McGraw-Edison Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 24, 1972199 N.L.R.B. 1017 (N.L.R.B. 1972) Copy Citation NATIONAL ELECTRIC COIL 1017 National Electric Coil Division , of McGraw-Edison Company and Harlan County Workers Association, Petitioner. Case 9-RC-9523 October 24, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as' amended, a hearing was held before Hearing Officer Wayne E. Natale of the National Labor Relations Board.' Fol- lowing the close of the hearing the Regional Director for Region 9 transferred this case to the Board for decision. Thereafter, .the Employer and Intervenor filed briefs with the Board. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the Hearing Officer's rulings made at the hearing and finds that they are free from prejudicial error.' They are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the Board finds: 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and it will effectuate the pur- poses of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to rep- resent certain employees of the Employer. 3. A question affecting commerce does not exist concerning the representation of certain employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act for the following reasons: The Petitioner filed the instant petition in the historic unit in the face of a 20-year collective-bar- gaining relationship with the Employer. A current agreement is effective from September 21, 1970, to i International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO-CLC, and its Local 658 (herein called Intervenor) intervened at the hearing based upon a showing of interest. 2 The Intervenor contends that the Hearing Officer erred in calling wit- nesses and permitting evidence concerning "the alleged sponsorship for the filing of the petition." In view of the circumstances of this case , we find no merit in that contention . This petition was filed under the principles of General Box Company, 82 NLRB 678, which allows recognized unions to seek certification at any time . The issue was squarely raised by the Employer whether the Petitioner and Intervenor were acting in concert concerning the filing of this petition , which , if true , would strike at the very core of the petition 's purpose, and its validity . As such, it formed a proper subject for inquiry, and the Hearing Officer , who is charged with the responsibility in this nonadversary type proceeding of making a complete record, would have been remiss in his duties had he not pursued it . Moreover , this is not a situation , as contended by the Intervenor , that entails delving into areas involving potential unfair labor practices. September 23, 1973, and covers the same unit as sought in the petition. But while the Petitioner has been the recognized bargaining agent in the peti- tioned-for unit for all these years, it has never received the certification of the Board. Petitioner contends that certification is the sole purpose of the instant petition-filed during the con- tract term-and thus, under the rational of General Box Company, 82 NLRB 678, the petition is properly filed. The Intervenor claims that since the petition raises a question concerning representation under current Board law, it is entitled to intervene based on its showing of interest. The Employer contends, inter alia, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that it is an ill-disguised attempt by the Peti- tioner to change its affiliation and escape from its current collective-bargaining agreement,' a purpose totally at odds with the principles of General Box, supra. We find merit in the Employer's position. The Board's decision in General Box, supra. has firmly established the principle that an uncertified union which already enjoys recognition can file a peti- tion at any time during a; contract's term to secure the benefits of certification. The rationale behind this de- cision is that certification affords certain statutory benefits under Section 8(b)(4) of the Act, and lends stability, security, and permanency to the bargaining relationship primarily by removing challenges to a union's majority status for a 1-year period following the date of certification. The Board reasoned that these benefits of certification would provide greater protection to an already recognized union against raids of competing unions with jurisdictional claims or organizational designs on the employees involved. For these reasons, a petition filed by a recognized but uncertified labor organization is treated by the Board as an exception to its contract-bar rules. And once a petition is filed under the General Box exception, it is viewed by the Board the same as any other petition that raises a question concerning representation and the contracting union's contract cannot thereafter act as a bar. Accordingly, the Board has permitted other unions to intervene 4 and has even directed an election in a case where the petitioner sought to withdraw its petition after intervention occurred.' 3 At the hearing the Intervenor was asked if it would continue the agree- ment for the balance of its term The Intervenor stated it would if the 4ployees so desired but did not feel compelled to do so.em Ottawa Machine Products Co., 120 NLRB 1133, Puerto Rico Cement Cor- poration, 97 NLRB 382. In fight of these decisions , the Employer's alternate argument that the Intervenor should be barred from the ballot under the doctrine of contract bar is disposed of as lacking in merit. s Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 120 NLRB 327. In this case and those cited in In . 4, above , it was quite clear that the unions involved were legitimate rivals contesting for the right to represent the sought-after employees, the incumbent earnestly battling to retain its position as their bargaining repre- sentative while its rival tried to replace it We consider the presence of such a rivalry to be a determining factor in General Box cases of this type . Unlike Continued 199 NLRB No. 133 1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD However, the General Box contract bar exception requires the Board to be vigilant in guarding against its abuse by a party or parties attempting to circum- vent our normal contract bar rules. Where a second union seeks a place on the ballot through interven- tion, we are confronted with a situation which creates the greatest potential and opportunity for subterfuge and misuse of this exception, and which must, there- fore, be given the closest scrutiny by the Board. Con- sequently, it is necessary that we carefully examine and evaluate the facts of this case to determine wheth- er the Petitioner's petition was, as it professes, filed solely to obtain certification for itself, or to provide a choice for the employees in selecting a bargaining representative through our election processes at a time when the existing contract would otherwise have barred a rival claim. According to the uncontradicted testimony of George Cox, Petitioner's vice president and an em- ployee of the Employer,6 at a regular monthly meeting of Petitioner's members held on April 1, 1972, a mo- tion was made that the Petitioner "be able to become certified through the National Labor Relations.Board of a union of our own choosing so that we be able to receive the benefits of such." (Emphasis supplied.) The motion carried. Cox further testified that he and other members had heard that the Intervenor would intervene if asked. Thus, when the motion passed, the Intervenor's representatives, who apparently had sta- tioned themselves near the meeting room, were invit- ed into the meeting by Petitioner at the request of the membership, and thereafter permitted by the Petition- er to circulate and secure signatures to authorization cards designating the Intervenor as bargaining agent. The testimony of John C. Barker, the Intervenor's organizational coordinator for Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia, establishes that the presence of these representatives near the Petitioner's meeting was not accidental. He testified that he had heard from one of his field representatives as much as a month prior to the April 1 meeting that there were rumors that the Petitioner was considering filing a petition? He states, consequently, that he went to Harlan on April 1 with the avowed purpose of trying to get into the meeting with the help of the committee of employees the Intervenor was already working with, all of whom were members of the Petitioner but not officers thereof.' the situations in the cases cited above, we are unable to detect the existence of any such relationship between the Petitioner and Intervenor for the rea- sons discussed, infra 6 It appears that the Petitioner is an independent labor organization formed and administered by the employees of the Employer at its Harlan, Kentucky, facility. r The Intervenor represents employees at the Employer's plants in Colum- bus, Ohio, and Bluefield, West Virginia The undisputed evidence also shows that on May 3 Cox called a special meeting of the Petitioner to quell rumors that the Employer might shut down or take other reprisals because of the situation created by the petition. The Intervenor's representatives were also invited by the Petitioner to attend this meeting, which they did. The reason for the invitation as ad- vanced by Cox in his testimony was that the Interve- nor-had already asked to intervene." The record does not reveal what took place at this meeting. These last events occurred prior to the hearing in this case which was held on May 17, 1972. These facts establish that the Petitioner knew before, the motion to file this petition was made and carried, of the Intervenor's presence outside the meeting room, and of that labor organization's keen interest and readiness to organize the unit employees; that the Petitioner knew then that there already was an active dissident movement among its members in favor of the Intervenor's sup- planting it as bargaining representative; that the Peti- tioner knew when it entertained the motion that if it carried, as it did, that the filing of such a petition would more likely than not lead to the demise of Petitioner as an operating labor organization; that the Petitioner knew the Intervenor would accept the invi- tation to come into the meeting and participate there- in; and that the Petitioner knew-or took action to make such knowledge certain by permitting the In- tervenor to circulate among the membership to solicit signed pledge cards-that the Intervenor's efforts to organize the members present would be successful. Yet armed with all this knowledge and fully aware of the consequences of its conduct, including the certain- ty that intervention by the Intervenor would follow, the Petitioner filed the instant petition, and claims before us, that it merely seeks the benefit of certifica- tion, so as to protect it from rival claims such as that made by Intervenor. To us, the only valid explanation for the conduct of the Petitioner in the face of the Intervenor's threat to its continued existence, is that the Petitioner sought an election for the precise purpose of bringing in the Intervenor as bargaining agent for the employees. As a preliminary means towards that end, the Petitioner, before filing its petition, willingly and wholeheartedly extended its aid and cooperation to the Intervenor's cause by thrusting the Intervenor upon the member- ship at the April meeting. As the device to fulfill that goal, the Petitioner then filed the petition herein. And as confirmation of that purpose, the Petitioner invited the Intervenor to its emergency meeting on May 3 to 8 According to James Parker, the Employer's Harlan plant manager, on or about April 4 or 5 he was told by Petitioner's president, Earl Hibbard, that Hibbard was not involved in bonging representatives of the Intervenor into the April meeting of Petitioner ; that such was the work of "an older group " Hibbard did not testify. He was on a job for the Employer in California at the time of the hearing. NATIONAL ELECTRIC COIL 1019 present a united front against rumors of dire action by the Employer . Indeed, that a desired change in repre- sentatives was the real purpose fueling the Petitioner's conduct all along can also be gleaned from the testi- mony of Cox , its vice president , when he stated that the motion concerning the petition was made to ena- ble the Petitioner "to become certified ... of a union of our own choosing" and later , when he testified that the Petitioner was invited into the second meeting, because they "had already asked to intervene," al- though at the time the hearing had not yet been held. Clearly, based on the facts presented here as illumi- nated by Cox's testimony , the petition was aimed at giving the employees that choice and the invitation was made-in the same spirit accompanying the one extended on April 1-because the Petitioner and its members welcomed the idea of such intervention. In view of the foregoing , we are unwilling to make our election processes available to the parties in this case . The effect (even if we had found it was not the intent) of Petitioner 's course of action has been to establish a purpose other than certification behind the filing of its petition , thereby making unwarranted the application of our General Box rationale . Thus, be- cause there is no basis for applying the General Box contract bar exception to the petition of Petitioner in this case , there is no reason to remove the current collective-bargaining agreement between the Petition- er and Employer as a bar . We find, therefore, that there is no question concerning representation to be resolved by an election. Accordingly , we shall dismiss the petition. ORDER It is hereby ordered that the petition herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation