Max Robbertze et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 12, 2020

2018008527 (P.T.A.B. May. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/416,866 01/23/2015 Max Robbertze LUTZ 201965US01 9244
48116 7590 05/12/2020
FAY SHARPE/NOKIA
1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor
The Halle Building
Cleveland, OH 44115-1843
EXAMINER
SMITH, LINDSEY B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
docketing@faysharpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAX ROBBERTZE, NEIL EMMERICH, and IVAN BEDINI
Appeal 2018-008527
Application 14/416,866
Technology Center 3600

Before DENISE M. POTHIER, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18. Appeal
Br. 19–23. Claims 6 and 16 have been canceled, and claim 13 has been
withdrawn from consideration. See id.; see Final Act. 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Alcatel
Lucent. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to the disclosure,
entities exist[,] which wish to establish operational relationships
with other entities, subject to particular rules and restrictions.
For example, network nodes within a wireless
telecommunications network may wish to communicate with
other network nodes within a telecommunications network, but
those relationships may be restricted by various characteristics
associated with each network node or with links between those
network nodes.

Spec. 1:9–14. As one example, a first entity can be a content owner and a
second entity can be a service provider. Id. at 11:3–7, Fig. 1; see id. at 6:35–
38. An example of an operational relationship can include these entities
entering into a license agreement. Id. at 11:24–26, 12:19–22, 13:4–6. The
invention’s “aim [is] to provide a means to match entities wishing to form an
operational relationship . . . .” Id. at 1:23–24; see id. at 10:12–13.
The claims are directed “to a method of establishing enablers[2] of a
relationship between a first entity and a second entity . . . .” Spec. 1:4–5.
The invention determines relationship characteristics (e.g., technology
available to process material) used to define a generic relationship between
the entities and then reduces each entity’s requirements to a common
language (id. at 2:2–12, 3:12–18). To determine what the entities have in
common, the invention identifies the overlap of shared relationship
requirements and if their commonality exceeds a threshold, the process
establishes the relationship’s operational parameters between the entities.
Id. at 2:14–21, 3:20–26, 3:33–38, 4:35–5:4.

2 Operational parameters are “also referred to as ‘enablers’ of a relationship
between the first and second entity.” Id. at 2:10–12.
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Claim 1, below, illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, performed by one or more processors,
of establishing technical communication in a wireless
telecommunications network between a first network node and
a second network node by establishing operational parameters
of a relationship between the first network node and the second
network node, said method comprising:
determining a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first
network node and said second network node, the set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics including a
format of a material and a technology available to process the
material;
establishing a common language comprising the set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics;
expressing relationship requirements of said first network
node and relationship requirements of said second network
node in terms of said common language, wherein said
expressing of relationship requirements comprises analyzing a
set of preferred operational parameters associated with each
network node to determine how the operational parameters
associated with each network node are expressed using said set
of indications of primary relationship characteristics;
assessing, based on common relationship requirements of
said first and second network nodes expressed in said common
language, whether overlap between said first network node
relationship requirements and said second network node
relationship requirements passes a preselected threshold; and,
in response to the overlap passing the preselected
threshold, establishing the operational parameters of the
relationship between said first network node and said second
network node based on said common relationship requirements.

Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Nevalainen US 2006/0242291 A1 Oct. 26, 2006
Seeman US 2008/0091634 A1 Apr. 17, 2008
Graham US 2010/0153282 A1 June 17, 2010
REJECTIONS
I. Claim 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph,3 as failing to comply with the written-description
requirement. Final Act. 3–5.
II. Claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the
invention. Id. at 6–7.
III. Claims 1–5, 7–12, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nevalainen and Seeman. Id. at 8–13.
IV. Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham. Id. at 13–14.

3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 103. Changes to §§ 112
and 103 apply to applications filed on or after September 16, 2012 and
March 16, 2013 respectively. Because this application has an effective filing
date before these dates, we refer to the pre-AIA versions of §§ 112 and 103.
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OPINION
I. Lack of Written Description Rejection
Claim 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written-description
requirement. Final Act. 3–5. For claims 1, 11, and 12, the Examiner stated:
The subject matter of the claim does not conform to the
disclosure in such a manner in which one of ordinary skill in
the art would recognize such a process as being that which the
Applicant adequately described as the invention of what the
Applicant actually had possession of at the time of the
invention.

Id. at 3. The Examiner additionally stated the Specification does not explain
“how to ‘determine’ a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network
node and second network node.” Id. (citing Spec. 2:1–7); see Ans. 4–7.
For dependent claim 7, the Examiner stated the step of “determining a
further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary
relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between
said first network node and said second network node” lacks written-
description support. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Spec. 2:1–7, 2:28–31, 4:1–6,
7:21–22, 8:18–21).
Appellant disagrees. Appeal Br. 11–14.

MAIN ISSUES
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, has the Examiner erred by
determining the following phrases lack written-description support:
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(1) “determining a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network
node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 1 and
(2) “determining a further common language comprising a set of
indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the
generic relationship between said first network node and said second
network node,” as recited in claim 7?

ANALYSIS
Based on the record, we find error.
To satisfy the written-description requirement, a patent specification
must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in
the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the
claimed invention. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Appellant points to various passages in the Specification to
demonstrate written description for claim 1’s “determining a set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic
relationship between said first network node and said second network node.”
Appeal Br. 11–12 (citing Spec. 2:2–7, 2:27–31, 4:8–12). In particular, the
Specification states: “[D]etermining a set of indications of primary
relationship characteristics which can be used to define a generic
relationship between a first entity and a second entity. . . .” Spec. 2:2–4; id.
at 1:28–30. Similarly, the Specification originally claimed “determining a
set of indications of primary relationship characteristics to define a generic
relationship between said first entity and said second entity.” Id. at 16:5–6.
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The Specification further describes “network nodes” as an example of
entities. See id. at 1:9–14; see id. at 2:36–37.
The Specification also discusses examples of “the determination of
the set of indications comprises establishing a database of domain-based
relationship parameters” (id. at 3:8–9) and the indicators may depend upon
(1) the particular domain within which the first and second entities operate
(id. at 3:9–11; see Appeal Br. 12 (discussing the “domain specific atomic
concepts” features in claims 8 and 9)), (2) the particular scenario (see Spec.
3:11–12), (3) the functionality provided by the entity (id. at 3:13–14), (4) the
communication means between entities (id. at 3:14–15), (5) the material
format (id. at 3:17–18), and (6) the technology available to process the
material (id.). Thus, although the Specification does not provide an
algorithm or software used to perform the “determining” step4 (see Final
Act. 3), we determine the Specification describes the step of “determining a
set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic
relationship between said first network node and said second network node”
in claim 1 in sufficient detail that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
reasonably conclude that Appellant had possession of the claimed invention.
Notably,

[a]lthough many original claims will satisfy the written
description requirement, certain claims may not. For example,
a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of
chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain

4 The Examiner explicitly states “these [rejections] are not an enablement
rejections.” Final Act. 5. We thus do not consider the rejection on this
ground. Nonetheless, the Examiner may wish to review whether an
ordinarily skilled artisan would know how to make and use the disputed
“determining” steps in claims 1 and 7 without undue experimentation.
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whether the specification, including original claim language,
demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient
to support a claim to a genus.

Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. Here, the Examiner has not demonstrated
sufficiently that the “determining” step in claim 1 is akin to the generic
claim discussed in Ariad defined by boundaries of a vast genus and that the
Specification does not sufficiently demonstrate Appellant has invented
species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. See id.
Turning to claim 7 and the disputed “determining a further common
language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship
characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first
network node and said second network node” (Appeal Br. 20 (Claims
App.)), the Examiner presented a similar argument to claim 1 that the
Specification does not “provide details on what algorithms/software are used
or written to ‘determine’ a common language.” Final Act. 4 (citing Spec.
4:1–6); id. at 4–5 (citing Spec. 7:21–22, 8:18–21). We find error.
First, we refer above for details related to the Specification describing
indications of relationship characteristics to define a generic relationship and
thus the recited “defin[ing] the generic relationship between said first
network node and said second network node” in claim 7. See, e.g., Spec.
3:8–18.
Second, turning to the Specification, the disclosure states:
the method further comprises determining a set of indications of
secondary relationship characteristics to further define a
primary relationship having a commonality past a
predetermined threshold between the first entity and the second
entity [and] expressing secondary first entity relationship
requirements and secondary second entity relationship
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requirements in terms of the indications of secondary
relationship characteristics.

Spec. 3:28–33. The Specification also states “the nature of the relationship
established between a first and second entity may be further refined by
secondary relationship characteristics. Those secondary relationship
characteristics again form a common language between entities where no
common language may previously have existed.” Spec. 4:1–6.
Third, the Specification also addresses determining a common
language in general based on relationships between the first and second
entities or nodes. See id. at 2:9–15, 3:23–26. We find the above-noted
passages collectively describe claim 7’s disputed limitation in sufficient
detail that an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably conclude that
Appellant had possession of the disputed limitation in claim 7.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has persuaded us of error
in the rejection of (1) claims 1 and 7 and (2) claims 11 and 12, which
recite commensurate limitations to claim 1, and (3) dependent claims
2–5, 8–10, 14, 15, 17, and 18 for similar reasons.

II. Indefiniteness Rejection
Claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the
invention. Final Act. 6–7. Similar to the discussion above when addressing
the lack of written description rejection, the Examiner contended “the
disclosure does not reveal the manner in which one ‘determines’ a set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic
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relationship between said first network node and second network node.” Id.
at 6. For this reason, the Examiner argued the “determining” step in claims
1, 11, and 12 does not ensure the scope of claims 1, 11, and 12 is clear and
does not demarcate the boundaries of these claims. Id.; see Ans. 8–10.
The Examiner additionally found the “determining a further common
language” step in claim 7 is indefinite for reasons similar to those discussed
for claim 1, arguing the disclosure does not reveal how the process further
defines the generic relationship by determining a further common language
and thus the scope of claim 7 is unclear. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner
further argued claim 7’s “further common language” phrase is indefinite
because “no other common language has been determined.” Id. at 6.
Appellant disagrees. Appeal Br. 14–17.

MAIN ISSUES
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, has the Examiner erred by
determining the following phrases are indefinite:
(3) “determining a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network
node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 1 and
(4) “determining a further common language comprising a set of
indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the
generic relationship between said first network node and said second
network node,” as recited in claim 7?

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ANALYSIS
Based on the record, we find error.
“[T]he statutory language of ‘particular[ity]’ and ‘distinct[ness]’ [in
35 U.S.C. § 112] indicates, claims are required to be cast in clear—as
opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite—terms.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d
1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “A decision on whether a claim is [indefinite]
under § 112, 2d ¶ [(pre-AIA)], requires a determination of whether those
skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in
light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
Claim 1 recites “determining a set of indications of primary
relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first
network node and said second network node.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).
An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand this phrase in claim 1 to
mean deciding on indications of primary relationship characteristics that
form a set and that define a general relationship between the first and second
network nodes.
Additionally, to the extent the Examiner contends an ordinarily skilled
artisan would not understand what “indications of primary relationship
characteristics” in claim 1 are, the Specification provides some examples.
The Specification describes “the set of indications comprises establishing a
database of domain-based relationship parameters” (id. at 3:8–9) and the
indicators may depend upon (1) the particular domain that the first and
second entities operate (id. at 3:9–11; see id. at 4:8–12 (discussing “domain
specific atomic concept”), quoted in Appeal Br. 15), (2) the particular
scenario (see Spec. 3:11–12), (3) the functionality provided by the entity (id.
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at 3:13–14), (4) the communication means between entities (id. at 3:14–15),
(5) the material format (id. at 3:17–18), and (6) the technology available to
process the material (id.). See Appeal Br. 14–15 (quoting Spec. 3:8–18).
The Specification further discusses the set of indications of primary
relationship characteristics that define a generic relationship between entities
or nodes are used to find commonality between the entities and to identify
entities that are suitable for forming a relationship (e.g., reciprocal,
asymmetrical, and producer-consumer) by matching characteristics. See
Spec. 22–7, 2:27–37. This discussion provides some further understanding
to those skilled in the art what the boundaries of “indications of primary
relationship characteristics” in claim 1 are intended to encompass.
We therefore determine claim 1’s “determining a set of indications of
primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between
said first network node and said second network node” is cast in clear terms
when read in light of the Specification and is thus definite.
Similarly, the phrase “determining a further common language
comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to
further define the generic relationship between said first network node and
said second network node” in claim 7 is definite. As explained above, an
ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the “set of indications of
secondary relationship characteristics” in claim 7 include those “indications”
described in the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. 3:8–18.
The Specification also explains:
[A] method may be provided where a course filter is provided
by primary relationship requirements, and the nature of the
relationship established between a first and second entity may
be further refined by secondary relationship characteristics.
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Those secondary relationship characteristics again form a
common language between entities where no common language
may previously have existed.

Spec. 4:1–6. Thus, when read in light of the disclosure, an ordinarily skilled
artisan would understand the recited “determining” phrase to encompass
ascertaining a common language between entities/nodes that includes a set
of indications of secondary relationship characteristics, including those
discussed in the Specification.
We also agree with Appellant that the recitation of “a further common
language” in claim 7 is not indefinite. Appeal Br. 16. The Examiner
contends that “no other common language has been determined” in the
claim. Final Act. 6. Yet, claim 1, from which claim 7 depends, recites
“establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of
primary relationship characteristics.” Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.).
Also, the disclosure discusses further defining a primary relationship
between entities or nodes using indications of secondary relationship
characteristics and determining commonality (e.g., “a further common
language” as claim 7 recites) between these characteristics. See Spec. 3:28–
36; see Appeal Br. 16–17. Accordingly, an ordinarily skilled artisan would
understand claim 7’s “determining a further common language comprising a
set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define
the generic relationship between said first network node and said second
network node” step when read in light of the disclosure.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has persuaded us of error in the
rejection of (1) claims 1 and 7, (2) claims 11 and 12, which recite
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commensurate limitations to claim 1, and (3) dependent claims 2–5, 8–10,
14, 15, 17, and 18 for similar reasons.

III. Obviousness Over Nevalainen and Seeman
Claims 1–5, 7–12, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Nevalainen and Seeman. Final Act. 8– 13.
Appellant argues the claims as a group (Appeal Br. 8–10), and we select
independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relied on Nevalainen to teach the
“determining,” “assessing,” and “establishing the operational parameters”
steps. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–19, 50, 60–65, 68, 71–72,
Abstract). The Examiner turned to Seeman in combination with Nevalainen,
to teach or suggest the “establishing a common language” and “expressing
relationship requirements” steps and other “common language” features in
claim 1. Id. at 9–11 (citing Seeman ¶¶ 17, 48–71, 98, 100, 209, Fig. 4).
Appellant argues that Nevalainen and Seeman do not teach
establishing a common language and using the common language to
determine whether an overlap between the first and second entity
relationship requirements passes a threshold as claim 1 recites. Appeal
Br. 8. Appellant asserts Nevalainen does not teach creating a common
language and more particularly, using its games, which are mapped to the
claimed “format of the material,” to create a common language. Id.
Appellant further asserts Seeman does not teach what is purportedly missing
from Nevalainen. Id. at 9–10. Specifically, Appellant argues Seeman’s
teaching to map terms from different fields to abstract code concepts does
not suggest establishing a common language that comprises a set of
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indications of primary relationship characteristics and then using the
common language to determine an overlap as recited in clam 1. Id. at 9–10
(citing Seeman ¶¶ 1, 48–71, 97–98, 100, 209, Fig. 4).

MAIN ISSUE
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by
determining that Nevalainen and Seeman collectively would have taught or
suggested “establishing a common language comprising the set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics”?

ANALYSIS
Based on the record before us, we find no error. The Examiner found
Nevalainen teaches “determining a set of primary relationship characteristics
defining a generic relationship between” two nodes but does not teach
“establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of
primary relationship characteristics” as claim 1 recites. Final Act. 8–9
(citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–16, 65, 68). More specifically, Nevalainen teaches
mobile terminal devices connected to a wireless communication network.
Nevalainen ¶ 7, Fig. 1. Nevalainen further teaches mobile terminal users’
preference data (e.g., indications of primary relationship characteristics,
including a format of a material and a technology available to process the
material, as recited and as mapped by the Examiner) are compared and those
with substantially matching preference data are notified. Id. ¶¶ 7–18; see
Final Act. 8–9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–16, 68). Appellant has not disputed
the Examiner’s mapping to Nevalainen for teaching the recited “determining
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a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic
relationship between” the nodes in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8–10.
The Examiner indicated that Nevalainen does not teach “establishing
a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics” as claim 1 recites, turning to Seeman in combination with
Nevalainen to teach or suggest this limitation. Final Act. 9–10. Seeman
teaches using taxonomies, including those comprising relationships (Seeman
¶¶ 48, 53), and building knowledge bases, including those that address
ontologies, concepts, relationships in general, and relationships to core
concepts in human knowledge to enable content in different domains to be
adapted (id. ¶ 17). Similar to Nevalainen’s data, these taxonomies
containing relationships can be viewed as “set[s] of indications of primary
relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship” between nodes as
claim 1 recites. See id. ¶¶ 17, 48, 53; see Final Act. 10 (noting “creating
taxonomies is comparable to a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network
node and said second network node.”).
Seeman further teaches using terms (e.g., 24) from content and/or
knowledge bases to arrive at core concepts (e.g., 22) or a core terms list.
Seeman ¶¶ 97–98. Seeman thus suggests using terms that define
relationships (e.g., indicate relationship characteristics) to arrive at concepts
or a core terms list. See id. When combining this teaching with Nevalainen,
one skilled in the art would have recognized the combination would have
predictably yielded no more than “establishing a common language” (e.g.,
concepts or core terms list) “comprising the set of indications of primary
relationship characteristics” (e.g., Nevalainen’s preference data), including
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“a format of a material and a technology available to process the material” as
taught by Nevalainen. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416
(2007).
Notably, Seeman teaches arriving at its concepts or core terms list
using terms from content (e.g., relationships) or knowledge bases. See
Seeman ¶¶ 97–98. This teaching at least suggests that the concepts arrived
at can include “the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics”
as claim 1 recites, especially given claim 1 broadly recites the set is “a set of
indications of primary relationship characteristics” and not the relationship
characteristics themselves. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
We therefore disagree with Appellant that Seeman’s teaching, when
combined with Nevalainen, fails to at least suggest “a common language is
established that comprises a set of indications of primary relationship
characteristics that includes a format of a material and a technology
available to process the material” as argued. Appeal Br. 8; see id. at 9–10.
We further disagree with Appellant that the combination fails to teach
“[t]he common language is in turn used to determine whether overlap
between first and second entity relationship requirements passes a
threshold.” Appeal Br. 8; id. at 8–10. For reasons similar to those discussed
above when addressing the “common language” feature, we are not
persuaded. For instance, the Examiner relied on the combination of
Nevalainen and Seeman to teach accessing whether an overlap between
relationship requirements passes a threshold in claim 1. Final Act. 9 (citing
Nevalainen ¶¶ 11–19, 50, 72, Figs. 1–2 for disclosing assessing whether an
overlap between the relationship requirements passes a threshold), 9–11
(citing Seeman ¶¶ 17, 48–71, 98, 100, 209, Fig. 4 for suggesting establishing
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a common language and a common relationship requirement of the nodes
expressed in the common language features of claim 1). When combined,
an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized the Nevalainen/Seeman
method would have predictably yielded no more than “assessing, based on
common relationship requirements of said first and second network nodes
expressed in said common language, whether overlap between said first
network node relationship requirements and said second network node
relationship requirements passes a preselected threshold” as claim 1 further
recites. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
Appellant’s arguments do not fully address what the combination
teaches or suggests. Appeal Br. 8–10. Instead, Appellant primarily focuses
on the references’ individual teachings (see id.), which is not persuasive.
See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the rejection of independent claim 1 and claims 2–5, 7–12, 17, and 18, which
are not argued separately.

IV. Obviousness Over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham. Final Act. 13–14.
Appellant argues claims 14 and 15 as a group (Appeal Br. 10–11), and we
select claim 14 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 14 depends from claim 1 and further recites, in pertinent part,
“the method further comprises automatically generating a schedule for a
license agreement between the licensee and the licensor.” Appeal Br. 22
(Claims App.). The Examiner relied upon Graham in combination with
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Nevalainen and Seeman to teach or suggest automatically generating a
schedule for a license agreement. Final Act. 14 (citing Graham ¶¶ 255, 272,
276, Abstract).
Appellant argues Graham only teaches automatically generating a
draft license and not a schedule for a license agreement. Appeal Br. 11.

ANALYSIS
The main issue before us is whether the phrase “automatically
generating a schedule for a license agreement between the licensee and the
licensor” can broadly, but reasonably map to generating a draft license when
considered in light of the disclosure. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr.,
367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The Specification uses the word “schedules” on several occasions.
Spec. 10:27, 12:4–6, 12:36, 13:23–25. In the context of a license agreement,
the Specification describes “[a] system may be operable to automate
generation of physical parameters governing processes that comprise part of
execution of a license agreement, for example, manifests or schedules.”
Spec. 13:23–25. As such, consistent with the disclosure, “generating a
schedule for a license agreement” can broadly, but reasonably include
generating parameters that govern processes that comprise part of the license
agreement to be executed. See id.
Graham teaches generating a draft license from the entered parameters
and enables building of an econometric model. Graham ¶ 276. Similar to
the Examiner, we agree this teaching in Graham at least suggests generating
parameters that govern processes that comprise part of the license agreement
to be executed. See Graham ¶ 276; see Ans. 13 (stating “a draft is a plan of
Appeal 2018-008527
Application 14/416,866

20
procedure for a proposed objective (i.e., the draft license is a written
proposed plan of procedure for an actual license agreement between the
parties)”). For example, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized
a draft license may include terms of the agreements (e.g., parameters), such
as contract length (e.g., start and end dates), time schedule or release dates
for products, a payment schedule, and exclusivity or territorial restrictions.
Based on the foregoing teachings and when combined with Nevalainen and
Seeman, the combination would have predictably resulted in claim 14’s
limitations and would have been within ordinarily skilled artisan’s
knowledge when accounting for the inferences and creative steps that these
artisans would have employed. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection
of claim 14 and claim 15, which recites commensurate limitations.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–12,
14, 15, 17,
18
112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
1–5, 7–12,
14, 15, 17,
18
1–5, 7–12,
14, 15, 17,
18
112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 1–5, 7–12,
14, 15, 17,
18
1–5, 7–12,
17, 18
103(a) Nevalainen,
Seeman
1–5, 7–12,
17, 18

14, 15 103(a) Nevalainen,
Seeman, Graham
14, 15
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–12,
14, 15, 17,
18

Appeal 2018-008527
Application 14/416,866

21
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED