Maurice Morrison, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 7, 1999
01990846 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 7, 1999)

01990846

09-07-1999

Maurice Morrison, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Maurice Morrison v. Department of the Navy

01990846

September 7, 1999

Maurice Morrison, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01990846

) Agency No. 98-65923-028

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On November 4, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a final agency decision (FAD) dated October 22, 1998, pertaining

to his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq. and �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29

U.S.C. �791 et seq. In his complaint, appellant alleged that he was

subjected to discrimination on the bases of mental disability (stress)

and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

Appellant was forced to resign effective June 13, 1998, due to

harassment;

On May 18, 1998, appellant was issued a notification of Proposed

Suspension from employment due to harassment;

Management rotated supervisors to write-up appellant;

Management failed to protect appellant from the threats and/or insults

of supervisors; and

One of appellant's supervisors told another employee that he (the

supervisor) wanted appellant out of the depot.

The agency accepted allegations (1) and (2), but dismissed allegations

(3), (4), and (5) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a),

for failure to state a claim. Specifically, the agency found that

supervisors rotated "so they may broaden their knowledge of the

difficult situations that may occur on the various shifts and satisfy

the requirement that employees are under the same supervisor for 120

days for performance appraisal purposes." The agency also found that

allegation (4) was deficient because appellant failed to provide specific

dates or information to prove harm to a term, condition, or privilege of

employment. Regarding allegation (5), the agency found that appellant

was not harmed, noting that there were no witnesses identified and

appellant did not provide any specific dates or information about the

alleged remark.

On appeal, the agency argues that appellant never alleged direct harm with

respect to allegations (3), (4), and (5), and that the allegations, even

if considered in light of appellant's accepted allegations, do not form

a pattern of harassment severe enough to state a cognizable claim.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (Apr. 21, 1994).

The Commission finds that the agency, in its FAD, addressed the merits of

allegations (3) and (4) without a proper investigation as required by the

regulations. The agency's articulated reason for the action in dispute,

i.e., that supervisors were rotated to broaden their knowledge of the

different shifts and that there were no witnesses to support allegation

(4), goes to the merits of appellant's allegations, and is irrelevant

to the procedural issue of whether he has stated a justiciable claim

under Title VII. See Osborne v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05960111 (July 19, 1996); Lee v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Request No. 05930220 (Aug. 12, 1993); Ferrazzoli v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910642 (Aug. 15, 1991).

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme

Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's

employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive

work environment" is created when "a reasonable person would find [it]

hostile or abusive: and the complainant subjectively perceives it as

such." Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus, not all claims of harassment are

actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or

inaction regarding a specific term, condition or privilege of employment,

a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment

to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that the complainant cannot prove a set of facts

in support of the claim which would entitle the complainant to relief.

The trier of fact must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents

and remarks, and considering them together in the light most favorable to

the complainant, determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim.

Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (Mar. 13,

1997).

Regarding allegation (5), the agency's reasoning relies on appellant's

failure to provide information, without the agency having made a formal

request for such information from appellant. Further, appellant alleged

that he was subjected to hostile work environment harassment, and various

forms of adverse action, that ultimately forced appellant to resign.

See Riden v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request 05970314 (Oct. 2,

1998) (finding that a complainant who alleges numerous forms of adverse

action and ongoing hostile work environment harassment, culminating

in the loss of a specific assignment, stated a claim). Instead of

treating these events as incidents of the claim of harassment, however,

the agency looked at them individually. Thus, we find that the agency

acted improperly by treating matters raised in appellant's complaint in

a piecemeal manner, and fragmenting his claim by accepting only certain

incidents, rather than the entire claim. See Meaney v. Department of

the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940169 (November 3, 1994) (an agency

should not ignore the "pattern aspect" of a complainant's allegations and

define the issues in a piecemeal manner where an analogous theme unites

the matter complained of). Consequently, when appellant's allegations

are viewed in the context of appellant's complaint of harassment, they

state a claim and the agency's dismissal of those allegations for failure

to state a claim was improper.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision is REVERSED, and allegations (3),

(4), and (5) are REMANDED for further processing.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.

The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Sept. 7, 1999

__________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations