May Patents Ltd.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 22, 20212020002710 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 22, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/992,221 05/30/2018 Yehuda BINDER BINDER-014-US7 8906 131926 7590 07/22/2021 May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov P.O.B 7230 Ramat-Gan, 5217102 ISRAEL EXAMINER KHAN, HASSAN ABDUR-RAHMAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2456 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/22/2021 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER and BENJAMIN MAYTAL ____________ Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–64. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents Ltd. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention is a control system including an appliance 58a, AC power plug 68, and sensor unit 50e. See Abstract; Spec. 109, 112; Fig. 5e. The sensor unit 50e is a single enclosure enclosing (1) sensors 57a and 57b measuring current flow from the AC power plug 68 to the appliance 58a; (2) an antenna 55 communicating over a wireless network; and (3) a wireless transceiver 54 that (a) transmits digital data to the wireless network in response to measured current flow from the sensors 57a and 57b, and (b) receives digital data from the wireless network. See Spec. 83, 112, 163–165; Figs. 5e, 17. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. An Alternating-Current (AC) powered appliance associated with food storage, handling, or preparation for use with a wireless network, the appliance comprising: an AC connector for connecting the appliance to an AC power source; a current sensor coupled to the AC connector for measuring an AC current consumed by the appliance; an antenna for communication over the wireless network; a wireless transceiver coupled to the antenna for transmitting digital data to, and for receiving digital data from, the wireless network; and a single enclosure housing the current sensor, the antenna, and the wireless transceiver, wherein the appliance is controlled or activated in response to digital data received from the wireless network, and wherein the current sensor is coupled to the wireless transceiver for transmitting digital data in response to the measured AC current to the wireless network. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 3 RELATED APPEALS On pages 2–3 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant identifies five related appeals as follows. Application Number Appeal Number Appeal Status 13/733,634 2018-007694 Decision mailed Mar. 2, 2020; Decision on Rehearing mailed May 18, 2020 15/657,1632 2019-002056 Decision mailed May 4, 2020 15/361,434 2019-000272 Decision mailed June 10, 2020 15/716,881 2019-002059 Decision mailed June 30, 2020 15/992,219 2020-004104 Undecided In Ex parte Binder, Appeal 2018-007694 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2020) (“Bd. Dec.”), among other things, we affirmed the Examiner’s obviousness rejection that cited one of the references at issue here, namely Ansari. See Bd. Dec. 43–44. 2 Although Appellant cited this application number as 16/657,163, this is a typographical error that we have corrected, and hold as harmless error. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 4 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–19, 32–34, 36, and 54–58 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Sharood (US 2001/0025349 A1; published Sept. 27, 2001). Non-Final Act. 3–13.3 The Examiner rejected claims 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 51–53 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood and Legaspi (US 2011/0170377 A1; published July 14, 2011). Non-Final Act. 16–21. The Examiner rejected claims 22 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood, Legaspi, and Rada (US 2011/0251807 A1; published Oct. 13, 2011). Non-Final Act. 21–22. The Examiner rejected claims 25–28, 30, 31, 35, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood and Kiko (US 2005/0125083 A1; published June 9, 2005). Non-Final Act. 22–27. The Examiner rejected claims 38–40, 42, 43, 47–50, 59, and 604 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood and Hendrickson (US 2011/0148651 A1; published June 23, 2011). Non-Final Act. 14–15, 27–30; Ans. 14. 3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Non-Final Rejection mailed October 31, 2019 (“Non-Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed November 15, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed February 19, 2020 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed February 24, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). 4 Although the Examiner omits claims 59 and 60 from the statement of the rejection, the Examiner clarified these claims are rejected by Sharood in view of Hendrickson (see Ans. 13–14). We, therefore, include claims 59 and 60 here to clarify the record, treat these claims as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and deem the Examiner’s error in this regard as harmless. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 5 The Examiner rejected claim 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood and Mehta (US 2010/0211359 A1; published Aug. 19, 2010). Non-Final Act. 30–31. The Examiner rejected claims 44–46 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood, Hendrickson, and Kiko. Non-Final Act. 31–33. The Examiner rejected claims 61, 63, and 64 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood and Ansari (US 2010/0071053 A1; published Mar. 18, 2010). Non-Final Act. 33–35. The Examiner rejected claim 62 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharood, Ansari,5 and Wong (US 2011/0298301 A1; published Dec. 8, 2011). Non-Final Act. 35–36. THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER SHAROOD Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Sharood discloses (1) an appliance 130 connected to (2) a retrofit plug 125 which is connected to (3) the main AC electrical supply via pins 603 and 604. Non- Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner further finds that retrofit plug 125 within its housing 600 includes (a) measure and transmit circuitry 620 monitoring and reporting current drawn by the appliance, and (b) Radio Frequency (RF) transceiver or wireless modem for incorporation in a wireless network for communication of the current draw and control messages of the appliance. See Non-Final Act. 3–5. 5 Although the Examiner omits the Ansari reference for claim 62 in the statement of the rejection, the Examiner clarified these claims are rejected as obvious over Sharood in view of Ansari and Wong. See Ans. 39–40. We, therefore, include the Ansari reference here in the statement of the rejection, and treat the Examiner’s error in this regard as harmless. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 6 Appellant argues that (1) the rejection is vague and unclear; (2) the anticipation rejection is improper by way of picking, choosing and combining the appliance and retrofit plug in Sharood and thus failing to disclose those elements as arranged in the claim; (3) the picking and choosing in the rejection also does not set forth an obvious combination; (4) Sharood teaches away from a combination of the retrofit plug 125 and an appliance 130; and (5) Sharood fails to disclose that the measure and transmit circuitry teaches a current sensor as claimed. See Appeal Br. 4–7; Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues various other recited limitations summarized below. ISSUES Under § 102, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding with the requisite clarity in the rejection rationale that Sharood discloses: (1) an appliance and a single enclosure as arranged in claim 1? (2) a current sensor as recited in claim 1? (3) the particular limitations recited in dependent claims 6, 9, 10, 32– 34, 36, and 54–57? ANALYSIS Claims 1–5, 7, and 12–19 On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. Contrary to Appellant’s contentions that the rejection’s copied passages from Sharood fail to set forth how the claimed elements or features are equated to claimed elements (see Appeal Br. 4), Sharood’s Figure 6d and accompanying description of an Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 7 appliance and retrofit plug closely correspond to the features of claim 1. This correspondence is shown in a comparison between Figure 5e of the present application, which Appellant refers to in the Appeal Brief for providing a summary of the claimed subject matter of claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 3–4), and Figure 6d of Sharood. Reproduced below are the respective figures. Present Application’s Appliance 58a and Single Enclosure 50e in Figure 5e Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 8 Sharood’s retrofit plug 600, with slots 601 and 602 for connection to an appliance in Figure 6d From the above figures, we find no error in Examiner’s reliance on Sharood’s appliance 130, which connects to slots 601 and 602 of retrofit plug 125 (with outer housing 600 in Figure 6d) which in turn connects to main alternating-current (AC) power supply, as corresponding to the claimed AC powered appliance comprising an AC connector to connect to an AC power source. See Non-Final Act. 3–4 (citing Sharood ¶¶ 85–87, 93; Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 9 Fig. 6d). Nor do we find error in the Examiner’s reliance on Sharood’s retrofit plug 125 with outer housing 600 in Figure 6d that is shown to include (1) slots 601 and 602 for connection to the appliance 130, and pins 603 and 604 to supply mains AC power to the appliance (corresponding to the claimed AC connector); (2) RF transceiver 680 to incorporate the retrofit plug in a wireless network for monitoring and control of the appliance (corresponding to the claimed antenna and wireless transceiver, and the appliance being controlled in response to data received from the wireless network); and (3) measure and transmit circuit 620 to measure the current drawn by the attached appliance, and send measured data which is shown as being connected to the RF transceiver 680 (corresponding to the claimed current sensor coupled to the wireless transceiver for transmitting data in response to the measured AC current). See Non-Final Act. 3–5 (citing Sharood ¶¶ 85–87, 89, 91, 94, 98; Fig. 6d). Nor do we find availing Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner’s correspondence of Sharood’s appliance 130 and retrofit plug 125 to the claimed appliance and single enclosure, respectively, amount to “[i]mproper picking and choosing.” See Appeal Br. 4–5 (emphasis omitted). To be sure, for anticipation, it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses multiple, distinct teachings that the ordinary artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention. See In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587–88 (CCPA 1972); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Rather, to anticipate, the prior art reference must disclose the recited elements arranged as claimed. See Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1369. Appellant’s contention of Examiner error, however, is based upon the notion that Sharood lacks a single appliance in a single enclosure. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 10 See Appeal Br. 4. We do not find these limitations in claim 1, where the appliance is recited, quite broadly, as merely comprising the single enclosure, but not being enclosed within the single enclosure or enclosing the single enclosure. To the contrary, although open-ended, claim 1 requires only that the single enclosure houses “the current sensor, the antenna, and the wireless transceiver. Moreover, Appellant refers to the claimed appliance as corresponding to item 50e or 58a in Figure 5e (see Appeal Br. 3), thus exemplifying the arrangement as claimed featuring the appliance 58a of Figure 5e as separate from the single enclosure 50e.6 Therefore, because Sharood’s appliance 130 is disclosed within the same embodiment as being connected to retrofit plug 125 (see Sharood ¶¶ 83, 86), we do not find that the Examiner’s rejection is improper. As to Appellant’s contentions regarding Sharood’s teaching away (see Appeal Br. 6–7), we note that “teaching away” arguments are irrelevant to anticipation rejections. See Leggett & Platt, Inc. v, VUTEk Inc., 537 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2131.05 (9th ed. rev. 10.2019 June 2020). Lastly, Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on Sharood’s measure and transmit circuitry 620 disclosed at least in paragraph 89 for teaching the claimed current sensor (see Appeal Br. 7), particularly since Sharood teaches in that paragraph that the appliance’s load 6 We leave to the Examiner to decide whether the Specification and Figure 5e provides sufficient written description support under § 112 to show possession of any arrangement of the claimed elements other than one where the appliance is not part of the single enclosure. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 11 current is measured, which corresponds to the claimed “measuring an AC current consumed by the appliance.” For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, and claims 2–5, 7, and 12–19 not argued separately with particularity. Claim 6 We do not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 6 reciting that the appliance comprises a dishwasher, a food blender, a beverage maker, or a coffeemaker. First, the Examiner’s indication that “[t]he claims and the arguments do not further define how the appliances are different from Sharood et al.’s home appliances in terms of consuming power . . . and the claims are just claiming other appliances without specifying their functionality” (see Ans. 6) is puzzling given the claim’s different limitations as Appellant indicates (see Appeal Br. 8). It is well settled that to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all recited elements within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369. “Thus, it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 1371. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 12 Claim 6 recites several examples of home appliances in the alternative; thus for Sharood to anticipate claim 6, one of the enumerated appliances must necessarily be disclosed. The Examiner cites Sharood’s examples of home appliances such as a refrigerator, oven, washer and dryer (see Non-Final Act. 6 (citing Sharood ¶¶ 4, 5, 87, 93)), but none of these examples in Sharood is necessarily a dishwasher, a food blender, a beverage maker, or a coffeemaker as claimed. We reach a similar conclusion regarding the additional “coffee pot” disclosure on which the Examiner relies. See Ans. 6. Although Sharood’s coffee pot is disclosed as being controllable in a wake-up mode of home manager software (see Sharood ¶¶ 141–42, 147), the coffee pot in paragraph 147 is not necessarily one of the appliances 130 disclosed for use with the retrofit plug (see Sharood ¶ 93) on which the Examiner relies in connection with the anticipation rejection of claim 1 from which claim 6 depends. To the extent that the recited appliances would have been obvious in view of Sharood is not a question before us; nor will we speculate in that regard here in the first instance on appeal. But what we can say is that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 6 is untenable. We are, therefore, constrained by this record to find that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6. Claims 9 and 10 We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 9 and 10, with claim 9 reciting an electrically actuated switch that is a latching or a non-latching type relay, and claim 10 reciting further features of the relay. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 13 Claim 9 depends from claim 7 that recites, in pertinent part, an electrically actuated switch in the appliance’s single enclosure. Regarding claim 7, the Examiner finds Sharood’s power-switching device included within the retrofit plug 125 corresponds to the claimed electrically actuated switch. See Non-Final Act. 6–7 (citing Sharood ¶ 94). Regarding claims 9 and 10, the Examiner then finds Sharood’s electrically actuated solenoid magnetic latching mechanism 1020 included within a forced air damper 900 for zoned heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) control as corresponding to the claimed electrically actuated switch. See Non-Final Act. 7 (citing Sharood ¶ 131). Although Sharood suggests using HVAC control alongside a retrofit plug in an automation system (see Sharood ¶¶ 74, 131; Fig. 1, illustrating a control module 120 connected to an appliance 130 as part of the same network as HVAC zone controller 133), Sharood does not disclose retrofit plug 125 comprises the electrically actuated solenoid magnetic latching mechanism 1020. Moreover, the antecedent basis provided in claim 7 which is found by the Examiner to be the power- switching device of the retrofit plug is a different component than what Examiner finds for claim 9, namely the mechanism 1020 included within a forced air damper 900. Given these disparate findings from different embodiments, Sharood does not disclose the recited elements arranged as claimed and, therefore, does not anticipate claims 9 and 10. See Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1369. Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner erred in citing portions of Sharood that are set forth in a different embodiment than that which was relied upon for claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8–9; Reply Br. 5. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 14 Further, to the extent the Examiner finds anticipation simply because the damper 900 is similar to the retrofit plug (see Ans. 6), we find such reasoning problematic. Although the damper 900 may be similar to the retrofit plug, and have all of the same features corresponding to the features of claims 1 and 7, that does not mean at least on this record, that this is necessarily the case—a crucial requirement for inherent anticipation. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”) Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9 and 10. Claims 32–34 and 36 We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 32–34 and 36. Claim 32 recites the single enclosure further comprises a first sensor, and the Examiner relies again on components within the damper 900 as anticipating claim 32. See Non-Final Act. 10. As noted above, however, the retrofit plug 125 and the damper 900 are disclosed in different embodiments, and notwithstanding any similarities they have, on this record, the Examiner has not shown the damper 900 to have all of the other elements of the retrofit plug, which were relied upon for anticipating claim 1. Given these disparate findings from different embodiments, Sharood does not disclose the recited elements arranged as claimed. See Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1369. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 32, and claims 33, 34, and 36 that depend therefrom. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 15 Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 32 and dependent claims 33, 34, and 36 which depend therefrom. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the Examiner’s rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other associated arguments. Claims 54 and 58 On this record, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 54 reciting, in pertinent part, in the single enclosure, an actuator coupled to the wireless transceiver for affecting a physical phenomenon. Although Appellant contends that the action is not clear as to which element is equated to the recited actuator (see Appeal Br. 12–13), the Examiner clarifies that Sharood’s power-switching device corresponds to the claimed actuator (see Ans. 10 (citing Sharood ¶ 94, disclosing a power-switching device under control of the measure and transmit circuit for enabling remote shutdown of the attached appliance)). The Examiner further finds that Sharood’s power-switching device is coupled to the wireless transceiver for being activated or controlled in response to digital data received from the wireless network. See Ans. 10–11. We see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Sharood’s power-switching device that is controlled by the measure and transmit circuit, which as disclosed above, is connected to the RF transceiver, and thus discloses coupling to the power-switching device. See Sharood ¶ 94. Further, Sharood’s power-switching device enables remote shutdown of the attached appliance, which given the name of power- switching indicates that the shutdown of the attached appliance is by way of power being shut down to the appliance. See id. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 16 To the extent Appellant contends that claim 54 requires the recited actuator to be within the same enclosure as the claimed appliance, we disagree. See Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 7. As noted above, claim 1, from which claim 54 depends, does not recite a single appliance in a single enclosure within which the elements of claim 1 are enclosed. Although the appliance is recited as comprising the single enclosure, the appliance is not recited as being enclosed within the single enclosure or enclosing the single enclosure. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 54, and claim 58 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 55 and 57 We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 55 and 57, reciting further features of the actuator. See Non-Final Act. 12–13. The Examiner relies upon teachings of the damper 900 as anticipating claims 55 and 57. See id. As noted above, however, retrofit plug 125 and damper 900 are disclosed in different embodiments, and notwithstanding any similarities they have, on this record, the Examiner has not shown damper 900 to have all of the other elements of the retrofit plug, which were relied upon for anticipating claim 1. Given these disparate findings from different embodiments, Sharood does not disclose the recited elements arranged as claimed. See Net MoneyIn, 545 F.3d at 1369. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 55 and 57. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 17 Claim 56 We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 56, reciting the actuator to consist of, or comprise, a sounder for converting an electrical energy to sound waves. See Non-Final Act. 12–13. First, the Examiner’s indication that “[t]he claims and the arguments do not further define how the actuators are any different without specifying their functionality” (see Ans. 12) is puzzling given the claim’s different limitations as Appellant indicates (see Reply Br. 8). Nevertheless, as noted above, it is not enough for anticipation that the prior art reference includes multiple distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention. See Net Moneyln, Inc., 545 F.3d at 1371. Accordingly, the Examiner’s reliance upon the teachings of a touchpad 152, which is disclosed in connection with a distinct embodiment from the retrofit plug teachings, for anticipating claim 56 is problematic. We fail to see—nor has the Examiner shown—that Sharood’s touchpad is within the retrofit plug, which the Examiner relies upon for the disclosed “single enclosure” of claim 54 from which claim 56 depends. We are, therefore, constrained by this record to find that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 56. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD AND LEGASPI Regarding dependent claim 87, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching the electrically actuated switch is normally 7 Claim 8 recites multiple features in the alternative, thus being amenable to two or more plausible constructions which may present issues of indefiniteness. See Ex Parte Miyazaki, Appeal No. 2007-3300 (BPAI Nov. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 18 closed, and has two or more throws with contacts of the switch arranged as a single pole double throw, the Examiner cites Legaspi as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non- Final Act. 16. Appellant argues (1) is it unclear how Sharood is modified to include the claimed features, (2) the rationale to combine Sharood and Legaspi fails to provide a link between the factual findings and the legal conclusion of obviousness, and (3) the rationale is based on a featured benefit already disclosed within Sharood. See Appeal Br. 19–20. Regarding dependent claim 11, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching the electrically actuated switch based on an electrical circuit that comprises an open collector transistor or an open drain transistor, the Examiner cites Legaspi as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 17. Regarding dependent claims 20 and 21, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching the wireless network is a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN), the antenna as a WPAN antenna, the wireless transceiver as a WPAN modem, and the WPAN is according to, based on, or compatible with Bluetooth® standards, the Examiner cites Legaspi as teaching these features, in concluding that the claims would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 17–18. Appellant argues that (1) is it unclear how Sharood is modified to include the claimed features, (2) the rationale to combine Sharood and 19, 2008) (precedential), at 11; see also MPEP § 2173.05(b)(II). However, we leave it to the Examiner to determine indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 19 Legaspi fails to provide a link between the factual findings and the legal conclusion of obviousness, and (3) the rationale is based on a featured benefit already disclosed within Sharood. See Appeal Br. 19 and 22–24. Regarding dependent claims 23 and 24, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood as teaching the wireless network is a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), the antenna as a WLAN antenna and the wireless transceiver as a WLAN modem, and the WLAN according to, based on, or compatible with, IEEE 802.11, the Examiner cites Legaspi as teaching these features, in concluding that the claims would have been obvious. See Non- Final Act. 18–19. Appellant argues that (1) is it unclear how Sharood is modified to include the claimed features, and (2) the rationale to combine Sharood and Legaspi fails to provide a link between the factual findings and the legal conclusion of obviousness. See Appeal Br. 19, 24–25. Regarding dependent claim 51, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood as teaching comprising in the single enclosure a light source emitting visible light and coupled to the AC connector, for indication in response to digital data received from the wireless network, the Examiner cites Legaspi as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 19–20. Appellant argues that (1) is it unclear how Sharood is modified to include the claimed features, and (2) there is an improper rationale for Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 20 combination of the Sharood and Legaspi references. See Appeal Br. 19, 25– 26.8 Moreover, in addition to the arguments above specific to certain dependent claims, Appellant argues generally that Sharood and Legaspi are not analogous. See Appeal Br. 17–18. ISSUES Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claims 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 51–53? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Legaspi’s particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the combinability of Sharood and Legaspi. Therefore, we confine our discussion to this issue. In this section, we address Appellant’s general arguments towards the combination of Sharood and Legaspi (see Appeal Br. 17–19), and under the claim headings below, we respond to Appellant’s specific arguments directed towards particular claims (see Appeal Br. 19– 26). Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Legaspi are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 17–18), we note that prior art is 8 Although Appellant does not provide a heading in the Appeal Brief for their arguments specifically against claim 51, we understand “Argument #22” to pertain to claim 51, and treat the argument as such. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 21 analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That is, contrary to what Appellant seemingly suggests (see Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 9), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As the Examiner explains, both Sharood and Legaspi are from the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is environment control. See Ans. 14. Moreover, both Sharood and Legaspi are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by using sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55), and Legaspi pertains to appliance energy control over a wireless network using detectors to prevent appliance damage (see Legaspi ¶¶ 9–11, 61). Further, to the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of the present application (see Appeal Br. 18–19), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistences associated with that Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 22 requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP §§ 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”), 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Non-Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Appellant’s contentions regarding the rejections citing the combination of Sharood and Legaspi as being improper for not being clear how Sharood is modified by Legaspi to arrive at the claims are also not persuasive. To be sure, “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). On this record, however, we do not find error in the Examiner’s rejections relying upon the combination of Sharood and Legaspi. The Examiner articulates that Sharood discloses elements from claims 1 and 7, which are further limited by claims 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 51–53, depending therefrom Moreover, the Examiner relies on Legaspi for its teachings for these further limitations such as (1) the electrically actuated switch (see Non-Final Act. 16–17), (2) the wireless Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 23 network (see Non-Final Act. 17–19) and (3) the single enclosure (see Non- Final Act. 19–21). To the extent Appellant contends that the articulated reasoning required any further details regarding how and where elements were incorporated into Sharood and whether they are substitutes or additional components (see Appeal Br. 19), we are not persuaded. The test for obviousness is not whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Accordingly, on this record, we do not find that the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion is erroneous. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 9. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 14–15. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation in the Answer constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 9), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 24 Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 9) are unpersuasive. Claim 8 On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 20–21. A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Sharood’s monitoring system that receives and provides power to an appliance. See Non-Final Act. 16; Ans. 15. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to enhance a power monitoring system that provides power to an appliance with methods for automatically disabling appliances upon the occurrence of a safety event by using a switch to cut off power to the appliance. See Non-Final Act. 16; Ans. 15. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement to add greater safety to an AC power based system by using a switch uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent Appellant suggests that a motivation to combine Sharood with Legaspi cannot be found based on the switching functionality generally simply because the combination includes Legaspi’s Single-Pole-Double- Throw (SPDT) relay (see Appeal Br. 20), we are not persuaded. The same advantage of adding greater safety to electrical circuits by having a switching function generally is no less a predictable result simply because the switching function is from Legaspi’s SPDT relay. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 25 We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses features of remote shut down of an attached appliance, as Appellant contends (see Appeal Br. 20) because Sharood does not disclose performing such a shutdown with an SPDT relay as Legaspi provides. Nevertheless, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a conclusion of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 20–21) comes from non-precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, but as non-precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these decisions been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/informative- opinions-0. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 9–10. Here, the Examiner sets forth in Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 26 the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 15–16. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 9–10), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 9–10) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8. Claim 11 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 reciting that the electrically actuated switch is based on an electrical circuit that comprises an open collector transistor, an open drain transistor, a thyristor, a TRIAC, or an opto-isolator. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 21. To the extent Appellant contends that obviousness cannot be concluded given the combination of Sharood and Legaspi because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims, we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 27 claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Legaspi’s transistor would also provide the benefit of greater safety to Sharood’s power monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 16–17. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement as to add greater safety to an AC power based system by using a transistor would be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 10. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 16. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 10), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 10) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 28 Claim 20 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 reciting the wireless network is a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN), the antenna is a WPAN antenna, and the wireless transceiver is a WPAN modem. On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi. Appellant’s contentions regarding the rejection citing the combination of Sharood and Legaspi as being improper for not being clear how Sharood is modified by Legaspi to arrive at the claims (see Appeal Br. 22) are also not persuasive. As previously noted, “obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. On this record, however, we do not find error in the Examiner’s rejections relying upon the combination of Sharood and Legaspi. The Examiner articulates that Sharood discloses elements from claim 1 that are further limited by dependent claims 20, 21, 23, and 24. See Non-Final Act. 17–19. Moreover, the Examiner relies on Legaspi for its teachings for these further limitations of the wireless network. See id. To the extent Appellant contends that the articulated reasoning requires further details regarding how and where elements are incorporated into Sharood, and whether they are substitutes or additional components (see Appeal Br. 22), we disagree. The test for obviousness is not whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Rather, the test is Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 29 what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 22–23. A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Sharood’s monitoring system that is able to output data from an appliance connected to a power supply and a wireless transceiver. See Non-Final Act. 17; Ans. 16–17. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to enhance a monitoring system that provides power and wireless networking to an appliance with methods for a particular type of wired and wireless signals transmission including voice and/or data signals or messages. See Non-Final Act. 17; Ans. 17. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement to add different types of wireless signal communication capability having expanded communication forms including voice as well as data signals or messages uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses features of wireless communications as Appellant suggests (see Appeal Br. 23) because Sharood does not disclose performing wireless communications using the particular wireless and wired communication methods as Legaspi provides. Nevertheless, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a conclusion of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 20–21), comes from non- Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 30 precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non- precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and- opinions/informative-opinions-0. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this Appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 10–11. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 16–18. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 10–11), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 31 Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 10–11) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20. Claim 21 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 reciting the WPAN is according to, based on, or compatible with, Bluetooth® or Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.1-2005 standards. On this record, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 24. To the extent Appellant contends that obviousness cannot be concluded given the combination of Sharood and Legaspi because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims, we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Legaspi’s Bluetooth® communication method would also provide the benefit of expanded communication forms having voice as well as data signals or messages to Sharood’s monitoring system. See Non- Final Act. 17–18. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement to add different types of wireless signal communication capability having expanded communication forms including voice as well as data signals or messages, would be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 32 Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this Appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 11. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 18. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 11), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 11) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21. Claim 23 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 reciting the wireless network is a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), the antenna is a WLAN antenna, and the wireless transceiver is a WLAN modem. On this record, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 24–25. To the extent Appellant Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 33 contends that obviousness cannot be concluded based on the combination of Sharood and Legaspi because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims, we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Legaspi’s wired or wireless communication methods would also provide the benefit of expanded communication forms having voice as well as data signals or messages to Sharood’s monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 18. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement to add different types of wireless signal communication capability having expanded communication forms including voice as well as data signals or messages, would be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this Appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 11. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 18–19. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 11), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 34 alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 11) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23. Claim 24 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 reciting the WLAN is according to, based on, or compatible with IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.11g, IEEE 802.11n, or IEEE 802.11ac. On this record, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 25. To the extent Appellant contends that obviousness cannot be concluded based on the combination of Sharood and Legaspi because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims, we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Legaspi’s wired or wireless communication methods including IEEE 802.11 communication methods would also provide the benefit of expanded communication forms having voice as well as data signals or messages to Sharood’s monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 19. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 35 We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement as to add different types of wireless signal communication capability having expanded communication forms including voice as well as data signals or messages, would be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this Appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 12. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 19. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 12), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 12) are unpersuasive. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 36 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 24.9 Claims 51–53 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 51 that recites, in pertinent part, a light source in the single enclosure that emits visible or non- visible light for illumination or indication, where the light source is coupled to the AC connector and wireless transceiver. On this record, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary.10 See Appeal Br. 25–26. A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Sharood’s monitoring system that is able to output data from an appliance connected to a power supply. See Non-Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 19–20. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to enhance a monitoring system that provides power and wireless networking to an appliance with methods for implementing detectors that can emit a light- based signal upon occurrence of an event. See Non-Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 19–20. 9 Although Appellant’s “Argument #23” is listed under the heading for claim 24 on page 12 of the Reply Brief, the argument is not germane to the rejection of claim 24 that is based on the combination of Sharood and Legaspi—not Sharood and Rada as articulated in the Reply Brief. 10 Although Appellant’s “Argument #22” does not disclose for which claim the arguments are intended, as best understood, the arguments are directed to claim 51. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 37 We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement to add additional event signalling capability in the form of emitting a light signal for visually indicating a status uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 51. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, and claims 52 and 53 which depend from claim 51, and are not argued separately with particularity. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD, LEGASPI, AND RADA Regarding dependent claim 22, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood and Legaspi for teaching the WPAN that is according to, based on, or compatible with Zigbee®, IEEE 802.15.4-2003 or Z-Wave® standards, the Examiner cites Rada as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 21. Appellant argues that (1) there is an improper rationale for combination of the Sharood and Rada references, and (2) the rationale is based on a featured benefit already disclosed within Sharood. See Appeal Br. 27–28. Regarding dependent claim 29, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood and Legaspi for teaching the wireless network is a WiMAX® network according to, based on or compatible with IEEE 802.16-2009, the antenna is a WiMAX® antenna, and the wireless transceiver is a WiMAX® Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 38 modem, the Examiner cites Rada as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 22. Appellant argues (1) there is an improper rationale for combination of the Sharood and Rada references, and (2) the rationale includes references to different technology than what is claimed and thus is a conclusory statement insufficient to support obviousness.11 See Appeal Br. 29–30. Moreover, in addition to the arguments above specific to certain dependent claims, Appellant argues generally that Sharood and Legaspi are not analogous. See Appeal Br. 26–27. ISSUE Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claims 22 and 29? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Rada for its particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s combination of Sharood, Legaspi, and Rada. In this section, we address Appellant’s general arguments towards the combination of Sharood and Legaspi (see Appeal Br. 26–27), and under the 11 Although Appellant lists “Argument #25” as pertaining to claim 24, we understand this to be a typographical error, and treat these arguments as being directed towards claim 29. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 39 claim headings below, we respond to Appellant’s specific arguments directed towards particular claims (see Appeal Br. 27–30). Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Legaspi are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 26–27), as previously noted, prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. See Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. That is, contrary to what Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 26; Reply Br. 12), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As explained by the Examiner, both Sharood and Legaspi are of the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is environment control. See Ans. 20. Moreover, both Sharood and Legaspi are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by use of sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55), and Legaspi pertains to appliance energy control over a wireless network using detectors to prevent appliance damage (see Legaspi ¶¶ 9–11, 61). Moreover, Appellant’s arguments regarding non-analogous art in the Appeal Brief are directed towards only Sharood and Legaspi, and make no reference to Rada. See Appeal Br. 26–27. Therefore, we find Appellant’s Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 40 further arguments first disclosed in the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s Answer failed to address the analogousness of Sharood and Rada (see Reply Br. 12), unavailing. To the extent Appellant argues that Rada is non- analogous art, we note that this argument was made for the first time in the Reply Brief, and is therefore waived as untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2); see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv)(“any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal”). Nor has good cause been shown to raise these new arguments in the first instance in the Reply Brief. Claim 22 We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 reciting the WPAN is according to, based on, or compatible with Zigbee®, IEEE 802.15.4-2003 or Z-Wave® standards. On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Legaspi despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 27–28. A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Sharood’s monitoring system that is able to output data from an appliance connected to a wireless transceiver. See Non-Final Act. 21; Ans. 20–21. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to enhance a monitoring system that provides power and wireless networking to an appliance with methods for a particular type of wireless signals transmission that provides for long battery life and also accessing data generated by a monitoring device’s messages. See Non-Final Act. 21; Ans. 21. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 41 We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement as to add different types of wireless signal communication capability providing more efficient energy usage for longer battery life uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses features of wireless communications, as Appellant suggests (see Appeal Br. 28), because Sharood does not disclose performing wireless communications using the particular wireless and wired communication methods as Rada provides. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a conclusion of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 28), comes from non-precedential Board decisions. Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non-precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/informative- opinions-0. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 12–13. Here, the Examiner sets forth in Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 42 the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 20–22. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 12), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 12) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22. Claim 29 Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Sharood with Rada despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 29. To the extent Appellant contends that obviousness cannot be concluded based on the combination of Sharood and Rada because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims, we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Rada’s message forwarding over 3G and WiMax® would also provide the benefit of accessing data generated by a monitoring device’s messages to Sharood’s monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 22. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 43 We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement as to add different types of wireless signal communication capability, would be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rationale to combine Sharood with Rada is limited by its reference to IEEE 802.15.4 based communication protocols (see Appeal Br. 30), we disagree. The Examiner’s rationale also includes that energy monitoring devices are communicated and forwarded over other network types such as 3G and WiMax® to enhance accessing monitoring data for real-time status checking. See Non-Final Act. 22; Ans. 22–23. Appellant has not persuasively rebutted these additional portions of the Examiner’s rationale to combine, and thus, we are not persuaded that the rationale provided is conclusory or irrelevant to the claim. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 13. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 22–23. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 13), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 44 alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 13) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 29. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD AND KIKO Regarding dependent claims 25–28, 30, and 31, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching various further features of the wireless network, the Examiner cites Kiko as teaching the further features of the wireless network in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 22–26. Regarding dependent claim 35, although the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching multiple sensors arranged as a directional sensor array operative to estimate the number, magnitude, frequency, Direction-Of- Arrival (DOA), distance, or speed of the physical phenomenon impinging the sensor array, the Examiner cites Kiko as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 26. Appellant argues that the rationale for combining Sharood and Kiko is improper. See Appeal Br. 34–35. Regarding dependent claim 37, although the Examiner does not provide citations to Sharood for teaching the first sensor consists of, or comprises, a nanosensor, a crystal, or a semiconductor, the Examiner cites Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 45 Kiko as teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 26–27. Appellant argues that the rationale for combining Sharood and Kiko is improper for lacking relevance to the claimed features. Moreover, in addition to the arguments above specific to certain dependent claims, Appellant argues generally that (1) Sharood and Kiko are not analogous, (2) the rationale to combine Sharood and Kiko is improper as the same rationale is repeated for different claims, (3) the rationale is redundant to Sharood, and (4) the rationale is conclusory and general as failing to explain why a wireless technology is to be used in general and the recited wireless technologies in particular. See Appeal Br. 30–34. ISSUE Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claims 25–28, 30, 31, 35, and 37? ANALYSIS Claims 25–28, 30, and 31 We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Kiko’s particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s combination of Sharood and Kiko. Therefore, we confine our discussion to the rationale to combine Sharood and Kiko. Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Kiko are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 30–31), as previously noted, prior art is Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 46 analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (see Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). That is, contrary to what Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 30–31; Reply Br. 14), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986–87. On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As the Examiner explains, both Sharood and Kiko are in the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is environment control. See Ans. 23. Moreover, both Sharood and Kiko are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by use of sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55) and Kiko pertains to monitoring and control functions for automation within a home using wireless networks (see Kiko ¶¶ 16–17, 208). Further, to the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of the present application (see Appeal Br. 31), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistences associated with that requirement. See Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 47 MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP §§ 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Non-Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Still further, to the extent Appellant contends that obviousness cannot be concluded based on the combination of Sharood and Kiko because the same rationale is used as motivation to combine for two different claims (see Appeal Br. 32), and that a rationale is conclusory unless it specifies use advantages specific to particular claim features (see Appeal Br. 33–34), we disagree. Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Kiko’s network and RF interface in all of the specific teachings respectively cited, all commonly provide the benefit of adding varied network access technologies, thus allowing access to even distant network nodes to Sharood’s power monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 23–26. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement as to add greater communication capabilities by using multiple communication protocols in a power monitoring and reporting system would Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 48 be using prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses features of various wireless communication methods, as Appellant notes (see Appeal Br. 33), because Sharood does not disclose performing such a shutdown with a wireless broadband network 3GPP (see Non-Final Act. 23), an unlicensed radio frequency Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band (see Non- Final Act. 23–24), a satellite link (see Non-Final Act. 24), or a cellular telephone 3G network (see Non-Final Act. 25–26) as Kiko provides. Nevertheless, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a finding of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 20–21), comes from non- precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non- precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and- opinions/informative-opinions-0. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 49 Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 14. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 23–25. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 12), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 12) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 25–28, 30, and 31. Claims 35 and 37 Because we do not sustain the rejection of claim 32, as discussed above, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 35 and 37 that depend from claim 32. Nor has the Examiner shown that the additional cited prior art cures those deficiencies. We, therefore, need not address Appellant’s other arguments regarding claims 35 and 37. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 50 THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD AND HENDRICKSON Regarding dependent claims 38–40, 42, 43, and 47–50, the Examiner does not rely upon Sharood for teaching the first sensor consists of, or comprises, specific claimed types of sensors, but rather relies upon Hendrickson to teach these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 27–30. Regarding dependent claim 59, although the Examiner does not cite to Sharood for teaching the actuator consists of, or comprises a chemical actuator and is operative for changing or affecting a matter composition, the Examiner cites to Hendrickson to teach these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 14; Ans. 13–14. Regarding dependent claim 60, although the Examiner does not cite to Sharood for teaching the actuator consists of, or comprises a thermoelectric actuator and is a heater operative for affecting the temperature of a solid, a liquid, or a gas object, and is coupled to the object by conduction, convection, force convection, thermal radiation, or by the transfer, the Examiner cites to Hendrickson to teach these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. See Non-Final Act. 14–15; Ans. 13–14. Appellant argues (1) Sharood and Hendrickson are non-analogous references, (2) the rationale for combining Sharood and Hendrickson is improper for failing to provide a link between the factual findings and the conclusion of obviousness, (3) Sharood already discloses the advantage provided by Hendrickson, and (4) the rationale does not explain how teachings of Hendrickson are used and specific functionality with the Sharood device. See Appeal Br. 36–39 Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 51 ISSUE Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claims 38–40, 42, 43, 47–50, 59, and 60? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Hendrickson’s particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s combination of Sharood and Hendrickson. Therefore, we confine our discussion to the rationale to combine Sharood and Hendrickson. Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Hendrickson are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 36–37), as previously noted, prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (see Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). That is, contrary to what Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 36–37; Reply Br. 16), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986–87. On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As explained by the Examiner, both Sharood and Hendrickson are of the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 52 environment control . See Ans. 26–27. Moreover, both Sharood and Hendrickson are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by use of sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55) and Hendrickson pertains to enhancing appliance functionality by controlling the appliance automatically using various sensors (see Hendrickson ¶¶ 1, 51). Nor do we find error in the Examiner’s rationale to combine Sharood and Hendrickson, despite Appellant’s contention that such rationale is in error when it is used for different claims (see Appeal Br. 37–38). A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Sharood’s monitoring system that receives and provides power to an appliance. See Non-Final Act. 16; Ans. 15. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to enhance an appliance monitoring system as disclosed by Sharood with various types of sensors that supplement functionality of the appliance. See Non-Final Act. 27; Ans. 27–28. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement of adding additional sensors to an appliance monitoring system to increase the types of information being sensed, and thus expand the monitoring capabilities, uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent Appellant suggests that a motivation to combine Sharood with Hendrickson cannot be found based on the sensing functionality generally simply because the combination includes specific kinds of sensors as Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 53 Hendrickson provides (see Appeal Br. 37–38), we are not persuaded. The same advantage of expanding the monitoring capabilities results no matter the specific kind of sensor disclosed by Hendrickson. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses various sensors and consumer accessory devices, as Appellant notes (see Appeal Br. 38), because Sharood does not disclose the specific sensors as Hendrickson provides. Notwithstanding, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a finding of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 20–21), comes from non- precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non- precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and- opinions/informative-opinions-0. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 54 ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 16–17. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 13–14, 27–29. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 16–17), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 16–17) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 59 and 60. However, because we do not sustain the rejection of claim 32 as discussed above, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 38–40, 42, 43, and 47–50 which depend from claim 32. Nor has the Examiner shown that the additional cited prior art cures those deficiencies. Therefore, we need not address Appellant’s other arguments regarding claims 38–40, 42, 43, and 47–50. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD AND ANSARI Regarding dependent claims 61, 63, and 64, although the Examiner does not cite to Sharood for teaching the appliance being further addressable in the wireless network using distinct locally administered addresses uniquely identifying the appliance in the wireless network, and using a layer Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 55 3 address assigned by another appliance using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), the Examiner cites Ansari as teaching these features in concluding that the claims would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 33–35. Appellant argues (1) Sharood and Ansari are non-analogous references, (2) the rationale for combining Sharood and Ansari is improper for failing to provide a link between the factual findings and the conclusion of obviousness, (3) Sharood already discloses the advantage provided by Ansari, (4) the rationale does not explain how teachings of Ansari are used and more specifics about what is being combined from Ansari with the Sharood device, and (5) the cited passage from Ansari is misrepresented in the rejection rationale for what it discloses. See Appeal Br. 47–52. ISSUE Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claims 61, 63, and 64? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Ansari’s particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s combination of Sharood and Ansari. Therefore, we confine our discussion to the motivations to combine Sharood and Ansari. Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Ansari are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 47–48), as previously noted, prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 56 problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (see In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). That is, contrary to what Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 47; Reply Br. 19), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986–87. On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As explained by the Examiner, both Sharood and Ansari are of the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is environment control. See Ans. 36. Moreover, both Sharood and Ansari are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by use of sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55) and Ansari pertains to controlling endpoints for wireless home network automation (see Ansari ¶¶ 96–97, 116). Further, to the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of the present application (see Appeal Br. 48), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistences associated with that requirement. See MPEP §§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 57 see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”), 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Non-Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Nor do we find error in the Examiner’s rationale to combine Sharood and Ansari, despite Applicant’s contention that such rationale is in error when it is used for different claims (see Appeal Br. 49). Notwithstanding the differences in recited claim features, the same advantage may apply nonetheless. Indeed, Ansari’s network gateway in all of the specific teachings respectively cited, all commonly provide the benefit of making available and accessible (exposing) endpoints of a home automation system via network addressing, thus allowing greater access to Sharood’s power monitoring system. See Non-Final Act. 34. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Such an enhancement of a network addressing scheme to increase the availability and access to monitoring capabilities uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent Appellant contends that a motivation to combine Sharood with Ansari cannot be found because “some of the wireless technologies do not lend themselves to be used in building Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 58 automation as described by the Sharood reference” (see Appeal Br. 49), we are not persuaded. Ansari contemplates using its wireless gateway technology in building automation as a home automation networking device. See Ansari ¶ 97; Fig. 11. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses the same advantages as Appellant contends (see Appeal Br. 50–51) because Sharood does not disclose the network addressing as Ansari provides. Nevertheless, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a finding of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 49–50), comes from non-precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non-precedential decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/informative- opinions-0. Appellant’s contentions that the combination of Sharood and Ansari is improper for being conclusory and not explaining how Sharood is modified by Ansari to arrive at the claims, are also not persuasive. To be sure, Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 59 “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (2007) (quoting Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). On this record, however, we do not find error in the Examiner’s rejections relying upon the combination of Sharood and Ansari. The Examiner articulates that Sharood discloses elements from claim 1, which are further limited by dependent claims 61, 63, and 64. Moreover, the Examiner articulates that Ansari is relied upon for its teachings for these further limitations, such as (1) the appliance being further addressable in the wireless network using distinct locally administered addresses uniquely identifying the appliance in the wireless network (see Non-Final Act. 34); (2) the digital address is a layer 3 address and is a static or dynamic Internet Protocol (IP) address (see Non-Final Act. 34); and (3) the digital address is assigned by another appliance using DHCP (see Non-Final Act. 35). To the extent Appellant contends that the articulated reasoning required any further details regarding how, why, or where elements were incorporated into Sharood and whether they are substitutes or additional components (see Appeal Br. 50–51), we are not persuaded. The test for obviousness is not whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. We find unavailing Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner’s rationale to combine Sharood with Ansari ostensibly lacks rational Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 60 underpinning. See Appeal Br. 51. After arguing that the combination with Ansari is conclusory and fails to explain the combination (see Appeal Br. 50), Appellant then contends the combination is adding the functionality of an addressing mechanism, and that such a combination would feature a “trivial, inherent, and self-evident” motivation to combine that would lack rational underpinning (see Appeal Br. 51). Appellant provides no persuasive evidence proving this assertion. Such unsubstantiated attorney argument has low probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Nor do we find availing Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s explanation of Ansari’s paragraph 1 is allegedly misrepresentative. The Examiner cites Ansari’s paragraph 1 as supporting the obviousness conclusion based on combining Sharood with Ansari. Therefore, the explanation given by the Examiner prior to the Ansari citation is not intended as a representation of Ansari, but rather to provide evidence supporting the combination’s rationale. The Examiner concludes that it would be obvious to combine Sharood and Ansari to expose the presence and functionalities of associated endpoints (of the home network) via a wide area network. See Non-Final Act. 34. Indeed, Ansari’s gateway device exposes the presence and functionalities of one or more associated end point devices via a wide area network. Ansari ¶ 1. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in citing and relying on Ansari for concluding obviousness based on the combination of Sharood and Ansari. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 61 sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 19. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 36–39. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 19), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 19) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 61, 63, and 64. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SHAROOD, ANSARI, AND WONG Regarding dependent claim 62, although the Examiner does not cite Sharood for teaching the digital address is a Media Access Control (MAC) layer address, the Examiner cites Wong as teaching this feature in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Non-Final Act. 35–36. Appellant argues (1) Sharood and Wong are non-analogous references, and (2) the rationale to combine Sharood and Wong is improper for (a) misrepresenting the cited portion from Wong and not explaining how Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 62 and why the provided motivation rationale is related to the claimed limitation; (b) using a motivational advantage already disclosed in Sharood and thus redundant; (c) including use of a different wireless networking standard than that disclosed for claim 61 from which claim 62 depends; and (d) not explaining how teachings of Wong are used and more specifics about what is being combined from Wong with the Sharood device. See Appeal Br. 52–56. ISSUE Under § 103, is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion in the rejection of claim 62? ANALYSIS We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on Wong’s particular teachings is undisputed. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s combination of Sharood, Ansari, and Wong. Therefore, we confine our discussion to the rationale to combine the cited references. Turning first then to Appellant’s contentions that Sharood and Wong are non-analogous art (Appeal Br. 52–54), as previously noted, prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved (see Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). That is, contrary to what Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 52–53; Reply Br. 20), the analogous art test does not ask whether the prior art references Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 63 are analogous to each other, but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986–87. On this record then, we see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination. As explained by the Examiner, both Sharood and Wong are in the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, which is environment control. See Ans. 40. Moreover, both Sharood and Wong are at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of optimizing environment control networks by use of sensors communicating over wireless networks. See Spec. 15, 75. Sharood pertains to a home automation system using a radio frequency network to monitor and optimize home utilities (see Sharood ¶¶ 54–55), and Wong pertains to (1) measuring AC current usage of a load device, and (2) transmitting values based on the measurements over a Wi-Fi network in order to configure, modify and administer energy settings for more efficient operations (see Wong ¶¶ 14, 42). Further, to the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of the present application (see Appeal Br. 53–54), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistences associated with that requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP §§ 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”), Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 64 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Non-Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Nor are we persuaded that the Examiner’s rationale to combine the cited references is improper. Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner’s rationale to combine Sharood and Wong misrepresents the cited portion of Wong and fails to explain why and how the provided benefit of the combination relates to the claimed features (see Appeal Br. 54) are unavailing. The rationale to combine Wong with Sharood cites to Wong disclosing a communication module (described later in Wong as a sensor) operative to transmit AC power values calculated from measured AC current by a measurement module in accordance with a Wi-Fi wireless networking standard to a wireless network access point. See Wong ¶¶ 14, 54. The Examiner reasons that combining Wong with Sharood is motivated by enhancements from assigning unique addresses to sensors to transmit the values to a wireless network access point. See Non-Final Act. 36; Ans. 39– 40. Given this reasoning in view of the cited portion of Wong, we see no misrepresentation in the Examiner’s rationale. Moreover, Appellant has not provided additional explanation as to what is mischaracterized by the Examiner’s rationale. See Appeal Br. 54; Reply Br. 20–21. Further, the Examiner’s rationale provides that an enhancement to Sharood’s appliance Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 65 monitoring device is by assigning unique addresses to sensors, as Wong provides. See Non-Final Act. 36. Given that claim 62 recites features of a MAC layer address, and Wong teaches assigning MAC addresses to sensors, we find that the reason to combine Wong with Sharood has sufficient rational underpinning that ties the enhancement of the unique MAC addresses of Wong to the appliance monitoring sensor of Sharood. We reach this conclusion regardless of what other teachings can be inferred from Wong, such as adding addresses to a sensor additionally providing a means to provide a service, as Appellant suggests. See Appeal Br. 54. In short, there is no persuasive evidence on this record proving that Wong’s teachings criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed as required for teaching away. See Norgren Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 699 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Kahn, 441 F.3d at 990. We reach this conclusion even if Sharood already discloses the same advantages as Appellant contends (see Appeal Br. 50–51) because Sharood does not disclose the MAC addressing as Wong provides. Nevertheless, Appellant’s authority for the contention that reliance on “redundant” advantages from a cited art combination would preclude a finding of obviousness (see Appeal Br. 55), comes from non-precedential Board decisions Ex parte Saiki, Appeal No. 2000-0373 (BPAI Jan. 17, 2002); Ex parte Burak, Appeal No. 2004-0823 (BPAI Dec. 8, 2004); Ex parte Anttila & Jung, Appeal No. 2010-006328 (BPAI Sept. 27, 2012); Ex parte Kastelewicz, Appeal No. 2008-004808 (BPAI June 9, 2009); and Ex parte Levine, Appeal No. 2010-001240 (BPAI Sept. 25, 2012). Not only are the facts in these cases different from those at issue here, as non-precedential Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 66 decisions, Saiki, Burak, Anttila & Jung, Kastelewicz, and Levine are not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf. Nor have these cases been designated as informative. See Alphabetical Listing of Informative Decisions, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/informative- opinions-0. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that the rationale to combine Sharood with Wong is improper for referencing a different network scheme than that referenced in the combination rationale for claim 61 from which claim 62 depends, and referencing different layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI) layer stack. See Appeal Br. 55–56. To the extent Appellant suggests that a wide area network is incompatible or inoperable with a local area network, and that addressing schemes at different OSI layers are similarly incompatible or inoperable together, Appellant provides no persuasive evidence proving these assertions. Such unsubstantiated attorney argument has low probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Further, to the extent Appellant contends that the articulated reasoning required any further details regarding how added sensors are incorporated into Sharood and what added services are provided by added elements (see Appeal Br. 56), we are not persuaded. The test for obviousness is not whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 67 Finally, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions that insufficient answers in the Examiner’s Answer to arguments raised in the Appeal Brief affect the grounds of rejection upon which this appeal is taken, such that sustaining the Examiner’s rejection would ostensibly constitute a new ground of rejection. See Reply Br. 20–21. Here, the Examiner sets forth in the Examiner’s Answer that the rejection is proper and offers additional explanation as to the combination. See Ans. 40–43. To the extent Appellant contends that the Examiner’s explanation constitutes an undesignated new ground of rejection in the Answer (see Reply Br. 20–21), that is a petitionable matter that is not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a); see also MPEP § 1207.03(b). Where, as here, Appellant did not file such a petition, Appellant’s contentions regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Given this waiver, Appellant’s contentions that our sustaining the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Examiner’s Answer should be considered a new ground (Reply Br. 20–21) are unpersuasive. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 62. THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS We do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of dependent claims 41 and 44–46. See Non-Final Act. 30–33. Because we do not sustain the rejection against claim 32, as discussed above, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 41 and 44–46, which depend from claim 32. Nor has the Examiner shown that the additional cited Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 68 prior art cures those deficiencies. Accordingly, we need not address Appellant’s other arguments regarding claims 41 and 44–46. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–7, 9, 10, 12–19, 32– 34, 36, 54– 58 102(b) Sharood 1–5, 7, 12–19, 54, 58 6, 9, 10, 32– 34, 36, 55– 57 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 51–53 103(a) Sharood, Legaspi 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 51–53 22, 29 103(a) Sharood, Legaspi, Rada 22, 29 25–28, 30, 31, 35, 37 103(a) Sharood, Kiko 25–28, 30, 31 35, 37 38–40, 42, 43, 47–50, 59, 60 103(a) Sharood, Hendrickson 59, 60 38–40, 42, 43, 47–50 41 103(a) Sharood, Mehta 41 44–46 103(a) Sharood, Hendrickson, Kiko 44–46 61, 63, 64 103(a) Sharood, Ansari 61, 63, 64 62 103(a) Sharood, Ansari, Wong 62 Overall Outcome 1–5, 7, 8, 11– 31, 54, 58–64 6, 9, 10, 32– 53, 55–57 Appeal 2020-002710 Application 15/992,221 69 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED IN PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation
