May Patents Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 4, 2020

2019002056 (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/657,163 07/23/2017 Yehuda BINDER BINDER-014-US3 1088
131926 7590 05/04/2020
May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov
P.O.B 7230
Ramat-Gan, 5217102
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
KHAN, HASSAN ABDUR-RAHMAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2456
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/04/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER and BENJAMIN MAYTAL
____________

Appeal 2019-002056
Application 15/657,163
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents
Ltd. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention is a voice control system used in connection
with a building, where the system uses a server implementing gateway or
control functionalities. See Abstract; Spec. 1, 178–80; Fig. 19. Controller
functionality can be integrated in a server external to the building. See Spec.
162–63; Figs. 15–15a. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for operating an actuator in a controlled device in
response to captured human voice data, for use with a client
device in a building communicating over a wireless network
and an Internet-connected server device external to the
building, the method comprising:
capturing, by a microphone in the client device, the
human voice data;
sending to the server, by the client device via the wireless
network, the captured human voice data;
receiving, by the server over the Internet, the captured
human voice data;
processing, by the server, the captured human voice data;
responsive to the processing, sending a message, by the
server to the controlled device over the Internet;
receiving, by the controlled device via the wireless
network, the message; and
operating the actuator in the controlled device in
response to the received message.

RELATED APPEALS
Appellant informs us of three related appeals in copending
applications (1) 13/733,634; (2) 15/361,434; and (3) 15/716,881. Appeal Br.
2. One of these appeals, namely the appeal in the ’634 application, has been
decided. See Ex parte Binder, Appeal 2018-007694 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2020)
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(“Bd. Dec.”). In that appeal, among other things, we affirmed the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections that cited two of the three references at
issue here, namely Beliles and Abe cited below. See Bd. Dec. 32–54.

THE REJECTION2
The Examiner rejected claims 1–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Beliles (US 2007/0283005 A1; published Dec. 6, 2007),
Buck (US 2009/0089065 A1; published Apr. 2, 2009), and Abe (US
2012/0253480 A1; published Oct. 4, 2012). Final Act. 17–28.3

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTENTIONS
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Beliles uses a
client device in a building communicating over a wireless network and an
Internet-connected server device external to the building. Final Act. 17.
Although the Examiner acknowledges that Beliles does not (1) capture
human voice data by a microphone in the client device; (2) operate an
actuator in a controlled device responsive to the captured voice data; and
(3) send the voice data to the server via the wireless network, where the
server receives the voice data over the Internet, the Examiner cites Buck as
teaching these features. Final Act. 18–19. The Examiner also acknowledges
that the Beliles/Buck system does not (1) process the captured voice data;

2 Because the Examiner withdrew rejections under §§ 101 and 112 (Ans. 3–
4), those rejections are not before us.
3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Office Action mailed
September 4, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed October 3, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed January 4, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and (4) the Reply Brief filed January 13, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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(2) send a message to the controlled device that is received by the controlled
device; and (3) operate the actuator in the controlled device responsive to the
received message, but cites Abe for teaching these features in concluding
that the claim would have been obvious. Final Act. 19–20.
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly combined the cited
references. Appeal Br. 45–58; Reply Br. 2–5. According to Appellant, not
only is the Examiner’s proposed combination unclear, Beliles and Buck are
non-analogous, and adding voice processing capabilities to Beliles as the
Examiner proposes changes Beliles’s principle of operation. Appeal Br. 45–
49. Appellant further contends that the Examiner’s articulated rationale to
combine the references is improper because (1) the primary reference,
Beliles, already has the capabilities for which Abe was cited; (2) it is unclear
why these two references are analogous to each other; (3) the Examiner’s
obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions
articulated in the Examiner’s earlier restriction requirement; and (4) the
Examiner picks and chooses subject matter from different embodiments in
Abe to arrive at the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 53–58; Reply Br. 3–5.
Appellant adds that Buck does not teach the voice data sending and
receiving steps, and Beliles does not teach the recited Internet-connected
server external to a building and wireless network. Appeal Br. 58–60; Reply
Br. 5. Appellant argues various other recited limitations summarized below.

ISSUES
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Beliles, Buck,
and Abe collectively would have taught or suggested:
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(1) operating an actuator in a controlled device responsive to captured
human voice data, where the method is used with a client device in a
building communicating over a wireless network and an Internet-connected
server device external to the building, where the client device sends the
voice data to the server via the wireless network, and the server receives that
data over the Internet as recited in claim 1?
(2) the particular limitations recited in dependent claims 2–5, 8, 9, 11,
and 13–30?
II. Is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references
supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 6, 7, and 10
On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. As shown in Beliles’s Figure
1 reproduced below, Beliles discloses a computer network 100 in a building
comprising, among other things, fire sensor 123 connected to sensor
translator 132 that is, in turn, connected to a network device (router 152) that
is connected to network cloud 110 to which fire suppression device 161,
door locks 162, and other physical control devices are connected. See
Beliles ¶¶ 15–17, 27–29, 34.

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Beliles’s computer network 100 in Figure 1

As shown above, network cloud 110 is connected to various network
devices 151–153 that include data centers, routers, personal computers, etc.
Beliles ¶ 29. These network devices, detailed in Beliles’s Figure 2 and
paragraphs 31 to 33, are “client devices” at least with respect to the external
monitoring/control system 140 that corresponds to the recited Internet-
connected server device consistent with the Examiner’s mapping. See Final
Act. 17; Ans. 5–7 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 15–16, 34).
Although physical events, such as detected fires, can be conveyed
from the sensors to monitoring/control system 140 using proprietary
signaling systems, such as an internal fire alarm system, these events can
also be sent over the Internet. Beliles ¶ 34. To the extent that Appellant
contends that this Internet-based functionality must be limited to an internal
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network within the building, and somehow cannot involve an external
network (see Reply Br. 59–60), we disagree. Not only is there no persuasive
evidence on this record to substantiate Appellant’s contention, ordinarily
skilled artisans would understand that external networks are the very essence
of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Therefore, Beliles at least suggests
an external network.
Nor does Appellant persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on
Beliles’s paragraph 27 for teaching communicating over a wireless network,
particularly since Beliles teaches in that paragraph that network 100 may be
configured as a wireless network. We likewise see no error in the
Examiner’s reliance on Beliles’s monitoring/control system 140 for teaching
the recited Internet-connected server device. See Ans. 5–7 (citing Beliles
¶ 34).
We also see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck for at least
suggesting (1) capturing human voice data by a microphone in a client
device, namely a vehicle; and (2) sending the voice data to the server via a
wireless network, where the server receives the voice data over the Internet.
Final Act. 18–19; Ans. 7. As shown in Buck’s Figure 4, the system converts
spoken words into commands using speech recognition device 402
connected to vehicle buses 408 and actuator 406. Buck ¶ 28. Notably, the
buses may be wireless and convey control and/or actuator signals to remote
(e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations. Id.
Given this functionality, Buck at least suggests sending captured voice
data wirelessly to a remote destination external to the vehicle. Although
Buck does not specify these remote destinations that receive the captured
voice data, we nonetheless see no reason why these destinations cannot
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include Internet-connected servers as the Examiner indicates. See Final Act.
18; Ans. 7. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise, there is no
persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention.
Given the Beliles/Buck system’s Internet-based functionality, we see
no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe merely to show that providing an
Internet-based control apparatus 101 that is external to a building is known
in the art as shown in Abe’s Figure 15, and that providing such external
control functionality in connection with the Beliles/Buck system would have
been at least an obvious variation. See Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6; see also
Abe ¶ 93. That (1) detected events associated with fires can be conveyed
over the Internet from the sensors to monitoring/control system 140 as noted
in Beliles’s paragraph 34, and (2) captured voice data is sent wirelessly to a
remote destination in Buck’s paragraph 28 only bolsters the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions in this regard.
Nor does Appellant persuasively rebut the Examiner’s mapping of
Abe’s control apparatus 101 to a control server (see Ans. 6)—a mapping that
we find reasonable on this record given the control apparatus’s external
control capabilities for in-building networked sensor-based systems via
Internet 300 in Figure 15. See Abe ¶¶ 93–96. As the Examiner indicates,
Abe’s in-building systems in Figure 15 include image display device 51 and
air conditioner 52 that are controlled devices with actuators. See Ans. 6;
Abe ¶ 95.
Given this functionality considered in light of the other cited
references’ teachings, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe for
teaching (1) processing captured voice data received from the Beliles/Buck
system; (2) sending a message to the controlled device over the Internet,
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where the message is received by the controlled device via a wireless
network; and (3) operating an actuator in the controlled device responsive to
the received message. See Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6.
Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged individual shortcomings
of Beliles, Buck, and Abe (Appeal Br. 58–60) are unavailing where, as here,
the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for
combining Beliles, Buck, and Abe despite Appellant’s arguments to the
contrary (see Appeal Br. 45–58; Reply Br. 2–5). First, we see no error in the
Examiner’s articulated rationale for combining Beliles and Buck, namely to
provide hands-free actuator control and operation using voice commands in
connection with Beliles’s system. See Final Act. 18–19; Ans. 4–5. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
To be sure, if the Examiner’s proposed modification renders the prior
art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, the Examiner has failed to make a
prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). But that is not the case here. Providing voice-based control,
such as that in Buck, in connection with Beliles’s system as the Examiner
proposes would not render Beliles’s system unsuitable for its intended
purpose as Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 48–49), but would
merely provide additional voice-based control capabilities to at least
augment Beliles’s sensor-based control system—an enhancement yielding a
predictable result. Accord Ans. 4 (noting that combining Buck with Beliles
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improves Beliles’s system by adding human speech recognition and actuator
voice control).
We see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination despite the
fact that Buck’s voice control system is used in connection with a vehicle.
As noted previously, Buck’s wireless buses 408 in Figure 4 convey control
and/or actuator signals to remote (e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations. Buck
¶ 28. Because Buck at least suggests sending captured voice data wirelessly
to a remote destination external to the vehicle for control purposes, Buck is
at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of sending captured data
to a remote location for processing and control and, therefore, is analogous
art. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that prior
art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the
problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved).
We reach this conclusion despite Beliles’s and Buck’s different patent
classifications as Appellant indicates. See Appeal Br. 46–47. Although
these diverse classifications can constitute some evidence of “non-analogy,”
this evidence is far outweighed by the references’ structural and functional
similarities that render them analogous art. See In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370,
1372 (CCPA 1973) (noting that (1) diverse patent office classification of
prior art references is some evidence of “non-analogy,” and (2) cross-
references in official search notes is some evidence of “analogy,” the
similarities and differences in structure and function of the references’
disclosed inventions carry far greater weight).
Appellant’s reliance on a non-precedential Board decision that,
according to Appellant, held that a vehicle-based control was non-analogous
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to a similar function in a building (Appeal Br. 46), is unavailing. Not only
do the facts in that case differ from those at issue here, as a non-precedential
decision, it is not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard
Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) (“SOP 2”) § I(B),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN
AL.pdf.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness
rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in
a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application
(see Appeal Br. 47), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the
Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a
petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding
procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP
§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to
objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”);
see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that
should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c)
(requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an
Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications).
Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s
restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction
requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is
(1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken,
and (2) based solely on the cited prior art.
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Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for
combining Abe with the Beliles/Buck system despite Appellant’s arguments
to the contrary (see Appeal Br. 53–58; Reply Br. 3–5). A key aspect of the
Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Abe’s control apparatus in
Figures 15 and 16. See Ans. 6. Given this functionality, the Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to implement an internet-
connected control server that (1) acquires and processes information, and
(2) sends associated control commands over the Internet to a controlled
device and actuator when an abnormality occurs. See Final Act. 20; Ans. 6.
We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Although the
Examiner’s citation to paragraphs 50 and 51 on page 19 of the Final Office
Action pertains to Abe’s first disclosed embodiment, we nevertheless see no
reason why this control apparatus functionality could not also be provided in
conjunction with that of Abe’s second embodiment in Figure 15 as the
Examiner proposes despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal
Br. 55). First, although Figure 15’s embodiment uses a control apparatus
101 instead of control apparatus 100 in Figure 1, the two respective control
apparatuses are nonetheless strikingly similar in many respects. As shown
in Abe’s Figures 2 and 16, control apparatus 101 has the same sections 11–
15 as control apparatus 100, including control rule accumulation section 14.
Given this striking similarity, the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s first and
second embodiments is reasonable, at least regarding the particular
functionality from these embodiments on which the Examiner relies. We
reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that control
apparatus 100 in Abe’s Figure 2 is inside a building, unlike control apparatus
101 in Figure 15 as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 55). Despite these
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purported differences, the control apparatues’ structure and control
functionalities are nonetheless strikingly similar as noted above and we,
therefore, see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on teachings from these
embodiments in the rejection.
Second, it is well settled that “[c]ombining two embodiments
disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap
of inventiveness.” Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d
982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That is the case here. In short, in light of Abe,
the Examiner’s proposed enhancement to the Beliles/Buck system is not
based on impermissible hindsight as Appellant alleges (Reply Br. 21), but
rather uses prior art elements predictably according to their established
functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Appellant’s contention that it is ostensibly unclear why Beliles and
Abe are analogous to each other (Appeal Br. 54) is unavailing. Prior art is
analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor as the invention,
regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Bigio, 381 F.3d at
1325. The analogous art test, then, does not ask whether the prior art
references are analogous to each other as Appellant seems to suggest (see
Appeal Br. 54), but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the
claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87
(Fed. Cir. 2006). Because Beliles and Abe both involve environment control
networks as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 6), the references are not only in
the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, but they are also
reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem in that regard.
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Lastly, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s contention that the
Examiner’s combining Beliles and Abe is improper because both systems
are ostensibly self-contained and independently operate effectively. See
Appeal Br. 57–58. To be sure, the court in Kinetic Concepts noted that
because two cited prior art references independently accomplished similar
functions, namely draining fluids, each device independently operated
effectively such that ordinarily skilled artisans seeking to create a better
device to drain fluids from a wound would have no reason to combine the
features of both devices into a single device. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Not only are the facts in Kinetic Concepts regarding draining fluids
from a wound entirely different from those at issue here, we also note that
familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and
often ordinarily skilled artisans can fit multiple references’ teachings
together like puzzle pieces, as is the case here. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
On this record, then, the Examiner’s proposed enhancement to the
Beliles/Buck system, namely (1) processing captured voice data received
from the Beliles/Buck system; (2) sending a message to the controlled
device over the Internet, where the message is received by the controlled
device via a wireless network; and (3) operating an actuator in the controlled
device responsive to the received message (see Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6)
uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—
an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1, and claims 6, 7, and 10 not argued separately with particularity.

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Claim 2
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 reciting that the
controlled device is part of, integrated with, or the same as, the client device.
Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one recited alternative
need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 60–61), we
see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least
suggesting the recited limitations for the reasons noted above and by the
Examiner. Final Act. 20; Ans. 7 (citing Buck ¶¶ 20, 31, 50).
To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s findings
regarding the limitations of claim 2 are inconsistent with claim 1 (see
Appeal Br. 60), we disagree. In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner
finds that Buck teaches, among other things, that a client device sends
captured voice data to a server via a wireless network. See Final Act. 18.
As Buck explains in paragraph 28, the vehicle’s wireless buses convey
control and/or actuator signals to remote (e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations.
Given this disclosure in light of the Examiner’s findings, we see no reason
why a vehicle and its data processing and transmission components cannot
be a “client device” as claimed, particularly given the client-based voice data
generated in Buck’s vehicle that is sent to remote destinations which, as
noted previously, include servers under the Examiner’s interpretation. See
Final Act. 18; Ans. 7.
In rejecting dependent claim 2, the Examiner finds that the controlled
device, namely Buck’s seating system, electronic entertainment, etc., is part
of the client device, namely the vehicle. Final Act. 20 (citing Buck ¶ 20).
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These findings not only satisfy the recited “part of” alternative noted above,
they are also consistent with those made for independent claim 1.
In short, Appellant fails to persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding
that Buck teaches a “controlled device,” for example, a seating system, that
is part of a “client device,” namely a vehicle or related system. See Final
Act. 18–19; Ans. 18.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 2.

Claim 3
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 reciting that the
processing comprises performing a voice recognition algorithm for
identifying the voice of a specific person. Despite Appellant’s arguments to
the contrary (Appeal Br. 61–62; Reply Br. 5), we see no error in the
Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least suggesting the recited
limitations for the reasons noted above and by the Examiner. Final Act. 20;
Ans. 7–8 (citing Buck ¶¶ 37–38; Abe, Fig. 16).
In short, Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding
that Buck teaches the recited voice recognition algorithm, and that it would
have been obvious to process that algorithm at a remote server, such as that
disclosed by Abe. See Ans. 8. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements
predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellant’s arguments regarding
Buck’s individual shortcomings in this regard (Appeal Br. 61–62) do not
show nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited
references’ collective teachings. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 3.

Claim 4
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4 reciting, in
pertinent part, that (1) the client sends sensor data to the server via the
wireless network, and (2) the server sends the message responsive to the
sensor data. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 62),
we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least
suggesting the recited limitations for the reasons noted above and by the
Examiner. Final Act. 21; Ans. 8 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 52, 54; Figs. 1, 6; Abe,
Fig. 15). Appellant’s arguments regarding Beliles’s individual shortcomings
in this regard (Appeal Br. 62) do not show nonobviousness where, as here,
the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See
Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 4.

Claim 5
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 reciting, in
pertinent part, the sensor is (1) a thermoelectric sensor that responds to a
temperature or to a temperature gradient of an object using conduction,
convection, or radiation, or (2) a photoelectric sensor that responds to a
visible or an invisible light or gamma rays. Our emphasis on the term “or”
underscores that only one of the recited sensors need be taught or suggested
by the prior art to satisfy the claim.
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Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 63), we see
no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Beliles for at least suggesting the
recited thermoelectric sensor, particularly in view of (1) Beliles’s exemplary
and non-limiting list of sensors 121–124 in Figure 1, and (2) event sensing
involves updating current conditions that include temperature as noted in
paragraph 52. See Final Act. 21–22; Ans. 8 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 16, 28, 52;
Fig. 1).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 5.

Claim 8
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 reciting, in
pertinent part, capturing the human voice data by multiple microphones in
the client device. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br.
63–64; Reply Br. 5–6), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck
(Final Act. 23) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in
view of Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with an array of
directional microphones in paragraph 31.
Given this teaching, we see no reason why directional microphones
could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner
proposes to, among other things, detect sound in the direction of the speaker
to detect speech, thus minimizing or attenuating detected sounds from other
directions that are unrelated to speech. Such an enhancement uses prior art
elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 8.

Claim 9
For reasons similar to those made regarding claim 8, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 reciting that the multiple microphones
are arranged as a directional microphone array operative to estimate a
(1) number; (2) magnitude; (3) frequency; (4) Direction-of-Arrival;
(5) distance; or (6) speed of a phenomenon impinging on the array. See
Final Act. 23; Ans. 9 (citing Buck ¶ 31). Despite Appellant’s arguments to
the contrary (Appeal Br. 64–65; Reply Br. 5–6), we see no reason why
directional microphones, such as those in Buck’s paragraph 31, could not be
provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to,
among other things, detect sound in the direction of the speaker to detect
speech, thus minimizing or attenuating detected sounds from other directions
that are unrelated to speech. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements
predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 9.

Claims 11 and 12
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 reciting, in
pertinent part, the client device or controlled device are addressable in the
wireless network or the Internet using an address stored in a volatile or non-
volatile memory of the respective device for uniquely identifying the
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respective device in the network. Our emphasis on the term “or” above
underscores that only one of the recited addressable devices need be taught
or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim.
A key aspect of the Examiner’s rejection is that communication
between devices is via data packets exchanged over a network using the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol. See
Final Act. 24; Ans. 9–10. Notably, the Examiner also finds that network
communication process 244 is used by network device 200 to communicate
information packets and frames among other network devices. Ans. 9–10;
Beliles ¶ 33.
Given this functionality, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion
that it would have been obvious for the client or controlled devices to be
addressable to receive data packets under Beliles’s TCP/IP scheme as the
Examiner proposes even assuming, without deciding, that it was known to
address ports connected to those devices, such as telephone connections in a
dial-up environment as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 65). In short,
addressing the client or controlled devices themselves to receive data
packets would have been at least an obvious variation in light of Beliles’s
network-based data communication functionality. Accord Bd. Dec. 43–44
(concluding that providing addressable devices in connection with the
Beliles/Abe system would, among other things, facilitate identifying and
communicating with those devices over a network). Nor has Appellant
shown that addressing the client and controlled devices would have been
uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinarily skilled
artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Because it would have been obvious for Beliles’s client and controlled
devices to be addressable as noted above, using an address stored in those
devices for that purpose would have likewise been obvious as the Examiner
indicates. See Final Act. 24; Ans. 9–10. We reach this conclusion noting
the network devices’ memory 240 which, as shown in Figure 2, stores data
associated with network communication process 244 that, notably,
communicates packets and frames of information among network devices.
See Beliles ¶¶ 31–33. Even assuming, without deciding, that Beliles does
not specify the content of this memory explicitly as Appellant contends
(Appeal Br. 65), Beliles’s Figure 2 nonetheless shows the box for memory
240 encompassing, among other things, network communication process
244—a process that exchanges data between addressed devices under the
TCP/IP protocol as noted previously. Beliles, then, at least suggests storing
addresses associated with this network communication process in at least
memory 240.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 11, and claim 12 not argued separately with particularity.

Claim 13
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 reciting a
Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) is (1) according to, or based on,
BluetoothTM or Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
802.15.1-2005 standards, or (2) a wireless control network that is according
to, or based on, ZigbeeTM, IEEE 802.15.4-2003, or Z-WaveTM standards.
Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited
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WPAN aspects enumerated above need be taught or suggested by the prior
art to satisfy the claim.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 66; Reply
Br. 6), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act. 25;
Ans. 10) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in view of
Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with a network using wireless
protocols, where the speech recognition controller is compliant with, among
other protocols, BluetoothTM and ZigbeeTM in paragraph 52.
Given this teaching, we see no reason why a WPAN could not be
provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to,
among other things, communicate data regarding recognized speech
wirelessly between devices using standard protocols. Such an enhancement
uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—
an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 13.

Claim 14
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14 reciting the
wireless network is a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) that is
according to, or based on, the recited IEEE standards. Although the
Examiner’s rejection incorrectly quotes claim 13 as Appellant indicates
(Appeal Br. 66), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the
Examiner’s other findings in the rejection and the Answer are nonetheless
commensurate with claim 14’s limitations that recite a WLAN. See Final
Act. 25; Ans. 10 (citing Beliles ¶ 27 and Figure 1 for teaching a LAN). We
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see no harmful error in these findings, for Beliles notes in paragraph 27 that
network cloud 110 can not only be wireless, but also a LAN.
Given this teaching, we see no reason why a WLAN could not be
provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to,
among other things, communicate data wirelessly between devices within a
local area using standard protocols. Such an enhancement uses prior art
elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s rejection of the parent
claim is based on another reference and, therefore, Beliles purportedly
cannot be used to teach the recited feature in a dependent claim (Reply Br.
6) is unavailing, for the Examiner relies on Beliles for teaching the recited
wireless network in rejecting claim 1 from which claim 14 depends. See
Final Act. 17 (finding that Beliles discloses a method for use with a client
device in a building communicating over a wireless network); Ans. 7
(mapping Beliles’s computer network 100 to the recited wireless network).
And to the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s reliance on
Beliles in rejecting claim 14 somehow conflicts with the Examiner’s reliance
on Buck in connection with the rejection of independent claim 1 (see Appeal
Br. 66–67; Reply Br. 6), we disagree.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 14.

Claim 15
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 reciting the
wireless network uses a wireless communication over a licensed or
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unlicensed radio frequency (RF) band, that is an Industrial, Scientific and
Medical (ISM) radio band. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that
only one of the recited RF bands need be taught or suggested by the prior art
to satisfy the claim.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that claim 15
“does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim 13” is puzzling
given the claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br.
67–68), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies
the rejection on page 10 of the Answer by citing Buck’s wireless networks in
paragraphs 51 and 52 that include, among other things, a ZigbeeTM wireless
network that the Examiner finds uses an unlicensed RF band as claimed—a
finding that is undisputed. See Reply Br. 6 (acknowledging that Buck may
disclose the recited feature).
Given this teaching, we see no reason why a wireless network using
an unlicensed RF band, such as that disclosed in Buck’s paragraphs 51 and
52, could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner
proposes to, among other things, communicate data wirelessly between
devices within a local area using conventional RF bands designated for that
purpose. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according
to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S.
at 417.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness
rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in
a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application
(see Appeal Br. 68), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the
Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a
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petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding
procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP
§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to
objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”);
see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that
should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c)
(requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an
Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications).
Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s
restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction
requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1)
articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and
(2) based solely on the cited prior art.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 15.

Claim 16
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 reciting, in
pertinent part, that the wireless network is a cellular telephone network that
is either a Third or Fourth Generation network, each of which uses one of
the recited alternative systems or protocols associated with those respective
networks. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the
recited networks need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the
claim.
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Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 68–69;
Reply Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act.
26; Ans. 10–11) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in
view of Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with a network using
cellular or wireless protocols or cellular telephones in paragraph 52.
Given this teaching, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that
it would have been obvious to provide one of the recited cellular telephone
networks in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to,
among other things, communicate data wirelessly between devices using
known cellular telephone networks and associated data transmission
schemes. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 16.

Claim 17
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17 reciting that the
client device or the controlled device is integrated in, part of, or entirely
included in, an appliance. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that
(1) only one of the recited devices, and (2) only one of the recited
orientations with respect to the appliance need be taught or suggested by the
prior art to satisfy the claim.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 69–72;
Reply Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s paragraph
34 (Final Act. 27; Ans. 11–12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations,
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particularly since an appliance, such as air conditioner 52, is one of the
devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1. This functionality suggests
that the controlled device is at least part of that appliance as claimed.
Given this teaching, we see no reason why the controlled device could
not be at least part of an appliance in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the
Examiner proposes to, among other things, control automatically appliances
that are commonly used in homes and offices, such as air conditioners, thus
precluding the need to manually control those appliances. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 17.

Claim 18
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 reciting that the
appliance’s primary functionality is associated with food storage, handling,
or preparation. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of
the recited functionalities need be taught or suggested by the prior art to
satisfy the claim.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 72; Reply
Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe (Final Act. 27;
Ans. 11) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly since air
conditioner 52 is one of the devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1.
Given this teaching, we see no reason why an appliance in the
Beliles/Buck/Abe system, such as Abe’s air conditioner 52, would not be at
least associated with the recited functionalities as the Examiner proposes to,
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among other things, use the air conditioner appliance in connection with
storing or handling food by keeping food cooler to avoid spoilage. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 16.

Claims 19–24
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19–24 reciting
(1) various types of appliances and associated functionalities including
heating food (claim 19), environmental control (claim 21), temperature
control (claim 22), and cleaning (claim 23); and (2) various other types of
appliances in claims 20 and 24.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that each of
claims 19 to 24 “does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim
17” is puzzling given the claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates
(Appeal Br. 72–73), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the
Examiner clarifies the rejection on pages 11 and 12 of the Answer by finding
that the network-connected home appliances in Abe’s paragraph 38 can
include the recited appliances.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 72–73;
Reply Br. 7–8), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s
paragraph 38 and Figure 1 (Ans. 11–12) for at least suggesting the recited
limitations, particularly since air conditioner 52—a home appliance—is just
one of the devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1. Given Abe’s
exemplary and non-limiting reference to the home network connecting
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various types of sensors and devices installed within a home, we see no error
in the Examiner’s finding that these various types of devices could include
the devices and functionalities recited in claims 19 to 24 and are, therefore,
obvious variations. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness
rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in
a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application
(see Appeal Br. 73), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the
Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a
petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding
procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP
§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to
objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”);
see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that
should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c)
(requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an
Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications).
Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s
restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction
requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is
(1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken,
and (2) based solely on the cited prior art.
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 19–24.

Claim 25
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 reciting that the
actuator is an electric light source that emits visible or non-visible light for
illumination or indication, where the non-visible light is infrared, ultraviolet,
X-rays, or gamma rays. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that
only one of the recited light types need be taught or suggested by the prior
art to satisfy the claim.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 73–75;
Reply Br. 8–9),4 we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final
Act. 28; Ans. 12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations. Buck’s
speech recognition and control process interfaces with, among other things,
in-vehicle devices that, through actuators, adjust electronic elements and
devices—elements that reasonably include visible light sources, such as
headlights or cabin lights as the Examiner indicates. See Final Act. 28; Ans.
25 (citing Buck ¶ 32). We reach this conclusion noting that Buck’s
paragraph 20 states, quite broadly, that the system can adjust or activate any
vehicle-related system that includes not only a seating system, mirror
controls, or entertainment systems, but also any in-vehicle or vehicle-related
system.

4 Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 is based on
Abe’s paragraph 32 (Appeal Br. 73) is incorrect. Rather, the Examiner cites
Buck’s paragraph 32 to reject claim 25. See Final Act. 28.
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Given these teachings that are replete with broad and non-limiting
terms, and leaving aside the fact that illuminance is sensed in Abe’s Figure
3, we see no reason why an electric visible light source actuator, such as an
actuator for vehicle headlights or cabin lights, could not be provided in the
Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things,
control the visible light source automatically via voice commands. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 25.

Claims 26–30
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26–30 reciting
(1) the electric light source comprises one of various types of alternative
light sources (claim 26); (2) a motion actuator (claim 27); and (3) a sounder
(claims 28–30).
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that each of
claims 26 to 30 “does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim
25” (Final Act. 28) is puzzling given the claims’ different limitations as
Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 76), we nonetheless deem this error
harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection on page 12 of the Answer
by finding that Buck’s paragraph 32 teaches various actuators that include
headlights, sounders, and other actuators that enable mechanical
adjustments.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 76; Reply
Br. 9), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck’s paragraph 32
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(Ans. 12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly since
Buck’s speech recognition and control process interfaces with, among other
things, in-vehicle devices that, through actuators, adjust electronic and
mechanical elements and devices—elements that reasonably include visible
light sources, motion actuators, and sounders. We reach this conclusion
noting that Buck’s paragraph 20 states, quite broadly, that the system can
adjust or activate any vehicle-related system that includes not only a seating
system, mirror controls, or entertainment systems, but also any in-vehicle or
vehicle-related system.
Given these teachings that are replete with broad and non-limiting
terms, we see no reason why actuators, such as the recited electric visible
light source, motion actuator, and sounder, could not be provided in the
Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things,
control those sources automatically via voice commands. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness
rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in
a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application
(see Appeal Br. 76), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the
Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a
petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding
procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP
§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to
objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”);
see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that
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should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c)
(requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an
Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications).
Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s
restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction
requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1)
articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and
(2) based solely on the cited prior art.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 26–30.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)
/Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–30 103 Beliles,
Buck, Abe
1–30

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED