. Louk did not contact the employees. The best that Louk could say was
that she did “know of one.” (Tr. 171.) Perhaps it was the double hearsay problem, but in any
case I am convinced that it was only after Louk became aware of the other complaints that she
“remembered” her own.
The point of the foregoing is to make it clear that there is no credible evidence from
which to conclude that Wright even came close to engaging in opprobrious conduct or “creating
a problem in any area of proper management concern.” Farah Mfg. Co., 202 NLRB 666, 666
(1973). If, however, I were to balance the Atlantic Steel factors, I would find that the first three,
unlike the fourth, favor retaining the Act’s protection and that they far outweigh the fourth
factor.
Based on the foregoing I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the
Act when it disciplined Wright on March 3, 2008, for engaging in union and protected concerted
activity on February 28, 2008. See St. Joseph’s Hospital, (supra); Nor-Cal Beverage Co. (supra).
c. Paragraphs 6(a) and (b) of the complaint
Paragraph 6(a) of the complaint alleges that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by maintaining an unlawful work rule. Paragraph 6(b) alleges that the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by enforcing the rule with respect to its employees’ protected
union activities.
The rule is set forth in part 14 of the employees handbook “performance improvement
plan, disciplinary, action and termination of employment” (GC Exh. 4 at 1–16.) The rule states:
Following is a list of actions which will result in serious disciplinary action, including
termination of employment. These actions include but are not limited to:
Disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior
including, but not limited to unwelcome solicitations, persistent and unwelcome talking,
distracting actions or non-work activities, etc.
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The analytical framework for determining whether the maintenance of a work rule
violates Section 8(a)(1) is set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–
647 (2004) (emphasis in original and footnote omitted):
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a work rule that reasonably
tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel,
326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the
Board must, however, give the rule a reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading
particular phrases in isolation, and it must not presume improper interference with
employee rights. Id. at 825, 827. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into whether
the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether the rule
explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, we will find the rule
unlawful.
If the rule does not explicitly restrict activities protected by Section 7, the
violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees would
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was
promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 rights.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the maintenance of the rule is unlawful because the
handbook does not define inappropriate or offensive behavior. Thus, argues counsel for the
General Counsel the employees could reasonably believe that it is inappropriate to actively
support union organizing and that the rule prevents employees from participating in protected
activities. Finally, counsel for the General Counsel contends that the rule is vague and
ambiguous, and as such any ambiguities should be construed against the Respondent.
Counsel for the General Counsel’s argument has appeal, although I find the total lack of
supporting case citations to be disconcerting. Regardless, I have found that the rule has been
applied to restrict Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I conclude that the mere maintenance of the
rule tends to have a chilling effect on the employees Section 7 rights and as such the
maintenance of the rule is an unfair labor practice. Id. at 825
C. Wright’s April 11, 2008 Warning
On April 11 at approximately 5:45 a.m. Wright placed union flyers on a table near
employee Don Tessner’s work area. Tessner was on the clock and working at the time but
Wright’s shift had not begun. Wright told Tessner not to touch the flyers until he went on break.
Wright next approached employee Terry Sloan who was working in the “super-susan” area. She
left some flyers and also instructed Sloan not to touch them until he went on break. Contrary to
Wright’s instructions Sloan picked up the flyers.
Employee Ernie Quimby was working in the same room where Wright was distributing
the flyers. He was on a machine that was 15 feet off the ground. Quimby testified that he saw
Wright approach the employees, hand them the flyers, and talk to them for a few minutes. He
testified that he was only 15 feet away and that this happened between 5 and 6 a.m.
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One of the employees threw the flyer in the trash. Quimby retrieved it and saw that it was union
propaganda. He reported what he saw to Louk.
Later that day, Louk gave Wright a reprimand for “soliciting employees during non-break
time on the production floor by the super susan area.” The reprimand also contained the
following statement from the employee handbook: “Team members may not solicit co-workers
or distribute any type of literature during working hours.”
There doe not appear to be any significant factual dispute. Counsel for the General
Counsel does not contend that the Respondent’s no-solicitation/no-distribution rule is invalid on
its face. Instead, counsel for the General Counsel argues that the rule was disparately enforced.
To that end, Wright testified that employees uniformly solicit during work hours and on
company time. She gave as examples sales of cosmetics, Girl Scout cookies, and collections of
money and clothes for employees in distress. She also testified that a supervisor has sold
products for her children’s school. Wright candidly testified that those who sold in work areas
“hide the books when they see the supervisors come around, because they know they are not
supposed to be doing that during working hours.” She also implied that supervisors do not go
out of their way to find employees soliciting.
In addition to corroborating Wright’s testimony, employee Christie Grogg candidly
admitted that she did most of her buying during worktime. Sometime she merely confirms a
“standing order” for a product. Other times she peruses a catalog containing the items for
purchase. Tessner also testified that when he sold candy bars all he did was to ask anyone who
walked near him if they wanted to buy a candy bar.
Discussion
I credit the employee witnesses regarding the solicitations during worktime, albeit I find
that the volume of business is greatly exaggerated. After hearing their testimony, I was left with
the impression that more sales occurred at the facility than in most department stores. I also
believe that the selling is less blatant than their testimony implies. I am also certain that many of
the solicitations mentioned occurred in nonworking areas and on nonworking time, in
accordance with the Respondent’s unchallenged no-solicitation/no-distribution rule.
Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), cited by the Respondent appears to stand for the
proposition that discrimination means unequal treatment of equals. That does not appear to be an
issue here. The Respondent appears to allow a wide range of nonwork-related solicitations, as
long as the solicitation and/or distribution is done in nonworking areas on nonworking time.
According to the policy, as articulated in the employee handbook, the “only exceptions to [the
solicitation and distribution policy] will be fundraisers to support holiday charitable donation
sponsored by Medallion or other programs authorized by the Human Resources Department.”
(GC Exh. 4 at 1-10.)
The burden on counsel for the General Counsel is to show that the Respondent permits
others to ignore the policy, but enforces it against employees who are exercising their Section 7
rights. I am not convinced. Louk credibly testified that when she receives a report of a breech of
the policy she issues a reprimand, if one is warranted. The Respondent offers the reprimand of
an employee for passing out invitations on working time to a tattoo party, as evidence of this
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fact. (R. Exh. 8.) Counsel for the General Counsel correctly observes that the reprimand,
although issued before Wright’s discipline, was still after the union organizing drive started.
Even so, I find that it supports and is consistent with Louk’s testimony. Nor should it be
overlooked that it was another employee that complained of Wright’s conduct, not a supervisor.
Based on this record, I do not find that the Respondent has enforced its facially valid no-
solicitation/ no-distribution rule in a desperate manner. Having made that finding it follows,
contrary to counsel for the General Counsel’s contention, that the lawful application of the
Respondent’s policy cannot be the foundation for a discrimination finding based on union
membership. I recommend that paragraph 7(c) of the complaint be dismissed.
D. Grogg’s April 1, 2008 Warning
Employee Christie Grogg has been employed by the Respondent since 2007. Her job is
to rebuild and repair cabinets. During the relevant period Grogg worked from 6 a.m. to 5 p.m.
with breaks at 8:30–8:40 a.m., lunch from 11–11:30 a.m., a break from 1–1:10 p.m., and the final
break from 2:30–2:40 p.m. Grogg has signed a union authorization card and attended union
meetings.
Grogg testified that during the morning of on March 26, 2008, employee Mellissa
Townsend and another employee asked Grogg for union authorization cards. Grogg said she
would get the cards. It was not until the 2:30 p.m. break that Grogg had the cards. Grogg gave
Townsend a card after they accidently met by an exit door during the 2:30 p.m. break. After
handing Townsend a card she went to the other employee’s workstation. That employee was not
at his station, Grogg, however, placed the card in a small box at the workstation. Grogg testified
that before the break ended she saw the individual and she pointed to the box. On April 1, 2008,
Supervisor Michelle Siple issued Grogg a written warning for “soliciting two employees during
non-break time on the production floor by the wall build area.” (GC Exh. 8.) Immediately on
receipt of the reprimand, Grogg wrote a response refuting the location and the time of the
incident. (R. Exh. 2.)
Employee Mellisa Townsend was called as a witness by counsel for the General Counsel.
She testified that she had worked for the Respondent for a little over 2-½ years. She appeared to
be a credible witness who basically corroborated Grogg’s testimony.
Joel Lloyd (incorrectly identified as Joe and Boyd in the transcript) was called by the
Respondent to testify. He had been employed by the Respondent for almost 3 years. Lloyd
stated that on March 26, 2008, at approximately 2:45 p.m., he was working at his workstation.
While working, he saw Grogg handing out union authorization the cards to another employee.
Lloyd estimated that Grogg and the other employee were only 20 feet away.
Lloyd immediately reported his observation to Brandt, his supervisor. He testified that
the reason he reported Grogg was because the previous day he overheard her telling employees
that when the Union got in it was going to have employees who had not signed a card
discharged. Lloyd felt threatened by the alleged statement.
Brandt told Lloyd to prepare a written statement and to give it to Louk the next day,
because Louk had left for the day. Lloyd went home and typed: “On March 26, 2008, I Joel
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Lloyd witnessed Chriss Grogg handing out two union cards on company time. This happened
around 2:45pm.[sic] It happened by the wall build area.” Lloyd signed the statement.
Louk states that on March 26 she talked with Lloyd after he talked with Brandt. She
listened to what he said and then asked him to write it out. She was surprised when he returned
with a typed statement. Louk is unsure if she waited to see the statement before she issued the
reprimand or not. In any case, Louk testified that the decision to reprimand Grogg was made by
Louk, Michelson, Roth, and “others I am not supposed to mention.” (Tr. 52.)
Discussion
I found Grogg to be a very impressive witness. Her demeanor was that of an honest and
sincere person. I was especially impressed by her candor. She displayed no hesitation when she
admitted that all of her purchases were made on worktime. She was equally forthcoming
concerning a sexual harassment complaint that she filed against Lloyd, after he complained about
her soliciting. Lloyd’s demeanor was not forthright. I found some of his testimony to be
unbelievable, and other parts conflicted with the documentary evidence, and some of his
testimony cried out for corroboration but none was forthcoming. Set out below are some of the
problems with Lloyd’s testimony and the Respondent’s discipline.
Lloyd claims that he was only 20 feet away from Grogg and the person to whom she
allegedly gave the authorization cards. I find it unbelievable that Lloyd was so close so as to be
able to see that Grogg was holding two authorization cards, and yet he was totally unable to
identify anything about the person to whom she was speaking. Initially, he attributes this to a
poor memory “I don’t really remember who it was,” implying that at one time he did know the
person. The next sentence he claims that he “couldn’t really get a good view of who it was.”
Thus, admitting that from a distance of only 20 feet he could not see the individual because of
some unidentified obstruction that blocks his view of the individual, but not of the two cards in
Grogg’s hand. Lloyd never explains what was obstructing his view of the person but not his
ability to see two cards Grogg is holding. When asked the same question on cross-examination,
he again blames his poor memory. Townsend and Lloyd have worked for the Respondent almost
the same length of time. They take their breaks outside the same exit door. Even if Lloyd did
not know her name, he should have at least be able to provide a description. A close reading of
his testimony reveals that he never even alludes to the gender of the other individual.
Lloyd and Louk’s stories also conflict. Lloyd says that he spoke with Louk about the
incident on March 27 not March 26 the day that it happened. (Tr. 329–330.) Also on March 27,
Lloyd gave Louk the statement that he had typed at the request of Brandt. Lloyd says that
Brandt told him to write it and that was because Louk was gone for the day. Lloyd testifies that
the brief statement is all that he told Louk. (Tr. 334.) Louk claims that Lloyd came to her with a
question on the day of the incident and in response to her answer said that he wanted to file a
complaint against Grogg. Louk asked him to write a statement. (Tr. 180.) Louk, who drafted
the warning, avers that she relied on Lloyd’s on the statement. (Tr. 181.) Earlier in her
testimony, Louk states that her investigation consisted of a personal meeting with Lloyd where
she asked him what he said to Brandt. She then asked him to “put that in writing for me.” (Tr.
52.) Later in her testimony, Louk continues to claim that it was she who asked Lloyd for the
statement. Once again, however, Louk becomes confused as to when she received the statement
from Lloyd. As with Stacy’s written statement, Louk accepted Lloyd’s statement, without
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making any notation when it was received.. Once again Louk is at a loss to recall if she relied on
Lloyd’s written statement when she typed Grogg’s discipline. She opines, however, that the
absence of the statement is of no significance “[b]ecause I heard what he had to say. He had
shared with me what he had seen and I asked him to put it in writing.” (Tr. 219.) The
significance is that Lloyd swore to seeing Grogg “hand” one person two cards. The warning that
Louk prepared Grogg with soliciting two employees on nonworking time. Louk admits that
when she prepared the discipline that was her intention. Counsel for the General Counsel asked
her the number of employees Grogg was allegedly soliciting or distributing cards to. Louk said
“two,” and then said that number was reported to her by Lloyd. (Tr. 51–52.) The record
contains no explanation for this dichotomy, and the matter is not addressed by the parties. I find
it the testimony regarding this matter to be very disconcerting. Grogg admits handing out two
cards to two different people, but Lloyd makes no mention of two people in his testimony. He
does use “handing out,” a phrase that usually denotes a distribution to a number greater than one.
The significance of the number of cards, a fact that all must concede is totally insignificant also
is odd. If Grogg was on worktime it matters not if she was distributing one or a hundred cards.
Lloyd initially states that he had returned from his break and he thought it was about 5
minutes later that he saw Grogg handing out the cards. When asked how he was sure, he states
that he and his partner were at their building table “so it had to have been after 2:40.” This
statement assumes that they returned exactly at 2:40 p.m. Significantly both Lloyd and Grogg
agree that there is no buzzer at the end of the 2:30 p.m. break. Thus, absent a synchronized
timepiece, and Lloyd was not even wearing a watch, when the break ended has to be a guess.
When asked on cross-examination what time he saw Grogg handing the cards to someone, he
replies, “2:45.” He was asked how he knew it was 2:45. He answers: “It was after the last break.
I was already at my table with my partner working. And then we have to write down our
cabinets at certain times, how many we have, and it was 2:45.” Although that statement was
made with certainty, when asked by counsel for the General Counsel if he was absolutely certain
it was 2:45 he replies, “It could have been 2:46. I mean it was after 2:40.” (Tr. 331.)
My concern is not whether Lloyd saw Grogg hand the cards to the individual at 2:45 or
2:46 p.m., my concern is whether Lloyd saw this happen before, during, or after the break, or at
all. Lloyd never established how he knew the time. This is especially true about his having to
write the time as part of his job duties. He never explains how he knew to write 2:45 p.m.
wherever he was required to write it. Presumably, since the Respondent requires that a record be
kept, it would also have some interest in retaining the record, at least long enough for Louk to
obtain a copy. No such record is in evidence. Grogg testified, without contradiction, that it takes
about “a half a minute,” to go from her work area to the wall build area were Lloyd works.
Thus, if Lloyd’s estimates are true and accurate, Grogg would have been at least 5-½ minutes
late returning from break. An absence of that length would most certainly be noticed by her
supervisor, as well as other employees. Almost all of whom should have been, like Lloyd,
working. Neither Grogg’s then supervisor, Michelle Siple the person who gave her the
reprimand, nor anyone else corroborated Lloyd’s allegations.
Grogg credibly testified that on March 26 she noticed that Lloyd, towards the end of the
2:30 p.m. break, was standing alone at his worktable. Grogg was also looking for his partner
because he was the individual in whose box she left the authorization card. Grogg explained,
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without contradiction, that both Lloyd and his partner must build together. Additionally, because
they are the first table, if they are not building, the other employees can not perform their jobs.
The partner did not testify.
Immediately after receiving the reprimand, Grogg wrote a response denying the
accusations, thus, satisfying Louk’s she/said, he/said criteria for including statements of both
parties as part of an investigation. Louk never spoke to Grogg about this incident. This is so
even though Louk found merit to Grogg’s sexual harassment complaint about Lloyd. Louk
apparently never asked Lloyd what motivated him to make his complaint. Had she done so, I see
no reason why he would not have told her, as he testified, that he felt threatened by the statement
he allegedly overheard Grogg make claiming that when the Union got in they would find out
who had not signed a union card and have them discharged. Certainly, either one of those pieces
of information would give one pause before accepting Lloyd’s unsupported allegations against
Grogg.
For all the foregoing reasons I credit Grogg and find that she did not violate the
Respondent’s no-solicitation/no-distribution rule. I find that the Respondent disciplined Grogg
because she was engaged in union and protected concerted activities. Accordingly, I find that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when it disciplined her for engaging
in protected union activity.
Moreover, contrary to the Respondent’s “good-faith” argument, when an employee is
disciplined for an alleged violation of a lawful rule while engaging in protected activity the
employer is not privileged to act on a reasonable belief if, in fact the employee is innocent. See,
e.g., Ideal Dyeing & Finishing Co., 300 NLRB 303 (1990).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Medallion Cabinetry, Inc., is an employer engaged commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), 2(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Carpenters Industrial Council, a/w United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining an overly broad rule prohibiting employees from engaging in
disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior including,
but not limited to unwelcome solicitation, persistent and unwelcome talking, distracting actions,
or nonwork activities, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By enforcing the foregoing rule against employee Julie Wright on March 3, 2008, by
issuing her a written warning because she engaged in protected union activities the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. By issuing employee Christie Grogg a written warning on April 11, 2008, because she
engaged in protected union activities the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
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REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to rescind its unlawful rule, and that it must notify
all employees in writing that its unlawful rule is no longer being maintained. The Respondent
shall also be ordered to take certain other affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended1
ORDER
The Respondent, Medallion Cabinetry, Inc., Culver, Indiana, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and enforcing an overly broad rule prohibiting employees from engaging
in disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior including,
but not limited to unwelcome solicitation, persistent and unwelcome talking, distracting actions,
or nonwork activities, in order to discourage union activities.
(b) Issuing written discipline to employees because they engaged in solicitation and/or
distribution of union authorization cards during nonworking time in order to discourage union
activities.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the overly broad rule prohibiting employees from engaging in disrupting
other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior including, but not
limited to unwelcome solicitation, persistent and unwelcome talking, distracting actions, or
nonwork activities. Further notify all employees in writing that the Respondent’s unlawful rule
is no longer being maintained.
(b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the current edition of the employee
handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rule has been rescinded, or (2) provide the language
of a lawful rule; or publish and distribute to all current employees a revised employee handbook
that (1) does not contain the unlawful rule, or (2) provides the langrage of a lawful rule.

1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules,
be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to the unlawful disciplinary warnings issued to employees Julie Wright on March 3,
2008, and Christie Grogg on April 1, 2008, and within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in
writing that this has been done and that the unlawful discipline will not be used against them in
any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Culver, Indiana,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 25, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
February 1, 2008.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of
the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 13, 2009
____________________
John T. Clark
Administrative Law Judge

2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
JD–19-09
Culver, IN
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us
to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce an overly broad rule prohibiting you from engaging in
disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive behavior including,
but not limited to unwelcome solicitation, persistent and unwelcome talking, distracting actions,
or nonwork activities in order to discourage union or other protected activities.
WE WILL NOT discipline you because you engage in solicitation and/or distribution of union
authorization cards during nonworking time in order to discourage union or other protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind and remove from the employee handbook the overly broad rule prohibiting you
from engaging in disrupting other workers by inappropriate behavior or otherwise offensive
behavior including, but not limited to unwelcome solicitation, persistent and unwelcome talking,
distracting actions or nonwork activities and WE WILL notify you in writing that this has been
done and that the rule is no longer in force.
WE WILL furnish all current employees with inserts for the current edition of the employee
handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful rule has been rescinded, or (2) provide the language
of a lawful rule; or publish and distribute to all current employees a revised employee handbook
that (1) does not contain the unlawful rule , or (2) provides the langrage of a lawful rule.
JD–19-09
Culver, IN
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any reference
to the unlawful disciplinary warnings issued to employees Julie Wright on March 3, 2008, and
Christie Grogg on April 1, 2008, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in
writing that this has been done and that the unlawful discipline will not be used against them in
any way.
MEDALLION CABINETRY, INC.
(EMPLOYER)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
575 North Pennsylvania Street, Federal Building, Room 238
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-1577
(317)-226-7382
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (317)-226-7413.