May Patents Ltd.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 4, 202015657163 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/657,163 07/23/2017 Yehuda BINDER BINDER-014-US3 1088 131926 7590 05/04/2020 May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov P.O.B 7230 Ramat-Gan, 5217102 ISRAEL EXAMINER KHAN, HASSAN ABDUR-RAHMAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2456 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/04/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER and BENJAMIN MAYTAL ____________ Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents Ltd. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention is a voice control system used in connection with a building, where the system uses a server implementing gateway or control functionalities. See Abstract; Spec. 1, 178–80; Fig. 19. Controller functionality can be integrated in a server external to the building. See Spec. 162–63; Figs. 15–15a. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for operating an actuator in a controlled device in response to captured human voice data, for use with a client device in a building communicating over a wireless network and an Internet-connected server device external to the building, the method comprising: capturing, by a microphone in the client device, the human voice data; sending to the server, by the client device via the wireless network, the captured human voice data; receiving, by the server over the Internet, the captured human voice data; processing, by the server, the captured human voice data; responsive to the processing, sending a message, by the server to the controlled device over the Internet; receiving, by the controlled device via the wireless network, the message; and operating the actuator in the controlled device in response to the received message. RELATED APPEALS Appellant informs us of three related appeals in copending applications (1) 13/733,634; (2) 15/361,434; and (3) 15/716,881. Appeal Br. 2. One of these appeals, namely the appeal in the ’634 application, has been decided. See Ex parte Binder, Appeal 2018-007694 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2020) Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 3 (“Bd. Dec.”). In that appeal, among other things, we affirmed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections that cited two of the three references at issue here, namely Beliles and Abe cited below. See Bd. Dec. 32–54. THE REJECTION2 The Examiner rejected claims 1–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Beliles (US 2007/0283005 A1; published Dec. 6, 2007), Buck (US 2009/0089065 A1; published Apr. 2, 2009), and Abe (US 2012/0253480 A1; published Oct. 4, 2012). Final Act. 17–28.3 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTENTIONS Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Beliles uses a client device in a building communicating over a wireless network and an Internet-connected server device external to the building. Final Act. 17. Although the Examiner acknowledges that Beliles does not (1) capture human voice data by a microphone in the client device; (2) operate an actuator in a controlled device responsive to the captured voice data; and (3) send the voice data to the server via the wireless network, where the server receives the voice data over the Internet, the Examiner cites Buck as teaching these features. Final Act. 18–19. The Examiner also acknowledges that the Beliles/Buck system does not (1) process the captured voice data; 2 Because the Examiner withdrew rejections under §§ 101 and 112 (Ans. 3– 4), those rejections are not before us. 3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Office Action mailed September 4, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed October 3, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed January 4, 2019 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed January 13, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 4 (2) send a message to the controlled device that is received by the controlled device; and (3) operate the actuator in the controlled device responsive to the received message, but cites Abe for teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Final Act. 19–20. Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly combined the cited references. Appeal Br. 45–58; Reply Br. 2–5. According to Appellant, not only is the Examiner’s proposed combination unclear, Beliles and Buck are non-analogous, and adding voice processing capabilities to Beliles as the Examiner proposes changes Beliles’s principle of operation. Appeal Br. 45– 49. Appellant further contends that the Examiner’s articulated rationale to combine the references is improper because (1) the primary reference, Beliles, already has the capabilities for which Abe was cited; (2) it is unclear why these two references are analogous to each other; (3) the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in the Examiner’s earlier restriction requirement; and (4) the Examiner picks and chooses subject matter from different embodiments in Abe to arrive at the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 53–58; Reply Br. 3–5. Appellant adds that Buck does not teach the voice data sending and receiving steps, and Beliles does not teach the recited Internet-connected server external to a building and wireless network. Appeal Br. 58–60; Reply Br. 5. Appellant argues various other recited limitations summarized below. ISSUES Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Beliles, Buck, and Abe collectively would have taught or suggested: Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 5 (1) operating an actuator in a controlled device responsive to captured human voice data, where the method is used with a client device in a building communicating over a wireless network and an Internet-connected server device external to the building, where the client device sends the voice data to the server via the wireless network, and the server receives that data over the Internet as recited in claim 1? (2) the particular limitations recited in dependent claims 2–5, 8, 9, 11, and 13–30? II. Is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion? ANALYSIS Claims 1, 6, 7, and 10 On this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. As shown in Beliles’s Figure 1 reproduced below, Beliles discloses a computer network 100 in a building comprising, among other things, fire sensor 123 connected to sensor translator 132 that is, in turn, connected to a network device (router 152) that is connected to network cloud 110 to which fire suppression device 161, door locks 162, and other physical control devices are connected. See Beliles ¶¶ 15–17, 27–29, 34. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 6 Beliles’s computer network 100 in Figure 1 As shown above, network cloud 110 is connected to various network devices 151–153 that include data centers, routers, personal computers, etc. Beliles ¶ 29. These network devices, detailed in Beliles’s Figure 2 and paragraphs 31 to 33, are “client devices” at least with respect to the external monitoring/control system 140 that corresponds to the recited Internet- connected server device consistent with the Examiner’s mapping. See Final Act. 17; Ans. 5–7 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 15–16, 34). Although physical events, such as detected fires, can be conveyed from the sensors to monitoring/control system 140 using proprietary signaling systems, such as an internal fire alarm system, these events can also be sent over the Internet. Beliles ¶ 34. To the extent that Appellant contends that this Internet-based functionality must be limited to an internal Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 7 network within the building, and somehow cannot involve an external network (see Reply Br. 59–60), we disagree. Not only is there no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate Appellant’s contention, ordinarily skilled artisans would understand that external networks are the very essence of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Therefore, Beliles at least suggests an external network. Nor does Appellant persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on Beliles’s paragraph 27 for teaching communicating over a wireless network, particularly since Beliles teaches in that paragraph that network 100 may be configured as a wireless network. We likewise see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Beliles’s monitoring/control system 140 for teaching the recited Internet-connected server device. See Ans. 5–7 (citing Beliles ¶ 34). We also see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck for at least suggesting (1) capturing human voice data by a microphone in a client device, namely a vehicle; and (2) sending the voice data to the server via a wireless network, where the server receives the voice data over the Internet. Final Act. 18–19; Ans. 7. As shown in Buck’s Figure 4, the system converts spoken words into commands using speech recognition device 402 connected to vehicle buses 408 and actuator 406. Buck ¶ 28. Notably, the buses may be wireless and convey control and/or actuator signals to remote (e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations. Id. Given this functionality, Buck at least suggests sending captured voice data wirelessly to a remote destination external to the vehicle. Although Buck does not specify these remote destinations that receive the captured voice data, we nonetheless see no reason why these destinations cannot Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 8 include Internet-connected servers as the Examiner indicates. See Final Act. 18; Ans. 7. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Given the Beliles/Buck system’s Internet-based functionality, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe merely to show that providing an Internet-based control apparatus 101 that is external to a building is known in the art as shown in Abe’s Figure 15, and that providing such external control functionality in connection with the Beliles/Buck system would have been at least an obvious variation. See Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6; see also Abe ¶ 93. That (1) detected events associated with fires can be conveyed over the Internet from the sensors to monitoring/control system 140 as noted in Beliles’s paragraph 34, and (2) captured voice data is sent wirelessly to a remote destination in Buck’s paragraph 28 only bolsters the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in this regard. Nor does Appellant persuasively rebut the Examiner’s mapping of Abe’s control apparatus 101 to a control server (see Ans. 6)—a mapping that we find reasonable on this record given the control apparatus’s external control capabilities for in-building networked sensor-based systems via Internet 300 in Figure 15. See Abe ¶¶ 93–96. As the Examiner indicates, Abe’s in-building systems in Figure 15 include image display device 51 and air conditioner 52 that are controlled devices with actuators. See Ans. 6; Abe ¶ 95. Given this functionality considered in light of the other cited references’ teachings, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe for teaching (1) processing captured voice data received from the Beliles/Buck system; (2) sending a message to the controlled device over the Internet, Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 9 where the message is received by the controlled device via a wireless network; and (3) operating an actuator in the controlled device responsive to the received message. See Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6. Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged individual shortcomings of Beliles, Buck, and Abe (Appeal Br. 58–60) are unavailing where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Beliles, Buck, and Abe despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (see Appeal Br. 45–58; Reply Br. 2–5). First, we see no error in the Examiner’s articulated rationale for combining Beliles and Buck, namely to provide hands-free actuator control and operation using voice commands in connection with Beliles’s system. See Final Act. 18–19; Ans. 4–5. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). To be sure, if the Examiner’s proposed modification renders the prior art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, the Examiner has failed to make a prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But that is not the case here. Providing voice-based control, such as that in Buck, in connection with Beliles’s system as the Examiner proposes would not render Beliles’s system unsuitable for its intended purpose as Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 48–49), but would merely provide additional voice-based control capabilities to at least augment Beliles’s sensor-based control system—an enhancement yielding a predictable result. Accord Ans. 4 (noting that combining Buck with Beliles Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 10 improves Beliles’s system by adding human speech recognition and actuator voice control). We see no error in the Examiner’s proposed combination despite the fact that Buck’s voice control system is used in connection with a vehicle. As noted previously, Buck’s wireless buses 408 in Figure 4 convey control and/or actuator signals to remote (e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations. Buck ¶ 28. Because Buck at least suggests sending captured voice data wirelessly to a remote destination external to the vehicle for control purposes, Buck is at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem of sending captured data to a remote location for processing and control and, therefore, is analogous art. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved). We reach this conclusion despite Beliles’s and Buck’s different patent classifications as Appellant indicates. See Appeal Br. 46–47. Although these diverse classifications can constitute some evidence of “non-analogy,” this evidence is far outweighed by the references’ structural and functional similarities that render them analogous art. See In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372 (CCPA 1973) (noting that (1) diverse patent office classification of prior art references is some evidence of “non-analogy,” and (2) cross- references in official search notes is some evidence of “analogy,” the similarities and differences in structure and function of the references’ disclosed inventions carry far greater weight). Appellant’s reliance on a non-precedential Board decision that, according to Appellant, held that a vehicle-based control was non-analogous Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 11 to a similar function in a building (Appeal Br. 46), is unavailing. Not only do the facts in that case differ from those at issue here, as a non-precedential decision, it is not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) (“SOP 2”) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN AL.pdf. To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application (see Appeal Br. 47), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 12 Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for combining Abe with the Beliles/Buck system despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (see Appeal Br. 53–58; Reply Br. 3–5). A key aspect of the Examiner’s rationale relies on the functionality of Abe’s control apparatus in Figures 15 and 16. See Ans. 6. Given this functionality, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to implement an internet- connected control server that (1) acquires and processes information, and (2) sends associated control commands over the Internet to a controlled device and actuator when an abnormality occurs. See Final Act. 20; Ans. 6. We see no error in these findings and conclusions. Although the Examiner’s citation to paragraphs 50 and 51 on page 19 of the Final Office Action pertains to Abe’s first disclosed embodiment, we nevertheless see no reason why this control apparatus functionality could not also be provided in conjunction with that of Abe’s second embodiment in Figure 15 as the Examiner proposes despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 55). First, although Figure 15’s embodiment uses a control apparatus 101 instead of control apparatus 100 in Figure 1, the two respective control apparatuses are nonetheless strikingly similar in many respects. As shown in Abe’s Figures 2 and 16, control apparatus 101 has the same sections 11– 15 as control apparatus 100, including control rule accumulation section 14. Given this striking similarity, the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s first and second embodiments is reasonable, at least regarding the particular functionality from these embodiments on which the Examiner relies. We reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that control apparatus 100 in Abe’s Figure 2 is inside a building, unlike control apparatus 101 in Figure 15 as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 55). Despite these Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 13 purported differences, the control apparatues’ structure and control functionalities are nonetheless strikingly similar as noted above and we, therefore, see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on teachings from these embodiments in the rejection. Second, it is well settled that “[c]ombining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.” Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That is the case here. In short, in light of Abe, the Examiner’s proposed enhancement to the Beliles/Buck system is not based on impermissible hindsight as Appellant alleges (Reply Br. 21), but rather uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellant’s contention that it is ostensibly unclear why Beliles and Abe are analogous to each other (Appeal Br. 54) is unavailing. Prior art is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor as the invention, regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. The analogous art test, then, does not ask whether the prior art references are analogous to each other as Appellant seems to suggest (see Appeal Br. 54), but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because Beliles and Abe both involve environment control networks as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 6), the references are not only in the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, but they are also reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem in that regard. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 14 Lastly, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s combining Beliles and Abe is improper because both systems are ostensibly self-contained and independently operate effectively. See Appeal Br. 57–58. To be sure, the court in Kinetic Concepts noted that because two cited prior art references independently accomplished similar functions, namely draining fluids, each device independently operated effectively such that ordinarily skilled artisans seeking to create a better device to drain fluids from a wound would have no reason to combine the features of both devices into a single device. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Not only are the facts in Kinetic Concepts regarding draining fluids from a wound entirely different from those at issue here, we also note that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and often ordinarily skilled artisans can fit multiple references’ teachings together like puzzle pieces, as is the case here. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. On this record, then, the Examiner’s proposed enhancement to the Beliles/Buck system, namely (1) processing captured voice data received from the Beliles/Buck system; (2) sending a message to the controlled device over the Internet, where the message is received by the controlled device via a wireless network; and (3) operating an actuator in the controlled device responsive to the received message (see Final Act. 19–20; Ans. 6) uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions— an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 6, 7, and 10 not argued separately with particularity. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 15 Claim 2 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 reciting that the controlled device is part of, integrated with, or the same as, the client device. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one recited alternative need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 60–61), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least suggesting the recited limitations for the reasons noted above and by the Examiner. Final Act. 20; Ans. 7 (citing Buck ¶¶ 20, 31, 50). To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s findings regarding the limitations of claim 2 are inconsistent with claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 60), we disagree. In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Buck teaches, among other things, that a client device sends captured voice data to a server via a wireless network. See Final Act. 18. As Buck explains in paragraph 28, the vehicle’s wireless buses convey control and/or actuator signals to remote (e.g., out-of-vehicle) destinations. Given this disclosure in light of the Examiner’s findings, we see no reason why a vehicle and its data processing and transmission components cannot be a “client device” as claimed, particularly given the client-based voice data generated in Buck’s vehicle that is sent to remote destinations which, as noted previously, include servers under the Examiner’s interpretation. See Final Act. 18; Ans. 7. In rejecting dependent claim 2, the Examiner finds that the controlled device, namely Buck’s seating system, electronic entertainment, etc., is part of the client device, namely the vehicle. Final Act. 20 (citing Buck ¶ 20). Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 16 These findings not only satisfy the recited “part of” alternative noted above, they are also consistent with those made for independent claim 1. In short, Appellant fails to persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding that Buck teaches a “controlled device,” for example, a seating system, that is part of a “client device,” namely a vehicle or related system. See Final Act. 18–19; Ans. 18. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2. Claim 3 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 reciting that the processing comprises performing a voice recognition algorithm for identifying the voice of a specific person. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 61–62; Reply Br. 5), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least suggesting the recited limitations for the reasons noted above and by the Examiner. Final Act. 20; Ans. 7–8 (citing Buck ¶¶ 37–38; Abe, Fig. 16). In short, Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding that Buck teaches the recited voice recognition algorithm, and that it would have been obvious to process that algorithm at a remote server, such as that disclosed by Abe. See Ans. 8. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellant’s arguments regarding Buck’s individual shortcomings in this regard (Appeal Br. 61–62) do not show nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 17 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3. Claim 4 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4 reciting, in pertinent part, that (1) the client sends sensor data to the server via the wireless network, and (2) the server sends the message responsive to the sensor data. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 62), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art for at least suggesting the recited limitations for the reasons noted above and by the Examiner. Final Act. 21; Ans. 8 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 52, 54; Figs. 1, 6; Abe, Fig. 15). Appellant’s arguments regarding Beliles’s individual shortcomings in this regard (Appeal Br. 62) do not show nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4. Claim 5 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 reciting, in pertinent part, the sensor is (1) a thermoelectric sensor that responds to a temperature or to a temperature gradient of an object using conduction, convection, or radiation, or (2) a photoelectric sensor that responds to a visible or an invisible light or gamma rays. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited sensors need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 18 Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 63), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Beliles for at least suggesting the recited thermoelectric sensor, particularly in view of (1) Beliles’s exemplary and non-limiting list of sensors 121–124 in Figure 1, and (2) event sensing involves updating current conditions that include temperature as noted in paragraph 52. See Final Act. 21–22; Ans. 8 (citing Beliles ¶¶ 16, 28, 52; Fig. 1). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5. Claim 8 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 reciting, in pertinent part, capturing the human voice data by multiple microphones in the client device. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 63–64; Reply Br. 5–6), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act. 23) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in view of Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with an array of directional microphones in paragraph 31. Given this teaching, we see no reason why directional microphones could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, detect sound in the direction of the speaker to detect speech, thus minimizing or attenuating detected sounds from other directions that are unrelated to speech. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 19 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8. Claim 9 For reasons similar to those made regarding claim 8, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 reciting that the multiple microphones are arranged as a directional microphone array operative to estimate a (1) number; (2) magnitude; (3) frequency; (4) Direction-of-Arrival; (5) distance; or (6) speed of a phenomenon impinging on the array. See Final Act. 23; Ans. 9 (citing Buck ¶ 31). Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 64–65; Reply Br. 5–6), we see no reason why directional microphones, such as those in Buck’s paragraph 31, could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, detect sound in the direction of the speaker to detect speech, thus minimizing or attenuating detected sounds from other directions that are unrelated to speech. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 9. Claims 11 and 12 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 reciting, in pertinent part, the client device or controlled device are addressable in the wireless network or the Internet using an address stored in a volatile or non- volatile memory of the respective device for uniquely identifying the Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 20 respective device in the network. Our emphasis on the term “or” above underscores that only one of the recited addressable devices need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. A key aspect of the Examiner’s rejection is that communication between devices is via data packets exchanged over a network using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol. See Final Act. 24; Ans. 9–10. Notably, the Examiner also finds that network communication process 244 is used by network device 200 to communicate information packets and frames among other network devices. Ans. 9–10; Beliles ¶ 33. Given this functionality, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious for the client or controlled devices to be addressable to receive data packets under Beliles’s TCP/IP scheme as the Examiner proposes even assuming, without deciding, that it was known to address ports connected to those devices, such as telephone connections in a dial-up environment as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 65). In short, addressing the client or controlled devices themselves to receive data packets would have been at least an obvious variation in light of Beliles’s network-based data communication functionality. Accord Bd. Dec. 43–44 (concluding that providing addressable devices in connection with the Beliles/Abe system would, among other things, facilitate identifying and communicating with those devices over a network). Nor has Appellant shown that addressing the client and controlled devices would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinarily skilled artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 21 Because it would have been obvious for Beliles’s client and controlled devices to be addressable as noted above, using an address stored in those devices for that purpose would have likewise been obvious as the Examiner indicates. See Final Act. 24; Ans. 9–10. We reach this conclusion noting the network devices’ memory 240 which, as shown in Figure 2, stores data associated with network communication process 244 that, notably, communicates packets and frames of information among network devices. See Beliles ¶¶ 31–33. Even assuming, without deciding, that Beliles does not specify the content of this memory explicitly as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 65), Beliles’s Figure 2 nonetheless shows the box for memory 240 encompassing, among other things, network communication process 244—a process that exchanges data between addressed devices under the TCP/IP protocol as noted previously. Beliles, then, at least suggests storing addresses associated with this network communication process in at least memory 240. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11, and claim 12 not argued separately with particularity. Claim 13 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 reciting a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) is (1) according to, or based on, BluetoothTM or Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.1-2005 standards, or (2) a wireless control network that is according to, or based on, ZigbeeTM, IEEE 802.15.4-2003, or Z-WaveTM standards. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 22 WPAN aspects enumerated above need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 66; Reply Br. 6), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act. 25; Ans. 10) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in view of Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with a network using wireless protocols, where the speech recognition controller is compliant with, among other protocols, BluetoothTM and ZigbeeTM in paragraph 52. Given this teaching, we see no reason why a WPAN could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, communicate data regarding recognized speech wirelessly between devices using standard protocols. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions— an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 13. Claim 14 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14 reciting the wireless network is a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) that is according to, or based on, the recited IEEE standards. Although the Examiner’s rejection incorrectly quotes claim 13 as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 66), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner’s other findings in the rejection and the Answer are nonetheless commensurate with claim 14’s limitations that recite a WLAN. See Final Act. 25; Ans. 10 (citing Beliles ¶ 27 and Figure 1 for teaching a LAN). We Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 23 see no harmful error in these findings, for Beliles notes in paragraph 27 that network cloud 110 can not only be wireless, but also a LAN. Given this teaching, we see no reason why a WLAN could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, communicate data wirelessly between devices within a local area using standard protocols. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s rejection of the parent claim is based on another reference and, therefore, Beliles purportedly cannot be used to teach the recited feature in a dependent claim (Reply Br. 6) is unavailing, for the Examiner relies on Beliles for teaching the recited wireless network in rejecting claim 1 from which claim 14 depends. See Final Act. 17 (finding that Beliles discloses a method for use with a client device in a building communicating over a wireless network); Ans. 7 (mapping Beliles’s computer network 100 to the recited wireless network). And to the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s reliance on Beliles in rejecting claim 14 somehow conflicts with the Examiner’s reliance on Buck in connection with the rejection of independent claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 66–67; Reply Br. 6), we disagree. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14. Claim 15 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 reciting the wireless network uses a wireless communication over a licensed or Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 24 unlicensed radio frequency (RF) band, that is an Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) radio band. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited RF bands need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that claim 15 “does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim 13” is puzzling given the claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 67–68), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection on page 10 of the Answer by citing Buck’s wireless networks in paragraphs 51 and 52 that include, among other things, a ZigbeeTM wireless network that the Examiner finds uses an unlicensed RF band as claimed—a finding that is undisputed. See Reply Br. 6 (acknowledging that Buck may disclose the recited feature). Given this teaching, we see no reason why a wireless network using an unlicensed RF band, such as that disclosed in Buck’s paragraphs 51 and 52, could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, communicate data wirelessly between devices within a local area using conventional RF bands designated for that purpose. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application (see Appeal Br. 68), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 25 petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15. Claim 16 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 reciting, in pertinent part, that the wireless network is a cellular telephone network that is either a Third or Fourth Generation network, each of which uses one of the recited alternative systems or protocols associated with those respective networks. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited networks need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 26 Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 68–69; Reply Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act. 26; Ans. 10–11) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly in view of Buck’s speech recognition system interfacing with a network using cellular or wireless protocols or cellular telephones in paragraph 52. Given this teaching, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to provide one of the recited cellular telephone networks in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, communicate data wirelessly between devices using known cellular telephone networks and associated data transmission schemes. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 16. Claim 17 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17 reciting that the client device or the controlled device is integrated in, part of, or entirely included in, an appliance. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that (1) only one of the recited devices, and (2) only one of the recited orientations with respect to the appliance need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 69–72; Reply Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s paragraph 34 (Final Act. 27; Ans. 11–12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 27 particularly since an appliance, such as air conditioner 52, is one of the devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1. This functionality suggests that the controlled device is at least part of that appliance as claimed. Given this teaching, we see no reason why the controlled device could not be at least part of an appliance in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, control automatically appliances that are commonly used in homes and offices, such as air conditioners, thus precluding the need to manually control those appliances. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17. Claim 18 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 reciting that the appliance’s primary functionality is associated with food storage, handling, or preparation. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited functionalities need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 72; Reply Br. 7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe (Final Act. 27; Ans. 11) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly since air conditioner 52 is one of the devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1. Given this teaching, we see no reason why an appliance in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system, such as Abe’s air conditioner 52, would not be at least associated with the recited functionalities as the Examiner proposes to, Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 28 among other things, use the air conditioner appliance in connection with storing or handling food by keeping food cooler to avoid spoilage. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 16. Claims 19–24 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19–24 reciting (1) various types of appliances and associated functionalities including heating food (claim 19), environmental control (claim 21), temperature control (claim 22), and cleaning (claim 23); and (2) various other types of appliances in claims 20 and 24. Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that each of claims 19 to 24 “does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim 17” is puzzling given the claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 72–73), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection on pages 11 and 12 of the Answer by finding that the network-connected home appliances in Abe’s paragraph 38 can include the recited appliances. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 72–73; Reply Br. 7–8), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Abe’s paragraph 38 and Figure 1 (Ans. 11–12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly since air conditioner 52—a home appliance—is just one of the devices to be controlled as shown in Figure 1. Given Abe’s exemplary and non-limiting reference to the home network connecting Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 29 various types of sensors and devices installed within a home, we see no error in the Examiner’s finding that these various types of devices could include the devices and functionalities recited in claims 19 to 24 and are, therefore, obvious variations. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application (see Appeal Br. 73), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 30 Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 19–24. Claim 25 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 reciting that the actuator is an electric light source that emits visible or non-visible light for illumination or indication, where the non-visible light is infrared, ultraviolet, X-rays, or gamma rays. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited light types need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 73–75; Reply Br. 8–9),4 we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck (Final Act. 28; Ans. 12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations. Buck’s speech recognition and control process interfaces with, among other things, in-vehicle devices that, through actuators, adjust electronic elements and devices—elements that reasonably include visible light sources, such as headlights or cabin lights as the Examiner indicates. See Final Act. 28; Ans. 25 (citing Buck ¶ 32). We reach this conclusion noting that Buck’s paragraph 20 states, quite broadly, that the system can adjust or activate any vehicle-related system that includes not only a seating system, mirror controls, or entertainment systems, but also any in-vehicle or vehicle-related system. 4 Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 25 is based on Abe’s paragraph 32 (Appeal Br. 73) is incorrect. Rather, the Examiner cites Buck’s paragraph 32 to reject claim 25. See Final Act. 28. Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 31 Given these teachings that are replete with broad and non-limiting terms, and leaving aside the fact that illuminance is sensed in Abe’s Figure 3, we see no reason why an electric visible light source actuator, such as an actuator for vehicle headlights or cabin lights, could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, control the visible light source automatically via voice commands. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 25. Claims 26–30 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26–30 reciting (1) the electric light source comprises one of various types of alternative light sources (claim 26); (2) a motion actuator (claim 27); and (3) a sounder (claims 28–30). Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that each of claims 26 to 30 “does not teach or further define over the limitation in claim 25” (Final Act. 28) is puzzling given the claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 76), we nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection on page 12 of the Answer by finding that Buck’s paragraph 32 teaches various actuators that include headlights, sounders, and other actuators that enable mechanical adjustments. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 76; Reply Br. 9), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Buck’s paragraph 32 Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 32 (Ans. 12) for at least suggesting the recited limitations, particularly since Buck’s speech recognition and control process interfaces with, among other things, in-vehicle devices that, through actuators, adjust electronic and mechanical elements and devices—elements that reasonably include visible light sources, motion actuators, and sounders. We reach this conclusion noting that Buck’s paragraph 20 states, quite broadly, that the system can adjust or activate any vehicle-related system that includes not only a seating system, mirror controls, or entertainment systems, but also any in-vehicle or vehicle-related system. Given these teachings that are replete with broad and non-limiting terms, we see no reason why actuators, such as the recited electric visible light source, motion actuator, and sounder, could not be provided in the Beliles/Buck/Abe system as the Examiner proposes to, among other things, control those sources automatically via voice commands. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. To the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution of a parent application (see Appeal Br. 76), such a contention is unavailing. The propriety of the Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”); see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that Appeal 2019-002056 Application 15/657,163 33 should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c) (requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications). Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is (1) articulated in the Final Office Action from which this appeal was taken, and (2) based solely on the cited prior art. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 26–30. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) /Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–30 103 Beliles, Buck, Abe 1–30 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation